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ABSTRACT
The main concern of environmental philosophy has been to find value for 
nature. The thesis is an attempt to link a theory of nature, a theory of human nature 
and a theory of value, which Andrew Brennan stipulated for a viable environmental 
philosophy.
The problem is set forward in Part I where a definition of nature is explored. 
The complexity of the task leads to a brief history of the concept of nature (after a 
criticism of other historical accounts by three environmental philosophers) whereby 
two opposing explanations of nature and human nature are revealed: teleological and 
non-teleological.
Part II traces the decline of teleological explanation in favour of non- 
teleological explanations and the development of two main explanations of human 
nature in relation to nature that are prevalent today: Ultra-Darwinism (a reductionist 
explanation of human nature) and postmodernism. An analysis of these two positions 
shows that neither have an adequate metaphysics for finding value for nature, and this 
is revealed by an examination of two different types of environmental philosophy 
influenced respectively by the two opposing views.
In Part III the problem of values is discussed with particular emphasis on 
moral values. An argument for objective values based on objective knowledge is put 
forward as well as a theory of human nature which leads to the conclusion that 
teleological explanations link a theory of nature, a theory of human nature and a 
theory of value more satisfactorily than the non-teleological explanations of Ultra- 
Darwinism and postmodernism. The relevance of this conclusion to the problems of 
the environment is shown.
PREFACE
The subject o f my thesis covers a broad area. It is the nature o f such a broad 
overview that a selective approach needs to be taken, and so it was not possible to 
include all the major philosophers, as I would have liked. Often I had neither the 
space nor the time to pursue all the philosophical problems and arguments that arose. 
I hope my readers will be tolerant about the many paths that I have not taken because 
it was not possible in a thesis o f this length to include everything that was relevant. I 
have read widely and could perhaps say that there is a lifetime o f reading and 
exploring ideas behind the words I have written.
My main interest was in the third part o f the thesis and particularly in the 
arguments for realism and objective value because o f the importance of these 
concepts for a viable environmental ethics. I hope that at a future date I may be able 
to do further research in this area and tighten my argument. This thesis has led me to 
question further many o f the philosophical problems I have come across. I have tried 
to obtain an answer to some o f these problems, although o f course it is the nature of 
these problems to be always somewhat elusive. In this way the completion o f my 
thesis has not been for me an end, but very much a beginning.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental philosophy as an academic discipline began in the mid­
twentieth century after a century or more of writers, using various styles, had 
expressed their concern that a nature which was free from human interference was 
rapidly disappearing. The increase of industrialization across the world and an ever- 
expanding capitalist market eventually made it evident that the non-human world was 
being threatened as it had never been before. While it once had been assumed that the 
natural world was a never-ending resource, more perceptive people realized that what 
had always been taken for granted was no longer immune to human greed and human 
destruction. The natural world was no longer resilient in the face of the level of 
utilization of natural resources by humans across the world. For the last century the 
amount of literature written about environmental concerns has increased considerably.
The word ‘environment’ may be considered to have extended its 
meaning so that it no longer refers only to a local area, as in
‘.. .the environment of this loch reminded me of Grasmere.’1,
but now also has a global meaning. The entire geosphere with its hydrosphere, 
biosphere and surrounding atmosphere are all included in the meaning of the word
1 The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd edition. Prepared by J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner.
Ox ford .Clarendon Press, 1989. Vol. 5. p.315.
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‘environment’. This extension of the meaning has been necessary because of the 
ability of humans to affect every part of the world through an increase of 
technological skills. In this thesis it will be assumed that the term ‘environment’ will 
be applied in this total way as in the ‘global environment’.
Ever since humans developed into tool-wielding animals they have 
inflicted change on the Earth. It is not that humans are the only animals to change the 
environment, for many other animals do also, but it is the extent and nature of that 
change which is important. With increasing technological skills humans have altered 
vast areas of the Earth’s surface. Humans and beavers build dams but the effect of 
formers’ construction on the environment is far in excess of anything that a beaver 
can achieve. The effects of human interference go beyond just the Earth’s surface.
The atmosphere and the solar system have also been affected by human enterprise. If 
these effects were beneficial to the Earth then there would be no alarm, but a high 
proportion of the impacts of humanity on the environment are detrimental to the 
Earth, as well as being detrimental to humans themselves and their survival. An 
example of the extent of damage caused by human activity are the growing holes in 
the ozone layer, a result of the manufacture and use of CFCs and HCFCs, which allow 
more ultra-violet light through the atmosphere.
As concern grew for the environment so did the wish to correct the 
mistakes that had caused the concern. However, problems arose at this stage. At first 
this was a concern at the practical level and questions were asked about what should 
be done to prevent further damage to the environment. But with increasing 
disagreements the questions became more philosophical ones. The questions that 
were then asked were about why we should be concerned about the environment and,
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ultimately, how we should regard nature. It was with these questions that 
environmental philosophy was bom.
Before environmental philosophy became a bona fide academic subject 
there were already environmentalists who were beginning to tackle some of the 
philosophical problems in their writings. Aldo Leopold was a pioneer of 
environmentalism and his book A Sand County Almanac is often referred to in 
environmental literature. In his book he offers one of the first environmentalist codes:
A thing is right where it tends to preserve the integrity, stability 
and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise.2
This statement was intended as a moral code for humans. However, it leaves out vast 
areas of human interrelationships and so does not qualify as a complete ethical code. 
In fact if followed strictly it would seriously conflict with many areas of human 
morality. It could even lead to the morally repugnant claim that we should kill a 
number of humans if that would bring about ‘.. .the integrity, stability and beauty of 
the biotic community’.
Environmental philosophers have seen a need to improve on our 
present ethical codes in order to take into account our behaviour towards the 
environment. This has developed into a branch of ethics called environmental ethics. 
Although some philosophers believe that the present ethical codes are adequate to 
include non-humans simply by extension, some have seen the need to create a 
completely new ethical code and even a new metaphysical explanation of the world 
arguing that all previous ethical and metaphysical descriptions were human centred or
2 Leopold, A. A Sand County Almanac: and sketches here and there. Illustrated by C. W. Schwartz. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1949. pp. 224-225.
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anthropocentric. To avoid anthropocentrism philosophers have developed a form of 
ethics termed ‘biocentric ethics’. Biocentric ethics refers to any theory that views life 
as possessing intrinsic value. Albert Schweitzer’s ‘reverence for life’ principle is an 
early form of biocentric ethics:
The man who has become a thinking being feels a compulsion 
to give to every will-to-live the same reverence for life that he 
gives to his own. He experiences that other life in his own. He 
accepts as being good: to preserve life, to promote life, to raise to 
its highest value which is capable of development; and as being 
evil: to destroy life, to injure life, to repress life which is capable of 
development. This is the absolute, fundamental principle of the 
moral.
For many environmentalists life is not a wide enough circle for moral 
consideration. These philosophers have argued for an ecocentric ethic. Non-living 
natural objects such as rivers and mountains should also be within the moral circle:
Ecocentric thinkers argue that biocentric approaches literally fail 
to see the forest for the trees. They claim that environmental 
concern for ecosystems and wilderness areas are not the same 
as concern for the individual trees, plants and animals that live 
within them. Wilderness areas, forests, wetlands, prairies, and 
lakes are valuable in their own right and deserve moral 
consideration.4
Ecocentric ethics relies on the science of ecology to determine morality. Within this 
explanation humans are one creature among many. The ecosystem takes precedence 
in any moral decision. Leopold’s ‘land ethic’ is an ecocentric ethical theory as is the
3 Schweitzer, A. Out o f  My Life and Thought. Translated by A. B. Lamke. New York: Holt, 1990. p. 
131.
4 Desjardins, J. R. Environmental Ethics: an introduction to environmental philosophy. 4th edition. 
Belmont: ThomsonWadsworth, 2006. p. 150.
ethical theory of J. Baird Callicott. Deep ecology also relies on the science of ecology 
for moral decisions. They are committed to the view that what is needed is an 
alternative philosophy to replace the dominant worldview and are concerned with 
changing people at a personal and social level. In this way deep ecology is a 
movement within the political and social realm as well as in the area of philosophy 
Environmental philosophers have not only blamed anthropocentrism for the 
problems of the environment. Feminists have understood the problems of the 
environment to be caused by the aggressive dominance of the male. They believe that 
a more female caring approach to nature would solve the problems. Other 
philosophers view the cause of the problems to come from religious beliefs or from 
scientific approaches of objectivism and reductionism towards nature.
In the process of searching for an environmental ethic, problems in 
philosophy have appeared. One such problem is to find a place for objective values in 
nature:
A simpler more biocentric theory holds that some values are 
objectively there -  discovered not generated, by the valuer.5
Philosophical problems, such as objective/subjective values and intrinsic/instrumental 
values have led to endless debates.
There are many different philosophical approaches on how to solve the 
problems of the environment, but as yet nothing which has really seized the 
imagination of the public and certainly no system of thought that has motivated 
people to act more in accordance with the needs of the environment. Although
5 Rolston, H. Environmental Ethics: duties to and values in the natural world. Philadelphia: Temple 
University, 1988. p. 116.
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practical solutions are being found to some environmental problems nothing can be 
done really effectively without a coherent theory to underpin practical decision­
making. As Andrew Brennan says in his introduction to The Ethics o f the 
Environment:
...a  philosophy is a general theory which explains or justifies actions, 
policies or positions...an environmental philosophy can be defined as a 
general theory linking humans, nature and values.
Brennan then goes on to list the four components that he feels an environmental 
philosophy should have:
.. .a theory about what nature is and what kinds of objects and 
processes it contains; a theory about human beings providing some 
overall perspective on human life, the context in which it is lived, and 
the problems that it faces; a theory of value and an account of the 
evaluation of human action with reference to the two points above, and 
a theory of method.
Brennan’s first three theories need to be linked together in order to move to a 
theory of method. In this thesis I intend to examine what the connection is between 
nature, human nature and value and in this way hopefully clear some ground for the 
foundation of a coherent theory that will link at least the first the three components of 
Brennan’s analysis. Only when this is done can we proceed to a theory of method.
6 Brennan, A. ‘Introduction’ in Brennan, A. ed. The Ethics o f  the Environment. Aldershot, Dartmouth, 
1995. p. xv.
7 Ibid, p. xv.
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PARTI
NATURE
Introduction
In discussions about the environment our concept of nature and what is 
‘natural’ is often called into question. Brennan suggests that environmental 
philosophy requires a theory of nature and what kinds of objects and processes it 
contains. Yet before we can proceed to a theory we need to find a definition of 
‘nature’ and what is meant when this word is used in various contexts. Kate Soper in 
her book What is Nature? quotes Raymond Williams:
‘Nature’, as Raymond Williams has remarked, is one of the most 
complex words in the language. Yet, as with many other problematic 
terms, its complexity is concealed by the ease and regularity with 
which we put it to use in a wide variety of contexts.1
As Soper rightly points out the combination of the ease with which the word is 
popularly used and its underlying complexity makes a precise definition impossible.
J.S. Mill made an attempt at a definition in his essay ‘Nature’ in Three Essays 
on Religion. He points out that the word ‘nature’ has gained so many connotations 
that it is difficult to reach a true definition without emotional bias. He says:
Nature, natural and the groups of words derived from them...
1 Soper, K. What is Nature? culture, politics and the non-human. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. p .l.
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have thus become entangled in so many foreign associations, 
mostly of a very powerful and tenacious character that they 
have come to excite and to be symbols of feelings which their 
original meaning will by no means justify.2
The word ‘nature’ is elusive and heavily emotive. Mill makes an attempt to 
disentangle all the meanings.
In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the first definition is given as: ‘The 
essential quality of a thing.’ This is the definition Mill first looks at in his essay:
.. .what is meant by the ‘nature’ of a particular object? As of fire, of 
water, or of some individual plant or animal? Evidently the ensemble 
or aggregate of its powers or properties: the modes in which it acts on 
other things.. .and the modes in which other things act upon it.3
This is not the definition of ‘nature’ that is needed in environmental philosophy 
although it is a part of it. The ‘nature’ of an object is in some sense linked to the 
concept of nature at a broader level. John Habgood’s account of this sense of ‘nature’ 
is:
To ask about the ‘nature’ of something is to ask what kind of thing 
it is, what are its essential characteristics.. .the nature of a thing is 
what is innate to it, what makes it what it is.4
Habgood gives another meaning for ‘nature’ which is the result of a generalization 
from the first meaning Mill gives. ‘Nature’ in this generalized sense can be
2 Mill, J.S. Three Essays in Religion: nature, the utility o f  religion and theism. London: Longman, 
Green, Reader & Dyer, 1874. p. 3
3 Ibid. pp. 4-5
4 Habgood, J. The Concept o f  Nature. London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 2002. p.2
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equivalent to ‘logos’ of the ancient Greeks, or the unifying force as in the pagan 
‘Mother Nature; or the ‘Nature’ of Stoic thought. It can also be thought of in terms of 
God, as within religious thinking, or the Laws of Nature as in science.
Mill gives a capital ‘N ’ for his second definition of ‘nature’:
As the nature of a given thing is the aggregate of all its powers 
and properties, so Nature in the abstract is the aggregate of the 
powers and properties of all things. Nature means the sum of all 
phenomena together with the causes which produce them.5
‘Nature’ according to Mill’s second definition is everything that there is, even 
beyond what humans can know or perceive. In a very wide sense this is true. There 
is nothing in the world that was not originally part of nature. Mountains, rivers and 
trees are obviously a part of nature. But under this all-encompassing definition so are 
houses, roads and nuclear power stations. These latter were made from materials that 
were originally in a natural state as a part of nature. Also included in this definition 
are humans. Humans are a part of nature: they are biological beings under the 
influence of physical laws. The word ‘nature’ can be used in this very broad sense to 
mean all that is in the physical world as opposed to anything supernatural or non­
physical.
Clearly this definition of ‘nature’ is too wide to be used in discussions about 
the environment. In fact it is too wide for everyday speech. As Mill points out:
.. .it entirely conflicts with the common form of speech by which 
Nature is opposed to Art and natural to artificial.
5 Mill, 1874. op. cit. p. 5
6 Ibid. p. 7
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He goes on to say that there are:
.. .at least two principle meanings in the word ‘Nature’. In one 
sense, it means all the powers existing in either the outer or the 
inner world.. .In another sense it means not everything which 
happens, but only what takes place without the agency or without 
the voluntary or intentional agency of man.7
When we especially talk about environmental problems we need to make the 
distinction.
Habgood shows that all these meanings of ‘nature’ have a common thread:
It seems to me that the common thread running through all 
meanings of nature I have been describing is a sense of 
givenness.8
We can accept Habgood’s insight that the meaning of ‘nature’ in all its senses is ‘the 
given’, but we still have to decide what is purely given and what still remains as 
nature, ‘the given’, after some intervention from humans.
We may decide to treat ‘nature’ as meaning ‘all that is or happens without the 
voluntary or intentional intervention of humans’. But if we choose this definition 
without exception we may find ourselves in the despair of Bill McKibben. In his 
book The End o f  Nature he writes that there is no more nature because everywhere we 
see the intervention of humans. Nothing is natural any more, he says. Even the
7 Ibid. p. 8
8 Habgood, 2002. op. cit. p. 14.
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atmosphere has been changed by human agency so that the climate is unnatural. Bill 
McKibben has too strongly restricted the definition of ‘nature’:
.. .nature and human society are separate things. It is this separate 
nature I am talking about when I use the word ‘nature’.9
His despair is over the fact that:
... we have ended the thing that has, at least in modem times, 
defined nature for us -  its separation from human society.10
McKibben’s definition seems to doom humanity to an artificial world. Perhaps 
because he is an American he is trapped within the concept of ‘wilderness’ or 
‘pristine nature’:
One proof of the deep-rooted desire for pristine places is the decision 
that Americans and others have made to legislate for ‘wilderness’ -  
to set aside vast tracts of land where, in the words of the federal 
statute ‘the earth and its community of life are untrammelled by men, 
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain’.11
This may be a problem to Americans particularly because of their historical past. 
There were unexplored areas in America up to the comparatively recent past. The 
earliest environmentalists in America, like George Marsh Perkins, discussed 
environmental problems in terms of the destruction of the ‘wilderness’ and so the 
concern for American environmentalists became the restoration of pristine nature as it
9 McKibben, B. The End o f  Nature. London: Viking, 1990. p. 61
10 Ibid. p. 60
11 Ibid p.51
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was before the arrival of Europeans. Holmes Rolston today frequently refers to 
‘wilderness’ or to ‘nature as wildness’ in his book Philosophy Gone Wild:
Wilderness is the incubating matrix that served as the production site
of the human race.. ..Wildness does not merely lie behind, it remains
19the generating matrix.
In England, however, the English countryside is referred to as ‘nature’ and yet there is 
no part of England that has not been altered by humans. The Lake District is 
particularly noted for its natural beauty, but its beauty is largely the result of farming 
for many centuries. The landscape of the downs and heathlands in England are 
completely the result of human intervention and need constant upkeep for them to be 
preserved as they are now. Not only has the vegetation been created artificially but 
the whole ecosystem, including flowers, butterflies and birds, has developed because 
of human intervention. The entire length of England was once covered with 
deciduous woodland, but this does not mean that that the hedgerows and fields and the 
wildlife that flourish there now are not nature. Criticisms of farming techniques today 
emphasize the difference between ancient forms of farming which worked with nature 
and those that appear to work against nature for its destruction. McKibben’s 
definition would not allow the concept of humans working with nature nor would he 
be able to include humans as in some way a part of nature themselves. The land has 
been cultivated by Europeans for many centuries and we can still have a concept of 
nature. Nature can still be conceived as ‘nature’ even after interference from humans. 
So it is not possible to accept McKibben’s definition of ‘nature’. Nature cannot be
12 Rolston, H. Philosophy Gone Wild: essays in environmental ethics. Buffulo: Prometheus Books, 
1986. p. 122
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thought of as entirely separate from humans. This is an important point that Mill fails 
to reveal. If nature can still be nature after a certain level of human interference it is 
because humans themselves are a part of nature.
However, we come across a dilemma at this point for some human actions can 
be considered as a part of nature and some cannot. Human actions that are not a part 
of nature are considered to be a part of human culture. The problem whether humans 
are a part of nature or apart from nature is made evident here. At some level of 
interference we begin to believe humans are not a part of nature, for whatever level of 
interference non-humans have with nature, as when termites construct tall mounds, we 
still consider their actions to be a part of nature. This is not the case for humans. The 
nature/culture distinction is an important one:
Both distinctions presume that there are certain ways in which 
humanity can -  and indeed must -  be counterposed to the rest 
of nature. The distinction between the natural and the artificial, 
for example, implies that there is a type of productive activity or 
creativity that is exclusive to human beings. Humanity, that is, has 
seen itself as differing from the rest of nature in virtue of the fact 
that it both reproduces and produces, or, if preferred, in virtue of 
the fact that it creates both natural and artificial ‘products’. For 
while other living beings both produce in the sense of reproducing 
themselves and create objects (nests, webs, hives etc), the latter have 
been denied the status of artifice precisely because they are viewed 
as instinctual and undeliberated, as the necessarily determined
1 o
‘product’ of their nature.
Human actions that are a part of culture are not instinctual, but are voluntary actions 
of humans that are undetermined by their nature, quite distinct from the rest of nature. 
However, it is a difficult line to draw between those actions of humans that can be 
classified as a part of culture in opposition to nature and those actions that are not
13 Soper, 1995. op. cit. pp. 37-38.
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deliberately in opposition to nature, but rather are aiding nature, such as the care of 
woodlands.
To return to McKibben’s strict definition of nature where only pristine nature 
is termed as true nature we can counter with a European’s concept of nature which is 
not so pristine. In fact the word ‘wilderness’ would invoke a sense of a place that was 
useless and to be avoided. It must not be forgotten that until the last century 
wilderness would be dangerous. It is a luxury of modem technology that nature need 
not be viewed as hostile but in more positive terms. Technology may have destroyed 
the close relationship of humans to nature, but it has also allowed the leisure and 
comfort to be able to appreciate nature for itself. The closeness of humans to the land 
was always mled by the need of survival and life was often harsh. Only in highly 
developed societies have humans had the time to reflect on how people should relate 
to nature and not been guided by survival alone. Nature, as ‘wilderness’ or ‘the other’ 
has an attraction for us now because we no longer fear it. We can delight in the lives 
of non-humans because they are no longer a threat to us. In fact, we are reassured 
these days by their existence because they provide us with a different perspective on 
our own lives. Their lives are so free from all the difficulties we encounter in a highly 
complex society.
Nature need not be understood only as pristine nature that has not been 
touched by humans. Cultivated fields, gardens and parks full of trees can also be 
regarded as nature. Nevertheless the concept of a pristine nature can be useful. It can 
be a guideline for the level of intervention by humans that is acceptable. Robert Elliot 
deals with the problem of restoring nature in his philosophical articles, ‘Faking 
Nature’. He compares the restoration of nature to the reproduction of a piece of
14
artwork. Neither have the same value as the original. It is the origin of each that 
gives them value:
Origin is important as an integral part of the evaluation process.14
Elliot reveals the problem of restoring nature. We may wish to restore nature but has 
it then lost its original value? Can restoration be natural or is it always artificial? 
Only with a concept of a pristine nature or of natural processes without the 
intervention of humans can the problem of how to restore nature be resolved.
Bearing in mind the above reflections, my definition of the word ‘nature’ will 
be ‘all that is except where the level of human interference is such that the term 
‘culture’ would be more applicable’. This is not an entirely satisfactory definition as 
it leaves open to debate in some areas if the term ‘nature’ or the term ‘culture’ should 
be applied. The areas of particular uncertainty are within domestic breeding, genetic 
manipulation and agriculture. I need to have an open definition because of the 
complexity of the term ‘nature’.
It may seem foolish to even attempt a definition. Kate Soper, in fact, evades a 
definition altogether as she feels that the task of systematically analysing a precise 
definition might not prove rewarding. She says:
But tempting as it might seem, in view of the conceptual imprecision 
of ordinary talk of ‘nature’ to want to police the term...,there are a 
number of reasons to resist the move. In the first place talk of the 
countryside and its natural flora and fauna may be loose, but it still
14 Elliot, R. ‘Faking Nature’ in Elliot, R. Environmental Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995. p. 88.
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makes discriminations that we should want to observe between 
different types of space and humans use of it. If ordinary discourse 
lacks rigour in referring to woodlands and fields, the cattle grazing 
upon them, and so forth, as ‘nature’, it is still making an important 
distinction between urban and industrial environment.15
Soper suggests that we should approach these terms in a Wittgensteinian way and not 
attempt to specify how they should be employed, but explore:
.. .the way in which they are actually used.16
According to Wittgenstein as Soper interprets him:
The philosophers’ task, suggested Wittgenstein, was not to prescribe 
the use of terms in the light of some supposedly ‘strict’ or essential 
meaning but to observe their usage in ‘ordinary’ language itself.17
Soper follows this type of philosophical analysis. But there is a major fault with this 
type of analytical style of philosophy. It is useless to examine ‘ordinary’ usage of 
words at this time when we are having a crisis in the understanding of what we mean 
by the nature that we refer to by using the word ‘nature’. We can no longer sit back 
and observe and analyse the usage of ordinary language. When we come to the world 
of real problems, particular those of the environment, in order to make decisions about 
practical matters we need to be sure what we are meaning when we use the word 
‘nature’. What are we referring to? Individuals may use the word in a number of
15 Soper, 1995. op. cit- p.20.
16 Ibid. p. 20.
17 Ibid. p.20.
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ways and in the practical world these different meanings cause mammoth problems.
So it is not the philosopher’s task to look at the usage of words but to attempt to find 
the underlying concepts that people hold that lead to the ambiguities that occur in the 
use of words. My own definition above, as loose as it is, is an attempt to give a more 
controlled meaning to the word ‘nature’ and the major part of my thesis will be 
exploring further our present concept of nature and what we mean by ‘nature’.
The word ‘nature’ is further complicated by the fact that we often use it not 
only in a descriptive sense but also in a normative sense. ‘Nature’ used in a normative 
sense is highly ambiguous according to whether nature is seen as benevolent and the 
source of all goodness, or malevolent and ‘red in tooth and claw. When taken in the 
latter sense, the control of nature is to be applauded, for example in the areas of 
agriculture and medicine. Control of nature in farming and preventive medicine helps 
lessen famine and disease. Nature untamed is destructive. In the former sense when 
nature is perceived as good, to go against nature would be wrong, as in cosmetic 
surgery or foot binding. These practices can be condemned as ‘not as nature 
intended’. The excessive use o f fertilizers and pesticides are upsetting ‘the balance of 
nature’ and so can also be condemned as against nature, where nature is seen as 
‘knowing best’. The ambiguity of the normative sense of nature is seen in the two 
intellectual movements of the 18th century -  the Enlightenment and romanticism. 
These two intellectual movements developed from two concepts of human nature. 
Human culture was seen either as a corrective to nature, or as repressive to human 
nature and alienating humans from nature:
Broadly speaking, we can say that one provides the animating 
idea of the Enlightenment, the other of the Romantic reaction to 
its economic and social consequences. In releasing humanity from 
a Deist conception of the order of Nature as hierarchically fixed or
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Providentially designed to secure the ‘best of all possible worlds’, the 
Enlightenment sought to realize the inherent dignity of the individual 
as a self-motivating rational and moral being: the progressive 
development of art, science and culture is this viewed as the vehicle 
for the realization of ‘human nature’ previously held in thrall to 
superstitious fears of ‘nature’ and theological bigotry. In the Romantic 
reaction, which is profoundly influenced by Rousseau’s summon to 
attend to conscience as the ‘voice of nature’ within us, the integrity 
of nature is counterposed to the utlilitarianism and instrumental 
rationality through which the enlightenment ideals were practically 
realized and theoretically legitimated: the point is not to return to a 
past primitivity, but to discover in ‘nature’, both inner and outer, 
the source of redemption from the alienation and depredations of 
industrialism and the ‘cash nexus’ deformation of human relations.18
Nature can be interpreted as something we need to overcome in order to express our 
true human nature, or it can be viewed as that which we need to discover in order to 
free our true human nature. This normative aspect of nature is more fully expressed 
in its related term ‘natural’.
When we come to use the term ‘natural’, as in ‘natural processes’, we are met 
with many more problems than with the word ‘nature’. ‘Natural’ is more frequently 
used within human cultural situations than the word ‘nature’. Human behaviour can 
be described as ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’. What do we mean by ‘natural? Chambers 
Dictionary gives a wide range of definitions including ‘produced by nature’, or 
‘according to nature’. This brings us back to a definition of ‘nature’ but the use of 
‘natural’ brings in more complications with its normative use. ‘Natural’ can be 
defined to be a part of Mill’s second definition of nature. What is ‘natural’ is not the 
work of humans and this reflects Mill’s definition of ‘nature’ as ‘not by the agency of 
man’. This is a positive use of the word ‘natural’ as it is in opposition to the more 
negative word ‘artificial’. A natural forest is more valued than an artificial forest. But
18 Ibid. p. 29.
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‘natural’ can also mean ‘without adornment’ and may take on more negative 
connotations as where the natural is opposed to civilizing influences. ‘Natural’ may 
then be thought of as applying to the rough and ready as opposed to those things that 
have more refinement.
The use of the word ‘natural’ becomes more complicated in areas where 
humans interact with nature. Such problems occur when we consider cultivated 
nature, as, for example, cultivated flowers in the garden that are neither natural nor yet 
artificial. They are not artificial as flowers that are made of silk or paper, but they are 
not natural in the sense of ‘not the work of humans’. There is the same problem when 
we consider, once again, the English countryside. The fields and neat hedgerows are 
not artificial, for they are not pretending to be something else, nor are they artefacts. 
They are natural but involve the intervention of humans. The problem becomes even 
greater when we consider selection of crops for agriculture and the breeding of 
domestic animals. Once again, they are neither artificial nor are they artefacts, but 
their characteristics and even their existence are entirely the result of human 
interference. The question arises whether a cow or a chicken is a natural animal. To a 
certain extent they are human creations. Recent developments in genetic 
manipulation make this question even more problematic. I will define ‘natural’ in a 
similar way to ‘nature’, as ‘all that is except where the level of interference from 
humans is such that the terms ‘unnatural’, ‘non-natural’, ‘artificial’ or ‘cultural’ are 
more applicable’. As with the term ‘nature’ there are certain areas where it is difficult 
to decide whether we should apply the term ‘natural’ or ‘cultural’ etc.
Throughout this chapter there is the underlying ambiguity of whether humans 
can be understood as a part of nature or apart from nature. We can have a concept of 
pristine nature but we must also take into account the interaction of humans with
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nature because we are a part of nature. It is the level of this interaction that becomes 
central to the arguments and also the type of interaction. We cannot understand 
ourselves as entirely a part of nature because we need to discriminate between 
‘natural’ and ‘artificial’, between ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ and between ‘wilderness’ 
and ‘cultivated’. But we cannot place nature as entirely opposed to us or we will then 
understand ourselves as apart from nature and fail to take into account the level of 
interaction we need with nature. Fruit and vegetables are a part of nature but they 
need to be cultivated to a certain level to be beneficial to humans. Copsed woodlands, 
downlands and low-intensity agricultural can still be a part of nature although they 
have a certain level of human intervention.
The problem that recurs in discussions about environmental problems is the 
level of human intervention, whether it should be limited when it appears to be doing 
harm to the environment or whether it should be increased as in conservation 
programmes. Always at the heart of these discussions, although rarely acknowledged, 
is the metaphysical problem of how we understand ourselves in relationship to nature: 
are we just biological animals and therefore all our actions part of nature so our use of 
nature is justified, or are we apart from nature and all our actions towards nature must 
be judged as interference? How far are humans separate from nature? Are humans a 
part of nature or apart from nature? It is this paradoxical question that underlies many 
arguments about the environment. When we are questioning what we mean by 
‘nature’ we are also asking questions about ourselves. And when we ask how far we 
are a part of nature we also question how far we want to be a part of nature and if 
nature is good or bad. Questions about nature are questions about ourselves as well as 
questions about values.
20
Chapter 1 
A History of the Concept of Nature
In order to understand more fully our present concept of nature it may be 
illuminating to attempt a history of the term ‘nature’. The question that needs to be 
asked is ‘how did people in the past think about nature?’ or even ‘how did people in 
the past relate to nature?’ By unravelling the history of the term ‘nature’, difficult as 
this may be, we may be able to understand how we conceive and relate to nature 
today.
Often confusions arise in discussions where opponents have not understood 
that they are using the same word in different ways because they have derived its 
meaning from different conceptions (and I use the term ‘conception’ in the sense of an 
action or faculty of forming a concept.) This is particularly true of the words ‘nature’ 
and ‘natural’ because of their frequent use. The word ‘nature’ relies on the 
underlying concept of what we regard as nature. Our conceptions of nature have 
come into being through our relations with nature, whether these are for the sake of 
survival or through the act of contemplation. Eventually a concept of nature is fully 
formed. A history of the concept of nature may help to define the term ‘nature’ more 
clearly so that in discussing environmental problems we can be confident that we are 
all using the same terminology and employing a shared concept.
This task is extremely difficult if not impossible. History is always an 
uncertain discipline and is too often accused of being pure interpretation. Trying to 
research the history of the concept of nature may be the most difficult area of history, 
but as there have been many environmentalists who have looked to history to explain 
the present problems it seems important to review some of the interpretations that
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have been put forward. In some of the earlier works in environmental philosophy 
writers have assumed that there was a ‘Golden Age’ that has been lost, and blame the 
present environmental problems on various events, whether real or imaginary, from 
the past. Carolyn Merchant blames the rise of male dominance and industrialization 
(a result of this male dominance in her theory) as destroying the harmonious 
relationship between humans and nature that once existed in the past:
The ancient identity of nature as a nurturing mother links 
women’s history with the history of the environment and 
ecological change. The female earth was central to the 
organic cosmology that was undermined by the Scientific 
Revolution and the rise of a market-oriented culture in early 
modem Europe. The ecology movement has reawakened 
interest in the values and concepts associated historically 
with the premodem organic world...
In investigating the roots of our current environmental 
dilemma and its connection to science, technology, and the 
economy, we must reexamine the formation of a world view 
and a science that by reconceptualizing reality as a machine 
rather than a living organism, sanctioned the domination of 
both nature and women.1
Merchant presents environmental problems as a result of science and technology as 
well as the growth of capitalism, all three labelled as ‘male’ activities that favour the 
oppression of nature and the female.
Lynn White believes the problems of the environment date from Middle Ages 
as a result of the doctrines of the Christian church. Christianity, according to White, 
had a particular attitude towards nature that allowed the introduction of new 
technology for agriculture. This was in the form of a more sophisticated plough as
1 Merchant, C. The Death o f  Nature: women, ecology and the scientific revolution. London: Wildwood 
House, 1980. pp. xvi-xvii
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opposed to the old scratch plough. It demanded a different type of approach to 
agriculture:
Thus, distribution of the land was based no longer on the needs of the 
family but, rather, on the capacity of a power machine 
to till the earth. Man’s relation to the soil was profoundly 
changed. Formerly man had been part of nature; now he 
was the exploiter of nature.2
White introduces here the separation of humans from nature. As exploiters 
humans are no longer a part of nature. White blames the rise of Christianity for this 
separation because within Christian doctrine there is the assumption of a dualism -  
man and nature:
Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and 
Asia’s religions.. .not only established a dualism of man and 
nature but also insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit 
nature for his proper ends.. .3
Ancient paganism, according to White, had a different relationship to nature:
At the level of the common people this worked out in an 
interesting way. In Antiquity every tree, every spring, every hill 
had its own genius loci, the guardian spirit. These spirits were 
accessible to men, but were very unlike men; centaurs, fauns 
and mermaids show their ambivalence. Before one cut a tree, 
mined a mountain or dammed a brook, it was important to 
placate the spirit in charge of that particular situation and to 
keep it placated. By destroying pagan animism, Christianity 
made it possible to exploit nature in the mood of indifference 
to the feelings of natural objects.4
2 White, L. ‘The Historical Roots o f Our Ecological Crisis’. In Barbour, I.G. ed. Western Man and 
Environmental Ethics: attitudes towards nature and technology. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1973. p.23.
3 Ibid. p.25.
4 Ibid. p.25.
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But Thomas Berry believes that it was civilization that was the cause of all the 
problems with the environment. He believes that there was a ‘primordial harmony’ 
before civilization and that civilization in itself, even before the ascent of Christianity, 
separated humans from nature:
Our earliest human documents reveal a special sensitivity 
in human intellectual, emotional and aesthetic responses to 
the natural world...In its beginnings human society was 
integrated with the larger earth community composed of all 
the geological as well as biological and human elements. 
Just how long this primordial harmony endured we do not 
know beyond the last hundred thousand years of the 
Paleolithic period. Some ten thousand years ago, the 
Neolithic and then Classical civilizations came into being.
It must suffice to say that with classical and general literate 
civilizations of the past five thousand years, the great 
cultural worlds of the human developed along with vast 
and powerful social establishments whereby humans 
became oppressive and even destructive of other life forms, 
alienation from the natural world increased.. .5
There are two questions that immediately spring to mind when reading Berry’s 
account of human alienation. The first is the link he makes assuming that there is a 
connection between humans becoming alienated from nature and environmental 
problems. However, it could be the case that humans were not alienated from nature 
but environmental problems still occurred. It is not unknown for wild animals to 
overpopulate an area and cause great damage to the surrounding environment. The 
first question is about what makes humans alienated from nature (as Berry concludes) 
while other creatures are not. The second question is whether there ever was a 
‘primordial harmony’.
5 Berry, T. ‘The Viable Human’, in Revision. Vol. 16 (2) 1993. p. 53.
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These three writers illustrate the use of historic interpretation and a concept of 
humans alienated from nature to support their arguments: Berry blames civilization 
itself for today’s environmental problems; White blames the rise of Christianity; 
Merchant sets the date for humans’ separation from nature at a later date, after the rise 
of science. Merchant, like many other environmentalists that accuse science as being 
the cause of the problems, portrays Francis Bacon as the main instigator of the new 
destructive order:
The fundamental social and intellectual problem of the 
seventeenth century was the problem of order. The 
perception of disorder, so important to Baconian doctrine 
of dominion over nature, was also crucial to the rise of 
mechanism as a rational antidote to the disintegration 
of the organic cosmos. The new mechanical philosophy of 
the mid-seventeenth century achieved a reunification of the 
cosmos, society and the self in terms of a new metaphor -  
the machine.6
Merchant, by placing the alienation of men from nature with the progress in science in 
technology, has her ‘Golden Age’ pre-dating this time. Humans were in harmony 
with nature in the Middle Ages, a time when Christianity was at its height in Europe:
Basic to the agrarian ecosystem of premodem Europe was 
the relationship between the peasant community and the 
land...Cooperation and interdependence maintained the 
health of the ecosystem.7
She praises the medieval theories of an organic society although they were in the 
main based on a Christian understanding of the world:
6 Merchant, 1980. op.cit. p. 192.
7 Ibid pp.43-44.
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The medieval theory of society thus stressed the whole before 
the parts, while emphasizing the inherent value of each 
particular part. The unity of the one was of higher value than 
the objectives of the many. The connection between the parts 
was integrated through a universal harmony pervading the 
whole. This organic cement bound together the macrocosm, 
the community, and the parts of each individual being or 
microcosm...
The organic society was to be modelled on nature’s prime 
examples of communal colonies -  bees and ants. Civil life 
should imitate nature, as exemplified by the political 
constitution of the bee. All workers must join together in 
common to produce welfare for the whole and sweetness in the
o
honey while the queen superintends.
This directly conflicts with White’s insistence that Christianity destroyed the balance 
between humans and nature.
These three theorists have very different views as to what was the major cause 
of environmental problems. Did these arise with the growth of science in the 
seventeenth century; with the rise of Christianity in the Middle Ages; or after the 
beginning of civilization much further back in time? The one common theme from 
these differing accounts is that at some point in the past humans became alienated 
from nature and in this way began to understand themselves as apart from nature. The 
suggestion is that humans should not be alienated from nature but should be a part of 
nature. All three accounts beg many questions about the relationship of humans to 
nature and therefore I shall try to assess all three claims before proceeding to a history 
of the concept of nature in the next chapter.
Berry claims that there once was a ‘primordial harmony’ between humans 
and the rest of nature. He dates this time as before civilization. This is the most 
difficult area of history because there are no written accounts and we can only acquire
8 Ibid. p.71.
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any knowledge of human behaviour through archaeological records and possibly by 
studying simpler societies of today. An archaeologist writing about Stone Age 
hunters in the British Isles gives this caution about his discoveries:
... we have seen how archaeologists attempt to reconstruct human 
behaviour from its material remains, which constitute the 
archaeological record. This record is subject to many distortions, 
only some of which arise from human behaviour, while others may 
be considered more as natural processes. It is one of the tasks of the 
archaeologist to establish in what ways the record has been distorted 
so that this may be allowed for in reconstructions of the past. 
Inevitably, the need to make such allowances imposes limitations. 
However, a relatively incomplete, but soundly based, reconstruction 
is to be preferred to one which, although more complete, does not 
bear close scrutiny because it is based on insufficient evidence.9
Later he reiterates the complexity of trying to uncover the behaviour of ancient 
peoples from archaeological records:
The archaeological record is created by the actions of human beings 
but.. .by the time the archaeologist comes on the scene, the evidence 
for those actions has become distorted in a number of ways. Natural 
processes may have disturbed or destroyed some of the evidence and 
the evidence itself has usually accumulated over a period of time and 
is not the residue of a single event.10
He shows the same reservation about being able to reconstruct the past from the 
ethnographic record. Simpler societies of today that appear to live in ancient ways 
inhabit areas that must have demanded the continuation of a hunter-gatherer life-style 
as well as now being affected by modem societies of today:
9 Smith, C. Late Stone Age Hunters o f  the British Isles. London: Routledge, 1992. pp.38-39.
10 Ibid. p.41.
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To begin with, today’s hunter-gatherers live in marginal, atypical 
environments, and it seems questionable to use the deserts of 
southern Africa and central Australia or the circumpolar zone 
as a source of analogy for temperate, mid-latitude Europe. North 
America is a more appropriate source of analogy but the hunter- 
gatherers of this region have been subject to several centuries 
of influence from settled, farming societies of both American 
and European origin.11
It appears that there is such scanty evidence available for trying to construct how 
ancient peoples used to live trying that we can hardly obtain an accurate enough 
picture to claim whether they lived in harmony with nature or not.
However, Berry makes the claim that:
In the beginning human society was integrated with the 
larger life society and the larger earth community composed 
of all geological as well as biological and human elements.12
Other environmental writers make similar claims. For example Peter Marshall states:
The harmony of nature has been destroyed by dominating and
meddling humanity in the last tens of thousands of years, a
fraction of evolutionary time. The natural condition of humans
and all beings require no artificial rules or laws. It is the laws
that have been the cause, not the remedy, of the prevailing
1 ^social and ecological crisis...
There are large assumptions in both these accounts. In Berry’s account we 
need to question what he means by ‘in the beginning’ when referring to human 
society and whether it is true that there is a ‘natural condition of humans’ which 
requires ‘no artificial rules or laws’ as Marshall claims. In order that Berry’s
11 Ibid. p.21.
12 Berry, 1987.op.cit. p. 53.
13 Marshall, P. Nature’s Web: rethinking our place on earth. New York: Sharpe, 1996. p.446.
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assumption can be validated we would have to find a time that was the beginning of 
human society. If we accept the present consensus concerning evolutionary theory 
then humans evolved from a common ancestor in the same way as other animals and 
most recently from ape-like creatures. Our nearest relatives today are the non-human 
primates. Paleoanthropologists are, however, uncertain when human society began:
.. .the ancestry of human society and the evolution of cultural 
traditions remain predominantly the domain of ‘general 
theorists’ working from comparative studies of fossil 
morphologies, of modem foragers and of living non-human 
primates.1
In other words, the ways of obtaining information about the beginnings of human 
society are very uncertain. The interpretations of these ‘general theorists’ are open to 
question and the conclusions drawn can, at most, only be probable. The assumption 
that modem foragers and living non-human primates resemble past early man could 
immediately be questioned. It may be that modem foragers have continued in their 
more simplistic form of living because they are in those regions of the world where it 
has not been necessary to evolve to a more complex way of interacting with the 
environment. In that case they could not be entirely similar to ancient foragers who 
sought out their living in environments with more opportunities for development. 
There is really no evidence to enable us to arrive at a conclusion. If it is so difficult to 
ascertain when human society began and what it was like, then the claims of Berry 
and Marshall cannot be accepted.
Perhaps Berry and other ‘primordial harmony’ environmentalists are referring 
to a time when humans were more ape-like than human. Humans would then be a
14 Steele, J. and Shannon, S. ‘Introduction’ in Steele, J. and Shannon, S. eds. The Archaeology o f  
Human Ancestry: power, sex and tradition. London: Routledge, 1996. p.9.
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part of nature in the way that the other higher primates are today. But this would not 
be a viable argument because we are talking about the particular way in which 
humans interact to form a human society and to create a culture that differentiates 
them from other higher primates. ‘Culture’ is a word that was first designated to 
humans specifically and only later applied to some non-humans when we were 
seeking similarities between them and ourselves. It is culture that differentiates us 
from nature. The defining criterion of ‘human’ is when humans are separated from 
non-humans by their culture and this immediately implies some distancing of humans 
from the rest of nature.
The beginning of ‘culture’, however basic, may be equated with the 
beginning of human society. This would be a more complex concept than just to be 
speaking of social interactions as we may do about non-human apes. Various 
paleoanthropologists regard the beginning of ‘culture’ as happening at the time when 
humans began making stone tools that indicate a more sophisticated form of thinking 
than had appeared in non-humans. The archaeologist cannot ascertain the intellectual 
ability of early humans directly, but only indirectly through the discovery of stone 
tools. It is the sophistication of these tools that can give an indication of how far first 
humans had developed beyond non-humans and, this is what may be thought of as the 
beginning of culture:
We must recognize that we can never directly ascertain the symbolic 
Capacities of our earliest ancestors -  for the first three million years 
Of our genius we must gauge ‘intelligence’ by measuring changes 
In the size and shape of hominid skulls and bodies and by finding 
Stone tools and the remains of other objects used by our ancestors. 
These indirect reflections on evolving symbolic ability constitute 
‘culture’ for the anthropologist in an analytical sense. 5
15 Wenke, R. J. Patterns in Prehistory: humankind’s first three million years. 4th edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999. p. 98.
30
We think of human society as consisting of much more than a basic ‘culture’ 
of tool-making, but the archaeological record only provides the remains of the ancient 
tools for us to judge what level of sophistication early humans had attained. The 
question is whether humans had gained a social sophistication before the making of 
the tools or not until much later. The primitive human was already bipedal before 
tool-making appears in the archaeological record, but it was with tool-making that 
certain styles of behaviour appeared which brought about what we would now term a 
human society and along with it ‘culture’:
‘Humans the toolmakers...’ -this phrase has served to distinguish the 
earliest toolmaking humans from other primates of the day -their 
ability to manufacture tools, a clear sign of that uniquely human 
attribute, culture. Other animals like chimpanzees make tools to 
dig for grubs or other specific purposes, but only people manufacture 
artefacts regularly and habitually as well as in a much more complex 
fashion. We have gone much further in the toolmaking direction than 
other primates. One reason is that our brains allow us to plan our 
actions more in advance.16
Other animals use tools but it is the sophistication of the tools made by 
humans and how the tools help them to change their environment combined with a 
growing brain capacity and erect posture that separate them from other animals.
Other animals can change their environment, as can beavers when they build dams. 
Some creatures can cause widespread devastation to their environment, as do 
swarming locusts. But it is the forward planning in the making of the tools and in the 
changing of their environment that appears to be most significant about the difference
16 Fagan, B.M. World Prehistory: a brief introduction. 4th edition. New York: Longman, 1999. p. 53.
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between human behaviour and that of other animals. What makes this behaviour 
different in kind rather than degree is the extent of the planning that appears to go 
beyond immediate response. If this is the case then human society begins when 
humans start to change their environment with premeditated planning and not just to 
satisfy immediate needs. ‘Culture’ is the result of humans adapting and changing their 
environment. This casts doubt on Berry’s claim that in the beginning ‘human society 
was integrated with the larger earth community’. If the beginning of human society 
was when humans began to forward-plan to control their environment then that also 
was the time when humans were no longer integrated with the rest of nature in the 
way we would consider non-humans were integrated. In other words, humans 
become what we call ‘humans’ because of the extent to which they control and 
change their environment.
So how does this lead us to understand what Berry and other writers have 
thought of as a ‘primordial harmony’ that existed between humans and the rest of 
nature? The dictionary definition of ‘harmony’ is as follows:
Harmony: combination or adaptation of parts, elements or related 
things, so as to form a constant and orderly whole; agreement, 
accord, congruity.17
‘Harmony’ implies many parts fitting together as a whole. Berry and Marshall are 
thinking of nature as being something made of several parts that, when integrated, or 
in harmony, make up a whole in the sense of making something complete. The word 
‘harmony’ has the added sense of ‘agreement in relation’. Thus to be disharmonious 
is to be in disagreement or lacking in congruity. Environmentalists like Berry and 
Marshall assume that there was a previous harmony when humanity was in full
17 The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd edition prepared by J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989. vol. III.
agreement with nature, but that we have now lost it. As already shown it is very 
difficult to have any evidence for this claim. Perhaps we could look at nature without 
humans to see what could be meant by this ‘harmony’, as the claim is that humans 
have now destroyed it.
The Earth has been estimated to be over 4,000 million years old. The 
geological record can tell us something of the Earth’s past before the arrival of 
humans, but again we are in the area of pure theoretical suppositions. The geological 
record however does seem to show that the Earth has had a turbulent history: land has 
been formed and destroyed; continents have drifted; sea-levels have risen and 
subsided; species have flourished and then become extinct. In the Burgess Shale in 
Canada geologists have found evidence of a massive extinction that marks the end of 
what has been called the Precambrian era. Most species of that era were 
exterminated. Afterwards new and different species began to evolve. Shelled marine 
animals flourished in the Cretaceous period when there was a high percentage of 
warm shallow water. Later sea-levels rose so that these ecological niches were not so 
numerous and consequently the numbers of shelled marine animals diminished. As 
every child knows, dinosaurs dominated the Earth for millions of years and then 
suddenly became extinct. The history of the Earth does not show harmony in the 
sense of parts fitted together to make a whole. Many species have been lost and 
living things have been anything but in harmony with one another. There has always 
been a constant changing and adaptation of species throughout the Earth’s history. 
Even over shorter periods of geological time, say within a particular climatic era, the 
mix of species does not live entirely in constant harmony. There may be times of 
relative stability where a number of species may co-exist in some balanced way, but 
even these times have their fluctuations.
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Harmony, within environmental literature, may be interpreted as ‘ecological 
balance’. ‘Harmony’ implies a static situation whereas ‘ecological balance’ allows for 
some change:
Ecological balance is a kind of stability or persistence that is
1 o
attained through counterpoised forces.
Holland explains that although Darwinian thought revealed the natural world as an 
open-ended historical process, within any set period of time and particular location an 
appearance of ecological balance, or stability, can be found in nature. There are 
various controls on individual species, such as food, disease and predators, but a 
balance of some kind between species can be achieved which gives a degree of 
stability. Perhaps harmony within nature can be understood as this type of ecological 
balance. Holland’s ecological balance involves species being integrated into the 
whole (a whole being an ecological system). But species cannot be seen as being in 
full agreement in any of the relevant senses that the concept of ‘harmony’ would 
imply. If we are to understand the natural world as in ecological balance, the term 
‘harmony’ seems to be inappropriate.
Further to this argument, understanding nature in terms of ‘ecological 
balance’ has been questioned since the widespread rejection of providential ecology 
within a theological explanation. Without a concept of providence, nature seems to be 
more about disturbance than balance:
The abandoning of providential ecology appears to mean that
ecological balance can no longer function as an indispensable
18 Holland, A. ‘Ecological Balance’ in Chadwick, R. ed. Encyclopaedia o f  Applied Ethics. Vol. 2. 
London: Academic Press, 1998. p.2.
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explanatory assumption but itself stands in need of explanation.19
According to a new account of nature, disturbance and a certain amount of chaos also 
have their place. Nature is a mixture of co-operation and disruptive elements. There 
is the co-operative behaviour in the relationship between flowering plants and their 
pollinators, but there is also the competitive element of the survival of the fittest, as 
well as entirely disruptive events as in naturally occurring forest fires. All play their 
part in the whole. In this way, ecological balance can be seen as a very precarious 
state of nature. So much of nature is dynamic and forever changing. Nature viewed 
in this way is not consistent with a concept of harmony.
There is thus much to doubt about the claim that there was once ‘primordial 
harmony’. Evidence is limited on deciding categorically when human society began, 
and human society and culture seem to be synonymous with the time humans 
developed beyond living spontaneously in response to basic needs. Neither can 
nature be perceived in any way as in harmony.
Some environmentalists have claimed that the North American Indians lived 
in harmony with nature:
They lived in comparative harmony with the natural world, following 
the cycles of nature and developing a subtle and profound 
understanding of their surroundings.
19 Ibid. p. 12.
20 Marshall, 1996. op.cit. p. 138.
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However, there is doubt in this, as what is known about the North American Indians 
has arisen since they have been a suppressed nation. It does not appear to agree with 
other information about the lifestyle of these people:
That Amerindians lived ‘in harmony with nature’ continues to 
be asserted despite the blatant differences between such 
‘Amerindians’ across the continent...and despite archaeological 
evidence of massive buffalo drives and the anthropological 
[sc. evidence] of casual cruelty.21
It would appear from many archaeological records that humans have always exploited 
the environment at whatever level they could. This is true of the Stone Age hunters of 
the British Isles. The archaeological records suggest that bands of hunters needed to 
move seasonally from place to place because they used up the resources wherever 
they stayed:
The hunters of the Late-glacial Interstadial may have followed a 
pattern of residential foraging, in which the whole band moved on as 
resources became depleted.2
Foraging until an area is depleted of resources is not a description of people living in 
harmony. This is still exploitation even if it is at a low level. To perceive ancient 
peoples as living in harmony with nature is a romanticizing of the past. ‘Romantics’ 
have always looked back to a ‘Golden Age’ and many have seen ancient peoples as 
proof of this previous harmonious time. Each age appears to develop some nostalgic 
dream of a previous age, far enough away in time that a fantasy can be woven. The 
fantasy consists of a time when humans lived peacefully with all other creatures:
21 Clark, S.R.L. How to Think About the Earth: philosophical and theological models for ecology. 
London: Mowbray, 1993. p.25.
22 Smith, 1992. op. cit. p. 167
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Long ago, or far away, romantics tell us, people were 
unselfconsciously united with their world. Nineteenth century 
romantics liked to think ‘the Greeks’ were like that; 
late twentieth century ones locate the fantasy in old Europe or 
amongst native Amerindians.23
It is unlikely that there was ever such a ‘Golden Age’ except in people’s minds.
There may have been a time when humans did not take more from the Earth than the 
natural balance could cope with, but this was probably more from lack of 
technological skill than from any wish to live in harmony with nature. Humans would 
have needed the scientific knowledge we have today to have known about the 
ecological balance of any area. Presumably humans have always lived at the level 
that they best could achieve in any area.
To look back in nostalgia or to try to re-create some fictional past is of no help 
to our problems today. To pretend there was some ‘Golden Age’ which disappeared 
at some point in time and to blame all environmental problems on that particular point 
in time seems to be highly misleading.
The word ‘harmony’ proves to be an inappropriate one to use in reference to 
nature. Within nature there is a certain amount of co-operation as well as 
competition. Even though there may be times of ecological balance nature contains 
moments of chaos and disruption. If nature itself is not in harmony then it cannot be 
expected that humans live in harmony with it. One could concede to those 
environmentalists who perceive a time of greater harmony between nature and 
humanity that humans may at one time have been living in a less destructive way 
towards nature than now.
23 Clark, 1993. op. cit. p. 13.
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Other environmentalists claim that it was not civilization in itself that brought 
about the destructive nature of humans but the Christian religion. According to Lyn 
White the axioms of the Christian religion still dominate humans’ behaviour today 
and their destructive attitude towards Nature:
. ..we shall continue to have a worsening ecological crisis until 
we reject the Christian axioms that nature has no reason for 
existence save to serve man.24
The claim is made by many environmentalists that Christianity, with its links to 
Judaism, placed humans in a superior position over nature and thus encouraged them 
to dominate nature and destroy it. Deep ecologists, wishing to change the attitude of 
humans at a fundamental level, claim that these religions cause humans to be 
alienated from nature. This is an argument against all the inherited traditional 
assumptions that underlie our present attitudes to nature. Christianity is again 
rebuked for encouraging humans to think of themselves as superior to the rest of 
nature and thus causing them to be arrogant in their attitude towards other species. 
Other writers, notably Robin Attfield, have offered arguments to prove that these 
accusations against Christianity are quite unfounded. I shall not go into the details of 
these arguments now, as I shall be looking at Christian attitudes to nature at a later 
part of this thesis. Suffice to say that in the Gospels there is little to indicate that 
Jesus recommended total domination over nature. In fact, in one famous passage he 
indicates that in some things nature is superior to humans:
Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do 
they spin; and yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory
24 White, in Barbour, 1973. op. cit. p.29.
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was not arrayed like one of these.
In fact the basic message of Christianity, like all major religions, is a plea to cease 
from human greed, to leave behind worldly possessions and to turn to the things of the 
spirit often aided by the contemplation of the living world. In both Judaism and 
Christianity nature is created by God and therefore should be treated with respect and 
awe, and I will be looking later at some of these religious ideas about nature. For the 
moment I shall examine the claim that humans had a better relationship with nature 
before the rise of Christianity.
Again we need to refer to archaeological and historical evidence as well as 
ethnological research that can often be misleading. It appears true that ancient 
peoples had a connection to nature that we have no longer. If we can accept the 
evidence from ethnological studies of people who until recently lived in a similar way 
to ancient peoples as being valid then we can see some reason to believe in this 
connection. The totemic system reveals humans as having a strong identification with 
non-humans. The anthropologist, A.S. Elkin, gives a definition of totemism 4s 
applied to aboriginal Australians in the following way:
Totemism is more than a mechanism for regulating marriage 
A view of nature and life, of the universe and man, which 
colours and influences the Aboringinees’ social groupings 
and mythologies, inspires their ritual and links 
them to the past. It unites them with nature’s activities 
and species in a bond of mutual life-giving...
A relationship between a person, or group of persons 
and (for example) a natural object or species as part of nature 
imparts confidence amidst the vissitudes of life. 6
25 Matthew 6 v. 28-9 in The Bible. Authorized version. Editor: J. Stirling. London: The British &
Foreign Bible Society, 1954.
26 Elkin, A.P. The Australian Aborigines. 3rd edition.. Sidney: Angus and Robertson, 1954. p. 133.
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There have been many theories as regards totemism, such as those of Levi Strauss and 
Durkheim, but it is enough to assume that totemism in some way links humans to 
nature:
Probably we do well simply to say that totemism is yet another 
example of man and nature linked in a single religious pattern.27
Among such people as the Australian aborigines and some Africans, there are tales 
that uphold this belief in the unity of humans with the animal world. A similar but 
more sophisticated view of this closeness to nature is seen in the tales of Ancient 
Greece that were eventually recorded in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. The famous tale of 
Apollo and Daphne, in which Daphne is changed into a laurel tree, is typical of these 
stories:
The story is one of the many folk-tales concerning the conversion 
of mortals into trees which Ovid has so gracefully elaborated 
in his Metamorphoses, and which assumes a new importance now 
that we can trace them back into that old world when tree and 
man and indeed all living things were held to be so near akin. It 
is sufficient for us that they demonstrate the survival of very 
ancient modes of thought amongst races who had otherwise 
reached a high degree of civilization.28
The close identification humans had with nature still lingered in the myths of ancient 
Greece and Rome. The ancient Britons also appear to have had a close identity with
27 Ferguson, J. Gods Many and Lords Many: a study in primal religions. Guildford: Lutterworth 
{Educational, 1982. p.9.
28 Philpot, J.H. The Sacred Tree: or the tree in religion and myth. First published in 1897. Facsimile 
reprint. Felinfach: Llanerch, 1994. pp.77-78.
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nature and this has remained, surprisingly enough, in some folk rituals that are 
continued today in England. I am thinking particularly of Jack-in-the-Green who 
appears every May Day morning in Oxford. A person parades the streets of Oxford 
very early in the morning covered in leaves:
Beltane (end of April/beginning of May) was the Celtic festival 
traditional to invoking and enlisting the aid of the tree spirit and 
occurs throughout Europe at about the same time. The Maypole 
represents the transplanting of a special tree in the village area, 
but the Maypole was once a living tree, brought into the village 
with its dryad. The dryad was called upon to help the village 
and ensure an abundant harvest. Later this became a Maypole, and 
the tree spirit was symbolically represented by a mummer or player 
who usually dressed in green, wore a mask of woven branches or 
a suit of plaited boughs. This character was called the Green Man 
or Jack in the Green.29
Nature was often seen as benevolent and the seat of gods. Trees were often seen as 
homes for the gods and evidence for ceremonies concerning worship of trees is found 
throughout the ancient world:
Very frequently, especially in early times this home or haunt of the 
god was a tree; his ceremonial worship was conducted beneath 
its shadows and the offerings of his worshippers were hung upon 
its branches or placed at its foot, or again a table by its side, and 
assumed thereby to have reached the god.30
The positive aspect of this association of gods with trees was that some trees became 
sacred and thereby became a place to take sanctuary because of the benevolent god 
residing there:
29 Kindred, G. The Sacred Tree. Nottingham: Glennie Kindred, 1995. p.6.
30 Philpot, 1994. op. cit. p. 25.
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However little benefit the votaries of trees and images derived from 
their observances apart from the subjective strength and solace that 
flow from every act of worship, there was at least one tangible 
service the gods could render them -  the right of sanctuary and 
asylum. For the sacred tree, sharing as it did in the protective 
power of the indwelling deity, offered an inviolable refuge to 
the persecuted, and the god’s forgiveness to the sinner who 
implored it.31
Ancient peoples venerated trees and often there were sacred groves. An example of 
sacred groves can be found in Celtic Britain. The evidence for these groves leads 
some environmentalists to assert that ancient people respected nature more than we do 
today and that our lack of respect is due to the introduction of Christianity. Ronald 
Hutton admits that superficially it appears that there is evidence for ancient people 
having respect for nature:
The Roman authors Lucan and Pomponius Mela wrote of Gaul 
as worshipping in groves of trees, and Tacitus and Dio Cassius 
attributed the same practice to the British...
Pagans all over Europe venerated certain groves of trees as sacred. 
The Romans believed that all natural things were associated with 
spirits which had to be respected, while the Irish Celts believed 
that every district was under the protection of a goddess, whose 
custody of the land had to be honoured. Christians on the other 
hand taught that the whole natural world had been given into the 
dominion of humans and cut down the old sacred groves.32
However, Hutton also points out that this first impression is soon revoked when 
archaeological and historical records are examined more closely:
The followers of Christ may have felled the groves, but they 
sanctified many springs in the name of their own faith and they 
stopped the slaughter of huge numbers of animals in the course
Hutton, R. The Pagan Religions o f  the Ancient British Isles: their nature and legacy. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1991 p. 252.
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of rituals.33
Although we can hold that humans identified closely with nature in pre- 
Christian societies and that nature was often viewed as benevolent, this is not the 
whole story. Early societies had to survive in environments about which they had 
little knowledge. Seed-time and harvest were important to them. Unfavourable 
weather conditions at planting or at harvest would prove disastrous and so certain 
rituals were carried out in order to secure a successful harvest, rituals that are now 
known to have nothing to do with the success or failure of a crop. Presumably, before 
there were settled farmers, hunters would have similar rituals to ensure a successful 
hunt and there is some evidence for this from ethnological studies. These rituals 
indicate that humans were fearful of their lack of control of the environment. In many 
early societies there were beliefs that mischievous spirits might destroy all their 
labours and ruin the harvest. Such fears are illustrated in the behaviour of tribal 
societies of today such as the Dasun of North Borneo:
The Dasun of North Borneo are an agricultural people, dependent 
on the rice harvest, and it is natural that many of their ceremonies 
are directed to securing this. These ceremonies are directed to 
protecting the crops against blight and other attacks by mischievous 
spirits, protecting the community from the results of offences they 
may have committed, and propitiating the rice souls. This we might 
call the spirit of the rice.34
Environmentalists often forget today how science and technology have freed 
us from the uncertainty and fear that haunted humans for centuries in the face of 
nature. In many societies peoples’ relationship to nature was in the form of
33 Ibid. p.252.
34 Ferguson, 1982. op. cit. p. 50.
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propitiation of harmful spirits. Rituals of appeasement of evil spirits or propitiation 
towards the gods have come down to us today in the folk festivals of modem Europe, 
although most of them have lost their original meaning. An illustration of this type of 
tradition is once again that of the Mayday celebrations held in Oxford every year. 
Originally these celebrations were for the securing of fertility and abundance for the 
coming year. They were a form of propitiation for the spirits of the Earth. As 
mentioned before, trees were often seen as the abodes of these spirits and so trees 
were worshipped in order that the spirit would give its blessing:
The gods or spirits of those far-off times had their habitation, or 
at least manifested their activity, in the tree. The gifts of rain 
and sunshine were in their hands. They made the crops to grow, 
the herds to multiply and women to give increase...
Eventually the ceremony of carrying the branch around the village, the 
primitive purpose of which was to make each house a sharer in the 
benevolent offices of the tree-spirit, degenerated into a meaningless 
observance, a pretext for indulging in festivities. But there can be no 
doubt that the securing of fertility and abundance together with the 
supply of rain and sunshine necessary therein, was originally the root 
idea of the world-wide spring observances.35
These spring observances, although initiated by fear of evil spirits, were in many 
respects harmless. However, sometimes the gods required the ultimate gift for 
appeasement. This was sacrifice. Even those who wish to perceive humans of earlier 
societies identifying with other living beings have to accept that this identification did 
not prevent the people of those societies from committing the wholesale slaughter of 
animals. Early societies killed for food but sacrifices demanded the death of many 
animals. Sometimes the sacrifice had to be human. The ancient Celts, together with 
other contemporary peoples, sacrificed humans as well as animals:
35 Philpot, 1994. op. cit. pp. 153-154.
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Unlike the Mediterranean world, both classical and Christian, 
where religious ceremonial was largely conducted in the 
stone-built temples and churches and cathedrals of 
ecclesiastical architecture - the Celts had practised their rituals, which 
were firmly believed to have involved human sacrifice, amid the 
organically sculpted cathedrals of forest and mountain. Most of their 
sanctuaries were simple clearings by way of human architecture, at 
most perhaps a timber-built shrine. These forest sanctuaries were out- 
of-the-way places where Druidical rites could be held in secrecy, away 
from the prying eyes of would be suppressors. In the first century A.D. 
Tacitus described the animal sacrifices of the forebears of the 
Germanic Alamanni which took place in a sacred wood: seven 
centuries later Abbot Pirman found it necessary to speak out 
against local propitiatory rites of prayer and magic still carried out 
in the same forest clearing.36
In these earlier societies gifts were given to show respect for another. The best were 
offered to the gods and a sacrifice was often seen to be the best gift. Fear led to 
wholesale killing and even murder. Evidence of sacrifices can be found throughout 
the world amongst these earlier societies including the North American Indians as 
well as in the East. Sacrifices were particularly evident in the late Vedic period of 
India:
The maintenance of the cosmic order was now seen as being 
dependent on the due and proper performance of the sacrificial 
ritual.. .Since prosperity and good fortune were believed to be 
dependent on the sacrifice, a threatened scarcity of cattle or 
food would lead to an increase in the number of sacrifices offered 
and in aggressive activity on the part of the warriors. Success in the 
latter enterprises also required sacrificial offering beforehand so there 
would be further reason for increasing the frequency of sacrifice.37
36 Douglas, A. The Beast Within, London: Chapmans, 1992. p. 76.
37 Ling, T. A History o f  Religion East and West: an introduction and interpretation. London: 
MacMillan, 1968. pp. 50-51.
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The lack of control humans had over the environment resulted in fear and belief in the 
supernatural. Everyday life involved using strange rituals to ward off ‘evil spirits’. 
This does not suggest that humans in these earlier societies lived more in harmony 
with nature. It gives a picture of more alienation than we have today when we can 
enjoy the things of nature without fear.
Furthermore, there is evidence that ancient people had just as great a 
disposition for destroying and manipulating the natural world as humans have today. 
In Britain alone there is evidence for humans wilfully damaging the environment 
throughout the Mesolithic, Neolithic and Bronze Ages. Hutton describes the 
Mesolithic Age:
Once again, humans responded to the alteration of their environment 
not merely by adapting to it but by challenging it. They domesticated 
the dog and used fire to remove woodland on a larger scale than 
before. Where the natural ecosystem was fragile, the trees never grew 
back as the people moved on, and heaths and bogs came into being. In 
the clearings thev created, humans seem to have penned, if not bred, 
cattle and deer.3
The picture Hutton gives us of earlier societies’ attitude to nature is not one of ‘let 
beings be’. Nor is it one opposed to domination of nature. It is much more likely that 
humans have always exploited nature as far as their technology would allow them. If 
there were less damage done to the environment before Christianity then it would 
simply be the result of low populations (kept low by disease and famine) and less 
advanced technology. Environmental damage was happening long before Christianity 
across the whole of Europe gnd parts of Africa too:
38 Hutton, 1991. op. cit. p. 14.
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.. .the Iron Age Celts in what became England may have had their holy 
stands of trees, but that did not stop them from clearing virtually all the 
large areas of forest spared by their predecessors, especially in the 
midlands. Under the pagan Roman empire, the remaining woods were 
stripped from much of the North African coast, producing an 
ecological catastrophe when most of the ploughed up soil was washed 
into the Mediterranean. It seems to have been the same period that the 
lion was exterminated in Europe, the elephant and the hippopotamus 
in North Africa and the bear in England. Christianity was absolutely 
irrelevant to the process.39
When studying the lifestyle of earlier societies it may at first appear that humans at 
those times lived more harmoniously with nature than we do today. However, this is 
to overlook the fear that was often behind their every action towards nature and also 
that they were not adverse to changing their environment sometimes to the great harm 
of other species. From the knowledge we have of their ritual and belief systems they 
evidently felt a need to control their environment in whatever way they thought might 
have an effect. This often involved sacrifice. It is no coincidence that Christianity, 
being a more intellectual approach to spiritual matters, was a background in which 
science could eventually flourish and humans could begin to control the environment 
in a more productive way without the use of empty superstitions:
Science is possible only because we live in an ordered universe which 
complies with simple mathematical laws. The job of the scientist is to 
study, catalogue and relate the orderliness in nature not to question its 
origin. But theologians have long argued that the order in the physical 
world is evidence for God. If this is true, then science and religion 
acquire a common purpose in revealing God’s work. Indeed it has 
been argued that the emergence of Western scientific culture was 
actually stimulated by the Christian, Judaic tradition, with its 
emphasis on God’s intentional organization of the cosmos -  an 
organization which could be discovered by the use of rational 
scientific inquiry.40
39 Ibid. pp. 252-253.
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In other words, first comes the concept of a divine intelligence that gives order to the 
world before the concept that the world can be understood by searching for the laws 
underlying that order. It cannot be denied that science has helped humans to be able 
to live healthy, fulfilled lives without the fear of famine and disease.
Further, it is also no coincidence that within Christian doctrines the Christ was 
seen to be the final sacrifice to end all sacrifices. Christianity brought with it the 
abolition of all irrational fears and emptied nature of its ‘evil spirits’ that needed to be 
appeased. Both Christianity and science have been able to diminish the fears of 
‘everyman’ and this positive aspect of them both should not be forgotten.
Merchant accuses science of destroying an organic, female concept of nature 
and developing a cold, mechanistic one. There may be some truth in this 
interpretation, but it tends to forget that science has improved the standards of living 
for both male and female. Science, which has done so much to improve the material 
situation of so many people, cannot be blamed for environmental problems. The 
problem must be in the way we use science; and the way we use science rests within a 
metaphysical background of how we understand nature and our relationship to it. The 
myths that humans before civilisation, Christianity, science or industrialization, lived 
more harmoniously with nature should not be accepted. We need not accuse any past 
events for our present problems.
It is more important to discover the reason why humans are not motivated to 
solve the problems of the environment now and this may be because of our present 
concept of nature. What is our concept of nature now? I shall now look at the history 
of the concept of nature in order to answer this question. Because this is a thesis in
40 Davis, P. God and the New Physics. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1990. p. 144.
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philosophy I shall be researching into the intellectual thinkers of previous times and 
the concepts of nature they present in their writings. The assumption is that in the 
main intellectual thinkers reflect the attitudes of the societies in which they find 
themselves, as well as being influential in the moulding of those attitudes. It is 
presumably a two-way process.
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Chapter 2 
Ancient Greece and Rome
1. Teleological Explanations of Nature
I will start my investigation into the history of the concept of nature with the 
ancient Greeks and Romans. The close identity of humans to non-humans is shown 
within the myths of Ancient Greece. Ovid’s Metamorphose gives a more 
sophisticated account of tales that had appeared in various forms in ancient 
civilizations. The accounts of the metamorphosing of human to nonhuman indicate 
that the belief existed that humans and non-humans were closely connected.
From archaeological records it is also evident that the Greeks and Romans had 
respect for nature. They believed that deities inhabited specific features of the 
landscape:
Rivers had gods, springs had nymphs called naiads, and lakes 
had limniads. There were oreads for mountains, napaeae for 
valleys, and leimoniads for meadows.1
There were also sacred places which were dedicated to a god, and sometimes a temple 
was built there. Romans inherited much of the religious attitude towards nature from 
the Greeks, but an agricultural element was added so that there were gods and 
goddesses for the spirit of every major growing crop, such as Ceres for grain, Liber 
for wine etc.
Yet in spite of their propensity to reverence wild places and natural processes, 
the people of the Ancient World continued the environmental damage in the same
1 Hughes, J.D. P an’s Travail: environmental problems o f  the Ancient Greeks and Romans. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins, 1996. p.49.
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way as earlier societies. There was the clearing of land for agriculture; overgrazing 
by cattle, sheep, goats and swine; growing urbanization and deforestation, often 
followed by erosion and siltation. The damage done was often irreversible:
Much more permanent and damaging was the de-vegetation of 
steep slopes by logging and grazing and their resultant 
vulnerability to rains, which are often torrential in the 
Mediterranean winter. Erosion swept away fertile soil, leaving 
rocky slopes where trees could scarcely have grown even if they 
had been protected. Silt, sand and gravel from the mountains was 
deposited in lowlands and along the coasts, choking ports and creating 
poorly-drained, silt-clogged marshlands. Deforestation, over-grazing 
and erosion produced the most visible, far-reaching and relatively 
permanent changes in the Mediterranean landscape of all those 
caused by human activities in ancient times.2
This dual attitude towards nature, on the one hand showing reverence towards it and 
on the other being destructive, was also evident in the ancients’ treatment of wildlife. 
Wild animals in sanctuaries were preserved as sacred to the gods and to kill them 
incurred punishment. But at the same time this did not exclude other animals from 
being hunted both for food and pleasure. Many wild animals were killed in the Roman 
arenas, for example.
The clearance of land for agriculture also had its effect on the populations of 
wildlife. Lakes and marshes were drained and forests cut down. Greeks and Romans 
continually exploited wildlife as if there would always be plenty to replace those 
animals they destroyed. Unfortunately the exploitation of wildlife had irreversible 
consequences as species were made extinct. Domesticated animals such as goats and 
cats were in competition with natural species as well as destroying the vegetation on
2 Ibid. p.90.
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which they depended. The result was depletion and extinction of wildlife and an 
impoverishment of the environment.
Mining and urbanization were polluting factors as much as they are today:
Air pollution resulted not only from wood and charcoal smoke, but 
also from the fumes of various noxious substances that were heated 
or burned. Speaking of metallurgists in Spain, Strabo observes: They 
build their silver-smelting furnaces with high chimneys, so that the 
gas from the ore may be carried high into the air, for it is heavy and 
deadly. 3
Accounts from ancient Greece and Rome reveal that there were no reservations at that 
time about the exploitation of nature. Certainly domination over nature and 
exploitation of wildlife was well established long before Christianity influenced 
people. Urbanization and civilization did not change this exploitation but it did 
change people’s awareness of it.
As with many other areas of knowledge, the complex attitude we now have 
towards nature has its roots in ancient Greece and Rome. Many of the ideas found in 
environmental writings today were first expressed in Ancient Greek writings, 
including nostalgia for a ‘Golden Age’. In this thesis I cannot attempt to look at this 
area in any depth but must necessarily offer only generalizations of major themes of 
ancient times.
Habgood traces back the three main meanings for the term ‘nature’ (as 
outlined in the introduction to this part of my thesis) to the Ancient Greeks. For the 
first definition of ‘nature’ meaning ‘the character or quality of something’ the Greeks 
used the word ‘phusis’ which had a similar meaning to the Latin ‘natura’. This term in
3 Ibid. pp. 105-106.
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its generalized form (which is the second meaning of ‘nature’) was the study of 
natural philosophy, ‘that which makes everything what it is’.
Whatever the precise reasons, the Classical Age began the search 
for intellectual coherence and the concept of Nature as a unifying 
force, an energising ground of things, was one way of expressing 
the intelligibility of the universe. It becomes possible to talk about 
Nature doing this or that, or even to personify it, as in the phrase 
‘Mother Nature’ which clearly has religious overtones.. .At a still 
later stage the idea of Nature as somehow underlying reality or 
cause of things could undergird the concept of the laws of nature, 
whether scientific or moral.
The third meaning of ‘nature’ is simply the entire physical world and the Greeks 
seemed to have been the first to give the same name ‘phusis’ to the whole of physical 
reality, as well as to the unifying power which they saw as underlying that reality and 
the particular character of each part of it.
The concept of nature at any time is closely intertwined with cosmology, 
theology and metaphysics. Concepts of nature involve all aspects of humans’ 
awareness of themselves in the cosmos. The inevitable question of why there is what 
there is brings in problems of creation and a divine purpose:
If we seek after the nature of God, we must consider the nature 
of man and the earth, and if we look at the earth, questions of 
divine purpose in its creation and the role of mankind on it 
inevitably arise.5
The Greek and Roman concept of nature evolved from those of the primordial 
Mediterranean world. In ancient belief systems the Earth was perceived as a mother.
4 Habgood, J. The Concept o f  Nature. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002. p.4.
5 Glacken, C. Traces on the Rhodian Shore: nature and culture in western thought from ancient times 
to the end o f  the eighteenth century. Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1967. p.35.
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Nature was then understood to be about fertility and about caring and giving in 
abundance. Philo the Jew gives a view of the background to Greek and Roman 
thought on nature:
Philo the Jew, living in the rich mixture of Hellenistic Alexandria 
at the beginning of the Christian era, saw this already old conception 
clearly and believed in it. Nature has bestowed on every 
mother as most essential endowment teeming breasts thus preparing in 
advance for the child that is to be bom. The earth also, as we all know, 
is a mother, for which reason the earliest men thought fit to call her 
‘Demeter’, combining the name ‘mother’ with that of ‘earth’, for as 
Plato says earth does not imitate women, but women earth. Poets quite 
rightly are in the habit of calling earth ‘All-mother’ and ‘Fruitbearer’ 
and ‘Pandora’ or ‘Giveall’, inasmuch as she is the originating cause of 
existence and continuance in existence of all animals and plants alike. 
Fitly therefore on earth also, most fertile of mothers, did Nature 
bestow, by way of breasts, streams of rivers and springs, to the end 
that both the plants might be watered and all animals might have 
abundance to drink.6
However, not all of nature was depicted as kindly in these ancient myths. The gods of 
Greek mythology were personifications of nature and they could be either kindly or 
threatening. They acted wilfully for their own amusement, often adding misfortunes 
to the lot of humans.
The dual aspect of nature of being either kindly or wild and threatening is later 
expressed in more reasoned accounts of nature. Often accounts will emphasize either 
one or the other aspect of nature. Linked to these two ideas is the further dichotomy 
of order and chaos. Nature is perceived either as an organized harmonious whole, or 
a chaotic system happening by chance. This particular confusing aspect of nature is 
reflected in the pre-socratic writers.
The Ionian philosophers are considered to be the first philosophers. They can 
also be considered as the first scientists. Their approach to understanding the world
6 Ibid. p. 14.
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around differs in certain respects to mythological explanations. They leave behind the 
stories of wilful gods and explain the world through experience and reason. In their 
accounts of the cosmos we can take ‘nature’ to be ‘all that is’ as in the third definition 
of ‘nature’. One of the major concerns of these first philosophers was the apparent 
chaos of nature. But in a chaotic system nothing can be known for certain: all events 
are random. The Ionian philosophers sought for order in the chaos, a pattern, a rule, 
an underlying ‘something’ that could help to make sense of everything, or at least 
provide a means of knowing with more certainty:
They looked for something permanent persisting through the 
chaos of apparent change; and they thought that they would find it by 
asking the question: What is the world made of? The world as our 
senses perceive it seems restless and unstable. It exhibits continual 
and apparently haphazard change. Natural growth may proceed or 
may be thwarted by blind external forces.. .Philosophy started in the 
faith that beneath this apparent chaos there exists a hidden permanence 
and unity, discernible if not by sense, then by mind.7
In their rudimentary scientific search for an explanation or cause of nature the later 
Greek philosophers came across a major metaphysical problem: was the universe an 
ordered living whole or was it the outcome of random mechanical events?:
.. .throughout their philosophy of science we may discern a 
preoccupation with the question how much, if at all, it is appropriate 
for the rational investigator of the universe’s inhabitants and 
processes to seek to explain them in terms of the ends, goals and 
purposes they subserve. Is the universe a complete structure, unified 
by the way in which the various functions of its parts are conducive 
to its overall operation (is it, then, as Plato and the Stoics believed, a 
kind of animal, and under the direct control of God)? Or is it merely 
the functional outcome of an agglomeration of initially random and 
undirected mechanical particular interactions (as the Atomists were to 
argue)? Or is there, as Aristotle held, some coherent, middle way
7 Guthrie, W.K.C. The Greek Philosophers from  Thales to Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1989. p.24.
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between the view that the cosmos is the work of God on the one hand 
and the purely mechanistic physics of chance on the other? Can 
Nature itself, intrinsically, exhibit a type of purposiveness which 
serves to explain its regularity and stability without appealing to some 
super-intelligence.8
These two distinct approaches to explaining nature divide the Greek philosophers 
into those who accepted a teleological explanation of nature and those that gave a 
non-teleological explanation. The acceptance of a teleological explanation or a non- 
teleological explanation of nature influences and changes the concept of nature 
significantly I shall first deal with those philosophers who were led by their 
processes of thinking to a teleological explanation of nature.
The Ionians solution to the problem of finding permanence in the chaos was to 
suggest that nature was made of one basic substance. Thales suggested water and 
Anaximenes air. Anaximander had a slightly different approach and suggested the 
‘apeiron’ -  the boundless or unlimited. From the ‘apeiron’ all things came. What is 
interesting in these early philosophies is that the thinkers were first aware of chaos, of 
illusion and change. In order to explain the world they sought an underlying 
something. They were the first scientists because they wanted to find the basic truths 
about the world in terms of which an account of it can be structured. In general a 
scientific explanation will pick out those more fundamental facts about the structure 
of the universe on the basis of which things can be explained. Science is inherently 
reductionist and the Ionians tried to ‘reduce’ the complexity of world to one basic 
substance which could be the explanation for everything else. In this way they could 
find some order with which to understand the world. This search for hidden order has
8 Hankinson, R. J. Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
pp. 5-6.
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been the goal of science. The success of science rests on the assumption that there is 
some order to be discovered if there is to be any knowledge at all. Experience of the 
fickleness of nature that controlled the lives of humans, as represented by the gods of 
ancient Greece and other civilizations, led to this need to find order and to assume 
there was an order to find.
Pythagoras moved away from the search for an underlying substance to the 
assumption that the essence of real identity of a thing is not determined by the stuff of 
which it is made, but by its structure. Geometrical structures -  the abstract shape of 
things -  seemed to answer all the awkward questions that the Ionian philosophers 
could not deal with in their theories of matter. The form, or pattern of things, seemed 
to provide better answers. Mathematics led the Pythagoreans to the idea of perfect 
harmony within the cosmos. Pythagoras applied his discoveries in the field of 
acoustics to other areas of nature and the history o f science has shown this to have 
been an useful insight. Often it is the underlying pattern that helps towards 
understanding how the world works, for example in atomic physics or in the basic 
building blocks of living things such as proteins. The Pythagoreans turned their 
discovery into a mystic belief: the cosmos was one of order, perfection and beauty.
Through Heraclitus’ work comes the idea that knowledge cannot be obtained 
only through the senses but must be linked to reason. The only factor in the world not 
subject to change is the Logos, an objective overall controlling force which 
determines the nature of the world. The world can only be known as far as the souls 
of humans are part of the divine Logos. The Logos is supreme reason, a divine law 
for everything in the world to follow:
This logos holds always but humans always prove unable to
understand it, both before hearing it and when they have first
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heard it. For though all things come to be in accordance with 
this logos, humans are like the inexperienced when they experience 
such words and deeds as I set out, distinguishing each in 
accordance with its nature and saying how it is. But other 
people fail to notice what they do when awake, just as they 
forget what they do while asleep.( Sextus Empiricus. Against 
the mathematicians 7.132 = 22B1 )9
Those who understand the Logos can understand the workings of the cosmos, but not 
everyone can do so if locked into the illusions of change. The Stoics were influenced 
by Heraclitus’ physics and metaphysics. Heraclitus’ philosophy presents the world as 
one that is composed of intelligible processes which humans are capable of 
understanding. Reason is required to understand the world beyond mere appearances.
Anaxagoras also claims that the senses are misleading. Knowledge is 
possible only through the understanding contributed by the Mind. Mind, or Intellect, 
sets everything in order:
The rest have a portion of everything, but Mind is unlimited and 
self-ruled and is mixed with no thing, but is alone and by itself...
For it is the finest of all things and the purest, and it has all judgment 
about everything and the greatest power. And Mind rules all things 
that possess life -  both the larger and the smaller. Simplicus, 
commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. 164.24-25; 156.13-15710
These early philosophers saw the need for order if there was to be any understanding 
of the world about them. They related this order to mind and intellect and assumed 
that there must be some supreme mind that first gave this order.
Plato also believed that this order was not imposed by us but was an 
underlying necessity of nature. Trapped in our senses, he believed that the order is
9 Curd, P. ed. A Presocratics Reader. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996. p.30.
10 Ibid. pp.56-57.
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not always obvious to us, but that it is an important aspect of nature and it is our duty 
to try and understand it. The senses confuse us so we can only find the order through 
the use of our intellect. If the intellect is so important to discover the order, Plato 
argues, then the natural world must be ordered by intelligence. The outline of his 
theory is in the dialogues Phaedo, Timaeus, Republic and Laws.
According to Plato’s theory originally there was disorderly material but this 
was gathered up into kinds. The state of the natural world without the ordering would 
be chaos, so that we would be unable to make sense of it. Plato assumed that there 
had always been matter but that at some time it must have been ordered and this 
ordering cannot have been arbitrary but, being rational, had to be an intelligible 
necessity.
For a thing to be rationally ordered, it must be possible to see that it 
had to be ordered like that. If I arrange things in one way, then my 
choice of arrangement is arbitrary and not rational. Therefore, the 
order which is imposed, the kinds that there are and the relation 
between them, is an order which has to be -  not products of the 
ordering, or its disposition would be arbitrary and not rational, but 
intelligible necessities given as much to the supreme mind which 
orders as to our minds which try to understand.11
Although Plato believed that the original chaos was now ordered he also held that the 
natural world does not conform perfectly to the order imposed upon it. It is like a 
clock that has run down and so has lost some of the original order:
We live in a running down phase, and that means that the universe 
as we know it ‘remembers’, but only imperfectly, the original 
divine order.12
11 Crombie, I.M. An Examination o f  P la to ’s Doctrines: II. Plato on knowledge and reality. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. p. 154.
12 Ibid. p. 155.
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In this way Plato could account for the immediate chaos that nature presents to the 
senses and the ability for humans, through the use of reason, to find the original order. 
His epistemology requires this underlying order which can be discovered through 
reason; otherwise no certain knowledge is possible.
Plato inherited the mathematical discoveries of Pythagoras. Pythagoras sought 
to understand the world through his knowledge of mathematical forms. Plato further 
developed this idea with his theory of Forms. The theory of Forms applied to all parts 
of nature. Form or structure, not matter, was therefore was what really constituted the 
nature of things. But:
.. .Form is not perceptible like the things that go to make up the 
natural world; it is intelligible.13
It was inevitable that from this thinking Plato should discredit knowledge obtained 
through perception. Within his theory perceptible things could not be real because 
they were subject to change; they were illusory. The unchanging Form or Idea was 
the object of true knowledge. Reality is beyond what we can perceive and can only be 
obtained through the intellect:
It is for Plato a proof of the unreality of things which go to make up 
the natural world that they are liable to change: not merely that 
they can be changed by the action upon them of external forces, 
but they change of themselves and thus show themselves to be 
inherently transitory...
If Plato calls the sun unreal, he does not mean that when we say 
‘There is the sun’ there is in fact nothing there at all; what he 
means is that the thing which is really there does not possess firmly 
and unconcealedly the qualities which when we call it the sun we
13 Collingwood, R.G. The Idea o f  Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945. p.54
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think it to possess; these qualities it only enjoys for the time being; 
they are not its inalienable property; we think they are but we are 
deceived.14
Knowledge was possible because there was an order in the universe to be found. If 
there was no order, or pattern, there would be nothing certain to know and we would 
be victims to our unreliable senses.
Looking for order within the cosmos led the Greek philosophers to the concept 
of a designer. For them order within nature also meant beauty and harmony and they 
concluded from this that there must be a creator or, at least, a designer. The Greeks 
mainly held that there had always been matter, but they argued that if there is order in 
nature then there must be a mind, or some being, that had given that order. The 
Pythagoreans perceived nature as permeated by an intelligent mind as did Diogenes of 
Apollonia:
Intelligence is required, he said, for the underlying substance 
‘so to be divided up that it has measures of all things -  of 
winter and summer and day and rain and wind and fair weather’.
The argument is based on the weather and seasonal and diurnal 
change.15
That intelligence is required within the cosmos appears also in Plato’s 
philosophy. In the Timaeus Plato argues that nothing comes into existence without a 
cause and that therefore everything that exists must be caused ultimately by a 
‘creator’. Plato gives an explanation for why the divine craftsman made the universe:
Let us therefore state the reason why the framer of this universe of
14 Ibid. pp.56-57
15 Glacken, 1967. op. cit. p.39.
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change framed it at all. He was good, and what is good had no 
particle of envy in it; being therefore without envy he wished all 
things to be as like himself as possible. This is as valid a principle 
for the origin of the world of change as we shall discover from the 
wisdom of men, and we should accept it. God, therefore wishing that 
all things should be good, and as far as possible nothing be imperfect, 
and finding the visible universe in a state not of rest but of 
inharmonious and disorderly motion, reduced it to order from 
disorder, as he judged that order was in every way better.16
The ‘creator’ is good and therefore has no envy. He wishes that everything should be 
good. It is not that the ‘creator’ creates matter but that he is an organizer, working 
with pre-existing materials. The world is good because it exhibits structure and order, 
the attributes of Mind or intelligence. The Greeks were fascinated by the way their 
own intellect could make sense of the world around them. If using their intelligence 
enabled them to find order then, they reasoned, the order must be put there by an 
intellect in the first place. There could not be order without intellect to create it. 
Furthermore Plato believed that the ‘creator’ had given intelligence to the world but 
this was only possible if the world has a ‘soul’. ‘Soul’ is a complex word with 
various meanings in Greek, but it seems to be for Plato the seat of reason:
It is impossible for the best to produce anything but the highest. 
When he considered, therefore, that in all the realm of visible 
nature, taking each thing as a whole, nothing without intelligence 
is to be found that is superior to anything with it, and that 
intelligence is impossible without soul, in fashioning the universe 
he implanted reason in soul and soul in body, and so ensured 
that his work should be by nature highest and best. And so the 
most likely account must say that this world came to be in very 
truth, through god’s providence, a living being with soul and 
intelligence.17
16 Plato. Timaeus and Critias. Translated with an introduction and an appendix on Atlantis by H.D.P. 
Lee. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1971. p.42,
17 Ibid. p.42
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Plato accepts the Pythagorean belief that the world, or nature as a whole, is permeated 
with soul. It is because of soul that intelligence is possible for reason is found within 
the soul, and because of reason the order that the ‘creator’ has given to the world can 
be found by humans. There is order because of intelligence and only through 
intelligence can order be found. Reason within the soul is the tool for making 
discoveries about the world.
Aristotle was also concerned with order and with form rather than matter. But 
he criticized Plato’s version of the Forms for he was not concerned with the problems 
of epistemology and so was able to embrace change and movement as real rather than 
illusory. As a philosopher of his time he was trying to come to terms with the 
idealism of Plato as well as the materialism of other philosophers. He accepts that 
within nature there is always change and movement and that they are eternal. He 
rejects Plato’s ideal Forms while still emphasizing that form is more important than 
matter.
Aristotle’s philosophy does not lead him to a ‘creator’ in the sense that Plato 
devised, but to a ‘First Mover’. In Aristotle’s philosophy the world of nature is a 
world of self-moving things. Like Plato and many other Greek thinkers, Aristotle 
perceives nature as imbued with a soul. All of nature has movement, growth and 
change:
Nature, then, is ‘innate impulse to movement’. That this exists is
1 0
obvious from experience and needs no proof.
Aristotle follows Plato and rejects the Ionian theories concerned solely with matter. 
He promotes the idea of the form as identical to the nature of things:
18 Ross, D. Aristotle. London: Methuen, 1964. p.67
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This Aristotle holds to be more properly the nature of a thing than 
is its material, since a thing is what it is, has its nature more fully 
when it exists actually, when it attains its form, than when it 
it exists potentially, ie. when the mere matter for it exists.19
The ability for change or movement within nature, such as growth, Aristotle 
understands as due to the form:
He habitually identifies nature as power of movement with 
nature as form. The form or mode of structure of a thing -  
eg. of an animal -  is just that by virtue of which it moves, 
grows and alters and comes to rest when it has reached the 
terminus of its movement.20
Aristotle links the first meaning of ‘nature’ to the second generalized meaning. 
Individual substances have natures. The natures of things are provided by those 
characteristics inherent to them and determine how each substance behaves. 
Aristotle’s explanation of nature is deeply teleological:
Each finite substance, having its own nature, has its own ideal state. 
This is especially clear (and poignant) in living things. Biological 
substances have ideal states toward which they develop-if they can. 
they have individual goods to pursue. The acom is self-directed 
toward its fulfilled state in becoming a productive oak tree, under 
fortunate circumstances. This is what is meant by having a distinct 
nature, an essential character bringing about internal self­
development.21
19 Ibid. p.68
20 Ibid. p.68.
21 Ferre. F. Being and Value. Albany: State University o f  New York, 1996. p.60.
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Each individual in nature has a goal which it attempts to achieve. Aristotle tackles the 
problem of change with his famous four causes: material cause, formal cause, 
efficient cause and final cause.
When discussing the whole of nature in the generalized second meaning of 
‘nature’, Aristotle defines it as also having a nature like everything else within nature, 
because it too has a final cause. Nature has a purpose. However purpose is not given 
from outside of nature, as Plato assumed. Nature is both agent and patient at the same 
time. Since nature is self-moving then there does not need to be an external power to 
account for changes. Like previous Greek thinkers Aristotle assumes that matter has 
always existed: nature is a self-causing and self-existing process. He did not have a 
concept of laws of nature as his emphasis is on growth and development, processes 
from the potential to the actual, but his philosophy did need a first unmoved mover 
who begins all the processes:
Aristotle, identifying God with the forms, conceives one single 
unmoved mover with a self-contained activity of its own, namely 
self-knowledge.. .thinking the forms which are the categories of its 
own thought, and since that activity is the highest and best possible 
inspiring the whole of nature with desire for it and a nisus towards 
reproducing it, everything in its degree and to the best of its power.22
The first unmoved mover gives nature the forms through its own thinking and is the 
‘creator’ of all movement as everything within nature is striving towards the 
fulfilment of its own form as given by the unmoved mover.
The First Unmoved Mover never changes. It is pure actuality without the need 
for change. Aristotle equates pure actuality with thought and this ‘thought’ is the 
final cause to which everything aspires. In this way the First Unmoved Mover is a
22 Ibid. p.68
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‘creator’ at least in the sense that it is the ultimate nature which gives meaning to 
everything else. The First Unmoved Mover’s activity is simply thinking because 
there is no distinction between thought and the object of thought with the final cause:
The intrinsic object of thought is what is intrinsically best, and the 
intrinsic object of absolute thought is the absolutely best. And in 
apprehending its object thought thinks itself. For it too becomes 
an object for itself by its contact with, and thinking of, its object, 
so that the thought and its object are one and the same.23
Aristotle’s First Unmoved Mover is, like a deity, the reason for all, as the harmony 
and good order in the world ultimately depends on it. Everything is striving to imitate 
it, to aim for the eternal and divine, but each in their own way. Individuals die, but by 
the process of reproduction the species are maintained forever. These rhythms of life 
and ceaseless interchanges arise from the stars emulating the divine’s activity by their 
eternal movement. Humans alone of all creation possess something of the divine 
ability to engage in pure thought.
Within the philosophy of the two great thinkers of Ancient Greece is a search 
for order in the universe, and from this search comes the logical step of there being 
some first Being that gives order or sets it in motion. These are teleological concepts 
of nature. Plato perceived nature to be a rational scheme in which everything has a 
purpose because the world is a perfect image of the whole of which all animals, both 
individuals and species, are parts. Aristotle’s concept of a well-ordered universe also 
leads him to assume that everything has a purpose as everything strives towards its 
best possible state.
23 Ibid. p.374.
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The teleological concept of nature was most strongly developed within the 
philosophy of the Stoics. They linked the idea of a purposive world with that of a 
Creator. The concept of nature was interwoven with the concept of God. Their 
thinking is important for the influence it later had on Christian thinking.
The Stoics used the term ‘nature’ in a number of different but interrelating
ways:
First some examples of the use of the term in Stoicism: (1) the power 
or principle which shapes and creates all things (SVF ii 937); (2) the 
power or principle which unifies and gives coherence to the world 
(SVF ii 549,1211); (3) fiery breath (or artistic fire) self-moving and 
generative (SVF ii 913); (4) necessity and destiny (SVF ii 913); (5) 
God, providence, craftsman, right reason (SVF 1 158, 176,iii 323). 4
The Stoics’ universe is a materialist, pantheistic one. Stoics linked the concepts of 
reason, or logos, god, necessity and nature. Many of these ideas were a development 
on those of the Ancient Greeks. The original idea from the Greeks where reason, or 
an intelligence, is needed so that there can be order is now expressed fully in the 
concept of a god. Intelligence permeates throughout the Universe in the form of a 
particularly fine substance, the pneuma, and this intelligence the Stoics equate with 
god.
The identification of god and nature led to an ethical code. Everything was 
interdependent and therefore to live a good life was to live in accordance with nature. 
In this way each could relate to the other as well as to the whole cosmos. As reason 
governs the cosmos, and so a good life was also one that followed reason; in this way 
the individual could feel they belonged to the whole:
24 Long, A.A. Hellenistic Philosophy; Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. London: Duckworth, 1974. p. 148. 
(SVF = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta.)
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In Stoicism to be a good and happy man is to be related in a certain 
way to Nature or God. The psychological need to relate -  to oneself 
to one’s society, to the world -  was sensed acutely by the Stoics. Like 
William James, or Jung, or Fromm, they detected an all-inclusive 
desire to ‘feel at home in the universe’. The Stoic philosophy of 
nature provides a cosmic orientation for personal identity which, far 
from neglecting human relationships, makes them implicit in life 
according to reason. ‘We have come into being for co-operation’. 
(Marcus ii. 1): ‘the good of rational being consists in communal 
association’, (v.16). 5
The whole of the universe is endowed with sensibility as well as with reason and 
intelligence and so, the Stoics reasoned, it must be god. Because of the existence of a 
creator the whole of the universe from the beginning of time is under the care of 
divine providence. The divine providence guides and directs nature so that everything 
is as it ought to be:
I affirm then, that the universe and all its parts were established and 
set in array in the beginning and have been administered through all 
intervening time by divine providence. We Stoics as a rule discuss 
this hypothesis under three general heads of which the first has to do 
with proof of the existence of the gods. If that be conceded, it follows 
logically that the universe is guided and directed by their wisdom. 
Under the second head, we seek to prove that all things are subject to 
the power of sentient Nature and that by her the affairs of the cosmos 
are conducted with supreme effectiveness. If this point be regarded as 
satisfactorily demonstrated, then it must be admitted that everything in 
the universe sprang from animate elements.
Under the third head we deal with the admiration which fills our 
hearts as we contemplate the celestial and terrestrial worlds.26
The Stoics believed that they lived in a world where everything is rightly ordered. 
The good life was then to accept the ways of nature because whatever happened was
25 Long, 1974. op. cit..p. 163.
26 Cicero, M. T. Brutus; On the Nature o f  the Gods; On Divination; On Duties. Translated by H.M. 
Poteat with an introduction by R. McKeo. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1950. p. 255
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as it should be. This is in one sense a complacent philosophy, and those who 
followed it would have been calm in all circumstances. It is a teleological explanation 
of nature and leads to a positive concept of nature. The wonder of nature is that 
everything fits so well together that nothing could have happened by chance: it has all 
been planned with purpose. This leads to admiration. But because the Stoic 
philosophy excludes chance it is at the same time a deterministic and fatalist 
philosophy. The Stoics attempted to maintain human freewill in their philosophy, but 
freewill did not fit easily into a nature that was governed by Providence.
The important point to notice about these thinkers of ancient times is their 
belief in human reason which is capable of perceiving order in nature and which 
allows humans to understand and to a certain extent control nature. Following from 
this was their belief that if humans had reason to reveal order in the world around 
them, then there must be an order amongst the seeming chaos of sense perceptions to 
be found which could only be there because it had been created by a higher reason 
and intelligence. In this way the search for order led to the concept of a god that 
maintained everything in nature. For the Stoics, God is the underlying intelligence 
within nature. The positive aspect of the teleological explanation of nature is that 
nature is perceived as a whole in which every part has a purpose in the whole, and that 
includes a role for humans. I shall be returning later in my thesis to teleological 
explanations of nature, but in the next section I shall be looking at non-teleological 
explanations of nature in the Ancient World.
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2. Non-teleological Concepts of Nature
Greek and Roman philosophers also postulated a non-teleological concept of 
nature. The pre-socratic philosopher, Empedocles, understood the world to be made of 
four elements: earth, air, water and fire. These elements were driven by Love and 
Strife and were forever changing from the One to Many. Love tries to unite all things 
into the One while Strife breaks things into the Many so that there is constant battle 
between them. At the present time it is Strife that is more successful. All living 
things are made by chance. Love brings them together into whole beings but Strife is 
always separating them so that monsters can sometimes be formed. It is only by 
chance that living beings can survive:
But I shall turn back to the path of song I traced before, leading off 
from one argument: when strife had reached the lowest depth of the 
whirl and love comes into27 the centre of the eddy, in her then all these 
things unite to be one only; not immediately, but coming together 
from different directions at will. And, as they were being mixed, 
countless types of mortal things poured forth, but many, which Strife 
still restrained from above, stayed unmixed, alternating with them 
which were combining, for it had not yet perfectly and completely 
stood out as far as the farthest limits of the circle, but part remained 
within and part had gone out of the frame. And in proportion as it 
continually ran on ahead, a mild, immortal onrush of perfect love was 
continually pursuing it. Immediately what were formerly accustomed 
to be immortal became mortal, and formerly unmixed things were in a 
mixed state, arising to the exchanging of their ways. And, as they 
were being mixed, countless types of mortal things poured forth, filled 
with all kinds of form, a wonder to see.27
In Empedocles’ account of creation there is no Mind or Intellect that gives order to
matter. There is no designer or creator but two impersonal forces at war with one
another. There is instead a destruction of the One to make the Many and all that come
into being adopt all sorts of forms and do so purely by chance. This account is in
27 Wright, M. R. ed. Empedocles: the extant fragments. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981. 
Fragment 47 (35).
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some ways a precursor of modem day evolutionary theory where natural selection and 
survival of the fittest are the chance elements that bring about the many different 
species. It is an account of the beginning of all things that excludes a teleological 
explanation. Nothing can be described as having a purpose since nothing was 
designed for anything.
Leucippus, possibly a pupil of Zeno, was the first to put forward the theory of 
atomism together with his pupil Democritus. Modem atomism can only loosely be 
attributed to these two early philosophers, as modem science relies heavily on 
mathematics and the particles of science today are thought by some to have only a 
functional role. The atomist theory of Democritus is purely philosophical and not 
scientific.
Democritus, according to Aristotle, believed the world to be made of space , or 
the void, and small physical matter, the atoms. These atoms are of various shapes and 
sizes. Visible matter is made of these atoms interacting with one another :
The reason why the substances stay together with one another up to 
a point, he finds in the overlappings and interlockings of the bodies; 
for some of them are scalene, some hooked, some convex -  and they 
have innumerable other differences. Thus he thinks that they hold 
on to one another and stay together for a time, until some stronger 
necessity comes upon them from their surrounding, shakes them about 
and scatters them apart. (Simplicius 213 Fr. 200. 68 A 37.)28
There is no purposeful design in this account but a physical necessity. There is no 
purpose within the physical world, although there is in the human soul. However, 
Democritus shows in his ethical writings that this purpose is limited, for he suggests
28 Barnes, J. The Presocratics Philosophers. (The Arguments o f the Philosophers.) London: Routledge, 
1999. p. 343.
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that humans have only the purpose of pursuing pleasure, or at least a state of calm and 
stability:
The state is achieved by not engaging in much business, either 
private or public, and by not trying to exceed one’s capacities; it 
depends on one’s mental and psychological state and ‘does not live 
in cattles or in gold’; to reach it you ‘must not take your pleasures in 
mental things.’ Above all, you must practice moderation.29
There is some parallel of this ethical theory in the Utilitarianism of Bentham although 
Utiltitarianism offers a moral guide to behaviour between people that the philosophy 
of Democritus does not. An encouragement for the individual to achieve stability is 
somewhat short of a guiding ethical theory:
All that amounts, I suppose, to a moderately coherent plan of life; 
and we may, if we wish, call it a practical system. Lovers of 
anachronism (among whom I happily enrol myself) may begin to 
think of a Benthamite Utilitarianism: if he did not invent a felicific 
calculus, at least Democritus prepared the way for one, and Bentham’s 
moral system was adumbrated at Abdera. But that suggestion is 
wholly mistaken: Democritus’ hedonism has nothing at all to do with 
morality; it does not pretend to tell us what, morally speaking, we 
ought to do, or how to live the moral life. It is a recipe for happiness 
or contentment, not a prescription for goodness: the system sets up a 
selfish end for the individual and counsels him on how to attain it; it
- JA
does not set up a moral goal and offer advice on its achievement.
Nevertheless, although Utilitarianism is a moral theory that gives advice, its emphasis 
is on the pursuit of happiness and not the search for goodness itself, for goodness is 
defined in terms of happiness, and in that Barnes is right to draw a parallel with 
Democritus’ code for living.
29 Ibid. p. 532.
30 Ibid. p. 533.
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The Democritean physical explanation of the world leads to determinism. The 
atoms collide by an inner necessity; there is no mind that directs them. The 
metaphysical explanation of physical necessity gives little basis for an ethical theory. 
In a physically determined universe, humans, whose souls alone are not determined, 
have no further need than to seek a stable life for themselves. A non-teleological 
explanation of the universe gives no necessary role to humans. Democritus’ theory 
lacks a creator to give humans that role.
In a similar way the Epicureans were opposed to the idea of a creator or of 
perceiving design and purpose within the world of nature. In Epicurus’ letter to 
Herodotus he says:
Nay more: we are bound to believe that in the sky, revolutions, 
solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like, take place 
without the ministrations or command, either now or in the future, 
of a being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with 
immortality. Hence, when we find phenomena invariably recurring 
the invariableness of the recurrence must be ascribed to the original 
interception and conglomeration of primary particles whereby the 
world was formed.31
Epicurus had inherited the atomic theory of Democritus. He modified this doctrine 
but took the fundamental principle that everything was made of atoms, or minute 
particles, and void. With this doctrine, explanations of causes could be made without 
recourse to a divine being, or to teleology:
The atomist system seemed to him to provide an explanation of the 
structure of things which was compatible with empirical data and 
psychologically comforting, in that it did away with the need for 
divine causation and any form of teleology.32
31 Gaskin, J. The Epicurean Philosophers. London: Everyman, 1995. pp. 26-27.
32 Long, A.A. Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. London: Duckworth, 1974. p. 39.
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Thus Epicurus rejected the teleological explanations of Plato and Aristotle. Socrates, 
or Plato, had found the emphasis on mechanistic explanations in the presocratic 
philosophers a defect, but Epicurus saw it as a merit. The world is so obviously 
imperfect that it could not possibly have been designed. He did not accept Plato’s 
explanation that the world was now imperfect because it had lost the perfection it first 
had from the Forms.
Epicureanism became the main doctrine in opposition to the Stoics. 
Against the Stoics’ philosophy of a purposeful, created world permeated with 
intelligence and in which we as humans have a valid place, the Epicureans presented a 
world of chance that had no direction. Lucretius, the Roman disciple of Epicurus, 
puts forward strong arguments for a non-teleological view of the world in his De 
rerum natura. He argues avidly against gods, which are those of Greek and Roman 
mythology, having any impact on the material world. He sees a belief in gods as a 
restricting fear:
This dread and darkness of the mind cannot be dispelled 
by the sunbeams, the shining shafts of day, but only by 
an understanding of the outward form and inner workings 
of nature. In tackling this theme, our starting point will be 
this principle; Nothing is ever created by divine power out 
of nothing. The reason why all mortals are so gripped by 
fear is that they see all sorts of things happening on the earth 
and in the sky with no discernible cause, and these they 
attribute to the will of a god. Accordingly, when we have 
seen that nothing can be created out of nothing, we shall 
then have a clearer picture of the path ahead, the problem 
of how things are created and occasioned without the aid of 
gods.33
33 Lucretius. On the Nature o f  the Universe. Translated by R. E. Latham. Revised with an 
introduction and notes by John Godwin. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1994. p. 13.
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Things are created without the aid of gods. The basic building blocks of the world 
are many different kinds of atoms or seeds. As nothing comes from nothing they must 
come from somewhere, so things of nature come from their own types of seed:
Surely because each thing requires for its birth a particular 
material that determines what can be produced. It must 
therefore be admitted that nothing can be made out of 
nothing, because everything must be generated from a seed 
before it can emerge into resisting air. 4
Lucretius is opposed to Plato’s rationalist concept of knowledge. He is one of the first 
empiricists. Knowledge can only be obtained through the senses and this includes the 
concept of truth:
You will find, in fact, that the concept of truth was originated 
by the senses and that the senses cannot be rebutted. The 
testimony that we must accept as more trustworthy is that 
which can spontaneously overcome falsehood with truth. 
What then are we to pronounce more trustworthy than the 
senses? Can reason derived from the deceitful senses be 
invoked to contradict them, when it is itself wholly derived
‘y e
from the senses?
Lucretius’ world is one without a creator and without design, so teleological 
explanations of nature are to be avoided. Lucretius warns against the dangers of 
seeing purpose in the objects of nature. Whatever is in nature comes first by chance 
and them it is used in the best way for it:
In this context, there is one illusion that you must do your 
level best to escape -  an error to guard against with all due
34 Ibid, p. 15.
35 Ibid. p. 107.
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caution. You must not imagine that the bright orbs of our 
eyes were created purposely, so that we might be able to 
look before us; that our need to stride ahead determined our 
equipment with the pliant props of thigh and ankle, set in the 
firm foundations of our feet; that our lower arms were fitted to 
stout upper arms, and helpful hands attached at either side, in order 
that we might do what is needful to sustain life. To interpret 
these or any other phenomena on these lines is perversely to turn 
the truth upside down. In fact, nothing in our bodies was bom in 
order that we might be able to use it, but whatever thing is bom 
creates its own use.36
This is a type of argument that is used in evolutionary theory today. Nothing occurs 
in nature for a purpose, but comes about through natural selection, evolving over the 
years. Whatever is selected for can then be used for certain tasks. Lucretius has no 
strongly developed understanding of how natural selection works, but nevertheless his 
ideas are similar to evolution theory today.
In Greek and Roman thought we have a fundamental opposition in the 
understanding of nature. One the one hand there is a created, purposeful world filled 
with living things that have their allotted place, and on the other there is the world of 
chance. Both opposing thoughts are concerned with change in the natural world but 
whereas the former thinkers seek for the unchanging and the eternal, the latter 
thinkers accept change as the fundamental principle underlying nature. The 
teleological thinkers perceive the world as perfect. This is most fully expressed in the 
Stoic philosophy. They took this view to its logical but unsatisfactory conclusion that 
as everything was for the best, and that even pain had a worthwhile place in nature. 
The non-teleological thinkers perceive a world that is imperfect and they use this 
argument as proof against a creator. Lucretius views humans as having a hard time in
36 p. 116.
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a cruel, ruthless world. Humans need to work to subdue nature and in this way 
progress. Nature is too flawed to be useful to humans left as it originally was:
But even if I knew not what are the primary particles of things, yet this 
I would dare to affirm from the very workings of heaven, and to prove 
from many other things as well; that by no means has the nature of 
things been fashioned for us by divine grace: so great are the flaws 
which it stands beset. First of all that the huge expanse of heaven 
covers, half thereof mountains and forests of wild beasts have greedily 
seized; rocks possess it and waste pools and the sea, which holds far 
apart the shores of the lands. Besides about two thirds of it burning 
heat and the ceaseless fall of frost steal from mortals. Of all the fields 
and land that remains, yet nature would by her force cover it up with 
thorns, were it not that the force of man resisted her, ever wont from 
his livelihood to groan over the strong mattock, and to furrow the earth 
with the deep-pressed plough. But that by turning fertile clods with 
the plough share and subduing the soil of the earth we summon them 
to birth, of their own accord the crops could not spring up into liquid 
air, and even now sometimes, when won by great toil, things grow 
leafy throughout the land, and are all in flowers either the sun in 
heaven bums them with too much heat or sudden rains destroy them 
and chill frosts, and the blasts of the winds harry them with 
headstrong hurricanes.
Lucretius describes a tough world which humans must subdue for their own survival. 
The Earth was once young and gave birth to many things but now it is tired. Humans 
must labour hard to gain anything from nature:
Already the life force is broken. The earth which generated every 
living species and once brought forth from its womb the bodies of 
huge beasts, has now scarcely any strength to generate tiny creatures. 
For we assume that the races of mortal creatures were not let down 
into the fields from heaven by a golden cord, nor generated from the 
sea or the rock-beating surf, but bom of the same earth that now 
provides nurture. The same earth that in her prime spontaneously 
generated for mortals smiling crops and lusty vines, sweet fruits 
and gladsome pastures, which now can scarcely be made to grow 
by our toil. We wear down the oxen and wear out the strength of 
farmers, we wear out the ploughshare and find ourselves scarcely
37 Gaskin, 1995. op. cit. pp. 235-236.
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supplied by the fields that grudge their fruits and multiply our toil.38
This is an earth that is running down to its inevitable end. There is no purpose for its 
existence as it happened by chance. There is no greater good which is concerned for 
the whole. Things come into being and then decay: death is the end for all. Lucretius 
portrays death as a comforting thing for it can take away all the sorrows that humans 
have endured while alive:
If the future holds misery and anguish in store, the self must 
be in existence, when that time comes, in order to be miserable. 
But from this fate we are redeemed by death, which denies 
existence to the self that might have suffered these tribulations. 
Rest assured that we have nothing to fear in death. One who no 
longer is cannot suffer, or differ in any way from one who has 
never been bom, when once this mortal life has been usurped 
by death the immortal.
Lucretius takes this line of thought to comfort those who fear what there might be in 
an afterlife. There is no afterlife to worry about, he assures them. However, his 
message is one that leads to the conclusion that each person should live as best one 
can for the time they are alive It is a philosophy for the individual moment for each 
person. There is little in his philosophy to encourage plans for the future. An 
individual cannot assume that they have any purpose within the whole for everything 
has to pass away to make room for the new things:
The old is always thrust aside to make way for the new, and one 
thing must be built out of the wreck of others. There is no 
murky pit of Tartarus awaiting anyone. There is need of matter 
so that later generations may arise; when they have lived out
38 Lucretius, 1994. op. cit. p. 66.
39 Ibid. p. 88.
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their span, they will all follow you. Bygone generations have 
taken your road, and those to come will take it no less. So one 
thing will never cease to spring from another. To none is life 
given in freehold; to all on lease.40
Life is so transitory that there is little purpose other than enjoy life as much as 
possible and survive as well as nature will allow. There is no grander plan or a 
purpose to which each and everyone is a part. Humans are simply one of the many 
chance things that happen to have come into existence. The Earth brought humans 
into existence but everything changes and, presumably, like other species, humans 
will also cease to exist at some time in the future:
Then, because there must be an end to such parturition, the earth 
ceased to bear, like a woman worn out with age. For the nature 
of the world as a whole is altered by age. Everything must pass 
through successive phases. Nothing remains forever what it was: 
everything is on the move. Everything is transformed by nature 
and forced into new paths. One thing, withered by time decays and 
dwindles. Another grows strong and emerges from ignominy. So the 
nature of the world as a whole is altered by age. The earth passes 
through successive phases, so that the earth which used to be able to 
bear can do so no longer, while mammals which could never bear 
in the past can now produce 41
This philosophy leads to acceptance of one’s lot in life and the transitory nature of 
one’s own lifespan and may be comforting for some. But it also suggests a certain 
laissez-faire attitude. If things are coming and going, forming and reforming from 
different combinations of atoms there is little need to have a direction in life. One 
simply accepts what one is given.
Writers today perceive Lucretius as ahead of his times:
40 Ibid. p. 91.
41 Ibid. pp. 149-150.
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This world outlook he applies to the evolution of plant, animal 
and man and puts forward a theory of biological and social 
evolution that goes far beyond anything propounded in classical 
antiquity.42
Lucretius’ ideas would seem very acceptable to many scientists today. But unlike the 
great philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, he gives little guidance in his thought for 
humans dealing with social and ethical problems. His only concern is that the fear of 
death should be taken away. His philosophy has no real ethical content. It also gives 
no role to humans within the whole of nature.
These two opposing points of view differ in another respect. Although both 
are anthropocentric, the teleological explanations are more so. This can be seen as a 
positive or negative element of the teleological point of view. The teleological 
viewpoint led thinkers to understand humanity to be the central reason for the 
existence of everything in nature and this is why it was heavily anthropocentric. 
Environmentalists have wrongly accused Christianity for this emphasis on humans 
within nature, but the concept was developed far earlier. Aristotle expresses the 
anthropocentric view of nature in his Politics:
In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants 
exist for their sake and that the other animals exist for the sake of 
man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all, at least the 
greater part of them, for food, and for the provision of clothing 
and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete 
and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all 
animals for the sake of man 43
42 Winspear, A. D. Lucretius and Scientific Thought. Montreal: Harvest House, 1963. p.3
43 Jowett, B. ‘Politica’ in Ross, W.D. The Works o f  Aristotle. Oxford.Clarendon Press, 1921. vol. 10. p. 
1256b.
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Aristotle credits nature with making everything for the sake of humans. There is 
nothing in nature that is not there for some purpose for nature is a whole and every 
part of the whole is necessary.
The Stoics believed that humans had a central role on Earth. The heavens 
were for the gods and the Earth for the use of humans. The idea that life was for the 
benefit of gods and humans was expressed by Stoics, like Strabo:
The geographer, Strabo, a Stoic, says that the region around the 
modem city of Toulouse is so harmoniously arranged and its 
people are so industriously engaged in their various ways of life 
that one might well credit the workings of Providence, ‘such 
a disposition of these regions not resulting from chance, but from 
the thought of some [intelligence]’. Providence is a ‘broiderer 
and an artificer of countless works’ who has created all life for the 
gods and for man. Providence has given the heavens to the gods, and 
earth to man, fashioning it for his use.44
The special placing of humans within nature is because they alone of all living things 
partake of the permeating intelligence of the universe. In Cicero’s De Natura 
Deorum, Balbus the Stoic implies that it is for humans to use nature and to improve it 
for their own use:
We enjoy the fruit of the plains and of the mountains, the rivers 
and the lakes are ours. We sow com, we plant trees, we fertilize 
the soil by irrigation, we confine the rivers and straighten or divert 
their courses. In fine, by means of our hands we try to create as it 
were a second world within the world of nature.45
Providence has designated the purpose of changing and improving the Earth to 
humans. In looking after the earth humanity is fulfilling a destiny inherent in
44 Glacken, 1967. op. cit. p.61.
45 Cicero. De Natura Deorum; Academia. With an English translation by H. Rackham. London: 
Heinemann Ltd., MCMXXXIIIII 60, 150-152 p. 271.
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Providence’s design. In this scheme of things humans have a very important role to 
play as regards the rest of nature: they are in the world to improve nature. The 
influence of Stoic thinking can be seen in the use Romans made of the land. The 
Romans divided land neatly and mathematically: it was a form of large-scale 
gardening. All work on the land was perceived as improving nature to help it to yield 
more.
In non-teleological philosophies the relationship of humans to nature is 
perceived very differently. Although nature is full of wonderful things for humanity 
to enjoy, nevertheless it is a struggle for humans to survive. The Earth is in fact a 
fitter environment for animals and plants than for humanity:
Again, why does nature feed and breed the fearsome brood of wild 
beasts, a menace to the human race by land and sea? Why do the 
changing seasons bring pestilence in their train? Why does untimely 
death roam abroad? The human infant, like a ship-wrecked sailor 
cast ashore by the cruel waves, lies naked on the ground, speechless 
lacking all aids to life, when nature has first tossed him with pangs 
of labour from his mother’s womb upon the shores of the sunlit world. 
He fills the air with his piteous wailing, and quite rightly, considering 
what evils life holds in store for him. But beasts of every kind, both 
tame and wild, have no need of rattles or a nurse to lull them with 
babbling baby-talk. They do not want to change their clothes at every 
change in the weather. They need no weapons or fortifications to 
guard their possessions, since every need is lavishly supplied by 
mother earth herself and nature, the clever inventor.46
Nature looks after all living creatures but humanity alone suffers and has to take from 
nature what it needs: humans are not favoured by nature. Epicureans therefore 
believed that humans should improve nature to make life more pleasurable. Both 
Stoics and Epicureans alike believed that humanity’s influence on nature was always 
for the better. Both schools of thought perceived nature as freely available for
46 Lucretius. 1994. op. cit. p. 134.
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humanity’s use although the reason for this came from two very different 
metaphysics. Stoics improved nature because it was a part of the plan of Providence 
and Epicureans improved it for the sake of survival. This anthropocentric attitude 
towards nature probably resulted out of necessity. Humans needed to survive in an 
environment that was often precarious. Although nature gave all and was perceived 
in a positive way as a provider, it also needed to be tamed in order that humans could 
live well. This attitude appears exploitative and most likely would have led to some 
environmental problems at the time. But the problems were not so acute as they are 
today and nature still appeared plentiful. There was no urgent need to change their 
exploitative attitude.
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Chapter 3
From Medieval Europe to the Beginnings of Science
Although Christian thought dominated Medieval Europe, there were also 
strong influences from the classical philosophers, at first from Plato and the Neo- 
platonists and later, in the twelfth century, from Aristotle. Within the domain of 
Christianity the teleological concept of nature presided. There is little evidence of 
non-teleological concepts at this time. On the whole writers of the time accepted that 
the world had been created by God, and that everything that was created had a 
purpose. It was the premise on which all thinking had its foundation. The works of 
both Plato and Aristotle were referred to in support of the belief that nature was 
purpose-filled. The thinking of the Stoics was also included in Christian concepts of 
nature.
The main theological interest of these times was the relationship between the 
Creator and His creation. One problem that concerned the early Christian thinkers 
was that of good and evil. God the creator was perfect and therefore what He created 
must be perfect. However there were obvious imperfections in the world including 
evil. The Gnostics solved the problem by believing in two Principles and not just one 
God. There was an Evil Principle as well as a Good Principle:
This world and all that is in it was made, they claimed, by the evil 
principle.1
The Gnostics were a strong religious sect in the first two centuries of 
Christianity. Their belief that an Evil Principle created the world meant that they
1 French, P. and Cunningham, A. Before Science: the invention o f  the Friars ’ natural philosophy. 
Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1996. p,.179
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perceived nature as evil. The Good Principle, God, was not a part of the material 
world. He was transcendent and removed from the world in which people lived:
The alien God is the key to Gnostic thinking. With regard to the world 
or what Christians have called creation, the Gnostic deity is 
absolutely transcendent. The life of this God is utterly removed and 
disconnected from mundane reality, which the Divine neither created 
nor governs. Compared to the light of the Divine, the material world, 
for the Gnostic mind, is a self-contained and distant realm of 
darkness... A fundamental conviction of Gnosticism, accordingly, is 
that the earth and everything contained in it is evil.2
Gnostics believed that humans should try to escape an evil world. Nature, under this 
theology, was a negative environment that was to be scorned. But this was not an 
acceptable theology for many Christians. St. Augustine in particular argued against 
the conclusions of the Gnostics. It was contrary to Christian doctrine that the world of 
creation, nature itself, should be perceived as evil. It was a fundamental belief of 
Christians that the world was created by God and therefore must be good.
The early Christians were always concerned to show that there was order and 
harmony within nature. They wished to support the belief that it was the one true God 
who had created everything. Augustine, in his fight against the Gnostics, said that 
there was one God, timeless and unchanging. He is the creator and the created order 
is complete. Everything, both as an individual and as a part of the whole, is good. 
Augustine’s concept of the Creator is very much influenced by Plato.
St. Augustine has no interest in human dominion over nature. His 
interpretation of ‘dominion’ is in terms of humans being able to judge all things.
2 Santmire, H.P. The Travail o f  Nature: the ambiguous ecological promise o f  Christian theology. 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985. p.33
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Humans have dominion over all things because they have understanding. Being 
created in God’s image, humans are created to imitate the governance of God:
For this governance, as we have seen, is for Augustine a rule not 
of arbitrary power but of wisdom and propriety, a dominion 
that allows all things to be and to function in ways appropriate 
to their natures. The divine governance is one of concursus, and 
so, mutatis mutandi, is the human relationship with nature, as 
Augustine depicts it.3
Nevertheless, there yet remains a paradox within the Medieval concept of 
God. If God was understood to be the perfect being that was the embodiment of good, 
following the concept of the Idea of the Good in Plato’s thinking, then He was a 
spiritual being to be seen as the perfection that humans should strive towards, 
forsaking everything in this world. On the other hand, as the creator He is understood 
to have given all that is on the Earth and humans therefore should care for the things 
of nature. These two concepts of God are present within the thoughts of Christian 
writers throughout the history of Christianity. If God was the perfection to which one 
strove, then the Earth was of little account. On the other hand, if God is perceived as 
‘goodness’ then He permeates creation and humans should attend to the Earth as part 
of God’s plan.
Medieval Christians positively encouraged the knowledge of nature.
Christians must have inspired a protective attitude towards nature because it was 
sacred as the work of God. St. Bernard saw value in nature because it was the 
revelation of God through his works. A Christian could learn about God through all 
growing things, he said. In his oft-quoted letter to Heinrich Murdach St. Bernard 
writes:
3 Ibid. p. 70.
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Believe me, I have discovered that you will find far more in the 
forests than in the books: trees and stones will teach you what 
no teacher permits you to hear.4
That the things of nature could teach good advice was a strong aspect in European 
thought.
But although nature gives lessons that God has placed within it, St. Bernard also 
saw the need to change nature. Humans are partners with God, so it is part of creation 
for humans to change and improve nature as long as it is done for the glory of God. 
This latter concept would put a restriction on humans’ exploitation of nature, for if the 
improvement is done for God’s glory it limits actions to being those that come from 
good motivations and not those that would be the result of human greed. The active 
side of Christianity believed that the improvement of nature was part of the work God 
had allotted to humanity on earth. Contrary to many descriptions by 
environmentalists of Christianity’s impact on the environment, the Christian attitude 
as outlined above was entirely positive and not exploitative.
Even on the contemplative side of Christianity there appears a respect for 
nature. The Franciscans demonstrate this. St. Francis emphasized a communion with 
nature. He praises God and all His creatures and implores the latter to praise God 
also. He perceived all non-human life as having its own dignity and purposes.
Within the writings of St. Francis can be seen the way he humanized all of nature to 
bring it closer to human understanding:
4 Glacken, C. J. Traces on the Rhodian Shore: nature and culture in western thought from ancient 
times to the end o f  the eighteenth century. Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1967. p.213.
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In The Canticle o f Brother Sun, written by St. Francis during the 
illness of his last two years of life, the saint has praise for the Lord and 
all his creatures; for Sir Brother Sun, a symbol of the Lord, for Sister 
Moon and the stars (‘In the sky You formed them bright and lovely 
and fair’), for Brother Wind (‘And for the Air and cloudy and clear and 
all weather, / By which You give sustenance to Your creatures.’), for 
Sister Water (useful, humble, lovely, chaste), for Brother Fire 
(beautiful, merry, mighty and strong), for our Sister Mother Earth 
(‘Who sustains and governs us, and produces fruit with colourful 
flowers and leaves.’)5
The thought of St. Francis suggests that he believed that every part of nature exists in 
its own right and for God’s purposes. His understanding of the relationship of 
humans to nature is not a practical one, but mystical. Looking at the visible things of 
nature was an act of contemplation. Nature for the Franciscans was symbolic and 
allegorical, for in the contemplation of nature, humans could see things of symbolic 
significance that helped to direct their thoughts heavenward. Although the 
contemplative attitude towards nature is very different from that of the Benedictine’s 
more active attitude, yet both approaches view nature with reverence. The 
environment should be loved and cared for. The Earth should not be exploited, but 
brought to fruition as it once had been.
But it is one thing to bring a barren earth once more to fruitfulness and quite 
another to take more from the environment than is sustainable. The main message of 
Christianity may have been positive towards the environment, but on the everyday 
practical level the spiritual message of Christianity appears to have been lost. Social 
and economic changes put pressure on the environment. What had begun as a positive 
attitude in the use of land that needed cultivation, under increasing wealth and 
settlement became gradually exploitative.
5 Ibid. p.214.
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Although changes in thinking happen in a gradual way over the course of time, 
yet the Copemican revolution can be seen as one of those great landmarks in history 
that was the beginning of an entirely new way of understanding the world. Its major 
revelation was that the earth could no longer be perceived as the centre of the 
universe. The return of the central position of science and technology can be seen to 
have its beginning with the Copemican Revolution. With science came its 
fundamental tool: mathematics.
Mathematics had lost its importance in Medieval Europe but by the fourteenth 
century it was again beginning to be explored more positively. Leonardo da Vinci 
was one of the new scientists who saw mathematics as important to scientific theory:
.. .two centuries after Bacon, the great and many-sided thinker 
Leonardo da Vinci, stands out as a leader in this development. 
The importance of mathematics in scientific inquiry is strongly 
stated:
‘He who is not a mathematician according to my principles must 
not read me.’ ‘Oh, students, study mathematics, and do not build 
without a foundation.6
In fact mathematics came to be taken as the key to understanding all of nature. 
This mathematical view of the world was encouraged by the new astronomical 
discoveries coupled with the renewed interest in Plato and the growth of 
Neoplatonism:
For the question went pretty deep, it meant not only is the astronomical 
realm fundamentally geometrical, which almost anyone could grant, 
but is the universe as a whole, including our earth, fundamentally 
mathematical in its structure J
6 Burtt, E.A. The Metaphysical Foundations o f  Modern Physical Science: a historical and critical 
essay. London: Kegan Paul, Trent, Trubner & Co, 1925. pp. 30-31.
7 Ibid. p. 40.
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Scientists of the time believed that the real world was a mathematical harmony that 
could be discovered by investigation. Both Kepler and Galileo held this view. Nature 
for both these scientists was a simple, orderly system where every procedure was 
thoroughly regular and necessary. Nature worked through immutable laws. Galileo’s 
words are quoted within Burtt’s text:
Further this rigorous necessity in nature results from her fundamentally 
mathematical character -  nature is the domain of mathematics. 
‘Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our 
eyes - 1 mean the universe -  but we cannot understand it if we do not 
first learn the language and grasp the symbols in which it is written. 
This book is written in the mathematical language and the symbols are 
triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without whose help it 
is impossible to comprehend a single word of it, without which one 
wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth’.8
Galileo held that nature can be understood only through mathematics, but he was in 
full support of knowledge from the senses. He criticizes Copernicus for putting 
reason above the senses although he follows Kepler in his acceptance of the doctrine 
of primary and secondary qualities. The doctrine of primary and secondary qualities 
arose from the emphasis laid upon mathematics. Mathematics is the main tool for 
understanding nature; so this leads to the conclusion that only that which can be 
measured is real and these are the primary qualities. Other qualities that arose 
through the senses could only be illusory: these are the secondary qualities:
We begin now to glimpse the tremendous significance of what these 
fathers of modem science were doing, but let us continue with our 
questions. What further specific metaphysical doctrines was Kepler 
led to adopt as a consequence of this notion of what constitutes the 
real world? For one thing it led him to appropriate in his own way the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which had been 
noted in the ancient world by the atomist and sceptical schools, and
8 Ibid. p. 64.
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which was being revised in the sixteenth century in varied 
form.. .Knowledge as is immediately offered the mind through the 
senses is obscure, confined, contradictory and hence untrustworthy; 
only those features of the world in terms of which we get certain and 
consistent knowledge open before us what is indubitable and 
permanently real... The real world is a world o f quantitative 
characteristics only; its differences are differences o f  number alone?
Here we have returned to the beliefs of Pythagoras and, to a certain extent, Plato. The 
abstract world of mathematics leads us to the real, certain world. Senses cannot be 
trusted. To be able to understand the real world it is necessary to go beyond the 
illusory world of the senses and see the pattern beyond. But the re-discovery of 
mathematics did not lead the thinkers to the concept of a perfect world over and above 
the world we perceive, but to emphasizing the importance of measurement. The 
world that could be measured was the real objective world. This emphasis on the 
primary qualities meant that the secondary qualities became relegated to the 
subjective realm. The subjective realm of immediate human experience was illusory 
and thereby not part of reality. This thinking led to major philosophical problems as 
the subjective realm of humans became separated from the rest of nature:
The natural world was portrayed as a vast, self-contained mathematical 
machine, consisting of motions of matter in space and time and man 
with his purposes, feelings and secondary qualities was shoved apart 
as an unimportant spectator and semi-real effect of the great 
mathematical drama outside.10
Unlike Plato’s doctrine where humans had a place within a harmonious whole (for the 
world of political and social organizations were to reflect the whole cosmos), the
9 Ibid. p.56
10 Ibid. p.95
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philosophy which was the background to the science of post-renaissance did not have 
any grand scheme to include the subjective, purposeful side of humans. The scientists 
of that time still worked within the accepted metaphysics o f  Christian doctrine and 
failed to realize that their new view of nature opened a chink that would grow wider 
with the growth of science. This chink was the breakdown betw een the objective and 
subjective views of the world, the consequent limitations put on subjective knowledge 
and the relinquishing of any sense of purpose within the whole cosmos. Mathematics 
became the new god.
Mathematics was the new god, but the scientific method o f  Bacon was its 
helpmeet. Bacon was enthusiastic about a systematic acquisition o f  knowledge which 
would benefit humanity. It was the combination of mathematics and the scientific 
method that created a revolutionary change in the concept of nature. From this time 
on nature was accepted as a mechanical object suitable for study b y  humanity. Still 
holding on to the Christian concept of the immortal soul which alone had purpose, 
humans were envisaged as apart from nature, the subjective elem ent within the 
objective, mechanical whole.
Bacon criticized the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle and  also that of the 
scholastics. He particularly criticized the use of final causes in a n  explanation of 
nature. Previous to this time thinkers had always asked the question ‘why?’ when 
looking at nature and therefore needed final causes in their answer. Bacon believed 
that the search for final causes was incorrect and futile. Material and formal causes 
were the only way to discover the truths of nature. The question asked became 
‘how?’ and not ‘why?’ and therefore final causes were inappropriate as an answer.
The inquiry into final causes thus became perceived as misplaced. Final causes did 
not lead to obtaining knowledge about nature:
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But this misplacing hath caused a deficience or at least a great 
improficience in the sciences themselves. For the handling of 
final causes, mixed with the rest in physical enquiries, hath 
intercepted the severe and diligent enquiry of all real and physical 
causes, and given men occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and 
specious causes to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery.11
Bacon’ argument is that searching for final causes stops new discoveries and therefore 
knowledge cannot advance. Looking for final causes is inappropriate to the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge.
However, Bacon was a religious man and therefore did not discard final 
causes entirely. He outlines strict limitations on the way that knowledge is obtained.
It should not be done for self-glory but only for the benefit of humankind as God 
would wish it. Final causes were justified according to Bacon but only within 
metaphysical explanations and theology. They were completely unjustified within 
science and therefore reference to divine causes was to be excluded from any 
scientific research. Only the study of material and efficient causes was useful in 
research about the physical world. This bracketing away of metaphysics from science 
gave scientists immense freedom. Bacon and the scientists that followed him worked 
within the framework that they were discovering truths about God’s creation. But the 
chink that Bacon opened, grew into a vast chasm and, for some thinkers, metaphysics 
eventually became discredited. Final causes became obsolete within science and 
science and religion parted company. For many thinkers, metaphysics was sterile and 
empty of content.
11 Bacon, F. The Advancement o f  Learning. Edited by G. W. Kitchen. Introduction by A. Johnston. 
London: Dent, 1973. p. 97.
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Bacon was unaware where his scientific method would lead in people’s 
concept of nature. He was only concerned that science should be of great benefit to 
humankind. His book New Atlantis outlines his thinking in this area. In New Atlantis 
there would be no disease. Technological skills would be used for the development of 
agriculture so that there would be no hunger. The increase of knowledge through 
science would lead humans to have complete control over nature so that no one would 
suffer again. Science would lead to such knowledge that anything would be possible:
The end of our foundation is the knowledge of Causes and secret 
motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of Human 
Empire, to the effecting of all things possible.12
Environmental philosophers have accused Bacon of encouraging a highly controlling 
role for humans over nature. They are correct in this but have perhaps forgotten that 
they live in a world today that is the result of this attitude and therefore are largely 
freed from many of the anxieties that beset the people prior to the rise in science. The 
freedom from childhood diseases is one of the many advantages that humans’ control 
over nature has brought. Bacon was concerned about the elimination of all diseases 
and famine and the West has greatly benefited from this attitude. Bacon could not 
have envisaged the type of scientific research that has been carried out since his time. 
He does, however, insist that humans should assert their natural authority over nature:
Concerning the condition of the sciences: that it is unprosperous, 
not much improved; and that a way completely different from the 
one known before should be opened for the human intellect, 
and other help devised to let the mind exert its proper authority 
over the nature of things.13
12 Bacon, F. The Great Instauration and New Atlantis. Edited by J. Weinberger. Arlington Heights: 
AHM Publishing Corporation, 1980. p. 70.
13 Bacon, F. The Instauration Magna Part II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 11.
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This attitude of Bacon’s has been severely criticized. However, the fundamental 
belief that the lot of humanity should be improved is a worthy one from which we 
have all gained.
Like the scientists of the age Descartes was entranced with mathematics. He 
developed a conviction that mathematics was the sole key needed to unlock the 
secrets of nature. He saw the importance of the link between mathematics and 
physics and believed that all physics could be reduced to geometrical qualities alone:
The existence and successful use of analytical geometry as a tool of 
mathematical exploitation presupposes an exact one-to-one 
correspondence between the realm of numbers ie, arithmetic and 
algebra and the realm of geometry ie. space. That they had been 
related, was, of course, a common possession of all mathematical 
science; that their relation was of this explicit and absolute 
correspondence was an intuition of Descartes.. .Whatever else the 
world of nature may be, it is obviously a geometrical world, its objects 
are extended and figured magnitudes in motions.14
Descartes was so fixated by mathematics that he believed that only arithmetic and 
geometry were sciences of sure and indubitable knowledge. Thus he came to believe 
that only those things that could be understood in mathematical terms were real in 
nature. The real things in nature are the things that can be measured, that is extension 
and motion. Descartes took the general trend of thought at that time and perceived the 
world as a mechanical world. For Descartes the whole spatial world becomes a vast 
machine, including even the movement of animal bodies and human physiology. 
Notoriously he decided that animals were nothing but machines. There was no need 
of the concept of spirit or soul within the world at large. Everything in it could be
14 Burtt. 1925. op. cit. p.97.
explained in mechanical terms. But Descartes was a religious man. The mechanical 
world was governed by the laws of nature which were kept constant by God. The 
human soul, or mind, was separate from this mechanical explanation.
Descartes’ enthusiasm for a mechanical human body that could be explained 
from an objective, scientific point of view made possible a complete physical 
description of human. In fact Hobbes with his material monism took just this route. 
Although Hobbes still kept his belief in God, it was a god that was only necessary as 
the first cause to initiate all the motions that made up the universe:
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man 
from consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, 
the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this 
thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no 
former cause, but is etemall; which it is men call God. So 
that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into naturall 
causes, without being inclined thereby to believe there is one 
God Etemall; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their 
mind, answerable to his nature.. .a man may conceive there is 
a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea 
or Image of him in his mind.15
The god of Hobbes is totally unknowable and seems only to exist in the minds of men 
to halt an infinite regress of causes. This is a god bom out of logic and has little to do 
with nature or humanity.
The division between those that perceived nature as purposeful and those that 
understood it as happening by pure chance had already begun in ancient times. The 
Middle Ages had been dominated by teleological explanations of nature. With the 
rise of science, teleological explanations began to be defunct. Nature was no longer a 
realm of substances in qualitative and teleological relations, but a realm of bodies
15 Hobbes, T. Leviathan. Edited with an introduction by C.B. Macpherson. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1968. p.167.
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moving mechanically in space and time. Hobbes included humans within this 
mechanistic explanation. Unlike Descartes, he did not perceive a soul or mind that 
lies outside the mechanistic descriptions of the rest of nature. He saw no difference 
between the works of man and the works of God (nature):
For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof is 
In some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata 
(engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a 
watch)have an artificiall life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring', and 
the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, 
giving motion to the whole body, such as intended by the Artificer?16
But at the same time there were those, particularly within the biological 
sciences of the time, who argued extensively for the overall purpose of nature. They 
did not want to see the demise of teleological explanations and argued against a 
mechanistic concept of nature. At the forefront of these arguments were the 
Cambridge Platonists such as Ralph Cudworth and Henry More. These men, as well 
as William Derham and John Ray, wrote in support of divine providence. They 
fought against the notion of unguided mechanism. They perceived nature as plastic 
and not mechanical, the revelation of a wise God and therefore a nature filled with 
purpose. Many, like More, saw nature as useful as well as beautiful and therefore it 
was consistent with man’s duty to understand it and to learn how to control it for 
humanity’s advantage. More believed that humanity was in the world to improve 
nature and that humans were the only beings on the Earth able to complete God’s 
creation. Humans participate in the improving of the creation by such activities as 
plant and animal selection. More’s approach is a strongly anthropocentric approach 
to nature.
16 Hobbes. 1968. op. cit. p. 81.
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Learned men of the time considered the state of the Earth to be largely 
constant. However there were also those who believed in the senescence of nature. 
Francis Shakelton believed in the corruption of the Earth. His Blazyng Starre of 1580 
describes the Earth as in decline. In fact the idea of a decaying world had taken hold 
so much at this time that George Hakewell felt compelled to write at length in defence 
of a divine providence who kept nature constant. In his book Apologie, or 
Declaration o f  the Power and Providence o f  God in the Government o f  the World, he 
expresses his concern that to believe in the senescence of the earth was a denial of 
God’s providence and a cause for people to lose hope. His well-researched arguments 
defeat those who had argued for a decline in the earth. He argues that environmental 
health is in the hands of humans, for what may seem to be less fertile fields can be 
improved with careful management by humans.
The scientists of the time continued to believe in a benevolent God. Like 
Bacon and Descartes, Robert Boyle held that final causes should not be disregarded, 
for divine ends could be observed within the workings of nature. He accepted 
teleology as a valid metaphysical principle, but nevertheless denied its application in 
physics. He had no doubts that there was a benevolent creator:
That the consideration of the vastness, beauty and regular 
motions of the heavenly bodies; the excellent structures of 
animals and plants; besides a multitude of other phenomena of 
nature, and the subserving of most of these to man, may justly 
induce him as a rational creature to conclude, that this vast, 
beautiful, orderly, and (in a word) many ways admirable system 
of things, that we call the world, was framed by a creator 
supremely powerful, wise and good, can scarce be denied by an 
intelligent and unprejudiced considerer.17
17 Burtt, 1925. op. cit. p. 189.
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However, in opposition to Descartes he believed that God could change the laws of 
nature whenever he chose. He also argued that the primary qualities were no more 
real than the secondary qualities in the universe as a whole, but since humans are a 
part of the universe then both of them are real.
Newton differed from Boyle in his metaphysics. He followed Descartes in his 
belief that the primary qualities belonged to the real world. The human soul, outside 
scientific explanations, was an irrelevant spectator to the laws of nature. The cosmos 
was a vast mathematical system whose regular motions ran according to mechanical 
principles. The real world was colourless, silent and a world of quantity only and no 
quality. Purpose lies in God and within the soul of humans; it was not a part of 
nature. Newton believed in God for he understood Him to be necessary as the first 
cause and to have set the mechanical world in action. The sensations and perceptions 
of living beings are a problem within Newton’s understanding of a mathematical 
world, but he sees them as an indication that there must be an incorporeal being that 
has given the ability to perceive the world to living creatures:
How came the bodies of animals to be contrived with so much art, 
and for what ends was their several parts? Was the eye contrived 
without skill in optics, and the ear without knowledge of sounds?
How do the motions of the body follow the will: and whence is the 
instinct in animals? Is not the sensory of animals that place, to which 
the sensitive substance is present; and into which the sensible species 
of things are carried through the nerves and brain, that they may be 
perceived by their immediate presence to that substance? And these 
things being rightly dispatched, does it not appear from phenomena 
that there is a Being incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who 
in infinite space, as it were in his sensory, sees the things themselves 
intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them 
wholly by their immediate presence to himself: of which things the 
images only, carried through the organ of sense into our little 
sensories are seen and beheld by that which in us perceives and thinks. 
And though every true step made in this philosophy brings us not
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immediately to the knowledge of the First Cause, yet it brings us 
nearer to it and on their accounts to be highly valued.18
In Newton’s mechanical world nature has no purpose in itself. It is also bereft of 
colours, sounds and all the qualities that make the human perception of the world so 
rich. These secondary qualities lie within the mind of humans, the facility of reason 
that makes humans aware of their creator. Newton’s concepts of the universe, 
humans and the creator are reflected in Addison’s poem The Spacious Firmament on 
High:
What though in solemn silence all 
Move round the dark terrestrial ball? 
What though no real voice nor sound 
Within the radiant orbs be found?
In reason’s ear they all rejoice 
And utter forth a glorious voice 
Forever singing as they shine 
The hand that made us is divine.19
Newton and other scientists of the time held to the belief that science could not 
explain everything that was in the universe. However, later the mechanical concept of 
the world became fully established and developed into the notion of a self- 
perpetuating machine. Within this explanation there was no need of a first cause, and 
so later thinkers discarded the concept of a divine being. Without a purposeful being 
to give purpose to his creation, teleological explanations at a metaphysical level as 
well as at a scientific level became obsolete.
The scientists of the time kept their science and their religious beliefs separate. 
It was the philosophers who were concerned to try and understand the world in a more
18 Newton, I. Opera Quae Exstant Omnia Commentaris illustrabat S.Horsley. Tom.IV 
Londini:Johannes Nichols. MDCCLXXXII p. 238.
19 Addison, J. ‘Ode’ in Howard, A. The Beauties o f  Literature, Consisting o f Classic Selections from  
the Most Eminent and Foreign Authors. Vol. 9. London: T.T. and J. Tegg, 1833. p. 185.
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coherent form. Descartes’ philosophy had led him to the belief in two basic 
substances, but he left unsolved the problem of how the material and the non-material 
could interact. The rationalists, fully convinced of the power of mathematics, sought 
systems that would prescribe how the world could be made intelligible to human 
reason. Mathematics was the paradigm subject that used pure reason and gave certain 
knowledge. The concept of pure reasoning, or intellect, is common to Descartes, 
Spinoza and Leibniz, but Spinoza found that accepting the two substances of 
Descartes’ world would lead to contradictions. For Spinoza there is only one 
substance; God or Nature. But this is not the god of theology and Spinoza ridiculed 
final causes.
The other rationalists of the age took a different approach to the problem of 
mind and matter. Like Spinoza and Descartes, Leibniz believed that reality is both 
physical and mental, possessing both extension and thought, but unlike Spinoza he 
maintains the need for both efficient and final causes. He also held to the view that 
there was harmony and order in nature
Harmony and order within nature were traditionally linked with a purposive 
view of nature. Leibniz’s philosophy echoed many of the thoughts of the Stoics. On 
the other hand, there were those who perceived nature as chaotic and capricious and 
therefore having no purpose other than the ones humans wished to create. Natural 
catastrophes were cited in support of the latter view. Baron d’Holbach denied that 
nature was created or had any purpose. Order does not lie in nature itself, but is 
projected by humans who wish to see it there:
Order, however, is never more than the faculty of conforming himself 
[sic. Mankind] with the beings by whom he is environed or with the
101
whole of which he forms a part.20
The order and harmony that humans perceive has simply resulted from the 
interactions of humans with the environment and their adaptation to different climates 
and vegetation of the world. If environmental factors were different then humans 
would be different. In contrast to Leibniz, Baron d’Holbach does not perceive a 
world that is the best possible world or the only one that could be this way. This 
world is one of many possibilities. Humans delude themselves into thinking the world 
is the best possible world:
It is this aptitude in man to co-order himself with the whole 
that not only furnishes him with the idea of order but also 
makes him exclaim Whatever is, is right, whilst everything is 
only that which it can be, and the whole is necessarily what it 
is, and whilst it is positively neither good nor bad.21
Humans hold no privileged position as regards nature or the cosmos. At this time 
humans are adapted to the present environment, but some day humans may cease to 
exist and other beings may take their place:
In conclusion we can see that the two opposing concepts of nature, which first 
appeared in the ancient world, find expression again in the beginning of the scientific 
age. The one view is to conceive of nature as designed with a particular order and 
harmony in which humans have a particular role to play: the other view is to conceive 
of nature as not created and having no order. The order humans perceive is simply 
the result of adaptation of the individual parts, but it is not the only possible way
20 Baron d’Holbach. The System o f  Nature. Adapted from original translation by H. D. Robinson,
1868. Introduced by M. Bush. Greek and Latin translation by A. Jackson. Manchester: Clinamen 
Press Limited, 1999. p. 45.
21 Ibid. p. 64
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things could be. There is no purpose within the whole and therefore the individual 
parts also have no purpose. In the former concept, humanity has an important role to 
play in the whole of nature; in the latter concept the part humanity plays is often 
regarded as incidental. The beginnings of science and the description of the world in 
mechanical terms opened the way to explain nature without recourse to teleology. 
Although some philosophers and scientists decided to keep the idea of a religious 
purpose confined to humans and thereby perceived humans as in some way apart from 
an otherwise mechanical nature, the trend was to give an explanation of humans in a 
similar way to the rest of nature. In the latter explanation humans would be in all 
respects perceived as a part of nature and thereby an object of scientific study.
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Chapter 4 
Hume and Kant
The rise of mechanistic explanations of nature in the 17th century did not 
directly lead to a non-teleological explanation of the world but a step was taken in 
that direction. In the 18th century discussions about whether the world was created 
by design became more frequent. Also important at this time was the question 
whether the Designer cared or did not care for His creation. The explanations of 
science allowed for the whole of creation to work, like clockwork, without any 
intervention from a creator. The main question was whether the world and the 
humans within it were created for a grand purpose, or whether everything had 
happened by chance and humans were in charge of their own ends. So once again 
the two opposing views of nature that had been expressed in the ancient world 
predominantly by the Stoics and the Epicureans from their respective points of view 
became a part of intellectual discussions in 18th century Europe.
The teleological and non-teleological explanations of nature are put in 
opposition in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Hume puts forward 
the three main arguments in the form of dialogues. He was concerned, not so much 
about the arguments themselves (although he wished to reveal the various 
inconsistencies within the arguments) but the psychological reason for the 
arguments held. In The Natural History o f  Religion he outlines his belief in the 
psychological states of humans that lead them to particular metaphysical 
conclusions:
We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true 
spring and causes of every event are entirely concealed from us; nor
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have we either sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to prevent 
those ills with which we are continually threatened. We hang in 
perpetual suspense between life and death, health and sickness, 
plenty and want; which are distributed amongst the human species by 
secret and unknown causes, whose operation is oft unexpected, and 
always unaccountable. These unknown causes, then become the 
constant object of our hope and fear, and while the passions are kept 
in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the 
imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers, 
on which we have so entire a dependence.1
The protagonists in his dialogue, Philo, Cleanthes and Demea, are arguing 
for and against the existence of a deity and this leads them to discuss the argument 
from design and their respective views on nature. Cleanthes represents those who 
see design in nature and Philo represents those who do not. Although Cleanthes uses 
the ancient arguments, he also uses the discoveries of science at that time to support 
his beliefs. Cleanthes clearly is convinced that the new discoveries in science 
enhance the argument for design. Philo, however, is convinced otherwise. The 
argument from design uses the analogy of human production to understand the 
creation of nature by a deity. But Philo criticizes Cleanthes. He does not accept that 
the new discoveries give support to the design argument as Cleanthes does:
The discoveries by microscope, as they open a new universe in 
miniature, are still objections, according to you; arguments according 
to me. The further we push our researches of this kind, we are still 
led to infer the universal cause of all to be vastly different from 
mankind, or from any object of human experience and observation.2
1 Hume, D. Principle Writings on Religion including Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and The 
Natural History o f Religion. Edited with an introduction by J. C. A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993. p. 140.
2 Hume, D. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edited with an introduction and notes by M. Bell. 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1990. p. 76.
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Cleanthes replies to Philo’s description of the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry and 
botany:
These surely are no objections.. .These only discover new instances 
of art and contrivance. It is still the image of Mind reflected on us 
from immeasurable objects.3
Philo has a non-teleological concept of nature. He refers back to the Greek 
and Roman thinkers, and Hume seems to show an influence from Lucretius in the 
arguments he gives his character:
Now if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our 
knowledge, it bears a great resemblance to an animal or 
organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle of 
life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it produces no 
disorder. A continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired. 
The closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system, 
and each part or member, in performing its proper offices, operates 
both to its own preservation and to that of the whole. The world 
therefore, I infer, is an animal, and the deity is the soul of the world 
activating it and activated by it.4
Philo’s concept of the world is of a self-regulating system that looks after itself and 
corrects all faults in the system. It has no creator and it does not need human 
assistance. It is eternal and, having no beginning and no end, it has no purpose or 
direction. Cleanthes argues back that the world cannot be eternal because of 
progression in history which suggests a beginning and a final end. Philo believes in 
an inherent principle of order and that progression is an illusion. If the world
3 Ibid.p. 76.
4 Ibid. pp.80-81.
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resembles an animal then its beginnings must be like that of an animal. There is no 
designer within nature, but everything occurs by chance:
If the universe bears a greater likeness to animal bodies and to 
vegetables, than to the works of human art, it is more probable that 
its cause resembles the cause of the former than of the latter, and its 
origin ought rather to be ascribed to generation or vegetation than to 
reason or design.5
Cleanthes argues against this view because he believes that if it was so then things 
could have happened in many different ways without fitting together, whereas in the 
world as we see it everything has a particular place in the whole and nature supplies 
everything that humans need. Demea adds that ‘chance’ is a word without meaning. 
There must therefore be an ultimate cause and it must be one with reason.
These two opposing arguments are similar to those of the ancients as expressed by 
the Stoics and Epicureans, and Hume shows in his dialogues that these differing 
concepts of nature led to two different attitudes towards humanity’s place in nature 
as it did to the ancients. Cleanthes is optimistic about life and nature:
Health is more common than sickness: pleasure than pain: happiness 
than misery. And for one vexation which we meet with, we attain, 
upon computation, a hundred enjoyments.6
Philo is pessimistic. His view on the lot of men is similar to that of Lucretius. Life 
is difficult. Humans must work hard to gain some happiness. Nature is blind and 
uncaring:
5 Ibid. p. 86.
6 Ibid. p. 110
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Look around this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, 
animated and organized, sensible and active. You admire this 
prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly 
these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How 
hostile and destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them for 
their own happiness! How contemptible or odious to the spectator! 
The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature, 
impregnated by a great vivifying principle and pouring forth from 
her lap, without discernment or parental care.7
Within this system Philo projects there is no right or wrong. Nature just happens, 
one event following another.
Hume is most likely expressing himself through the character of Philo. 
Although he never professed himself as an atheist or a total sceptic, he brings 
through his empiricism a sceptical position as regards metaphysical questions, for 
he denies that we can provide any antecedent justification for reasoning as we do 
from causes and effects, and therefore we cannot assume that the conclusion we 
reach must be true. On the other hand we normally are persuaded by the inferences 
that we make. His conclusion is that we can only accept the way we are. Much that 
we believe about the world, which we think is the result of reasoned argument, is in 
fact the result of emotional, imaginative responses to our situation in life. He 
attacked the argument from design as he believed that to perceive order or the 
causes of order in the universe is probably the result of an analogy to human 
intelligence. He claimed that the argument from design lacked a determinate base in 
experience, that it is untestable, unrevisible and claims a dogmatic finality and 
uniqueness inimical to genuine scientific enquiry.
7 Ibid. p. 121.
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Hume’s conclusions on metaphysical questions are the result of his 
epistemological theory that relies on ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’. The extreme 
reductionism of his theory leads him to some unsatisfactory conclusions as regards 
to our ability to use reason and to find basic truths about the world. His emphasis 
on ‘passions’ and psychological states of humans as an explanation of human 
beliefs about the world questions many of the intellectual insights of the ancients. 
What Hume missed is that there are things that we learn which are neither things 
that we just do, nor things which could have conceivably been otherwise. We 
identify permanent objects in space and look for their causes and effects. In a 
Humean world there would be no order or persistent identities and we could learn 
nothing from it.
The consequence of Hume’s philosophy is the annihilation of all rationalistic 
metaphysics and ethics. Instead he opened the door for a purely descriptive role for 
natural science and the inclusion of human thought and action as natural processes 
within the province of biology and psychology. But in his eagerness to ground all 
human knowledge as resulting from the input of the senses, he left many questions 
about the possibility of human knowledge unanswered. He also undermined the 
previous status of reason and regulated values to be only the result of the ‘passions’. 
The extreme empiricism of Hume has had some serious consequences in later 
philosophy, of which not the least is the problem of the fact/value dichotomy. I 
shall be returning to this problem in the third part of my thesis.
As is well known in the philosophical world, Kant was inspired to write his 
three critiques in response to the scepticism of Hume’s extreme empiricism. In a 
thesis of this length I am again limited as to how much of Kant’s philosophy can be
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included. I shall therefore be concerned only with those areas of his philosophy that 
have immediate relevance to the issue in hand.
Hume’s scepticism led Kant to examine the limits of human knowledge. He 
considered it important to unite the rationalist and empiricist thinking that had 
divided the thinkers of the 17th century. Hume had been highly sceptical about the 
usefulness of metaphysical thinking. But Kant accepted the fact that metaphysical 
thinking was a part of human thinking in general and was interested in what could 
be claimed as metaphysical truths. In the Critique o f  Pure Reason and the Critique 
o f Practical Reason Kant explored the extent of our cognitive powers which allow 
us to discover a priori truths about the world, such as the existence of objects, space 
and time, the order of nature, ourselves, freedom of the will and the possibility of 
morality and God.
In his thinking Kant was led to believe that the human mind in itself has an 
important role in the attempts of humans to understand the world in which they find 
themselves. Knowledge is gained through certain facilities and categories that the 
human mind supplies. Space and time, therefore, are not realities of the world as 
such but are the means by which humans conceptualise the world. These he calls 
intuitions:
Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from 
which, a priori various synthetical knowledge can be drawn. Of 
this we find a striking example in the knowledge of space and its 
relations, which form the foundation of pure mathematics. They 
are the two pure forms of all intuitions, and thereby make 
synthetical propositions a priori possible. 8
8 Kant, I. Critique o f  Pure Reason: a revised and expanded translation based on Meiklejohn. Edited by V. 
Politis. London: Dent, 1993. p. 59.
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Similarly there are a number of categories through which humans comprehend the 
world. There are twelve of these which are made up from four groups (of three 
categories each) under the headings of quantity, quality, relation and modality.
These categories, as well as the intuitions of space and time, enable us to make 
synthetic a priori judgements, judgements which could not have come simply from 
empirical observations. Such judgements are that all properties in nature must 
inhere in substances, and that every event in nature must have a cause. The human 
mind can only make sense of what there is through these intuitions and categories 
and thereby Kant creates a division between what there is and what there appears to 
be to us. Kant calls things-in-themselves noumena and things-as-they-appear 
phenomena. Humans have access only to phenomena. The noumena can never be 
truly known. It can be immediately seen that Kant’s division between noumena and 
phenomena would lead to problems in epistemology, for how can we ever know 
what there is if we have no immediate access to the things-in-themselves?
In his Critique o f  Practical Reason Kant deals with human freedom. He 
understands human freedom as outside the world of natural causes. Human freedom 
is concerned with the moral law and this is in the practical sphere of living. This 
thinking led Kant to assume that there are two different realms of reason: one that is 
concerned with natural concepts and one that is concerned with the concept of 
freedom in relation to humans alone. Again there is a division in Kant’s 
philosophy, this time between the world of nature, which can be known through 
pure reason, and ourselves as beings that possess freedom, which can be known 
through practical reason. He sums up his philosophical account of the first two 
Critiques in the Critique o f  Judgement:
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Our entire faculty of cognition has two realms, that of natural 
concepts and that of the concept of freedom, for through both it 
prescribes laws a priori. In accordance with the distinction then, 
philosophy is divisible into theoretical and practical.
The function of prescribing laws by means of concepts of nature is 
discharged by understanding and is theoretical. That of prescribing 
laws by means of the concept of freedom is discharged by reason and 
is merely practical. It is only in the practical sphere that reason can 
prescribe laws; in respect of theoretical knowledge (of nature) it can 
only (as by the understanding advised in the law) deduce from given 
laws their logical consequences, which still remain restricted to 
nature.
Understanding and reason, therefore, have two distinct jurisdictions 
over one and the same territory of experience. But neither can 
interfere with the other. For the concept of freedom just as little 
disturbs the legislation of nature, as the concept of nature influences 
legislation through the concept of freedom.9
Here Kant distinguishes between the laws of nature (scientific knowledge 
and causal laws) and the will. Humans are free and outside the laws of causation. It 
is in practical reality that we meet the concept of freedom. These two realms are 
vastly different from one another:
Albeit then, between the realm of the natural concept, as the sensible, 
and the realm of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, there 
is a great gulf fixed, so that it is not possible to pass from the former 
to the latter (by means of the theoretical employment of reason), just 
as if they were so many separate worlds, the first of which is 
powerless to exercise influence on the second.10
Humans according to Kant’s philosophy are, as a result of their freedom, apart from 
nature; they are free from its causal laws. But this strict division would leave an
9 Kant. I. The Critique o f  Judgement. Translated with analytical indexes by J.C. Meredith. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1952. pp. 12-13.
10 Ibid. p. 14
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unsatisfactory account of the world. Kant, however, wishes to heal the breach and 
postulates the supersensible (the substrate that underlies the world of nature as it 
appears to us) that joins the world of nature and the world of human freedom:
There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible 
that lies at the basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom 
contains in a practical way, and although the concept of this ground 
neither theoretically nor practically attains to the knowledge of it, 
and so has no peculiar realm of its own, it still renders possible the 
transition from the mode of thought according to the principle of the 
one to that according to the principle of the other.11
In the Critique o f Judgement Kant deals with the problem of how to connect these 
two realms. Although some thinkers may find the Critique o f  Judgement the most 
difficult part of Kant’s work to accept, it does appear to show how important to 
Kant was the concept of the supersensible structure in his philosophical thinking.
It is in the Critique o f Judgement that Kant introduces the concept of the 
‘purposiveness’ of nature. Kant held that we could not say that natural objects, or 
the world of nature, were designed for a specific purpose. To say this would be to 
imply that natural objects were not natural but artificial. The mode in which he 
used teleological explanations was different from previous thinkers in his 
understanding of nature. Prior to Kant the teleological explanation of nature was 
understood in an objective way in that the purpose of nature was held to be within 
natural objects themselves. But for Kant teleology as applied to nature is an 
epistemological principle. The concept of purposiveness helps us to reflect on the 
objects of nature. Teleology, in this way, has a heuristic or investigating value and 
it does not necessarily explain the way things are:
n Ibid. p. 14.
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Now the concept of an object, so far as it contains at the same time 
the ground of the actuality of this object, is called its end, and the 
agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is only 
possible according to ends, is called the finality of its form. 
Accordingly the principle of judgement in respect of the form of the 
things of nature under empirical laws generally, is the finality of 
nature in its multiplicity. In other words, by this concept of nature it 
is represented as if an understanding contained the ground of the 
unity of the manifold of its empirical laws.
The finality of nature, is therefore, a particular a priori concept, 
which has its origin solely in the reflective judgement. For we 
cannot ascribe to the products of nature anything like a reference of 
nature in them to ends, but we can only make use of this concept to 
reflect upon them in respect of the nexus of phenomena of nature -  a 
nexus given according to empirical laws. Furthermore, this concept 
is entirely different from practical finality (in human art or even 
words) though it is doubtless thought after this analogy.12
In this passage Kant uses his constant guideline of ‘as i f . We cannot look at nature 
as having a final cause or purpose in reality, but in order to have any knowledge of 
it we need to think of it in that way, as i f  it had a purpose. This is particularly true 
of the biological sciences. So this notion of final causes as regards nature is, as 
Kant called it, a transcendental principle of judgement and not a metaphysical one. 
(‘Transcendental’ in Kant means ‘concerning the necessary conditions for the 
possibility of experiencing things and of describing what we experience’). It is only 
a judgement that attributes to nature a transcendental finality. This is the only way 
we can have knowledge of nature:
For, if it were not for this presupposition, we should have no order 
of nature in accordance with empirical laws and, consequently, no 
guiding-thread for an experience that has to be brought to bear upon
12 Ibid p. 20.
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• 1 ^these in all that variety, or for an investigation of them.
Kant seems to be suggesting that, although nature may or may not have purpose 
within it, nevertheless in order to understand it we must view it teleologically. We 
give purpose to nature in order to understand it. But nature does not have objective 
finality and Kant criticized Plato who saw final causes in nature as objective. For 
Kant, this intellectual finality was ‘simply formal, not real’. He also criticized those 
who saw nature having natural ends because so many things are as they are because 
of adaptation. For example pine forests grow where there is sand. He derided the 
notion of purposes in nature just for the sake of humans. For example, there are 
many natural products in cold climates that are useful for people who live there, but 
there is no necessity for them to be living there in the first place:
In cold lands, snow protects crops from the frost. It makes it easier 
for people to get together (by means of sleighs). In Lapland, the 
people find animals (reindeer) that they use to get together. These 
animals find adequate nourishment in a dry moss that they have to 
scrape out for themselves from under the snow. But they are also 
easily tamed and willingly permit people to deprive them of their 
freedom even though they could easily support themselves on their 
own. For other peoples in the same frigid zone, the sea holds rich 
supplies of animals that provide them not only with food and 
clothing, and with timber that the sea floats to them, as it were, as 
building material for their homes, but also with fuel for heating their 
huts. So here we have an admirable collection of cases where nature 
relates to a purpose: that purpose is the Greenlander, the Lapp, the 
Samoyed, the Yakur etc. And yet it is not clear why people should 
have to live in those regions at all.. .rather, we ourselves would then 
consider it impudent and rash even to demand that there be such a 
predisposition and to require nature to pursue such a purpose (on the 
ground that otherwise only people’s extreme inability to get along 
with one another could have scattered them all the way to such 
inhospitable regions.)14
13 Ibid. p.25
14 Kant, I. Critique o f  Judgement. Including the First Introduction. Translated, with an introduction by W. S. 
Pluhar. With a foreword by M. J. Gregor. Cambridge: Hackett, 1987. p. 247.
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Kant seems to mean here that it is the fault of humans where they live and it is not 
up to nature to supply the necessary means of survival. Human folly sends them to 
inhospitable places.
Kant argues against a mechanical nature. In this area he favours the 
vitalises concept of nature over that of the mechanistic descriptions of Descartes 
and Hobbes :
Hence an organized being is not a mere machine. For a machine 
has only motive force. But an organized being has within it 
formative force, and a formative force that this being imparts to 
the kinds of matter that lack it (thereby organizing them). This 
force is therefore a formative force that propagates itself -  a force 
that a mere ability of one thing to move another (ie. mechanism) 
cannot explain.15
But the capacity for nature to organize itself means, for Kant, that the analogy of a 
designer just does not work:
In considering nature and the ability it displays in organized 
products, we say far too little if we call this an analogue of art, for 
in that case we think of an artist (a rational being) apart from nature. 
Rather, nature organizes itself, and it does so within each species of 
its organized products; for though the pattern that nature follows is 
the same overall, that pattern also includes deviations useful for 
self-preservation as required by circumstances.16
Although there is no necessity for a designer, yet the objects of nature often appear 
to have been made for an end. Particularly within the natural sciences it is often 
difficult for scientists to free themselves from a teleological explanation:
15 Ibid. p.253.
16 Ibid. pp. 253-254.
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It is a familiar fact that those who dissect plants and animals in 
order to investigate their structure and gain insight into the reasons 
why and to what end these plants and animals were given those very 
parts, their position and combination, and were given precisely that 
internal form assume this maxim as inescapably necessary -  ie. the 
maxim that nothing in such a creature is gratuitous. They appeal to it 
just as they appeal to the principle of universal natural science -  viz. 
that nothing happens by chance. Indeed, they can no more give up 
that teleological principle than they can this universal physical 
principle. For just as abandoning this physical principle would leave 
them without any experience whatsoever, so would abandoning that 
teleological principle leave them without anything for guidance in 
observing the kind of natural things that have once been thought 
teleologically,under the concept of natural purposes. 17
Natural scientists may use a teleological principle, but this extrinsic finality of 
natural things does not mean there are ends in nature which justify that existence. 
Kant does not see final causes as a justifying explanation of the whole. Rivers are 
not there for the purpose of humans to be able to travel inland, although they are 
useful in this way. There is a difference between estimating anything as a physical 
end in virtue of its intrinsic form and understanding its existence as an end in nature.
It is in this latter understanding of an end in nature that Kant finds he needs 
to turn to the ‘supersensible’. It is this concept of the ‘supersensible’ that is the 
foundation of all Kant’s thinking, for the supersensible unites nature, human 
freedom and moral law, God and immortality. The moral law leads us to endeavour 
to achieve the final purpose. The supersensible substrate can never be known, in the 
sense that the things of science can be known, and so Kant does not say anything 
substantive about it. But the concept of the supersensible is almost certainly the 
essential basis of his philosophical thought and only through the acceptance of this
17 Ibid. p. 256.
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concept can Kant’s philosophy really be understandable. Although his philosophy 
argues against the superficial teleological explanations of nature, his own concept of 
nature is a teleological one. Later writers on Kant have not always acknowledged 
this side of his philosophy and some have even deliberately belittled this part of his 
thinking. Nevertheless it seems that if Kant’s concept of the supersensible had been 
taken into account some of the philosophical problems that arose after his work 
would not have arisen. There is strong evidence in his work that Kant understood 
that it is through human freedom, humans as noumenon, that there is a link to the 
supersensible substrate. And it is only through humans that a final purpose can be 
reached:
Now, in this world of ours there is only one kind of beings with 
causality that is teleological, ie. directed to purpose, but also so 
constituted that the law in terms of which these beings must 
determine their purposes is presented by these very beings as 
unconditioned and independent of conditions in nature, and yet 
necessary in itself. That being is man, but man considered as 
noumenon. Man is the only natural being in whom we 
can nonetheless cognize, as part of his own constitution, a 
supersensible ability {freedom), and even cognize the law and the 
object of causality, the object that this being can set before itself as 
its highest purpose (the highest good in the world).18
It is through humans, as moral subjects, that there is a final purpose to creation:
Only in man, and even in him only as moral subject, do we 
find unconditioned legislation regarding purposes. It is this 
legislation, therefore, which alone enables man to be a final 
purpose to which all of nature is teleologically subordinated.19
18 Ibid. p. 323.
19 Ibid. p.323.
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As moral beings humans are concerned with final purposes and this leads humans to 
making the assumption that that there is a moral cause to the world if they are to be 
morally consistent.
Kant’s teleological explanation of nature rests on his interpretation of 
humans as moral creatures through their freedom. In this way he understands 
humans as in some vital way apart from nature. As noumenon humans are a part of 
the supersensible substrate. Kant equates nature’s purposiveness with some 
supersensible basis of the purposiveness which links together the other two concepts 
of the supersensible, nature as itself and that as required by the moral law. But the 
weakness of his account is that he can say nothing about the supersensible, for he 
admits that it can never be known. This gave problems to later thinkers who were 
inclined to reject anything that could not in essence ever be known. The noumena 
were dismissed as irrelevant.
Ultimately Kant’s account of nature leads to humans being considered 
outside the laws of nature. We can only know nature through our own subjective 
judgements and the values of nature become human dependent. Kant did not intend 
this conclusion himself because his concept of God and the supersensible substrate 
prevented such a conclusion. But later thinkers de-emphasized his stance on God 
and adopted a more subjectivist interpretation. At the same time later thinkers were 
inclined to disregard the metaphysical arguments of the Critique o f Judgement and 
to prioritise Kant’s position in the first and second Critiques. However this was to 
lead to a vast division of thinking that has caused numerable social and 
philosophical problems, not least among them those within environmental ethics 
and ethics in general today.
119
PART II
HUMAN NATURE 
Introduction
With Kant’s philosophy we now have reached the point where our present 
concept of nature began to have its formation. It is at this point that the emphasis 
changes to the concern about the concept of human nature. This is because the 
problem increases as to how humans relate to nature, whether they are a part of nature 
or apart from nature, in the modem and postmodern contexts. There is an immense 
amount of literature that could be included but which will have to be passed over in a 
thesis of this length. I can only give some important trends that developed in the 
thinking of the nineteenth century which have strongly influenced the present day 
concept of nature and are the background to the debates in environmental philosophy 
today.
It was in the 18th and 19th centuries that writers began to express a concern for 
the amount of destruction humans had caused the environment. In general there was 
still a positive attitude towards humanity’s control of the environment, but there was a 
growing awareness that human power could upset the balance of nature. This was 
most noticeable in America where primordial land was being destroyed at a rapid rate. 
The change of the environment in Europe had happened over such a long span of time 
that the extent of human impact on the countryside was not so obvious.
At this time science and technology were making tremendous strides and have 
ever since. Geology, geography, biology and the physical sciences were all areas of 
knowledge that were expanding rapidly. The increased knowledge increased 
humanity’s control over the environment. With the increased control the damage that
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could be done to the environment became more intense. This was a time when writers 
began to reflect on the power humans had over nature and questioned the relationship 
humans had to nature It was also a time when the teleological explanation of nature 
was under attack. The world of science had become prominent and within science 
any explanation in terms of final causes was firmly discouraged.
The growth of humanity’s power over nature and the extent of the change to the 
environment were both seen as positive by many:
The cultivation and great cities are reminders of power and of glory 
showing sufficiently that man, master of the domain of the earth 
has changed it and renewed its entire surface and that he will always 
share the empire with nature.1
Those who followed this type of thinking showed their adherence to a concept of 
nature being wild and dangerous for humans. Under this ideology a tamed nature was 
a good nature. For others the extent of the change was seen as negative. Thinkers 
began to reflect back, much as the ancient Greeks had done, to a Golden Age. This 
was a reaction to the Enlightenment and many questioned the rational and mechanical 
foundations of western civilization. Writers became interested in ‘primitive’ forms of 
life. Travellers brought back tales of other societies that gave the illusion that there 
were other more peaceful and harmonious forms of existence. American Indians and 
Tahitians seemed to live idyllic lives compared to the Europeans. Many thinkers 
believed there had been a previous age when all of humanity must have lived this 
primitive, ideal life.
1 Buffon, Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de: Histoire naturelle, generate etparticuliere. Paris: 
Imprimerie Royale, puie Plassen, 1749-1804. Vol. 12 pp. xiii -  iv.
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This cult of primitivism, which either looked back historically to a Golden Age, 
or geographically to a country far away, was most clearly expressed in the writings of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau’s theory was that humans had been corrupted by 
civilization and so had become tyrants over themselves and over nature. Humans 
should, according to Rousseau, return to nature. He opened his treatise on education 
with:
Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the author of nature,
everything degenerates in the hands of man.2
Rousseau gave positive accounts of nature at a time when western civilisation was 
developing rapidly, but he failed to realize that he had the luxury to do so. As already 
shown in this thesis primitive humans were in the hands of the vagaries of nature and 
their relationship with nature had to be entirely pragmatic. In Europe of the 18th and 
19th centuries many of the fears people had about nature had been diminished. With 
the growth of cities and the wealth that accumulated for many, there were those who 
had the leisure to reflect upon nature and view it aesthetically. The movement of the 
Romantics developed at this time. Romanticism was a reaction to the scientific 
revolution. From the comforts of an economically secure position, the Romantics 
criticized the scientists for their objective view of nature and refused to see it as only a 
potential for practical use. The German and English Romantics began to look at the 
environment from an aesthetic point o f view and understood nature as having its own 
integrity, in some cases a purpose and meaning. In the literature of the Romantics,
2 Rousseau, J-J, Emile; or treatise on education. Translated by W.H. Payne. Great Books in 
Philosophy. New York: Prometheus Books, 2003. p .l.
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nature was viewed as dynamic and organic. Romanticism tried to defend a qualitative 
science in which humanity is not separate from nature. It is this aspect of their views 
that has been a welcome restraint on the growth of the scientific enterprise.
Wordsworth scorned the man of science who saw nature only in a quantitative
way:
One that would peep and botanize 
Upon his mother’s grave.3
The Romantics encouraged a different approach to animals. Other species were 
not created just for human use but had intrinsic value. The poet William Blake 
expressed an identity with other creatures in many of his poems:
Am not I 
A fly like thee? 
Or are not thee 
A man like me.4
The poets widened the moral community not only to animals but also to plants. 
Wordsworth wrote:
I would not strike a flower as many a man would strike his horse.5
3 Wordsworth, W. ‘A Poet’s Epitaph’ in Wordsworth, W. Poems. Vol. 1 edited by J.O. Hayden. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977. p. 396.
4 Blake, W. Poems o f  William Blake. Selected and introduced by P. Ackroyd. London: Sinclair 
Stevenson, 1995. p. 17.
5 Wordsworth, W. ‘I Would Not Strike a Flower’ in Wordsworth, W. Lyrical Bollards, and Other 
Poems. 1797-1800. Edited by J. Butler and K. Green. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. p. 312.
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The settled society, economic wealth and control of nature brought this kind of 
romantic reaction. Well-fed and well-clothed people could begin to think of being 
vegetarian. Thinkers such as John Ray believed a vegetable diet was preferable to the 
‘butchery and slaughter of animals’. Arguments for vegetarianism became more 
widespread at this time. Jeremy Bentham in the 19th century changed the status of 
animals by giving the criterion of suffering as most important for moral consideration.
The Romantics not only opened the door to the appreciation of other species of 
animal but to wild nature in general. Before this time the cultivation of land was 
understood to be a positive occupation against the evils of the wilderness. But as 
more and more land was cultivated and Europe became prosperous there was 
nostalgia for what was lost and people began to appreciate unspoiled nature. Deserts, 
mountains, seas, woods and marshes were appreciated for what they represented -  the 
primeval, the non-human, the instinctual and the natural. The wilderness became no 
longer the evil place to be feared but the source of spiritual renewal. Those who 
viewed nature in this new way were not those who had to earn a living from it. 
However, they brought to everyone’s consciousness the fact that the growing power 
humanity had over nature was not entirely good. The right of humanity to have power 
over nature was first questioned at this time.
The dream of mastery over nature was almost a reality and this has continued 
today. Nature is no longer an immediate threat in many parts of the world: nature 
itself is threatened. With this power over nature the separation of humans from nature 
becomes more striking. However evolutionary theory revealed another way of 
understanding the relation of humans to nature. In the 19th century, Darwin’s Origin 
o f Species caused an outcry. Evolutionary ideas affirmed that humans were truly a
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part of nature. Nowadays the ideas of genetic theory and natural selection are 
accepted in every day life as explanations for human nature.
In order to understand how we relate to the environment we need to understand 
how we perceive ourselves in relationship to nature. In the history of the concept of 
nature it is evident that there were two major concepts of the relationship of humans 
to nature that were implicit in the way people thought about themselves and how they 
interacted with the world around them. These two conflicting concepts are concerned 
with the question of whether humans can be considered as a part of nature or apart 
from nature. Thinkers of the past have assumed one or the other of these concepts of 
humanity. This puzzling aspect of ourselves influences us today in many of our 
practical decisions.
We need to untangle some of the problems that we have inherited. In the past 
people have failed to be clear and consistent about the nature of humanity. The idea 
of humanity as apart from nature had its origins in religious thought. People believed 
that they had souls which were separate from their bodies and could exist after the 
death of their bodies. The concept of soul, or spirit, had its origins early in the history 
of humanity and certainly was expressed by the ancient Greeks, particularly Plato, 
and, of course, was a central dogma in Christianity. But at the same time, humans 
understood themselves to be a part o f nature not differing from other species in kind 
but only in degree. In this scheme of things people are mortal and there is no 
immortal soul. This dualistic view of ourselves is still prevalent today.
The cogito ergo sum of Descartes’ philosophy encouraged the religious view of 
humanity being of two substances: that of the mind and the body. I am the thing that 
thinks and therefore essentially soul. In this view the external world is less real. It 
can lead to radical subjectivism and the problem becomes how we can know the
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external world outside our own perspectives. This is the subjective view of ourselves: 
humans are apart from nature. But at the same time, through the influence of science, 
humanity is considered to be under the rule of physical laws in the same way as any 
other part of nature and human behaviour can be studied according to scientific laws 
as in psychology. This is the objective view of ourselves: humans are a part of nature. 
I shall look at the way these two views of human nature in relation to nature have 
developed in modem thinking.
The religious view of humans assumes that aesthetic and moral values are given 
by God. These values can be found by anyone because the spiritual side of us links us 
to the immortal. Outside the religious framework values are the concern of the 
individual but the search for values becomes problematical. Science views the 
universe as morally and aesthetically neutral. Morality and beauty are in the eye of 
the beholder. I shall look at the problem of finding value in post-Kantian philosophy.
Post-Kantian philosophy has seen a division in philosophy involving two very 
different methods or approaches. On the one hand there is what is termed Continental 
philosophy, largely coming from philosophers in Europe although not entirely, and on 
the other hand there is analytical philosophy that developed in England, but also had 
followers in Europe, and that spread across to America. Analytical philosophy based 
itself on science. It looked at problems and tried to clarify them in order to make 
sense of them. It has sometimes been sceptical at language’s ability to communicate 
meaning. The point of the analytical enterprise is to develop a systematic theory of 
meaning. It tries to rid words and phrases of the ambiguity that results from sloppy 
thinking and writing and reduce the imprecision of everyday language to bring out the 
real underlying meaning. The scientific method is followed in all areas of philosophy,
126
even in ethics, and the philosopher becomes a professional problem-solver much like 
a scientist or mathematician.
Continental philosophy, however, looks at the broader picture and is interested in 
social and political aspects of humanity. This wider area of interest has probably led 
Continental philosophy to have more influence on the general public. Recently 
philosophers have tried to bridge the gap between analytical philosophy and 
Continental philosophy, but for over a century the two have dealt with the same 
problems in very different ways. Their difference in style masked their similar 
concerns. They were both influenced by Kant’s philosophy, but each took from his 
philosophy a very different starting point.
I shall now look at these two reactions to Kant in the following chapters and 
examine their interpretations of human nature. The impact of science and the 
scientific method on analytical philosophy has been highly significant, so I shall also 
examine the assumptions within science, its tendency to reductionism and its 
influence on our concepts of nature and human nature. But first I shall look at the 
influence of Continental philosophy on the concept of human nature and our 
relationship to nature.
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Chapter 1 
Continental Philosophy
Kant had argued that we cannot understand the world through intuition alone but 
only through the synthesis of intuition and concepts. We cannot know the world as 
‘thing-in-itself, but only through an intellectual intuition. Continental philosophers 
took this part of Kant’s thought as their starting point.
Fichte, a follower of Kant, emphasized this point of Kant’s philosophy. He 
described self-knowledge as an intuiting of the self and that this was the only 
intellectual intuition. The idea of the self was further developed within Continental 
philosophy after Fichte and led to an emphasis on the subjective stance:
Underlying knowledge, yet outside its purview, is the free and 
self-producing subject. The destiny of the subject is to know 
itself by ‘determining’ itself, and thereby to realize its freedom 
in an objective world. This great adventure is possible only 
through the object, which the subject posits, but to which it stands 
opposed as its negation. The relation between subject and object is 
dialectical -  thesis meets antithesis, whence a synthesis (knowledge) 
emerges. Every venture outwards is also an alienation of the self, 
which achieves freedom and self-knowledge only after a long toil 
of self-sundering. The self emerges at last in possession of the 
Holy Grail: an intellectual intuition not of itself only but of the whole 
world contained in itself as in a crystal ball.1
The self is separated from the not-self, and, although it strives for a unity with the 
whole outside itself, it has not yet achieved it. Continental philosophy, with its 
involvement with the self, is also concerned with human freedom, with self- 
knowledge and with the concept of humanity constructing their world around them.
1 Scruton, R. ‘Continental Philosophy ’ in The Oxford Illustrated History o f  Western Philosophy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. pp. 197-198.
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Kant’s concept of the noumena is rejected because it can never be known. Without 
the metaphysical underpinnings of Kant’s philosophy, Continental philosophers 
became entangled with the self and the way the self can construct its world. The 
problem of the subject (self) and object (not-self or external world) becomes complex 
without the metaphysical foundation of that which underpins Kant’s philosophy.
Fichte offered a metaphysical solution to the problem of the human condition. 
He believed that the self would eventually possess an intellectual intuition of itself 
and the whole world contained in itself. Schelling, following Fichte, offered a 
different solution to the subject/object dichotomy. He developed Kant’s 
transcendental idealism by presenting two philosophies: the subjective, dealing with 
the self and its freedom; and the objective, dealing with the natural world. These two 
worlds have a common source in the transcendental subject. Schelling was strongly 
influenced by Kant’s Critique o f Judgement. Through the aesthetic experience we 
can harmonize nature and intellect, object and subject, non-conscious and conscious 
activity.
Continental philosophy, with its emphasis on the self, understands nature as 
outside of the self. The thinking eventually led to the idealism of Hegel. Hegel 
introduced a historical, evolutionary perspective to philosophy:
In rough outline, however, he saw the world as a whole on the 
model of a mind, a mind which, as it were, projects an object (‘nature’) 
of which it can be conscious. This object develops by stages 
into men, and they become conscious not only in various ways 
of nature but of the cosmic mind itself and its relationship to 
nature. The emergence of men and the growth of their understanding 
represents the increasing self-consciousness of the cosmic mind.
This self-consciousness is completed by Hegel’s own system, in 
which the whole process has become entirely transparent to us.2
2 Inwood, M. Hegel. London: Routledge, 1983. pp. 1-2.
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Inwood describes the way in which Hegel understands the human condition to be one 
which is a journey to a final goal. The final goal is to be the achievement of absolute 
knowledge. Later thinkers rejected the final goal, but accepted Hegel’s concept of the 
journey.
Hegel understood the human consciousness to be not just of the individual but 
of the entire human culture of each period of time in history. The human 
consciousness, in its entirety, developed through various stages. At each stage 
consciousness, or geist (spirit), adopts a certain way of understanding the world 
(including itself) only to find out that this is incoherent and thereby a more adequate 
conception evolves. Therefore our understanding of the world is caused by a 
continuing conceptual revolution. All cultural changes and developments within the 
sciences are a result of the spirit changing the categories in which it interprets the 
world around it. Hegel did not mean that these changes occur haphazardly and will 
continue to do so throughout human existence, for his philosophy was governed by a 
belief in a general progression towards the final goal. Without this belief there is no 
progression and changes are random.
The concept of self in Hegel’s philosophy is an introspective one: a person’s 
body is an extrinsic part of the individual, as simply one of the objects of which the 
self is aware. Thinking, however, is identical with the self. Hegel emphasizes the 
concept of ourselves as thinking things separate from the external world. We 
determine the external world by our use of categories and it is therefore understood in 
a mediated manner. Our knowledge of ultimate reality is never direct. Inwood 
summarizes Hegel’s belief in the prominent part active thinking takes in humans 
obtaining knowledge of the external world:
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It is only by applying thought to my sensations and thus organizing 
them in a coherent and interconnected way that I can think of them 
as representing external objects; and it is only if I can do this that I 
can distinguish between what is objective, external things, and 
what is subjective, my conceptions for example and my sensations; 
the application of thought to my sensations is therefore necessary 
if I am to be aware of what is mine and what is not.3
Hegel’s idealism colours his perception of nature in a particular way. He 
understands humans as separated from a unity with nature because of evil. We can 
relate to nature in two ways: either in a practical day-to-day way, or in a theoretical 
way. It is this latter way that causes us problems when we think about our 
relationship to nature. Hegel asks: ‘What is nature?’:
It is through the knowledge and the philosophy of nature that we 
propose to find the answer to the general question. We find nature 
before us as an enigma and a problem, the solution of which seems 
to both attract and repel us; it attracts us in that spirit has a 
presentiment of itself in nature; it repulses us in that nature is 
an alienation in which spirit does not find itself.4
It is because of our consciousness that we find ourselves separated from nature. By 
looking at nature in a theoretical way, as in science, we find problems about ourselves 
in relationship to nature:
.. .we... find that the theoretical approach is inwardly self­
contradictory, for it appears to bring about the precise opposite of what 
is intended. We want to know the nature that really is, not something 
which is not, but instead of leaving it alone and accepting it as it is in 
truth, instead of taking it as given, we make something completely 
different out of it. By thinking things we transform them into
3 Inwood, 1983. op. cit. p.37.
4 Petry, M. J. ed. tr. Hegel’s Philosophy o f  Nature. Edited and translated with an introduction and 
explanatory notes by M.J. Petry. London: Allen and Unwin, 1970. p. 194.
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something universal; things are singularities however, and the lion 
in general does not exist. We make them into subjective things, 
produced by us, belonging to us, and of course peculiar to us as men; 
for the things of nature do not think, and are neither representations nor 
thought.5
Hegel seems to mean that by trying to understand nature we change its very essence 
and thereby become alienated from it. His philosophy puts an emphasis on the 
subject; so human consciousness is always obstructive to understanding the external:
Our aim is rather to grasp and comprehend nature however, make 
it ours, so this is not something beyond and alien to us. This is 
where the difficulty comes in. How are we as subjects to get over 
into the object? If we venture the leap over this gap, and, while 
failing to find our footing, think we have found nature, we 
shall turn that which is something other than we are into 
something other than what it is.6
This problem became a difficulty for later thinkers, but within Hegelian philosophy 
this alienation from nature can eventually be overcome. It is part of his metaphysical 
system that all things are in a state of becoming and eventually all will be spirit. The 
teleological aspect of Hegel’s thinking gives a solution to human alienation.
Hegel also developed the idea of will and power. Kant first introduced the 
concept of will as regards to the nature of humanity, but in Hegel the emphasis on the 
will is increased because of his concept of the self. The self tries to possess the world 
and make it belong to itself. It wants, or desires, the world about it. But then there is 
opposition. The world is not merely passively unco-operative but actually resists the 
demands of the self. It becomes the other. Hegel describes the Tife and death
5 Ibid. p. 198.
6 Ibid. p. 198.
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struggle with the other’, in which the self begins to know itself as will, or power, 
confronted by other wills.
Schopenhauer also substantially accepts Kantian philosophy. The world 
cannot be known only through perception but needs also the veil of intellect to be 
understood. Space, time and causality are given by the intellect. Kant held that 
beyond the veil of perception there exists the real world of noumena which can only 
be reached by humans through the exercise of the free will. Schopenhauer develops 
this area of Kant’s philosophy but he rejects Kant’s metaphysics and denies that 
humans are linked by free will to God and immortality and thereby to ultimate reality. 
Ultimate reality for Schpenhauer is a blind, universal, eternal force or urge and 
striving -  the metaphysical will.
Schopenhauer begins his argument with the self: things exist for me only as I 
perceive and understand them. The world of perception is then divided into the T ,  the 
subject of perception, and the objects that are perceived. The things in the material 
world exist (for oneself) as perceived objects. But subject and object cannot be 
separated. Intelligence and matter are a necessary part of one another. Therefore 
intelligence as well as matter is part of the world of representation. But the things of 
intelligence are an illusion. Schopenhauer thinks that through introspection we can 
reach reality, for via introspection we can find our own will. Will and action are the 
same thing; so the body becomes a representation of the will. The one reality is the 
will and this will is one will undivided without reason or purpose. Reason is unitary 
but has plural manifestations which are the world we see. All nature whether organic 
or inorganic, is a manifestation of the will. This metaphysical will just is with no 
value, purpose or reason. Individuals may manifest this will as if it had purpose but 
this is part of the illusion.
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In his book On Human Nature Schopenhauer offers a very bleak picture of 
humanity. His pessimism leads him to recognize only the evil actions of humans and 
to be blind to any positive attributes that humans may possess. He has an extremely 
negative view of human nature:
In every man there dwells, first and foremost, a colossal egoism 
which breaks the bounds of right and justice with the greatest 
freedom, as everyday life shows on a small scale, and as history on 
every page of it on a large. Does not the recognized need of a balance 
of power in Europe, with the anxious way in which it is preserved, 
demonstrate that man is a beast of prey, who no sooner sees 
a weaker man near him than he falls upon him without fail? 
and does not the same hold good of the affairs of ordinary life?
But to the boundless egoism of our nature there is joined more 
or less in every human breast a fund of hatred, anger, envy, rancour 
and malice, accumulated like the venom in a serpent’s tooth, and 
waiting only for an opportunity of venting itself, and then, like a 
demon unchained, of storming and raging.7
Schopenhauer sees the striving of will throughout nature, but humans are different in 
the particularly unpleasant expression of that will. Only humans can be diabolically 
cruel, unlike any other creature. Schopenhauer does not perceive this as evil in 
human nature, but the frustration of the will to live:
It is a fact then, that in the heart of every man there lies a wild 
beast which only waits for an opportunity to storm and rage, in 
its desire to inflict pain on others or, if they stand in his way, to 
kill them. It is this which is the source of all the lust of war and 
battle. In trying to tame and to some extent hold it in check, the 
intelligence, its appointed keeper, has always enough to do. People 
may, if they please, call it the radical evil human nature -  a name 
which will at least serve those with whom a word stands for an 
explanation. I say, however, that it is the will to live, which, more 
and more embittered by the constant sufferings of existence, seeks 
to alleviate its own torment by causing torment to others.8
7 Schopenhauer, A. On Human Nature: essays (partly posthumous) in ethics and politics. Selected and 
translated by T.B. Saunders. London: Swan Sonnenshein & Co., 1902. p.20.
8 Ibid. pp.22-23.
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Schopenhauer’s philosophy is at odds with the mechanical description of the world 
found in science. The nature of Schopenhauer is that of desires and struggles, the 
expression of the striving of the will. The will is life, but it is blind and selfish, 
without purpose.
The emphasis on the self in German Idealism appears again in existentialism. 
S0ren Kierkegaard is often regarded as the first existentialist. Existentialism is a 
philosophical movement which puts the emphasis on the individual’s responsibility to 
himself. Here again are the themes of continental philosophy: choice, subjectivity and 
isolation. This developed in more recent philosophy to viewing the human condition 
as one of despair.
Kierkegaard’s existentialism is developed within a Christian perspective. 
However it is his break with the rationalist thinking of many philosophers, including 
that of Hegel, that is important. For rationalist philosophers it is possible to transcend 
finitude and individuality by adopting the standpoint of pure thought. Rationalism 
was first in evidence in Greek thinking. Humans were understood to have a rational 
spirit that takes them beyond the world of appearances. Existentialists abandon this 
aspect by affirming that humans can never go beyond the individual experience. We 
are always trapped within a human perspective.
This philosophical point of view has tremendous implications for ethics and 
any philosophical discussion on values. Objective truth is lost. Kierkegaard accepted 
that there were no objective values, but he based his morality on religious faith. 
According to Kierkegaard our existentialist predicament can only be transformed by 
faith, which is subjective, and not by reason.
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In Nietzsche’s philosophy the potential nihilism within Kant’s philosophy 
which the critics had unveiled finds full expression. Kant had taken a middle path 
between dogmatism (belief upon authority) and scepticism (doubt about all belief). 
This middle path would be achieved by examining all our beliefs according to eternal 
laws of reason. However critics had revealed a problem in Kant’s philosophy. If 
reason should examine all, then it must examine itself, and this becomes the problem 
of how self-criticism does not become total scepticism. The result is nihilism; doubt 
about all beliefs. The problem of the authority of reason is one of the defining issues 
of continental philosophy and it appears must fully in Nietzsche’s philosophy.
Nietzsche has been interpreted in many ways and his style of writing is 
attractive to many people. Whatever the quality of his philosophy, he has become 
extremely important because of his influence on modem day thinking. He takes up 
the criticism of the authority of reason and the emphasis on the self and the individual 
experience that was already the concern of continental philosophers. He denies 
absolute truth:
For Nietzsche, there is no absolute truth because there is no absolute 
perspective. It is not possible to escape from perspectives to 
understand what the world is like beyond all perspectival 
interpretations. Nietzsche thinks that all understanding is essentially 
specific, which means that it necessarily presupposes some point 
of view, some organizational center of interpretation. What would 
be required for attaining absolute understanding is a point of view 
which was perspectival and yet transcended all perspectives 
at the same time. To want to attain absolute truth, then, according to 
Nietzsche, is to demand what is logically impossible.9
9 Moles, A. Nietzsche’s Philosophy o f  Nature and Cosmology. New York: Peter Lang, 1990. p.36.
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He also believed that there were no eternal substances and no fixed, stable objects in 
the world. Similarly there are no fixed, universal moral values. Fixed values are 
continually being undermined. He saw Western culture as evolving inevitably and 
self-destructively towards a point of radical inner change:
Since Copernicus man seems to have been on a steep slope- 
ffom now on he rolls faster and faster away from the centre- 
in what direction? towards nothingness? towards the piercing 
feeling of his nothingness?10
Nietzsche’s conclusion is that there is nothing of objective value in the world. We 
have to create our own world. Taking the existentialist’s stance he emphases the 
point that humans must take responsibility for the knowledge they seek and how they 
behave to one another. The emphasis is on the individual as in Kierkegaard and there 
is no appeal to any transcendent understanding of the whole. The subjective 
importance of learning about the world that appears in the philosophies of Kant and 
Hegel is accepted by Nietzsche, but he discards the transcendent metaphysics. The 
search for knowledge is emptied of its purity and truth and becomes only an exercise 
of will to power:
The world seen from within, the world described and defined 
according to its intelligible character -  it would be ‘will to 
power’ and nothing else.11
Schopenhauer’s vision of ultimate reality being the will to power is diminished into 
the individual’s will:
10 Nietzsche,F. On the Genealogy o f  Morals: a polemic. By the way o f clarification and supplement to 
my last book Beyond Good and Evil. Translated with an introduction and notes by D. Smith. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996. p. 130.
11 Nietzsche, F. Beyond Good and Evil: prelude to a philosophy o f  the future. Translated by R.J. 
Hollindale with an introduction by M. Tanner. London: Penguin Books, 2003. p.67
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To be unified, it is necessary that the drives have something 
in common. This shared characteristic, according to Nietzsche, is 
their will to power. By alliance and opposition, each achieves higher 
power than it would have achieved singly. In the process the body as 
a totality maximizes its level of power. At this point Nietzsche makes 
a surprising move, considering his usual criticism of attempts to 
understand things as simple and integral when investigation reveals 
them as complex and plural. He claims that the body itself is will 
to power, not only because all its components drives, considered 
separately, are will to power, but by virtue of being an integral 
system of will to power itself.12
Nietzsche understands the will to power as the individual (any living thing) seeking 
growth for itself. His interpretation differs from the Darwinian concept of natural 
selection (survival of the fittest) by stressing the individual’s need to expand rather 
than just survive. Everything in nature, including humans, has an active will to 
power. Self-preservation is not the ultimate goal (which only happens in times of 
decadence). The goal is the individual’s own growth in opposition to everything else:
In this state one enriches everything out of one’s own fullness: 
whatever one sees, whatever one wills is seen swelled, taut, 
strong, overloaded with strength. A man in this state transforms 
things until they mirror his power -  until they are reflections 
of his perfection.13
This is a doctrine of the stronger ruling over the weaker (although the strong need not 
be physically stronger) through the will to power. It is the will to be master.
Nietzsche praises the will to power and its expression when it is practised overtly. 
However, power as practised through diverse means he despises. This struggle of will
12 Moles. 1990. op. cit. p.l 11.
13 Kaufmann, W. The Portable Nietzsche. Selected and translated with an introduction, prefaces, and 
notes by W. Kaufmann. London: Chatto and Windus, 1971. p.518.
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takes place throughout nature. It results in deception as a means of power. Animals 
gain power by the act of deception because it is a form of defence
Nietzsche defines spirit as a type of force. Humanity has achieved supremacy 
over other animals by this spirit. Humanity is not special in Nietzsche’s eyes because 
of some hidden purpose, but just because humans have gained more ‘spirit’ (force) 
over other animals by their ability to deceive for the sake of defence. Humans are just 
one type of animal and do not take part in anything divine. But they are the strongest 
because of their cunning:
We have become more modest in every way. We no longer derive 
man from ‘the spirit’ or ‘the deity’; we have placed him back among 
the animals. We consider him the strongest animal because he is the 
most cunning: his spirituality is a consequence of this. On the other 
hand, we oppose the vanity that would raise its head again here 
too- as if man had been the great hidden purpose of the 
evolution of the animals. Man is by no means the crown of 
creation: every living being stands beside him on the same level 
of perfection. And even this is saying too much: relatively 
speaking, man is the most bungled of all the animals, the 
sickliest, and not one has strayed more dangerously from its 
instincts. But for all that, he is of course the most interesting.14
Nietzsche does not regard humans as the best animals, only the most cunning.
Nietzsche’s description of human nature is pessimistic. The individual strives 
to impose his will on others by the use of deception in a world that has no ultimate 
reality or true value. With this kind of analysis of human nature there is little 
direction on how we are to value one another let alone the environment around us. If 
the emphasis was on the individual and his need to impose his will, then there would 
be little point in discussing joint ventures and an individual would be more concerned 
with his present survival than any survival of nature around him. There are no
14 Kaufmann, 1971. op. cit. p. 580.
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teleological explanations within Nietzsche’s philosophy, no sense of purpose or 
direction for any creature, least of all for humans.
Studying Nietzsche we can see in him the culmination of a particular 
metaphysical process beginning with Descartes. It is the undermining of any religious 
and teleological perspective to philosophical speculation. Kaufmann sums this up in 
his introduction to his collection of Nietzsche’s works, The Portable Nietzsche:
If one considers the history of modem philosophy from Descartes, 
it is surely, for good or ill, the story of an emancipation from 
religion. Or conversely: each philosopher goes just so far, and 
then bows to Christianity and accepts what becomes unacceptable 
to his successors. Descartes resolves to doubt everything, but 
soon offers proofs of God’s existence that have long been shown 
to be fallacious. A similar pattern recurs in Hobbes and Spinoza, 
though they stray much further from all orthodoxies, and, a 
little later, in Berkeley and Leibniz. Locke is an empiricist 
who cites scripture to his purpose; Voltaire is an anti Christian 
who accepts the teleological argument for God’s existence.
Kant sets out to smash not only the proofs of God but the very 
foundation of Christian metaphysics, then turns around and 
postulates God and the immortality of the soul, preparing the 
way for Fichte and idealism. Schopenhauer finally breaks 
with Christianity but accepts the Upanishads from Hinduism. 
Nietzsche is one of the first thinkers with a comprehensive 
philosophy to complete the break with religion. 5
With the breakaway from religion in philosophy, teleological explanations for 
humanity and nature are discarded. There is now no metaphysical foundation in 
which humanity can be linked to nature in a purposeful way. Nietzsche maintains that 
all living things, including humans, are striving against one another. This is not a 
philosophy that can support any kind of positive attitude to the environment, but it has 
been one that has been overtly or covertly largely accepted today within a capitalist 
society based on competition.
15 Ibid. p. 17.
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Phenomenology is another strand of Continental philosophy. The philosophies 
of Husserl and Heidegger have been the most influential in this area. In 
phenomenology knowledge is based on the subjective experience. Through the 
phenomenological reduction, according to Husserl, we find our essential nature which 
is the subject and the knower, but never the known. Philosophers in the modem 
tradition become involved in the way the subject (ourselves) conceptualise the world. 
Dilthey understood human action within the world to be different from the scientific 
attitude. We see the world under the aspect o f our own freedom and describe it 
accordingly. We are interacting with the world, moulding the world through our own 
descriptions. In this way modem philosophy became concerned with meaning. 
Humans do not explain the world, but endow it with meaning and, therefore, 
discussions about ultimate reality or eternal truths become a fruitless endeavour. We 
can only be concerned with the meaning we ourselves impose on the world.
Heidegger concentrates on Dasein (Human Being). The question of Being is 
important because of its contingency in the world; its ‘thrownness’. Each of us must 
come to terms with our contingency. The problem, and solution, to it are existential. 
We are concerned with our being in the world. Heidegger distinguishes between 
person and thing. Things are ‘ready to hand’ and ‘to be used’. This is how objects 
appear to us. We also have relations to others, whether humans or the rest of nature. 
Heidegger calls this state ‘being-for-others’. Another state of being is when I see that 
I alone have the question of being and responsibility for it. This is called ‘angst’. In 
this philosophy we see the emphasis on the individual trying to constitute his world 
through interaction with things and others.
Sartre’s philosophy describes the psychological state of humankind within the 
world that can only have meaning through individual experience. Existence precedes
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essence. Human nature is not a given. At the heart of us is Nothingness, and humans 
must make their own beings to fill the Nothingness within them. Objects exist but 
they exist without meaning. The existentialist finds the world of being 
incomprehensible and gratuitous. A human made object, such as a hammer, does 
possess an essence that was in the maker’s mind before the hammer was made. But 
things that exist independently of a person’s intention do not have an essence. 
Roquentin in La Nausee contemplates the roots of a chestnut tree. The abstract idea 
of a ‘root’ may contain essence and be defined by it a priori but the definition does 
not explain why this particular root exists in physical, tangible presence. Existence is 
a brute fact; things exist without reason. Sartre describes the realization of the brute 
existence of things as creating within one the sense of nausea.
Humans, faced with this world deprived o f meaning and motives, may feel 
alone and unprotected. It is a depressing realization but the solution to this situation is 
that humans can come to understand themselves as being free, unlike other things. 
Humans can create their own essence, which things cannot. Things are trapped, 
imprisoned in a mire of non-meaning. Only humans are free to define themselves and 
to create their own values. Human reality is therefore distinguished from the rest of 
reality. The abstract notions of good and evil no longer mean anything and therefore 
such values no longer exist in a determined state. Values are not objective nor to be 
found in the exterior world, for humans are free to create them for themselves. The 
free will that Sartre gives humans is different from the notion of free will as within a 
religious context where humans are free to choose between the good and evil that is in 
the world. For Sartre humanity is separated from the rest of nature by this freedom. 
Nature is brute fact with no reason for existence. In humanity alone is there reason 
for existence and this must be created, not found, by humanity alone.
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Humans try to deny their freedom and become like objects. Sartre calls this 
mauvais foi, or bad faith. Humans are free to invent meaning and they try to escape 
this by various ways, as when they follow set codes of morality. But for Sartre morals 
in a world without the absolute of good and evil are not to be observed in blind 
obedience to a code. Morals are to be followed in a free and conscious expression of 
the individual’s choice. This, of course, puts enormous responsibility on the 
individual and most people try to avoid this.
We can see that Sartre’s philosophy is sadly lacking any guidelines for a 
constructive way of caring for the environment. His existentialism is essentially 
human dominated. The only world that exists is the human one and the only problems 
are human ones. Humans must deal with their freedom but nature stands outside the 
debate. Humans are not linked in any way to nature; in fact the brute fact of nature is 
disturbing because it lacks any meaning. Values are entirely within the human 
dimension and there does not seem to be any reason within Sartre’s philosophy to put 
independent value on nature.
Sartre himself came to be dissatisfied with his form of existentialism. It 
results in a form of solipsism and Sartre realized that individuals cannot find values 
within their own existence. His turning to Marxism must surely have been the result 
of his understanding of the need for humans to co-operate with one another and form 
social bonds.
It is difficult to include all the Continental philosophers in this thesis, so only 
major trends can be mentioned. A particular movement of the late 20th century should 
be included. Although there are many different thinkers within this movement who 
would not wish to be thought as part of one, they all contain similar themes of 
thought. This movement, which is often called post-structuralism, argued against all-
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encompassing explanations of human behaviour, such as Marxist, Freudian or 
Structuralist ones. These systems of thought tried to understand humans within a 
totalising vision. Freud and Marx were concerned to give a particular structure to the 
interpretation of human nature and behaviour. By becoming a Marxist, Freudian or 
Structuralist one was meant to be able to make sense of socio-historical processes 
(Marx); human behaviour (Freud); or understand the sign systems that constitute the 
world of human experience (Structuralists). All three systems of thought were 
engendered within a tradition of totalizing intellectual thinking dating from the 
Enlightenment of the 18th century. The values of the Enlightenment were: belief in 
liberal humanism; the power of reason to resolve human problems and a commitment 
to improve the material quality of life. It was a project to liberate humanity from 
oppression. These appear good values in themselves but the post-structuralists 
rejected these types of total structure systems as too authoritarian.
Structuralism can be seen as a brief backward look to the values of the 
Enlightenment, but the main trend of modem continental thinking has been the 
emphasis on the individual, the subject and the subjective stance as in post­
structuralist thought. Post-structuralism covers a variety of themes and positions: 
Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approach; Derrida’s deconstruction; 
Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis; Lyotard’s post-modernism, and various forms 
of feminism. All argue against the authoritarian implications of a structuralist 
position. As Ferre says in his book Being and Value:
Post-structuralists are especially averse to anything unchanging or 
‘ahistorical’. Such ahistoricity might suggest dreaded ‘absolutism’, 
which might inflict ‘grand unifying perspectives’ or ‘theories’
(which totalise and lead to hegemony).
From these aversions we may correctly infer that post-structuralists 
tend to value ‘pluralism’, ‘change’, ‘incommensurability’,
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‘flexibility’, ‘playfulness’, and the ‘uniqueness’ secured by finding 
‘differences’ (‘differance’, Jacques Derrida; ‘differend’, Jean- 
Francois Lyotard) everywhere. 16
I shall look particularly at Foucault’s work as it is highly representative of post­
structuralist thinking.
His approach to tackling problems has been influential on some thinkers in 
environmental debates, although he, himself, disregarded nature. It is perhaps rather 
perverse to use the thoughts of a philosopher who had so little time for nature himself 
in discussing environmental problems and it is perhaps in this realization that one can 
trace some inappropriate approaches to the problems of the environment. However, 
Darier in his book of collected essays, Discourses o f  the Environment, believes that 
Foucault’s approach is valid:
If one shouldn’t look in Foucault for an obvious aesthetic appreciation 
and/or some empathy with nature, it doesn’t mean that Foucault’s 
work is irrelevant or unimportant for environmental thinking. In 
fact, as this collection of essays illustrates, Foucault’s concepts can be 
made highly relevant to environmental thinking, whatever attitude to 
‘nature’ Foucault himself might have held....Foucault was advocating 
the ‘total effacement of the individual characteristics of the writer’. He 
also systematically resisted the boxing of his work in the existing 
intellectual categories such as ‘structuralism’,’poststructuralism’, 
‘modernism’ or ‘postmodernism’. In order to achieve this he 
employed several ‘de-locations’ in the form of his research...
The rupture between ‘author’ and ‘text’ explains how concepts can 
have unintended, unpredictable effects in ‘back of the author’.
I would argue that despite his having ‘turned his back to nature’ 
Foucault’s writings are having profound, albeit indirect, effects on 
environmental thinking. The virulent critique of Foucault by many 
environmental thinkers, via the postmodernist category, may 
also indicate that Foucault is having an effect ‘in the back’ of 
environmental thinkers themselves.17
16 Ferret F. Being and Value: toward a constructive postmodern metaphysics. Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1996. p.281.
17 Darier, E. ‘Foucault and the Environment’ in Darier, E. ed. Discourses o f  the Environment. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999. p.6.
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That environmental philosophers have accepted Foucault’s thinking means that he has 
been extremely influential on thinking in general today.
In his work we can see the growth of a particular type of thinking that has its 
roots in the existentialism of Kierkegaard and developed in the works of Nietzsche 
and Sartre. This is the emphasis on the individual as an experiencing centre. It is this 
particular point of view that has had so much impact on how we perceive ourselves 
metaphysically. It has also affected the way we understand our system of values 
which has become such a central topic of environmental philosophy. Foucault abhors 
the grand schemes of the Enlightenment and rejects Kant’s approach. Philosophy for 
Foucault is a critique. The criticism consists of analysing and reflecting upon limits 
but not in a Kantian way:
But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits 
knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that 
the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive 
one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory 
what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent 
and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, 
is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary 
limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a 
possible transgression.
This entails an obvious consequence: that criticism is no longer 
going to be practical in the search for formal structures with 
universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the 
events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize 
ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking and saying.
In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal 
is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical 
in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological- 
and not transcendental- in the sense that it will not seek to 
identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible 
moral action but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that
146
j o
articulate what we think, say and do as so many historical events.
In this quotation one can see the influence of Nietzsche in the genealogical approach 
to understanding humanity. There is no ultimate reality or truth to be discovered, no 
essence that could be called human nature, simply an historic look backward to 
understand how we have arrived where we are now. Emphasis is put on the 
subjective viewpoint and human freedom. The objective viewpoint is discarded. 
Following Nietzsche, Foucault also emphases the will to power. The accumulation of 
knowledge is an expression of this will to power. Power and truth are linked:
The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn’t outside power, or 
lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions 
would repay further study, truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the 
child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have 
succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world; 
it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it 
induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, 
its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the type of discourse which it 
accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means 
by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded 
value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged 
with saying what counts as true.19
Like Nietzsche and Sartre, Foucault is an anti-essentialist. There is no 
universal human essence. His understanding of power is also anti-essentialist. Any 
concept of power is historically contingent and not absolute. He does not define 
power outside the limits of what power is currently understood to be. Power, for 
Foucault, is not what one authority has. Power is relational and rarely an absolute, so 
it cannot be as the Marxists have perceived it. Foucault’s concept of power is more
18 Foucault, M. ‘Truth and Method’ in Rabinow, P. ed. The Foucault Reader. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1991. pp. 45-46
19 Foucault, M. ‘Truth and Power’ in Ibid. pp. 72-73.
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positive in that it is not repressive and may have normalizing effects on populations.
It is a way of constructing identities; relations of power give identity to individuals. 
Freedom, therefore, shows itself through relations of power: power is not 
deterministic. The field of power imposes constraints about the possible options open 
to individuals and groups, but it is those individuals and groups who make choices to 
accept those constraints or to challenge them.
Because of his concept of power and freedom Foucault was against grand 
narratives of liberation such as liberalism or Marxism. He saw these as potential 
disciplinary regimes. Foucault’s concept of power is more diffuse and fluid. So for 
Foucault any environmental movement with a particular structure of action would be 
open to suspicion as a potential authoritarian domination. He suggests that humans 
should be constantly vigilant and critical of all actions especially those undertaken in 
the name of liberation. Social change, revolution or environmental activism should 
be, according to Foucault, a never-ending activity in which tactics and ‘goals’ are 
constantly re-evaluated and adapted to changing circumstances within the field of 
power. Foucault does not think there should be any fixed, certain strategic position to 
adopt. He is against any grand normative project. His emphasis is on the individual 
who must engage in the ‘practice of the self.
Foucault’s philosophy is an anti-naturalist and anti-essentialist one. It is one 
that would be fervently against environmental movements like deep-ecology and any 
foundational form of environmental ethics. Darier concludes his book in support of a 
Foucauldian approach to environmental problems:
Therefore the challenge to environmental activism is not to establish 
a binding ‘ecological rationality’ with even more powerful 
instruments of control and management, but to acknowledge human 
freedom, which can manifest itself anywhere, from the outright
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destruction of the planet to its survival. Maybe it is not environmental 
ethics we need, but rather, a Green aesthetic of existence. In this 
case, Foucault is particularly relevant to the task.20
The reference to aesthetics is because, like Nietszche, Foucault believes that it is only 
through the aesthetic experience that any meaning for life can be formed.
Foucauldian philosophy is founded on the belief in the subjective stance and human 
freedom, the most important areas of concern in modem Continental philosophy. Can 
it help towards an understanding of nature and our own beings within it? In fact what 
comes across so strongly in the works of these philosophers is their alienation from 
nature and their total concern with humanity’s sense of freedom and power.
The trend of Continental philosophy has been to discredit the objective, but 
post-modernism has also brought about the diminishing of the concept of a subject. 
Anti-humanist and anti-subject sentiments are commonly expressed. Deleuze and 
Guattari, who are both post-modernists, have a radical vision of the subject. In Anti- 
Oedipus the individual is understood as a ‘desiring machine’ without any unity. 
Desire, rather than reason, drives the individual. This is again an anti-essentialist 
view of the subject. Becoming is more important than being, because there is no 
central essence to anything. Everything becomes a process and so meaning is lost:
There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a 
process that produces the one within the other and couples the 
machines together. Producing machines, desiring machines 
everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: the self 
and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning 
whatsoever.
20 Darier, E. ‘Foucault against Environmental Ethics’ in Darier, ed 1999. op. cit. p.238
21 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. Anti-oedipus: capitalism and schizophrenia. Translated from the French 
by R.Hurley, M. Seem and H. Lane, preface by Michel Foucault. London: Continuum, 2004. p.2.
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The schizophrenic is chosen as a paradigm because a schizophrenic has multiple 
identities and the ability to go on producing new identities as if identity were a 
process. Thus the ideal subject of these writers is a decentred, plural subject. It is a 
subject open to new experiences and resistant to institutional pressure. Deleuze and 
Guattari show in their ideal subject their opposition to authority and repression, which 
is a main theme of post-modernist thought. They are against anything that thwarts the 
free expression of desire and therefore against theories and institutions that curb 
individual expression. They also dismiss teleology and continuity of any explanatory 
kind.
The post-modernist ideal system is represented by a rhizome rather than a tree. 
A tree has roots and a definite hierarchical structure -  a centred system, but the 
rhizome:
.. .is an acentred, non-hierarchical, nonsignifying system without a 
General and without an organizing memory or central automaton, 
defined solely by a circulation of states. 22
The subject of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s philosophy is a fragmented, centreless entity 
that cannot be defined.
Postmodernists are opposed to all authority and rules. Jean-Francois Lyotard 
is particularly opposed to ‘techno-science’ -  the grand narrative collaboration of 
political states and advanced technology. He sees them as inhuman and is therefore in 
support of little narratives at the individual level. However, the emphasis placed on 
the individual’s freedom is the Achilles-heel of the post-modernists’ view. The
22 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia. Translation and 
foreword by B. Massumi. London: Continuum, 2004. p. 21.
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individual becomes a passive-observer in global events as Baudrillard reveals in his 
philosophy. ‘Grand narratives’ are to be only passively watched. I will be discussing 
Baudrillard later in Part II.
The real danger of postmodernism is its influence on the fragmenting of 
society. It is a philosophy of the individual and thereby can undermine the sense of a 
larger community. It is a type of philosophy that has nothing to offer in support of a 
global movement such as one which would be necessary to find a solution for 
environmental problems.
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Chapter 2 
Analytical Philosophy and Science
In the last chapter I have briefly outlined some of the major trends that 
Continental philosophy has taken up to the present day concerning human nature. 
Within this philosophy the concept of human nature is revoked. There is no essence 
to humans that we can call human nature as such: human nature is fluid. Humans 
create their own selves and they are free. Alongside these notions is that of the will to 
power. Power is, like human nature, fluid but it is what drives us all. The outcome of 
this thinking seems to lead to a fragmented society where only the individual self has 
importance. Even the concept of the self becomes fragmented in some philosophical 
writings. This type of thinking has influenced ethical theories and consequently 
environmental ethics. I shall be dealing with the ethical implications of the concept of 
pluralism that has developed largely from the influence of Continental philosophy.
However, in England the analytical critique of Kant’s first Critique was seen 
as the more important part of Kant’s philosophy and the emphasis was on an 
analytical style of philosophy. It is a philosophy that was strongly influenced by 
scientific method and so the various developments in the sciences are as important as 
the philosophy with regard to understanding the development of a new concept of 
human nature and the relationship humans have to nature. This particular style of 
philosophy was not restricted to Britain, for it had its roots also in Vienna and spread 
to America. It is also called Anglo-American philosophy. Analytical philosophy was 
at first bewitched by the successes of science, so much so that the philosophers of the 
Vienna Circle drew a line of demarcation between science and what they labelled 
‘metaphysics’ which for them was synonymous to nonsense. They did this by saying
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that only propositions concerned with matters of fact or with logical relation between 
concepts are meaningful. Propositions not falling into either of these two classes -  
the propositions of ethics and religion, for example -  they regarded as expressions 
having emotional or exhortatory but not cognitive content; strictly they lack sense. 
Factual propositions are based upon experience and are significant because they can 
be verified or falsified by experience. Analytical philosophy therefore became 
concerned primarily with language and meaning. The analytical philosopher tries to 
reduce the imprecision of everyday usage of language to find the real meaning. Much 
like the scientist, these philosophers were concerned with problem-solving. The 
tendency of this approach is to become restricted within minor arguments in 
extremely complex ways. Although it can be a very useful approach to clearing up 
misunderstandings within philosophy, the desire to solve problems within the use of 
language often leads to greater confusion and the larger picture is often ignored.
Philosophy for analytical philosophers is a conceptual, analytical process. It 
follows a reductionist approach to knowledge in a similar to fashion to that of science. 
As John Searle explains:
If we combine the assumption that philosophy is essentially a 
conceptual, analytical enterprise with the assumption that its task 
is to provide secure foundations for such things as knowledge -  then 
the consequence for the positivists is that philosophical analysis tends 
in large part to be reductive. That is, the aim of the analysis is to show 
for example, how empirical knowledge is based on, and ultimately 
reducible to, the data of our experience, to so-called sense-data.1
In this way analytic philosophy often supported the scientific method, although this is 
not true of all the philosophy in this style. Anglo-American philosophy, unlike
1 Searle, J. ‘Contemporary Philosophy in the United States’ in Bunnin, N. and Tsui-James, E.P. eds. 
The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 5.
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Continental philosophy, was, in many areas, the hand-maiden to science. At least it 
would seem that way to anyone of a more Continental persuasion, because of the 
emphasis in analytical philosophy on objective knowledge rather than the acceptance 
of the subjective stance that was the guideline in Continental. To accept science in 
the way that analytical philosophy tends to do is for Continental philosophers not to 
be practising philosophy in the right way:
From a continental perspective, the adoption of scientism in 
philosophy fails to grasp the critical and cultural function of 
philosophy, that is, it fails to see the complicity between a scientific 
culture and what Nietzsche diagnosed as nihilism. What this means 
is that philosophical scientism fails to see the role that science 
and technology play in the alienation of human beings from the 
world through the latter’s objectification into a causally determined 
realm of nature or, more aggregiously, into a reified realm of 
commodities manipulated by an instrumental rationality.2
Continental philosophers tend to be anti-scientistic, although this is not the same as 
being anti-scientific. They simply are doubtful that the natural sciences provide our 
most significant access to the world and therefore for this reason they are critical of 
analytical philosophy.
There has been much good work done in analytical philosophy, but it has been 
influential mainly to only a select few; it has not caught the imagination of the general 
public. The emphasis on the individual in Continental philosophy and its concern 
with the human condition has meant that certain philosophers and their theories have 
generally been known more by the public than the philosophers of the analytic 
tradition. In England and English speaking countries the discoveries of science and
2 Critchley, S. ‘Introduction: what is Continental philosophy?’ in Critchley, S. and Schroeder, W. R. 
eds. A Companion to Continental Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999. p. 13.
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the scientist who has ventured into vague speculations of nature and human nature 
have often had more influence on the public and what is generally accepted than the 
philosophers. When examining people’s attitudes to the environment and concepts of 
nature and human nature it is therefore necessary to assess the implications of 
scientific discoveries and their impact on the concept we have of ourselves.
The scientific method led scientists to reductionism and, for the purpose of 
simplification I shall be looking at the extreme form of reductionism in science as its 
simplicity has been very influential in framing a concept of human nature today. 
Reductionism can be understood as a way of relating the discoveries of each science 
to one another:
Reductionism is one solution to the problem of the relationship 
between different sciences. Thus one might advocate reducing 
biology to chemistry, supposing that no distinctive biological facts 
exist, or chemistry to physics, supposing that no distinctive 
chemical facts exist.3
Someone who is a reductionist in these terms would believe that to understand 
anything within the world would be to break it down into its component parts and 
nothing woud be lost in so doing. Or to reverse this idea: if anyone had the basic 
building blocks of the world, anything in the world could be made from them exactly 
as they are to be found now, including human consciousness.
One important area within science was to find the ultimate building block of 
everything. Not only do scientists search for fundamental particles and forces that are 
the building blocks of the world we see around us, but they also seek to explain the 
workings of the universe by one unified theory. Thus Stephen Hawking writes.
3 Blackburn, S. The Oxford Dictionary o f  Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. p. 322.
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The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that 
describes the whole universe.4
By this he means a theory within the discipline of physics.
The reductionist programme in science is built on the assumption that in order 
to understand how the things of the world function it is necessary to break them down 
into simple units. In this way, to understand living creatures science ‘reduces’ them 
to organic parts to be studied within the discipline of biology, and further parts to be 
studied at the biochemical level. Thence to chemistry and physics and the ultimate 
building blocks whatever they may be. David Deutsch, a scientist who is critical of 
the full reductionist position explains reductionism as follows:
That is to say, science allegedly explains things reductively -  by 
analysing them into components. For example, the resistance of a 
wall to being penetrated or knocked down is explained by regarding 
the wall as a vast aggregation of interacting molecules. The properties 
of those molecules are again explained in terms of their constituent 
atoms, and the interaction of those atoms with one another, and so on 
down to the smallest particle and most basic forces. Reductionists 
think that all scientific explanations, and perhaps all sufficiently deep 
explanations of any kind, take that form.
The reductionist conception leads naturally to a classification of 
objects and theories in a hierarchy, according to how close they are to 
the ‘lowest-level’ predictive theories that are known. In this hierarchy, 
logic and mathematics form the immoveable bedrock on which the 
edifice of science is built. The foundation stone would be a 
reductionist ‘theory of everything’, a universal theory of particles, 
forces, space and time, together with some theory of what the initial 
state of die universe was. The rest of physics forms the first four 
storeys. Astrophysics and chemistry are at a higher level, geology 
even higher, and so on. The edifice branches into many towers of 
increasingly high-level subjects like biochemistry biology and 
genetics. Perched at the tottering, stratospheric tops are subjects like
4 Hawking, S. A Brief History o f  Time; from the big bang to black holes. London: Bantam Press, 1988.
p.10.
156
the theory of evolution, economics, psychology and computer science, 
which in this picture are almost inconceivably derivative.5
In this extreme form of reductionism that Deutsch describes science leads to the 
attempt to find a theory of everything and this ultimately leads to an explanation in 
terms of the initial state of the universe. In a reductionist account of the world the 
laws governing sub-atomic particle interactions are of paramount importance as these 
are the bases of the hierarchy of all knowledge. The whole reductionist programme 
rests heavily on the acceptance of causal laws:
Not only does it assume that explanations always consist of 
analysing a system into smaller, simpler systems, it also 
assumes that all explanation of later events are in terms of earlier 
events, in other words, that the only way of explaining something 
is to state its causes. And thus implies that the earlier the events 
in terms of which we explain something, the better the explanation, 
so that ultimately the best explanations of all are in terms of the 
initial state of the universe.6
The reductionist approach of science has been hugely successful in so many areas of 
practical application that it has been largely accepted as the only way to explain and 
solve problems. But it is controversial within the area of biology and related subjects, 
This is because it touches on our concept o f ourselves as human beings and our 
relationship between ourselves and nature.
To a certain extent the reductionist programme is still considered successful 
within the biological sciences. Genetic theory is well established and every day we 
can see the influence of this theory on the explanation of human behaviour. The 
writings of Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett have been extremely influential in
5 Deutsch, D. The Fabric o f  Reality. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1998. pp. 19-20.
6 Ibid. p.24.
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this area and they are both reductionists. Also Edward Wilson and his book 
Sociobiology has had an effect on how we understand ourselves in our environment.
The Darwinian revolution has been equated to the Copemican revolution in 
astronomy: it turned the concept of ourselves in relation to the cosmos upside-down. 
In the Copemican revolution the Earth was removed from the centre of the universe 
and became a satellite of the sun. But more important than the decentralization of 
humans’ place in the universe, the difference between heaven and earth was no longer 
accepted. This had a profound effect on religious beliefs of the time. Like the 
Copemican revolution, the Darwinian revolution was not only a scientific revolution 
but a philosophical one as well. After the Copemican revolution people were able to 
realign themselves and still believe in a difference between body and mind (or spirit). 
After the Darwinian revolution, the difference between mind and body was 
threatened. Materialism became the most likely candidate for a theory of everything. 
Janet Radcliffe Richards sums this up in her book Human Nature after Darwin:
This is a useful vantage point from which to approach the Darwinian 
revolution, because the best way of understanding the significance 
is in terms of its apparent potential for completing the synthesizing 
process. Newton had broken down the distinction between the 
heaven and the earth, and brought them into a single explanatory 
scheme. Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection has 
seemed to many people to hold out the threat (or promise) of 
breaking down the other distinction, and showing that it is, after 
all, possible for the workings of ‘bare incogitative matter’, to 
lie at the root of all complexity and consciousness, and for 
traditional dualities ( the idea that there are two distinct substances, 
spirit and matter) to be replaced with monism ( the idea that there is 
only one)... .The Darwinian threat was to make plausible the idea 
of material monism, or materialism, and in doing so to cast doubt 
on the Mind First view of the world.7
7 Richards, J. Human Nature after Darwin: a philosophical introduction. Milton Keynes: Open 
University, 1999. p.26.
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Prior to the Darwinian revolution it had been thought that there could not have 
been matter without there first being Mind to create matter, mind being more complex 
than matter. But after the Darwinian revolution there was now a way of explaining 
how mind could be developed from matter. It was not in fact the theory of evolution 
that had opened up this new explanation, as a theory of evolution had been developing 
before Darwin, but the idea of natural selection. Dennett calls this ‘the dangerous 
idea’, the title of his ultra-Darwinian book, because it gave a mechanism by which 
evolution could happen and an explanation of how mind could develop from matter. 
Darwin summarizes his understanding of natural selection at the end of his book:
If during the long course of ages and under varying conditions 
of life, organic beings vary at all in the several parts of their 
organization, and I think this cannot be disputed, if there be 
owing to the high geometric power of increase of each species 
at some age, season or year, a severe struggle for life, and this 
certainty could be disputed, then considering the infinite complexity 
of the relations of all organic beings to each other and to their 
conditions of existence, causing an infinite diversity in structure 
constitution and habits, to be advantageous to them, I think it would 
be a most extraordinary fact if  no variation ever had occurred 
useful to each beings own welfare, in the same way as so many 
variations have occurred useful to man. But if variations useful to any 
organic being do occur, assuredly individuals thus characterized will 
have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and 
from the strong principle of inheritance they will tend to produce 
offspring similarly characterized. This principle of preservation 
I have called for the sake of brevity, ‘natural selection’.8
Although Darwin did not know the mechanics of heredity, it only took 
Mendel’s work to fill in this gap in knowledge. The final victory for a reductionist 
understanding of human nature was the discovery of DNA. For thinkers like Dennett 
the discovery of DNA means that we can understand everything about ourselves in
8 Darwin, C. The Origin o f  Species. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968. pp. 169-170.
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material terms. There are no more ‘skyhooks’ as he calls explanations that are not 
reductionist. The following are the claims Dennett makes for contemporary 
Darwinism in its most extreme form:
The fundamental core of contemporary Darwinism, the theory 
of DNA-based reproduction and evolution, is now beyond dispute 
among scientists. It demonstrates its power every day, contributing 
crucially to the explanation of planet-sized facts of geology and 
meteorology, through middle-sized facts of ecology and agronomy 
down to the latest facts of genetic engineering. It unifies 
biology and the history of our planet into a single grand story.
Like Gulliver tied down in Lilliput, it is unbudgeable, not because of 
some one or two huge chains of argument that might -  hope against 
hope -  have weak links in them, but because it is securely tied by 
hundreds of thousands of threads of evidence anchoring it to virtually 
every other area of human knowledge.9
Dennett reveals his belief that evolutionary theory is the unifying theory as it unifies 
‘biology and the history of our planet into a single grand story’. He takes his building 
blocks to be DNA. Everything on the planet Earth is explained through the story of 
these building blocks. The result is that we have an explanation for human nature in 
monistic-materialist terms. It is contrary to any teleological explanation of nature and 
humans. But to describe every living thing on Earth in terms of DNA could be 
equivalent of describing a home in terms of the bricks that made the dwelling for the 
home. In such a description the bricks would be doing a lot of work for a concept that 
has very little to do with them.
Scientists who are reductionists come in various disguises. The success of 
Edward Wilson’s book Sociobiology named those who followed his ideas as 
‘sociobiologists’. Rightly or wrongly Wilson came under severe criticism for some of 
the implications in his book so that those who later accepted his ideas have given
9 Dennett, D. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: evolution and the meanings o f  life. London: Penguin Books 
Ltd., 1996. p. 20.
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themselves the name of evolutionary psychologists. Wilson is strongly reductionist. 
His explanations of the world and the relationship of humans to nature are securely 
within the field of scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is highly reliant on the 
concept of causality and this is where scientific explanations for humans become 
controversial. Kant had excluded human freewill from scientific causes because he 
recognized the importance of human freewill as regards morality. A scientific 
explanation of humans can seem too deterministic and this was the main criticism of 
Wilson. In On Human Nature Wilson portrays a deterministic account of human 
nature:
.. .what is man’s ultimate nature?
We keep returning to the subject with a sense of hesitancy and even 
dread. For if the brain is a machine of ten billion nerve cells and the 
mind can somehow be explained as the summed activity of a finite 
number of chemicals and electrical reactions, boundaries limit the 
human prospect -  we are biological and our souls cannot fly free.10
This point of view is in direct contrast to continental philosophy, which although 
rejecting a teleological explanation of human nature, encourages the concept of 
human freedom. Wilson and his followers require a completely deterministic 
explanation. Sociobiology, now called evolutionary psychology, is a theory to place 
humans within the biological sphere. Just as non-humans can be studied within the 
evolutionary theory, so can humans. Human nature and human behaviour come 
within the scientific sphere and can be understood by studying their evolutionary 
development. Wilson makes this claim:
It [genetic chance and environmental necessity] is the essential first 
hypothesis for any serious consideration of the human condition.
10 Wilson, E. On Human Nature. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1995. p. 1.
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Without it the humanities and social sciences are the limited 
descriptions of surface phenomena, like astronomy without physics, 
biology without chemistry and mathematics without algebra. With it, 
human nature can be laid open as an object of fully empirical research, 
biology can be put to the service of liberal education and our self- 
conception can be enormously and truthfully enriched.11
Wilson is aware of the determinism within his account but sees it as an asset for future 
understanding of humans. All human behaviour and experience will be understood as 
determined by biological constraints. Thereby a full description of human nature is a 
possibility:
But to the extent this new naturalism is true, its pursuit seems 
certain to generate two great spiritual dilemmas. The first is that no 
species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives 
created by its genetic history. Species may have vast potential for 
material and mental progress but they lack any immanent purpose or 
guidance from agents beyond their immediate environment or even 
an evolutionary goal toward which their molecular architecture 
automatically steers them. I believe that the human mind is 
constructed in a way that locks it inside this fundamental constraint 
and forces it to make choices with a purely biological instrument.
If the brain evolved by natural selection, even the capacities 
to select particular esthetic judgments and religious beliefs must 
have arisen by the same mechanistic process. 2
Wilson is not concerned that some of the higher intellectual endeavours of humans are 
down-graded quite considerably by his account. Purposes, aesthetic and religious 
experiences are explained as the result of mechanistic processes. He is overjoyed to 
have simplified humans to the level of his specialist knowledge. In this cavalier 
fashion Wilson abolishes the higher aspirations of humans. It is an explanation that 
immediately negates any thoughts that take us beyond the every day. Creativity and 
imagination become mundane. It is, in fact, a very poor explanation for the existence
11 Ibid. pp. 1-2
12 Ibid. p.2.
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of inspiration. Yet the reductionist explanation for human nature is enticing in its 
simplicity and its all-encompassing claims. If humans can be explained entirely in 
this scientific way then there is a genuine possibility of solving all problems. All we 
need to do is examine the evolutionary process that brought it about and by 
understanding the problem in this way we can solve it. Wilson believes that morality 
can be explained in evolutionary terms as well:
.. .innate censors and motivators exist in the brain that deeply 
and unconsciously affect our ethical premises; from these roots, 
morality evolved as instinct. If that perception is correct, science 
may soon be in a position to investigate the very origin and 
meaning of human values from which all ethical pronouncements 
and much of political practice flow.13
I cannot help but admire the amazing optimism that this passage contains, but it is 
also very disturbing. Here Wilson really is saying that we each are a given, a result of 
the evolutionary process that made our brains what they are, so that the very thoughts 
of right and wrong are simply to be understood as the way our brains have evolved to 
think. However if this is the case, how is it possible that after reading and discoursing 
with others about a particular moral problem we can take a fresh look at the problem 
and change our opinion? If our brains had evolved in a particular way, would this be a 
possibility?
Wilson was by training a biologist. It was studying the behaviour of non­
human animals that inspired his theory of human nature. Evolutionary psychologists 
tend to interpret human behaviour using the same terminology as that applied to 
animal behaviour. Thinkers of the 19th century, such as Spencer, held that there was 
evolutionary progress, humans being the topmost pinnacle to which evolution aspired.
13 Ibid. p.5.
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But this has been discredited. As everything is a result of random selection there can 
be no notion of progression. Progression implies purpose and natural selection has no 
purpose. At the same time that humans are brought into the realm of the animal 
kingdom, animal behaviour is interpreted in terms of human behaviour and the 
difference between the two is understood as a difference of degree and not of kind. 
Thus there have been studies of our closest relatives, the apes, to show links between 
their social behaviour and our own. There has been research into the ability of 
chimpanzees to acquire language, trying to prove that they have the same potential 
ability to understand symbols as humans. The closeness of humans to the rest of 
nature is emphasized because the claim supports evolutionary theory. But, perhaps in 
an attempt to close the gap, the extent of the difference has been undervalued.
According to environmental psychologists human nature is fixed because it is 
the result of natural selection. Each individual that is alive today is the result of 
ancestors having favourable genes for selection. Favoured genes will spread 
throughout the population and the particular traits they generate will become 
characteristic of the species. As Wilson says:
In this way human nature is postulated by many sociobiologists, 
anthropologists, and others, to have been shaped by natural selection.14
Wilson further holds that human personalities are the result of selected genes and that 
all cultural behaviour is the result o f the sum of those selected genes:
The recently discovered enkephalins and endorphins are protein­
like substances of relatively simple structure that can profoundly 
affect mood and temperament. A single mutation altering the
14 Ibid. p.33.
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chemical nature of one or more of them might change the personality 
of the person bearing it, or at least the predisposition of the person 
to develop one personality as opposed to another in a given cultural 
surrounding. Thus it is possible, and in my judgement, even probable, 
that the positions of genes having indirect effect on the most complex 
forms of behaviour will soon be mapped on the 
human chromosomes.15
Wilson gives a genetic explanation for human personalities. This is a biologically- 
determined view of human nature. Wilson also makes claims about human 
behaviour:
I also believe that it will be soon within our power to identify 
many of the genes that influence behaviour.. .Thus it is possible and in 
my judgement even probable, that the position of genes having indirect 
effects on the most complex forms of behaviour will soon be mapped 
on the human chromosomes.16
The sociobiologist holds that to understand human nature it is sufficient to study 
evolutionary factors:
Self-knowledge [through socio-biology] will reveal the element 
of biological human nature from which modem social life 
proliferated in all its strong forms. It will help to distinguish 
safe from dangerous future courses of action with greater 
precision.17
Evolutionary psychologists today are aware of the negative implications of the 
doctrine Wilson put forward. They are more careful as to how they phrase their 
theory maintaining that environmental influences are no less deterministic than
15 Ibid. p. 47.
16 Ibid. pp. 46-47.
17 Ibid. p.47.
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genetic inheritance. However, Steven Pinker in his book The Blank Slate published 
2002 still can say this:
Psychologists have discovered that our personalities differ in five 
major ways. We are to varying degrees introverted or 
extroverted, neurotic or stable, incurious or open to experience 
agreeable or antagonistic, and conscientious or undirected.. .All five of 
the major personality dimensions are heritable, with perhaps 40 to 50 
percent of the variation in a population tied to differences in their 
genes. The unfortunate wretch who is introverted, neurotic, narrow, 
selfish and undependable is probably that way in part because of his 
genes, and so, most likely are the rest of us who have tendencies in any 
of those directions as compared with our fellows.18
Later he says this about ‘heinous acts’:
In either case genetics and neuroscience are showing that a heart of 
darkness cannot always be blamed on parents or society.19
This suggests that evolutionary psychologists are saying that human personalities are 
to a large part genetically determined and the implication of this seems to be that 
those who behave badly in society cannot have total moral responsibility for their 
actions. I think he would claim that he was really saying that humans are determined 
one way or another, either genetically or by the environment, society, family etc. 
Either way the concept of responsibility of the individual for himself is not 
immediately apparent in their explanations. Later he says:
The explanations [genetics, neuroscience] may help us understand 
the parts of the brain that made a behaviour tempting, but they say 
nothing about the other parts of the brain (primarily in the pre-frontal 
cortex) that could have inhibited the behaviour by anticipating
18 Pinker, S. The Blank Slate: the modern denial o f  human nature. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2002. 
p.50.
19 Ibid. p.51.
166
how the community would respond to it.20
This implies that moral correction o f behaviour is also controlled by physical 
processes and is mainly concerned with not disturbing the community. However, 
Pinker does not address the problem that, if  a society holds to this particular theory, 
the inhibition of behaviour may not function so well when everyone assumes that the 
genetic background determines so much social behaviour. His understanding of 
morality is phrased in evolutionary terms:
The expansion of the moral circle does not have to be powered by 
some mysterious drive toward goodness. It may come from the 
interaction between the selfish process of evolution and a law of 
complex systems. The biologists John Maynard Smith and Eors 
Szathmary and the journalist Robert Wright have explained how 
evolution can lead to a greater and greater degree of cooperation. 
Repeatedly in the history of life, replicators have teamed up, 
specialized to divide the labor, and coordinated their behaviour. It 
happens because replicators often find themselves in non-zero-sum 
games, in which particular strategies adopted by two players can leave 
them both better off.21
As always with the theories of evolutionary psychologists this gives an excellent 
description of the history of a phenomenon but it is hardly inspiring, nor gives any 
forward-looking direction in which way we should tackle moral problems now. A 
historical description is not a guide-line to future behaviour. Besides which, a 
morality based on individuals winning games changes the concept of morality to such 
a degree that it could no longer be classed as morality. Nor would this explanation of 
morality based ‘winning-games’ be much incentive for people to follow moral codes.
20 Ibid. p. 183.
21 Ibid. p. 167.
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An extreme form of reductionism used to describe human nature is formulated 
by Richard Dawkins in his book The Selfish Gene. It is not always easy to make an 
assessment of his theory for he has a tendency to shift his ground when criticized for 
the implications of his theory. However I can only give an outline of what he seems 
to be saying even if he may deny its implications. Lured by his particular specialist 
area of knowledge, he gives a totally biological interpretation of human nature. He 
says that natural selection does not work on individuals or groups but on a smaller 
unit -  ‘the germ-line replicator’:
The thesis that I shall support is this. It is legitimate to speak of 
adaptations as being ‘for the benefit’ of something, but that something 
is best not seen as the individual organism. It is a smaller unit which 
I call the active, germ-line replicator. The most important kind of 
replicator is the ‘gene’ or small genetic fragment...
The individual bodies are still there, they have not moved, but they 
seem to have gone transparent. We see through them to the replicating 
fragment of DNA within, and we see the wider world as an arena in 
which these genetic fragments play out their tournaments of 
manipulative skill.22
The implications of his writings seem to be that the gene is the most important entity 
in the living world and everything else is happening as a by-product. From this 
description humans become merely carriers of the genes:
Fundamentally, what is going on is that replicating molecules 
ensure their survival by means of phenotypic effects on the world. 
It is only incidentally true that those phenotypic effects happen to 
be packaged up into units called individual organisms 23
22 Dawkins, R. The Extended Phenotype: the gene as the unit o f  selection. Oxford: W.H. Freeman and 
Company,1982. p.4.
23 Ibid. pp.4-5.
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This does give a picture of a world seething with genes and of humans as mere 
victims of what their genes require them to do in order for the genes (and not even the 
individual human in which the genes reside) to survive. However, Dawkins has 
denied this picture, saying that it does not matter what our genes are doing; humans 
can function the same way as always as if the genes were having no effect. But this 
seems a little like presenting a theory and then rejecting all its implications because 
they are unpalatable.
Both Dawkins and Pinker deny the deterministic implications of their theories 
although their argument for the denial is in negative terms. They both argue that 
environmental factors can be more determinative than gene factors. It is interesting 
that they support their own theory by attacking the other side, for the fact that 
environmental factors may be more determinative does not mean that gene factors are 
not determinative. There is a big problem here about determinism and the need for 
free will within human behaviour which I shall tackle later, for much of the argument 
rests on what is meant by ‘determinism’ and particularly what sort of causes we are 
discussing when we say ‘this behaviour was caused by... ’ But at the moment I want 
to look at what Dawkins and Pinker seem to be saying because it is the surface 
interpretation that has attracted the attention of the media and, as a result, public 
opinion. The problem seems to be that physical entities appear more concrete than 
social entities, so that if one is bom with particular genes that want to survive 
whatever may befall, there is little that you can do to change them. You are the sum 
of your genes and must behave as they dictate. Whereas environmental factors seem 
more open to change and more under an individual’s control. This may not be true 
and I have some sympathy with Pinker and Dawkins when they see environmental 
factors as every bit as deterministic as genes. It is the popular conception of physical
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entities that is at fault but it is my argument that the metaphysical picture presented by 
scientists, and understood at large, is the one that frames our present understanding of 
human nature and our relation to nature.
The reductionist approach in the biological sciences depicts a particular 
deterministic concept of human nature. On this account we are products of natural 
selection at the gene level. The particular genes that are selected are the ones that 
determine our behaviour. The evolutionary psychologists hold that most of our 
behaviour is determined by genes that evolved to help us survive as stone age humans 
so that sometimes, or even often, our behaviour today is dictated by survival values of 
the past which often conflict with modem civilization. It is a wonder that the genes 
have not caught up! The populist understanding of the reductionist explanation of 
human nature is that we are just physical beings like the rest of nature, only separated 
from our nearest cousins, the apes, by a slight degree. Social and cultural 
developments are seen as much less important in this description of human nature. 
Human behaviour, even altruistic acts, is explained as survival tactics. In fact all 
areas of human interactions and thoughts, including care for families and establishing 
social groups as well as aesthetic and spiritual expressions, are explained in terms of 
survival.
This type of explanation makes it difficult to possess any values at all apart 
from that of survival. It would be difficult to build an environmental ethics on this 
type of basis. If we are a sum of genes fighting for our survival then so is the rest of 
nature. All we need to do is to sustain that part of nature that we need for our 
existence.
Not all scientists who accept evolutionary theory are as extreme as the 
evolutionary psychologists. There is a vast spectrum of ideas within the variety of
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evolutionary explanation about human nature. I have been dealing with those that 
may be termed ‘ultra-Darwinists’ who accept mono-materialism. Other Darwinists 
can be non-materialists for, while they accept evolutionary theory, they sometimes 
hold a belief that there could also be some non-materialist substance. The ultra- 
Darwinists deny that there could ever be anything but physical matter. This 
materialist account of humans and nature is often a mechanical one as well. It seems 
to follow from reductionist thinking. The line of thought is this: if we are products of 
inanimate matter developed by physical processes we must, like all of nature, be 
subject to physical laws which are, following Newton, basically mechanical. Dennett 
certainly follows this line of thought in his explanation of human consciousness.
Human consciousness seems to be the last area in the understanding of 
humans that escapes a material explanation. Our own experience of consciousness 
seems to deny that there could be a materialist explanation for it. However Dennett 
does give a materialistic explanation of human consciousness. With the development 
of computer sciences he, and many other thinkers today, understand the mind as an 
extremely complex computer. The particular manifestation of the human mind has 
been formed through the process of natural selection: Environmental pressures have 
helped the brain to be developed in a certain way so that a mind has evolved to cope 
with survival. All thoughts and feelings are the brain’s way to make us behave in 
certain ways in order to survive. Our attempt to make these processes in the brain 
more than the material is because we are trapped into a grand illusion. The grand 
illusion is our consciousness. In fact, according to Dennett, these illusions (ideas, 
intentions etc.) are just mechanistic processes. However, Dennett says, we can use 
such non-mechanistic terms to help us in certain explanations of behaviour, but
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language has given us the illusion of a non-material substance that in fact does not 
exist:
The phenomena of human consciousness have been explained in 
the preceding chapters in terms of the operations of a ‘virtual 
machine’, a sort of evolved ( and evolving) computer program that 
shapes the activities of the brain. There is no Cartesian Theatre; there 
are just Multiple Drafts composed by processes of content fixation 
playing various semi-independent roles in the brain’s larger economy 
of controlling a human body’s journey through life. The astonishingly 
persistent conviction that there is a Cartesian Theater is the result of a 
variety of cognitive illusions that have now been exposed and 
explained. ‘Qualia’ have been replaced by computer dispositional 
states of the brain, and the self (otherwise known as the Audience in 
the Cartesian Theater, the Central Meaner or the Witness), turns out to 
be a valuable abstraction, a theorists fiction rather than an internal 
observer or boss.24
Thus Dennett demolishes the one area of our awareness that seemed to stand outside 
all physical explications. To any protests that our awareness of experiences within 
consciousness seems to differ in a vast way from anything else and that all our 
concepts have been built on the difference between what we experience as internal 
and what we experience as external (the subjective and the objective), he has the 
answer that we are suffering from a grand illusion. But Dennett is open to the 
question as to how he is able to see the illusion as an illusion if it is an illusion. In 
fact, how can any of us stand outside our own consciousnesses and assess them to be 
what they are if we must use consciousness to examine it?
Nevertheless this picture of the mind as a vast and complex computer 
programme is well established today. The corollary to this hypothesis is that it is 
logically and, eventually, physically possible to build a computer complex enough to 
have consciousness. Thinkers in this line complete the mechanical picture of nature
24 Dennett, D. Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1991. p. 431.
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begun by Descartes, but this time including the mind in the description. In spite of 
further developments in science that may question this mechanical description of 
nature following the laws of physical causation, the popular concept of human nature 
seems to be the one that Dennett has successfully outlined. We have today a concept 
of nature that is a mechanical one based on monistic materialism, and humans, 
including consciousness, are a part of that mechanical explanation.
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Chapter 3
Continental Philosophy and Science 
Comparisons and Contrasts in their Concepts of Human Nature
In this thesis I have been attempting to outline the main themes that dominate 
thinking today in the formation of the concepts of nature and of human nature. In this 
second part I have researched into the development of Continental philosophy and 
how it has influenced the concept of human nature, as well as scientific reductionism 
which has led to the Ultra-Darwinist position on the concept of human nature. In this 
chapter I want to examine further the main themes in Continental philosophy and 
Ultra-Darwinism and compare the two opposed concepts of human nature. My 
argument is that both Continental philosophy and Ultra-Darwinism have had a 
considerable influence on the concept of human nature that has been generally 
accepted today. There are many who dissent from the general consensus, but 
nevertheless the two opposing schools of thought appear to dominate literature and 
the media. Often the two concepts are held simultaneously without the realization 
that they are fundamentally contradictory.
As noted earlier, the difference between analytical philosophy and its 
acceptance of scientific method, and Continental philosophy could be seen to largely 
turn on whether philosophers were concerned solely with the epistemological issues 
of the first Critique, as was the case with analytical philosophy, or with the greater 
systematic ambitions of the third Critique. Kant’s critique of the faculty of judgement 
was an attempt to link the concept of nature, tied by physical laws, with the concept of 
human freedom. While analytical philosopher largely ignored the third Critique, 
Continental philosophers were left discontent with Kant’s solution.
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Yet the question that this raises is the following: how is freedom 
to be instantiated or to take effect in the world of nature, if the 
latter is governed by causality and mechanically determined by 
the laws of nature? How is the causality of the natural world 
reconcilable with what Kant calls the causality of freedom? How, 
to allude to Emerson alluding to the language of Kant’s Third 
Critique, is genius to be transformed into practical power? Doesn’t 
Kant leave human beings in what Hegel might have called the 
amphibious position of being both freely subject to the moral law 
and determined by an objective world of nature that has been stripped 
of any value and which stands over against human beings as a world 
of alienation?1
It is this criticism of Kant that occupied the thoughts of many Continental 
philosophers. Nietzsche diagnosed it as the concept of nihilism. It is the realization 
that the subject’s freedom opens the gates to a collapse in moral certainty in the world 
because the highest values have devalued themselves. Where Kant could claim a 
transcendent source of values, the implications of his philosophy was that this 
transcendent source could not be known and therefore successive philosophers found 
the concept empty.
For the German philosophers that followed Kant the achievement of 
transcendental idealism was to reduce the importance of the thing-in-itself, objects of 
the ‘real’ word. Objects are constructed within the mind of the self-conscious subject 
and so the characteristic emphasis in German philosophy is on the latter. In Fichte’s 
philosophy, only the self can know itself; the self ‘posits’ itself. Everything else is 
mere representation or the not-self. In the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel there 
are large metaphysical systems to give purpose and direction to the self. In German 
Idealism the underlying reality is spirit whose journey towards self-knowledge leads 
to the Absolute Idea. But later philosophers abandoned these types of systems and
1 Critchley, S. ‘Introduction: what is Continental philosophy’ in Critchley, S. and Schroeder, W.R. eds. 
A Companion to Continental Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999. p.l 1.
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the self-conscious subject becomes the centre of all knowledge. The self floats in a 
vacuum that only itself can fill. Idealism gave way to materialism as in the works of 
Marx. Marx interprets Hegelian dialectics in material and historical terms. The 
concept of spirit is discarded.
With the emphasis on the self, Continental philosophers place importance on 
subjective knowledge. The world is ordered by the subject: there is no order ‘out 
there’ to discover. In this respect humans can be understood as apart from nature for 
nature is organized and categorized through human consciousness. All aspects of 
nature are therefore representations, as expressed in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and 
any interpretations of these representations are myths, as in Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
Objective truth is a grand illusion:
The fictitious world of subject, substance, ‘reasons’ etc. is 
needed; there is in us a power to order, simplify, falsify, 
artificially distinguish. What then is truth? A moveable 
host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms; 
in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically 
and rhetorically intensified, transferred and embellished, and 
which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical 
and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are 
illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and 
have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their 
embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as 
coins.2
Objective knowledge of any kind, whether of morality or science, can never be 
attained. For Nietzsche, as for other philosophers that followed him, all such attempts 
at objective knowledge are mere illusions. Science may be able to gradually reveal 
the history of the fantasies we call reality, but science is yet another myth:
2 Nietzsche, F. On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. In Breazale, D. Philosophy and Truth: 
selections from Nietzsche’s notebooks o f  the early 1870’s. Translated and edited with an introduction 
and notes by D. Breazale, with a foreword by W.Kaufmann. Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979. p.84.
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Because we have for millennia made moral, aesthetic, religious 
demands on the world, looked upon it with blind desire, passion 
or fear, and abandoned ourselves in the bad habits of illogical 
thinking, this world has gradually become so marvellously 
variegated, frightful, meaningful, soulful. It has acquired colour -  
but we have been the colourists...
With all these conceptions the steady and laborious process of science 
which will one day celebrate its greatest triumph in a history o f  the 
genius o f thought, will in the end decisively have done; for the 
outcome of this history may well be the conclusion. That which we 
now call the world is the outcome of a host of errors and fantasies 
which have gradually arisen and grown entwined with one another 
in the course of the overall evolution of the organic being, and are 
now inherited by us as the accumulated treasure of the entire past -  
as treasure for the value of humanity depends upon it. Rigorous 
science is capable of detaching us from this ideational world only 
to a limited extent -  and more is certainly not desired -  inasmuch 
as it is incapable of making any essential inroad into the power 
of habits of feeling acquired in primeval times.3
According to Nietzsche the only achievement of science could be the unravelling of 
the history of how we came to perceive the world as we do. Science cannot find a 
reality because there is no possibility of objective knowledge beyond our own 
imaginings. Without an ultimate reality or objective knowledge, humans are forced to 
create their own realities. It is only through the will to power that we can achieve a 
path for ourselves. All knowledge is subjective because there is no God-like point of 
reference to be attained:
The radical finitude of the human subject is that there is no 
God-like standpoint or reference outside human experience from 
which our experience might be characterized and judged; the 
thoroughly contingent or created character of human experience. 
That is, human experience is all-too-human, it is made and remade 
by us, and the circumstances of this fabrication are by definition 
contingent.4
3 Nietzsche, F. Human, All Too Human: a book for free spirits. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. 
Introduction by E. Heller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. p.20.
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In classical science there is no doubt about the reality of objects of the 
external world, and humans, within an Ultra-Darwinist interpretation are considered 
as among those objects. Ultra-Darwinists would probably accept what in metaphysics 
is called ‘ontological naturalism’, although mind-first Darwinists could do also. 
Ontological naturalism is the view that natural objects, kinds and properties are real. 
‘Natural’ would be equal to ‘what is recognized by science’ and therefore anyone 
accepting ontological naturalism could reach a position of having complete faith in 
science beyond what would be normally philosophically acceptable. However, anyone 
who accepted absolute faith in science could be accused of scientism, for it would 
mean that an assumption had been made that science has a higher degree of rationality 
than any other subject and therefore should take precedence over any other rational 
inquiry. The acceptance of the superiority of science over any other subject may lead 
to the conclusion that anything that cannot be ‘naturalized’, or reduced to natural 
terms, as for example human consciousness, does not have ‘real’ existence. Thus 
Owen Holland, a roboticist, claims:
Now whatever consciousness is, it does appear to be some 
kind of user illusion created by the brain for dealing with 
itself. And while a lot of what consciousness seems to be telling 
us is wrong, it’s still very useful. In the Illusion o f Conscious 
Will, Daniel Wegner extends this by arguing that conscious [free] 
will is an illusion that allows us to track and identify the 
‘authorship’ of our actions, and to behave consistently. These 
illusion are engineering solutions from nature, to solve engineering 
problems which we don’t yet understand. But when our 
biologically inspired robots get sophisticated enough, we’ll copy 
those tricks. So robots won’t have free will but they will have 
the illusion of it, the same illusion that we have.5
4 Critchley, S. Continental Philosophy: a very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001. p. 63.
5 Holland, O. ‘New Scientist at the RSA’ in New Scientist 10* May 2003. p. 48.
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In the extreme form of scientific reductionism those expressions of humans that are 
viewed as subjective, such as intentional states and colours, must be reduced to 
natural items if they are real, because it is doubtful that they could have their apparent 
qualities unless they themselves were natural. They would argue for reduction on the 
grounds that intentionality and other subjective experiences supervene on natural 
properties. Thus mental properties supervene on physical properties. Accepting 
ontological naturalism means that science, in its methods and results, is above 
criticism. This total acceptance of science as beyond criticism is in direct contrast to 
the questioning of all modes of enquiry in Continental philosophy.
An important element as regards to human nature in Continental philosophy is 
the concept of will. According to Schopenhauer my essence is will and my 
immediate and non-conceptual awareness of myself is awareness of will. Human 
nature in its expression of the will is no different from the rest of nature because the 
individual will is part of an extended will throughout nature. The concept of the 
individual will that is striving to survive has parallels with the concept of natural 
selection within evolutionary theory. Roger Scruton explains Schopenhauer’s concept 
of will:
Will manifests itself among phenomena in two ways: as individuals 
striving and as Idea. An Idea is something like a complete conception 
of the will. In so far as this can be grasped in the world of 
representation it corresponds to the universal not the particular, 
and it is therefore only in the species that the Idea is truly present to 
our perception. In the natural world, therefore, the species is 
favoured over the individual since in the species the will to live 
finds a durable embodiment, which the individual judged in 
himself, is a passing and disposable aberration. Schopenhauer 
expresses the point in one of his many beautiful images: ‘Just as 
the spraying drops of the waterfall change with lightening rapidity 
while the rainbow which they sustain remains immovably at rest quite 
untouched by that restless change, so every idea in every species of 
living being remains entirely untouched by the constant changes of
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its individuals. But it is the Idea of the species in which the will-to- 
live is really rooted and manifests itself; therefore the will is really 
concerned only in the continuation of the species.’6
Although within Schopenhauer’s philosophy there is a system within which the 
will has purpose and direction, yet his concept of the will possesses the same 
indifference to the individual as expressed in the theory of natural selection. Nature is 
portrayed as cold and ruthless towards the individual. Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
echoes some of the thinking of Lucretius in his description of a ruthless nature in 
which all creatures, including humans must fight against one another in order to 
survive. It is a cruel, harsh nature and humans are a part of its cruelty:
Thus everywhere in nature we see strife, conflict and alteration 
of victory, and in it we shall come to recognize more distinctly 
that variance with itself which is essential to will. Every grade of the 
objectification of will fights for the matter, the space, and the time 
of others. The permanent matter must constantly change its form; 
for under the guidance of causality, mechanical, physical, chemical 
and organic phenomena, eagerly striving to appear, wrest the matter 
from each other, for each desires to reveal its own Idea. This strife 
may be followed through the whole of nature; indeed nature exists 
only through it:.. .Yet this strife itself is only the revelation of that 
variance with itself which is essential to the will. This universal 
conflict becomes most distinctly visible in the animal kingdom, for 
animals have the whole of the vegetable kingdom for their food, and 
even within the animal kingdom every beast is the prey and the food of 
another; that is, the matter in which its Idea expresses itself must yield 
itself to the expression of another Idea, for each animal can only 
maintain its existence by the constant destruction of some other. Thus 
the will to live everywhere preys upon itself, and in different forms is 
its own nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues all 
the others, regards nature as a manufactory for its use.7
6 Scruton, R. A Short History o f  Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Wittgenstein. 2nd ed. London: 
Routledge, 1995. p. 188.
7 Schopenhauer, A. The World as Will and Idea. Translated from the German by R.B Haldane and J. 
Kemp. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1891. pp. 191-192.
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In this passage Schopenhauer condones the subjugation of nature by humans because 
that is the way of the will. The will preys on itself and humans follow the dictates of 
the will. Human nature is ruled by the all-pervasive will and their behaviour is no 
different from any other animal. As the top predatory animal they are entitled to 
subdue all nature. This explanation of the behaviour of humans towards nature offers 
no positive view of the relationship between nature and humans. It is an explanation 
of human nature that vindicates domination.
The picture of a brutal nature in which humans pursue their own particular 
cruel fight is similarly portrayed in the philosophy of Nietszche. Nietszche gives a 
mechanical explanation of nature. He even interprets human behaviour as being 
dictated by causal laws:
106 By the waterfall. -  At the sight of a waterfall we think we see in 
the countless curvings, twirlings and breakings of the waves 
capriciousness and freedom of will, but everything here is 
necessary, every motion mathematically calculable. So it 
is too in the case of human actions; if one were all-knowing 
one would be able to calculate every individual action, likewise 
every advance in knowledge, every error, every piece of 
wickedness. The actor himself, to be sure, is fixed in the illusion 
of free will; if for one moment the wheel of the world were to 
stand still, and there were an all-knowing, calculating 
intelligence there to make use of this pause, it could narrate the 
future of every creature to the remotest ages and describe every 
track along which this wheel had yet to roll. The actor’s 
deception regarding himself, the assumption of free will, is 
itself part of the mechanism it would have to compute.8
Nietzsche gives a highly deterministic concept of human nature although he seems to 
contradict himself in other areas of his philosophy where he maintains that everything
8 Nietzsche, F. Human, all to Human. 1986. op. cit. p.57.
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we know about the world is an illusion and that humans must freely create their own 
realities.
Nietzsche portrays the will of all nature as the strongest force that propels 
even humans along in its inevitability. Nietzsche gives a historical and genealogical 
explanation of humans within a mechanical concept of nature. Here again is the 
concept of the survival of the fittest and of the will to power, although Neitzsche 
believes that the Darwinian concept of the survival of the fittest is only one part of the 
overall driving will to power. Nietzsche condones the hegemony of the strongest in 
his philosophy of the Overman although this may not be the physically strongest. His 
Overman conquers himself as much as others and thereby becomes the strongest in 
the will to power. It is a philosophy of the individual. He rejects any values that have 
been accepted up to date, particularly those of Christianity. The Overman must make 
his own values. The distinction of good and evil within a moral sphere is rejected and 
replaced with the opposition of good and bad. The good man, like the good horse, is 
one who is healthy, flourishing and potent; the bad one is sick in body and mind. 
Survival is the only value to retain. This area of Nietzsche’s philosophy has parallels 
to the Ultra-Darwinist concept of human nature where moral behaviour is a tactic for 
survival. In both concepts of human nature humans are at war with one another and 
the emphasis is on the individual’s survival without regard for others. Nietzsche was 
opposed to socialism, utilitarianism and democracy as well as Christianity and in fact 
any system that attempted to find objective values for all humans. Nietzsche denies an 
ultimate reality or objective truth. However, as has often been noted, Nietzsche 
defeats all his own arguments for, if  all theories are myths created subjectively from 
ourselves, then there is little reason for us to accept Nietzsche’s philosophy: it is just 
another myth.
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Subjective knowledge and the will to power are two aspects that are developed 
in later Continental philosophy as well. Foucault interpreted human nature through 
the concept of will to power, but in Foucault’s philosophy the will to power is 
separated from nature. It is purely an expression of human nature. Foucault has 
nothing to say about nature, as he is only concerned with an explanation of human 
struggles for power. In social organizations power is institutionalised to promote 
particular concepts of the world to benefit the ruling classes. All knowledge is the 
expression of power. To use reason and make knowledge claims is to follow those 
who have presumed the right to make such claims:
Power produces knowledge.. .power and knowledge directly 
imply one another.. .there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, not any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations.9
Foucault’s philosophy demonstrates the tendency of Continental philosophy to 
concentrate on the human condition. Humans are embedded historically and culturally 
within the world. Nature becomes just one of those phenomena that is constructed in 
cultural terms and all knowledge is an expression of human relations.
Continental philosophy is concerned with humans and the way they perceive 
and construct their world. It is often concerned with crisis:
For the Continental tradition, philosophy is a means to criticize 
the present, to promote a reflective awareness of the present 
as being in crisis, whether this is expressed as a crisis in faith 
in a bourgeois-philistine world, a crisis of the European sciences, 
of the episteme of the human sciences, of nihilism, pf the
9 Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: the birth o f  the prison. Translated from the French by A. 
Sheridan. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books , 1991. p. 27.
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oblivion of being, of bourgeois society, of the hegemony of 
instrumental rationality, of the technological domination of nature, 
or whatever. Philosophy as an acute reflection upon history, culture 
and society can lead to the awakening of critical consciousness..10
The concept of human nature in relationship to nature within Continental 
philosophy is in opposition to that of scientific reductionism. Continental 
philosophers are concerned with how humans perceive nature within the historical, 
cultural and social structures of humans including the structures determined by 
science: scientific reductionism is concerned with humans as one of the objects of 
nature and all historical, cultural and social aspects of humans can be explained in 
terms of science.
Another important aspect o f Continental philosophy is the concept of human 
freedom. This is most fully expressed in existentialism where the emphasis on the 
subjective stance results in free choices of the individual. Choice is the only capacity 
that makes sense of existence: existence is an absurdity that can only be overcome by 
choice, by a leap of faith as in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Sartre examined the 
question of being and concluded that the essence of objects precedes their existence, 
but that for humans, resting on the condition that God does not exist -  the case of the 
free subject -  it is the other way around:
Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares 
with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is 
at least one being whose existence comes before his essence, 
a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception 
of it. That being is man, or, as Heidegger has it, the human 
reality.11
10 Critchley, S. ‘Introduction’ in Critchley, S. and Schroeder, W. R. eds. A Companion to Continental 
Philosophy; Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999. p. 14.
!1 Sartre, J-P. Existentialism and Humanism. Translation and introduction by P. Mairet. London: Eyre 
Methuen Ltd., 1973. pp. 27-28.
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Humans are different from any other being in the world because they are free to create 
themselves: they have no essence given. As humans are free to create their own 
essence they are very different from the rest of nature and are separated from nature 
by this distinction. Within the context of Continental philosophy human nature is of a 
contingent nature. Human nature is not determined: it can be recreated. In this way 
humans can emancipate themselves from situations in which they find themselves.
The historical critique of philosophical problems and the emancipation of humans 
work together. Continental philosophy often is a philosophy of liberation. Humans 
are capable of improving their situation by solving the problems of the past: they are 
not determined by the past. Existentialism also emphases the subjective nature of 
values: there are no objective values. Humans should create their own values to be 
authentic. Although existentialism has a liberating message, its major fault is its 
reliance on the individual. It is not a philosophy for cooperative enterprises, so 
essential for such matters as those concerning the environment.
Opposed to the Continental concept of human nature as free to construct both 
itself and its realities is the determinism of Ultra-Darwinism. It is wedded to extreme 
scientific reductionism. An explanation of human nature can be found totally within 
the realms of science:
..it is possible ( and desirable) to unify chemistry and physics 
biology and chemistry, and yes, even the social sciences and 
biology. After all, societies are composed of human beings, who, 
as mammals, must fall under the principles of biology that cover 
all mammals. Mammals, in turn, are composed of molecules, 
which must obey the laws of chemistry, which in turn must answer
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to the regularities of the underlying physics.12
This is a quote from the philosopher Daniel Dennett who gives an explanation of 
humans as being fully a part of nature. Dennett’s description leads him to believe that 
all events, even those that are normally thought of as mental, are in fact physical 
events that have evolved through natural selection:
Darwin’s dangerous idea is reductionism incarnate, promising 
to unite and explain just about everything in one magnificent 
vision. Its being the idea of an algorithmic process makes it 
all the more powerful since the substrate neutrality it thereby 
possesses permits us to consider its application to just about 
anything. It is no respecter of material boundaries. It applies, 
as we have already begun to see, even to itself. The most 
common fear about Darwin’s idea is that it will not just explain 
but explain away the Minds and Purposes and Meanings that we 
all hold dear. People fear that once this universal acid has 
passed through the monuments we cherish, they will cease 
to exist, dissolved in an unrecognisable and unlovable puddle 
of scientistic destruction.13
Dennett believes that Darwin’s dangerous idea will only demystify various areas of 
human behaviour and help humans to understand themselves better. However, the 
danger seems to be not about demysitification but the explaining away of particular 
beliefs that are important for humans when they interact with one another. He makes 
unsubstantiated claims. The search for the reduction of mental events to physical 
events has not been successful and it is not at all clear that intentionality cpuld 
possibly be reduced to natural items. Certain beliefs, such as those surrounding the 
concepts of freewill and moral responsibility, seem not to be conducive to reduction.
12 Dennett, D. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: evolution and the meaning o f  life. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1995. p.81.
13 Ibid. p.82.
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These concepts stand within a social context and to explain them in physical terms is 
to misunderstand their being.
The rapid development within computer sciences has given an analogy from 
which to understand the human brain. If physical objects like computers can be 
developed to reveal intelligent behaviour then the human brain can be explained in 
purely physical terms. The concept of the mental, or explanations that are not entirely 
physical, have been marginalized. As Tooby and Cosmides say in the introduction to 
the book they jointly edit, The Adapted Mind:
The rise of computers and, in their wake, modem cognitive science 
completed the conceptual unification of the mental and physical 
worlds by showing how physical systems can embody information 
and meaning. The design and constmction of artificial computational 
systems is only a few decades old, but already such systems can 
parallel in a modest way cognitive processes, such as reason, memory 
knowledge, skill, judgment, choice, purpose, problem-solving, 
foresight and language -  that had supposedly made mind a 
metaphysical realm forever separated from the physical realm, and 
humans metaphysically disconnected from the causal network 
that linked together the rest of the universe. These intellectual 
advances transported the living, the mental, and the human -  
three domains that had previously been disconnected from the 
body of science and mystified because of this disconnection -  
into the scientifically analysable language of causation.14
Both nature and humans (who by this analysis are a part of nature) can be explained in 
the ‘scientifically analysable language of causation’. The argument of Cosmides and 
Tooby rests on the acceptance of scientific knowledge as the only form of knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge is reliant on the concept of physical causation. Even if the 
causes are understood in terms of probability, as within quantum physics, still the
14 Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L: ‘The Psychological Foundations o f Culture’ in Barkow, J., et al. eds. The 
Adapted Mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation o f  culture. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992. p.20.
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success of science relies on the assumption that there is a binding relationship 
between cause and effect over and above the psychological persuasion of repeated 
events as in the analysis of Hume. Cosmides and Tooby claim that humans can be 
totally explained within the terms of physical causation:
In this vast landscape of causation, it is now possible to locate 
‘Man’s place in nature’ to use Huxley’s famous phrase and, 
therefore, to understand for the first time what humankind is and 
why we have the characteristics that we do. From this vantage 
point, humans are self-reproducing chemical systems, multicellular 
heterotrophic mobile organisms (animals), appearing very late in the 
the history of life as somewhat modified versions of earlier primate 
designs. Our developmental programs, as well as the physiological 
and psychological mechanisms that they reliably construct, are the 
natural product of this evolutionary history. Human minds, human 
behaviour, human artefacts, and human culture are all biological 
phenomena -  aspects of the phenotypes of humans and their 
relationships with one another.15
The explanation that Cosmides and Tooby give assumes that all human behaviour is 
the result of complex biological mechanisms that have come about through the 
physical causes of evolution and natural selection. However, it overlooks the fact of 
thousands of years of civilization and the influence of language and cultural behaviour 
that has had a profound effect on the human mind.
This explanation of human nature by Cosmides and Tooby in terms of 
physical causation is a form of scientific reductionism as it explains all human 
behaviour in terms of biological processes that in turn can be explained by physical 
and chemical processes. Evolutionary psychologists, like Cosmides and Tooby, 
believe that human behaviour today is the result of evolutionary processes and there is 
nothing more. It is a deterministic account of human nature as they claim that the
15 Ibid. pp.20-21.
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individual human is the sum of his/her genes that have been selected in the process of 
natural selection. As I have already explained, evolutionary psychologists do not deny 
that the environment plays a major role in the development of the individual, for it is 
the combination of genetic and environmental factors that determine a particular 
individual. As well as the individual all human social interactions, including those to 
do with morality, are explained as a result o f these determining factors. The intentions 
of evolutionary psychologists are well-meaning as they believe that a scientific 
explanation of humans will not only unite all humans over and above their cultural 
identities but also provide a guideline as how to govern society.
However, their deterministic account has caused an outcry amongst 
philosophers because of the obvious dangers of such an explanation of humans within 
society. The determinism of evolutionary psychologists is a compelling one, 
particularly if scientific knowledge is accepted as the only valid way to obtain 
knowledge. It is hard to argue against them if  one accepts monistic materialism. 
However, their theory not only undermines the concept of morality and freewill as 
previously understood, it also brings into question what we understand by the terms 
‘reason’ and ‘rational arguments’. John Lucas has a defeating argument against all 
forms of determinism:
So to the determinist, if  what he says is true, he says it merely 
as a result of his heredity and environment, and of nothing else.
He does not hold his determinist views because they are true, but 
because he has such-and-such a genetic make-up, and has received 
such-and-such stimuli, that is, not because the structure of the 
universe is such-and such but only because the configuration 
of only part of the universe, together with the structure of the 
determinist’s brain, is such as to produce that result...Determinism 
therefore is not true because if it was, we should not take the 
determinist’s arguments as being arguments, but as being
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only conditioned reflexes.16
If determinism were true there would be no point in arguing at all because we would 
simply be putting forward points of view determined by our genes and our 
environmental background. The main problem here is the acceptance of science as the 
only form of true knowledge. However, the scientific determinist undermines not 
only many valuable concepts that humans hold about themselves, but also the very 
truth of the science on which they put their trust. If humans are determined in every 
respect by their genetic inheritance and environmental influences, then the types of 
reasoning that they use in science is also determined by these factors. We would not 
be able to trust our reason that it could ever obtain truths about the world as we would 
all have ideas, including scientists, that were determined by our genes and upbringing.
These arguments would probably not worry a hard and fast evolutionary 
psychologist, as they would probably reply that human reason has been selected to be 
most successful for understanding the world around us. But there is still the problem 
of the individual whose genetic make-up might be slightly different, and also the very 
different types of environmental influences on each individual.
The main problem is in the area of morality. The determinism of evolutionary 
particular undermines our concept of morality. That humans have freewill is a 
condition for the possibility of morality. The moral act is the reasoned act that is 
decided upon in spite of any genetic or evolutionary factors. The determinism of the 
evolutionary psychologists opens the doors for individuals to be pre-judged by their 
genetic make-up plus any statistical conclusions that are made about the effects of 
different types of environmental factors that can influence human personality. The
16 Lucas, J. The Freedom o f  the Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. p. 114 and p. 115.
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theory could easily lead to society branding certain of its individuals as ‘a criminal 
type’ before any crime was committed. There is something fundamentally wrong 
about a theory that could lead to these kinds of decisions. Humans need a part of 
them that is thought to be over and above determining factors in order to preserve 
their moral worthiness. In Christianity the concept of ‘soul’ dealt with this problem 
quite efficiently. Now we have human rights, but can human rights give enough 
moral worthiness to an individual in spite of all determining factors in the same way 
as a concept of soul did?
Evolutionary psychologists hold that humans contain deeply ingrained, 
genetically-induced residues of their evolutionary past which are resistant to change 
by upbringing. Evolutionary biologists like Wilson often explain human behaviour by 
describing the behaviour of non-human animals or early hunter-gatherers, maintaining 
that humans will understand themselves through historical explanations. Morality is 
also explained in historical evolutionary terms.
However an evolutionary psychologist’s explanation of morality does not 
easily account for the types of moral revolutions that have happened within the 
history of humans, and the concept of acting on moral principle seems to be 
somewhat undermined. Their account of morality cannot account for the movement to 
abolish slavery because the realization that it was immoral might never have arisen if 
they were right. The fact that there had always been slavery would have been enough 
to persuade people to have endorsed its continuation. From an evolutionary point of 
view, slavery would be a natural development and there would be no need to abandon 
that particular type of social structure built upon it. The evolutionary psychologists 
could argue that economic and social pressures would alter the social structure so that 
slavery would become a less satisfactory system for survival but that explanation only
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works within a particular culture and would not explain the general abhorrence to 
slavery that has spread world wide. One particular culture might change its economic 
and social structures, but other cultures would remain the same and yet come to the 
conclusion that slavery was wrong even though to abandon slavery would be 
economically detrimental to them. In these cases the moral argument would outweigh 
the economic pressures and the acceptance of a moral position may not always be best 
for survival whether for the individual or the society at large.
Within Continental philosophy human nature is fluid and non-deterministic. 
Any individual is free to decide his own being. Human nature within an ultra- 
Darwinist explanation is determined and ultimately the same throughout the world, 
although perhaps moderated by different cultures. However, this deterministic 
explanation of human nature limits the ability for humans to change their behaviour.
If human nature is interpreted as set by natural selection, often with habits and 
behaviours that are outmoded for today’s situation, there is little incentive for 
individuals to change their behaviour. If humans are understood to be a part of nature 
and nature is understood to be mechanistic, subject to causal laws, then it seems that 
human behaviour should continue as it does relying on natural selection to sort things 
out. The concept of natural selection holds within it the concept of survival of the 
fittest and competition between different patterns of behaviour. Thus the capitalist 
system fits in very nicely with the evolutionary psychologist’s interpretation of human 
nature. Mary Midgley comments about the rise of scientific materialism in the 
1970” s:
Dawkins’ and Wilson’s books both came out in the mid-1970’s, 
a time when, op both sides of the Atlantic, the moral fide was on 
the turn from the relatively idealistic, co-operative temper 
generated after the Second World War towards a more relaxed
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mood of self-expression and self-indulgence. In Britain, the real 
advantages which the welfare state had produced were becoming 
familiar. They were beginning to be taken for granted while the 
drawbacks which had gone along with them began to be sharply 
felt. Bureaucratic control and the ‘culture of dependence’ were 
seen as grave evils. The immediate remedy prescribed for them 
was a return to commercial freedom and to extreme individualism 
generally which was seen for a time, with a good deal of unrealistic 
nostalgia a social panacea.17
The capitalist system is often seriously at odds with needs of the environment. The 
capitalist system is run blatantly for profit and cannot survive without the need for 
some to accumulate wealth at the expense of others. A description of human nature 
within the realms of biology supports the present status quo that has been shown 
many times to be detrimental to the environment. Capitalism dominates world 
economics and the wealth acquiring population has become international. In the 
words of Arran Gare:
The new international bourgeoisie are the agents of the new 
transnational organization of capitalism, bringing fulfilment 
to grand narratives underlying capitalism. The achievement 
and maintainance of their power has been possible through 
developments in communication, and to a considerable extent 
through the control of mass media which has been the site of 
unprecedented corporate activity in recent decades. This has 
been associated with massive expenditure by large, mainly 
transnational business corporations on public relations promoting 
the economic policies favourable to their expansion.18
Explanations of human nature in total scientific terms can have dangerous 
effects on the way people interact with one another and with the environment. Science
17 Midgley, M. Science and Poetry. London: Routledge, 2001. p. 197.
18 Gare, A. Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis. London: Routledge, 1995. pp. 10-11.
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is one particular area of knowledge and cannot be applied to all areas of human 
experience. Mary Midgley has written how scientific theories can take on a life of 
their own and have serious consequences:
The theory of evolution is not just an inert piece of theoretical 
science. It is and cannot help being also a powerful folk-tale 
about human origins. Any such narrative must have symbolic 
force. We are probably the first culture not to make that its main 
function. Most stories about human origins must have been devised 
purely with a view to symbolic and poetic fittingness. Suggestions 
about how we were made and where we come from are bound to 
engage our imagination, to shape our view of what we now are, and 
so to affect our lives. Scientists, when they find themselves caught up 
in these webs of symbolism, sometimes complain calling for a sanitary 
cordon to keep them away from science. But this seems to be both 
psychologically and logically impossible.19
Scientists so often assume that they are fact finding when often they have ventured 
beyond the domains of their subject and into the realms of pure theory. When a 
theory about human nature, like evolutionary psychology, claims that it is science and 
that science deals with facts and when the results of such a theory seem to endorse 
behaviour that is detrimental to the environment (or for relations between people for 
that matter), it is necessary to step back and examine it again.
To sum up, in scientific reductionism humans are the result of evolutionary 
processes, no different from other animals. All things in nature, including humans, 
can be described in physical, mechanical terms. There is no need of free will as 
previously understood to account for moral responsibility although humans are free to 
make choices within the limitations of a genetic make-up and environmental factors. 
The behaviour of humans can be described in similar terms to that of other animals,
19 Midgley,M. Evolution as a Religion: strange hopes and stranger fears. London: Methuen, 1985. 
p.l.
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and, in fact, study of behaviour of other animals is beneficial to understanding human 
behaviour. Humans are no different from other animals, simply more complicated. 
There is no such thing as a soul or spirit and certainly no other type of existence than 
the material. Nothing in nature is designed: it all happened by pure chance, an 
accumulation of certain physical and chemical processes. Scientific reductionism is 
anti-teleological and Ultra-Darwinists are vocally anti-religion. I am here discussing 
the extreme form of Darwinism, and these conclusions are not true for all Darwinists.
Continental philosophy is also against teleological explanations and religion. 
Niezsche ridiculed religion and denied the existence of God who he understood to be 
a creation of our own minds. If there is no God then the concept of an ultimate 
purpose must be discarded. If there is no ultimate purpose then the meaning of life 
comes into question; therefore our thought about an ultimate meaning of life could 
well be pointless. If all thoughts about the meaning of life are pointless, how do we 
justify our existence? Nietzsche’s reply, to which others have conceded, is that 
justifications are to be sought in the aesthetic sense. Nietzsche believed that people 
should be free from all restraints, all purpose and direction, in order to create their 
own beings and this is most fulfilled through the arts. His thinking has influenced the 
postmodernists. Amongst the intellectuals this justification through the aesthetic can 
produce fine living, but it can easily be debased into a life that seeks pleasure for 
itself. Arran Gare quotes Daniel Bell’s summary of this situation from his book 
Beyond Modern, Beyond Self:
To the postmodernist successor of modernist artists, ‘impulse 
and pleasure alone are real and life-affirming; all else is 
neurosis and death. In the literal sense, reason is the enemy 
and the desires of the body the truth. Objective consciousness
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defrauds, and only emotion is meaningful.20
Postmodernism accepts the aesthetic stance. Only the satisfaction of bodily 
pleasures at any level has any meaning. Reason is cast off and the Enlightenment 
project is rejected. There are no objective values and therefore only the subjective 
stance can be valid.
Postmodernism is anti-worldviews, or ‘grand narratives’ and so deconstructs 
the ingredients that are necessary for a worldview, such as God, self, purpose, real 
world and truth as correspondence. They accept differences and the concept of 
pluralism. As well as being anti-teleological and anti-worldviews, postmodernism 
denies progress in the history of human kind. The concept of progress would be 
included in a ‘grand narrative’ that postmodernists reject. All cultures have equal 
weight and therefore no culture is superior to another: no culture has ‘progressed’ 
further in civilization than another:
The most widely accepted characterization of the postmodern 
condition is that offered by Lyotard. It is ‘the incredulity 
towards metanarratives’; that is, the incredulity to any discourse 
which makes appeal to some grand narrative, such as the emancipation 
of the rational, the liberation of the exploited, or the creation of 
wealth, which can legitimate all particular claims to knowledge.
What does this mean? The loss of credibility of grand narratives 
is essentially a loss of belief in progress.21
Without ‘worldviews’ or ‘grand narratives’, postmodernism evolves into a 
concern with language as a system o f signs that humans have created, for 
understanding the world about us. These signs are therefore arbitrary and their
20 Gare, 1995. op. cit. p. 16.
21 Ibid. p.4.
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meanings conveyed by a system that is conventional. But then language becomes 
self-contained and can tell us nothing of the world outside of itself. Derrida reasons 
that language is always ‘metaphorical’ in a Nietzschean sense. This means that 
language can never take us beyond to some kind of objective truth that lies beyond 
our own local culture and history. Language can never have an inner meaning and 
cannot prevent change or fix ideas, so it cannot establish essentialist ‘truths’ such as 
about human nature or nature. The conclusion is that language and reality is the same 
thing; we can never escape from textuality and free-floating signifiers. There is 
obviously a major fault in this theory in that it leads to an inability to produce any 
new theories.
For the ancients Mind came first. There was an order and a purpose in nature 
that united everything. This concept also gave value to nature, as with an order and 
purpose each individual has a value within the whole. Both Ultra-Darwinism and 
Continental philosophy are metaphysically poorer as they fail to give a firm 
foundation for values of any kind. Neither systems of thought accept the possibility 
of objective values. They certainly have a problem to find value for nature, as I shall 
show in Part III.
I have argued that scientific reductionism considers humans as a part of nature 
and that Continental philosophy is concerned with humans as apart from nature. 
However Continental philosophers would view it differently. They would accuse 
science in general of objectifying nature and leaving humans out of any account, as in 
the Cartesian view of nature, while believing that they describe humans as embedded 
in nature. Whilst I agree that science can objectify humans if human nature is 
explained in reductionist terms this need not be necessarily true for science in general.
In both systems of thought the individual is isolated, with no positive relation
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to nature. Ultra-Darwinism largely presents a warring nature, ‘red in tooth and claw’, 
in which the individual fights for survival: Continental philosophy leaves the 
individual to create its own self and its own values whatever they may be. These two 
views of nature and human nature result in the individual being alienated from others 
and from nature.
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Chapter 4 
Scientism and postmodernism
Since the 1970’s discussions on the problems of the environment have 
increased, yet, in practical terms, very little has been achieved. The attitudes of 
governments and the general public have not changed to any great extent in their 
interaction with the environment. In my thesis I have been trying to trace the cause of 
this inertia, believing that it is in some way connected to how we understand human 
nature and our relation to nature.
Arran Gare explains this inertia as a result of the conflicting images presented 
by the media that often deny the existence of environmental problems.
In the introduction to this book an article was quoted which spoke 
of a massive inquiry into the earth’s environment and claimed 
that humanity is in a war for survival, a war in which all nations 
must be allies. This implies that gaining universal recognition 
of global environmental crisis is straightforward, and that there 
should be little difficulty in achieving universal consensus about 
its severity and significance. However, the notion of a global 
environmental crisis is a social construction.. .As yet, there is no 
definitive social construct of the environmental crisis. The 
mass media presents one image of the global environmental 
crisis, scientific journals another, while economic journals 
scarcely recognize any but minor problems which can be solved 
by the proper functioning of the market. Scientists, economists 
and business leaders in the USA have dismissed environmentalists 
as cranks, while many political leaders in the Third world countries 
see the claims of environmentalists as nothing more than an effort 
to prevent Third World countries sharing the benefits of industrial­
ization.1
1 Gare,A. Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis. London:Routledge, 1995. p,73.
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There has been some acceptance from world powers of the seriousness of 
environmental problems since Gare’s book, but nevertheless political problems 
around the world gain precedence over environmental concerns, and day to day life 
for many around the world is still lived contrary to the needs of the environment. Gare 
outlines the problems that are a part of any environmental movement. There is not a 
common picture of the state of the environment or a consensus on environmental 
problems and it all leads to confusion. Even in environmental philosophy there are 
many disparate ideas and very little agreement.
The inertia of governments and people in general cannot simply be the result 
of a confused picture presented by the media, business and governments. To call the 
global environmental crisis a ‘social construction’, as Gare does, is to fall into the 
postmodernist mode of thinking in which the reality of the situation is not as 
important as the social construction. The problem is the confusion at a deeper level of 
what it is to be human and the relationship humans have towards nature and, indeed, 
what our concept of nature is. Our concept of nature and our relationship to it is 
paradoxical. This brings out the persistent problem of whether humans are a part of 
nature or apart form nature, a problem which has now become more complex with the 
two main strands of contemporary thought which have developed through Continental 
philosophy and Ultra-Darwinism. Not only are these two modes of thinking accepted 
at one and the same time, but neither system o f thought gives a positive concept of 
either nature or the human relationship to nature as outlined in the previous chapter. 
Certainly neither gives a guideline to help people to value nature
The picture of humans as a part of nature is strongly presented to us by 
science and particularly the biplogical sciences in its reductionist form. Ultra- 
Darwinists could be accused of scientism in that they accept the realities that science
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describes without question. Ultra-Darwinists accept that any explanation of humans 
is to be in terms of evolutionary processes and only evolutionary processes governed 
by causal, physical laws. The underlying metaphysics is monistic materialism. 
Materialism, or physicalism, is the general thesis that originated with the ancient 
atomists, Democritus and Lucretius, that everything that exists is a purely material (or 
physical) entity, so that every individual or groups of individuals has only physical 
properties. Thus, as in eliminative materialism, even the mental is understood to be 
identical to the physical brain and so all discourse about mental events will eventually 
be eliminated when science has advanced enough to understand the whole brain and 
its parts.
Science affirms an objective reality even though it may be open to 
interpretation and revision. Within these strict scientific lines the way to understand 
humans is by learning as much as possible about the history of their development 
from simple single-celled creatures to the more complex. Humans are different from 
non-humans only by degree: there is nothing that is unique to humans, except that 
they are more complex evolved creatures. By studying non-humans that are close to 
ourselves on the evolutionary tree, we can have a better understanding of ourselves. 
This interpretation of humans is in direct contrast to that of most thinking before the 
19th century. Under that interpretation, mind came before matter and humans had a 
special place within the creation. The concept of the Great Chain of Being, in which 
humans were in a position between lower animals and the divine, was adopted by 
most Christians, and the unique position given to humans in creation was reinforced 
by the doctrine of the Fall. The possession of soul and intellect separated humans 
from all other beings. Evolutionary theory, as interpreted by Ultra-Parwinians, has
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reversed the place of intellect. Matter comes before mind and, in fact, mind is a by­
product of matter or even nothing but matter, the concept of a mind being an illusion.
Ultra-Darwinians give an explanation of humans as firmly within the causal 
laws of nature. The implication of this is that human nature is deterministic because if 
humans are the result of physical processes then all thought and action are within this 
framework of causation. The apparent randomness at the quantum level can be 
explained by the limitations of our knowledge at present. Science, for Ultra- 
Darwinians, becomes a means for salvation, as Mary Midgley describes it, to solve all 
problems and give a full explanation of human nature and nature. Midgley rightly 
sees the need to question this aspect of the acceptance of all scientific based theories 
about humans:
Does this language of salvation seem alarmingly strong?
I use it because I want to stress throughout this book how 
deeply these matters affect all of us, not only scientists and 
not only intellectuals. Any system of thought playing the 
huge part that science now plays in our lives must also 
shape our guiding myths and colour our imaginations profoundly.
It is not just a useful tool. It is also a pattern that we follow at a 
deep level in trying to meet our imaginative needs.2
Mary Midgley’s use of the word ‘myth’ is probably more to do with story telling than 
with the way Nietzsche uses the word to deny all objective knowledge. Midgley 
would accept the validity of scientific investigation but is concerned about the wild 
speculations that grow from it. Some areas of knowledge are outside the realms of the 
scientific method.
Although many Continental philosophers accepted that humans were subject 
to causal laws, as did Nietzsche, at the same time there is a concept of human freedom
2 Midgley, M. Science as Salvation: a modern myth and its meaning. London: Routledge, 1992. p.l
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that is in direct opposition to the thinking of evolutionary theory. According to 
existentialism humans can create themselves. There are certain facts in their lives 
(Sartre’s facticity) but there is no true essence to human nature. The concept of 
human nature within Continental philosophy is much more fluid than in evolutionary 
theory. Continental philosophy dismisses objective reality. All knowledge consists of 
myths, metaphors and narratives. Turning away from the concept of objective 
knowledge, Continental philosophers place the emphasis on language and symbols 
and the social constructions that humans create. Under the influence of this type of 
philosophy nature becomes less central to the interpretation of human nature. Nature 
is as humans perceive it: it is as much a construction of our awareness of the world as 
any human institution. The concept that nature is a social construction is largely taken 
for granted in post-modern writing. Thus Gare can state within the paragraph already 
quoted:
However the notion of a global environmental crisis is a social 
construct.3
Postmodernism has encouraged the thought that what is understood as reality is the 
result of certain power structures and institutions. Thus Gare continues:
To talk of ‘massive injury to the environment’, holes in the ozone 
layer, the rising level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and the 
possible effects of this on average global temperatures, to consider 
the total amount of land devoted to agriculture or covered by closed 
forests or to calculate the rate at which stocks are being depleted, is 
to invoke complex frameworks of concepts based on metaphors 
negotiated or sustained by practices of investigation which are 
themselves sustained by a large number of institutions of research,
3 Ibid. p.73
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communication and administration, which are in turn sustained by 
political and economic institutions and processes of different kinds 
at local, national and global levels.4
Gare accepts that any talk about the environment or nature is going to be one that is 
based on ‘metaphors’ created by various institutions.
Continental philosophy, with its emphasis on individual freedom and 
subjective knowledge, has given rise to the notion that we all create our own realities 
and use our will to power to establish those realities over others. Thus any concept of 
nature is a result of those that have the greatest power. Gare gives the reasons for the 
development of postmodern thinking . He believes it is the result of globalization and 
the growth of a new international order, blurring national identities. At the same time 
ethnic minorities have fought for the expression of their own identities. The result has 
been that western civilization has accepted itself as simply one type of cultural 
expression and has given up its role as leaders in the world:
It is likely that in this new global order, Westerners will no longer 
be the main beneficiaries of ‘progress’. The future no longer 
belongs automatically to Caucasians, and the incredulity towards 
grand narratives can be partly understood as disorientation caused 
by this. It is the response of people of European descent to their 
powerlessness within the world-order created by European 
civilization. This disinclines them to even contemplate grand 
narratives, which, to have any plausibility, could only portray 
them as insignificant bystanders in the march of history.5
Gare depicts a world that is in the throes of great turmoil, beset by the confusions of 
the meeting of different cultures and systems of values. In this confusion only
4 Ibid. p.73
5 Ibid. p. 8.
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economic values can have weight, for people would only have the value of survival to 
give them direction in life. But in fact if  postmodernism is the reaction of western 
civilization to the general confusion it is ‘throwing out the baby with the bath water’. 
In a time of confusion what is required even more is a system of values beyond 
economic ones and that these values are understood to be valued for all time for all 
humans and not the result of a concocted ‘grand narrative’.
Postmodernism leads to a fractured concept of human nature and one 
separated from nature. Nature can only be known through the subjective stance and 
therefore the concept of nature is human-based.
The two opposing systems, today expressed as scientism and postmodernism, 
surface at a cultural level. C.P. Snow noted this difference at a cultural level in the 
middle of the last century. He describes two cultures:
I give the most pointed example of this lack of communication 
in the shape of two groups of people representing what I have 
christened ‘the two cultures’. One of these contained the scientists 
whose weight, achievement and influence did not need stressing.
The other contained the literary intellectuals. I did not mean that 
literary intellectuals act as the main decision makers of the western 
world. I meant that literary intellectuals represent, vocalise, and to 
some extent shape and predict the mood of the non-scientific culture: 
they do not make the decisions but their words seep into the minds of 
those who do. Between these two groups -  the scientists and the 
literary intellectuals — there is little communication and, instead of 
fellow-feeling, something like hostility.6
Snow was concerned about the opposition in thinking between scientists and the 
humanities that had developed in the twentieth century. Since then the humanities 
have been influenced by Continental thinking and the gulf between the two cultures
6 Snow, C.P. The Two Cultures. With an introduction by S. Collins. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969. p. 60.
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has increased. Science has a louder voice today, to the extent that we can call its total 
acceptance ‘scientism’, an acceptance already current in the mid-twentieth century, 
but postmodernism affects many of the social aspects of today’s society. In this thesis 
I have tried to reveal that these two cultures are, at foundation, reliant on very 
different metaphysics. One that believes that the world has some objective reality 
and can be explained in physical terms and one that denies all objective knowledge 
and interprets the world around it as social and political interactions of humans. The 
confusion today is not only one of cultural and political movements, as Gare 
describes, but a fundamental problem where these two diverse interpretations of 
human nature and nature are accepted simultaneously. People accept that they are a 
part of nature and deny its hold on them. This paradox causes the inertia that Gare 
mentions, for it makes any decision difficult especially in the areas of values and 
ethics.
Although some philosophers have maintained the necessity of values that are 
Platonic or Christian based, largely the present two systems of thought have 
abandoned objective values. Within the scientific sphere evolutionary theory is used 
to describe human nature. Any values that humans have are ones that have evolved 
for the survival of the species, individual or gene. In a simplistic analysis, the main 
value is survival, for all human actions can be interpreted as being those that lead to 
survival, even such acts that normally would be called altruistic or cooperative. In 
Continental philosophy humans create values freely. The individual is called upon to 
create his own value system for his own needs. In both systems of thought 
teleological explanations are scorned; the concept of ultimate purpose and direction is 
abandoned. In general both science and the post-modernism movement are concerned 
with particulars. Habermas interprets this type of conceptual movement today as an
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anti-Platonist reaction to the objective viewpoint of Platonism. Platonists emphasize 
abstract universals while anti-Platonists focus on particulars. Habermas sees an 
opposition between Platonists and anti-Platonists throughout history and concludes 
that the trend today is largely anti-Platonist. He wonders if  the dispute can ever be 
resolved:
From the repetitious cycles of enduring dialectics of enlightenment 
we learn that today’s anti-Platonism has a heritage as impressive as 
Platonism itself. The anti-Platonist spirit emerges from important 
materialist, sophist, and skeptic strands in classical Greece. This 
critical attitude even seizes power with late medieval nominalism 
and extends via early modem empiricism (still prevailing in the 
Anglo-Saxon world) and throughout the nineteenth century up to 
Nietzsche, American pragmatism, and German historicism. These 
movements show a critical attitude towards metaphysics and a 
liberal one in politics. Each of them equally responds to a new 
wave of perceived contingencies.7
Both science and postmodernism could be interpreted as being within this anti- 
Platonist phase. Neither system of thought is interested in metaphysics as all- 
encompassing world-views: both are caught in historicism. The conflict of the two 
systems of thought brings an inability to act. Baudrillard is a mouthpiece of the post­
modernist situation:
There is a clear analogy here with the slowing down of history 
when it mbs up against the astral body of the ‘silent majorities’.
Our societies are dominated by this mass process, not just in the 
demographic and sociological sense, but in the sense of a ‘critical 
mass’, of passing beyond a point of no return. This is the most 
significant event within these societies: the emergence, in the very 
course of their mobilization and revolutionary process (they are all 
revolutionary by the standards of past centuries), of an equivalent
7 Niznik,J. and Sanders, J. eds. Debating the State o f  Philosophy: Habermas, Rorty and Kolakowski.
Edited by J. Niznak and J. Saunders with contributions by E. Gellner and others. Connecticut: Praeger,
1996. p.5.
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force of inertia, of an immense indifference and the silent potency of 
that indifference. The inert matter of the social is not produced by 
a lack of exchanges, information or communication, but by the 
multiplication and saturation of exchanges. It is the product of the 
hyperdensity of cities, commodities, messages and circuits. It is the 
cold star of the social and, around that mass, history is also cooling. 
Events follow one upon another, cancelling each other out in a state of 
indifference. The masses, neutralized, mithridatized by information 
in turn neutralize history and act on an Ecran d ’absorption. They 
themselves have no history, meaning, consciousness or desire. They 
are the potential residue of all history, meaning and desire. As 
they have unfurled in our modernity, all these fine things have 
stirred up a mysterious counter-phenomenon, and all today’s political 
and social strategies are thrown out of gear by the failure to understand 
it.8
This passage reflects the state of a society that is inundated with information of 
conflicting principles and historical awareness. The lack of understanding, the 
inability to piece together a particular worldview, leads to inertia. Knowledge from 
science, that is supposed to be of an objective world, does not help the social 
situation. In fact Baudrillard uses a scientific analogy to help describe the present 
social situation:
Whether the universe is expanding to infinity or retracting 
towards an infinitely dense, infinitely small nucleus depends 
on its critical mass ( and speculation on this is itself infinite by 
virtue of the possible invention of new particles). By analogy, 
whether our human history is evolutive or involutive perhaps 
depends on humanity’s critical mass. Has the history, the 
movement, of the species reached the escape velocity required to 
triumph over the inertia of mass? Are we set, like the galaxies, 
on a definitive course distancing us from one another at prodigious 
speed, or is this dispersal to infinity destined to come to an end 
and the human molecules to come back together by an opposite 
process of gravitation? Can the human mass, which increases 
every day, exert control over a pulsation of this kind?9
8 Baudrillard, J. The Illusion o f  the End. Translated by Chris Turner. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994. 
pp.3-4.
* Ibid. p.5.
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Baudrillard’s thinking reflects a society that has become disillusioned with science or 
any other system of thought. Science has failed to solve all problems or to give any 
meaning to existence. It is like any other worldview that is now understood to be only 
a metaphor or grand narrative. Baudrillard implies that our society is directed by the 
fleeting images of the media:
One has the impression that events form all on their own and drift 
unpredictably towards their vanishing point -  the peripheral void 
of the media. Just as physicists now see their particles only as 
trajectory on screen, we no longer have the pulsing of events, but 
only the cardiogram, have neither representation nor recollection 
of them, but merely the (flat) encephalogram, neither desire nor 
enjoyment of them, but only the psychodrama and the T.V. image.10
For Baudrillard the human condition is today parallel to environmental problems. 
Everything must be recycled. It is a picture without direction and purpose or meaning 
or value:
The ecological imperative is that all wastes must be recycled. 
Otherwise, they will circle endlessly like satellites around the 
earth, which has itself returned to the state of a lump of cosmic 
waste. What is happening with history is the foreshadowing of 
this dilemma: we can either perish under the weight of the 
non-degradable waste of the grand empires, the grand narratives 
the great systems made obsolete by their own gigantism, or else 
recycle all this waste in the synthetic form of a heteroclite 
history, as we are doing today in the name of Democracy and 
Human rights, which are never anything but the confused end- 
product of the reprocessing of all the residues of history -  
crusher residues in which all the ethnic, linguistic, feudal 
and ideological phantoms of earlier societies float... We shall 
not be spared the worst -  that is, History will not come to an end 
- since the leftovers, all the leftovers -  the Church, communism,
10 Ibid. p. 19.
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ethnic groups, conflicts, ideologies -  are indefinitely recyclable.11
There is nothing in Baudrillard’s philosophy of direction or progress. Everything is 
devoid of meaning. Humans are caught within the residues of past ‘grand narratives’.
With all history at our disposal humans are unsure which way to understand 
themselves: there are so many theories and myths, leftovers as Baudrillard calls them, 
to take. Baudrillard shows the result of this dilemma in the example of the Biosphere 
2 experiment. A second earth is created, mimicking the original one: the artificial is 
easier to accept because reality has no meaning:
Real life, which surely, after all has the right to disappear (or 
might there be a paradoxical limit to human rights?) is sacrificed 
to artificial survival. The real planet, presumed condemned, is 
sacrificed in advance to its miniturized, air-conditioned clone 
(have no fear, all the earth’s climates are air-conditioned here) which 
is designed to vanquish death by total simulation. In days gone by it 
was the dead who were embalmed for eternity; today it is the 
living we embalm alive in a state of survival. Must this be our hope? 
Having lost our metaphysical utopias, do we have to build this 
prophylactic one?12
Baudrillard suggests that the belief that humans create their own values coupled with 
the evolutionary value of survival results in humanity being doomed to simulate 
environments, or create a ‘reality’, in which to survive. This may be an extreme view 
of the human condition but the conflict between scientism and postmodernism as 
explanations of human nature does present a problem. The problem is particularly 
noticeable within any discourse about the environment. The problem is at a
11 Ibid. pp.26-27.
12 Ibid. pp. 87-88.
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metaphysical level. Without a coherent metaphysical structure the possibility of a 
meaningful system of values is impossible to achieve. How can we find values for the 
environment today if we have a confused understanding of ourselves and our 
relationship to nature? If we cannot find a meaning for ourselves within nature it is 
unlikely that we will be able to know what to value.
Baudrillard also looks at the problem of values. Continental philosophy has 
largely followed the philosophy of Nietzsche and has stressed that humans should 
emancipate themselves from all superstitions (religions, immortality etc.). But the 
question is what should humans do once emancipated from such beliefs? Baudrillard 
suggests that the choice is to be an individualist, a Marxist or to be the Overman of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy. The ‘beyond’ is no longer that of religion but humanity 
reaching beyond its own condition. The Nietzschean Overman can only rule itself by 
the transvaluation of values; otherwise it is condemned to superstitious beliefs. 
However, Baudrillard shows how the Nietzschean transvaluation of values has not 
succeeded:
Needless to say, this transvaluation of values of which Nietzsche 
speaks has not taken place, except precisely in the opposite sense -  
not beyond, but this side o f  good and evil; not beyond, but this 
side of true and false, beautiful and ugly etc. A transvaluation 
folding in upon itself towards a non-differentiation, a non­
distinction of values, itself fetishized in an aesthetics of plurality, 
of difference etc. Not any longer a fetishization of divinities, great 
ideas or grand narratives, but of minimal differences and particles. 
It is in this respect that fetishism has become radical; it has become 
minimal and molecular; it is no longer the fetishism of a form , but 
of a mere formula - subliminal, subhuman. The boundaries of 
the human and the inhuman are indeed blurring, yet they are doing 
so in a movement not towards the superhuman, but towards the 
subhuman, towards a disappearance of the very symbolic 
characteristics pf the species. Verkarung des Untermenschen. 
Transfiguration of the subman.13
13 Ibid. pp.94-95.
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I have quoted Baudrillard at length because he does in some way highlight the 
dilemmas of today. Nietzsche’s dismissal of traditional values to be replaced by those 
of the Overman has indeed been unsuccessful. There have been no other values to 
replace the traditional ones and the result has been a fracturing of all values. The 
individual’s values are as good as any others. Baudrillard seems to be giving a picture 
that fits partly into Habermas’ interpretation; that the thought of today is in a phase of 
anti-Platonism being fractured into particulars with no overruling framework into 
which to place the particulars. In this background of thought it is the survival of the 
individual that becomes paramount. The Enlightenment programme, as all other all- 
encompassing systems, is discarded as faulty.
The original, Enlightenment humanism was based on man’s qualities, 
his virtues, his natural gifts, his essence, together with his right to 
freedom and to the exercise of that freedom. Current humanism, 
which finds its highest expression in the new extension of human 
rights, is more concerned with the conservation of the individual and 
of man as a species (in the one case, immortality is a virtue; in the 
other, it is merely a right to conservation). But human rights 
immediately become problematic, since the question arises of the 
potential rights of other species, of nature etc. and in respect of which 
they have to be defined. Now, does humanity even have rights over 
its own genome? What does it mean for a species to have the right to 
its own genetic definition and then to its potential genetic 
transformation?14
Baudrillard expresses the inability to appeal to higher values, because those belong to 
metaphysical beliefs that have been discarded. All that is left is the appeal to 
particular rights; rights of the individual, rights of minority groups, rights of species.
14 Ibid. pp. 96-97.
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Rights were once the domain of legal contracts. Today they have taken on a life of 
their own, without any metaphysical structure to support them.
The result of postmodernism is the acceptance o f conflicting values, which 
leads to deadlock in any attempt to form reasons for particular actions on the larger 
social scale in any area of life and not only towards solving the problems of the 
environment. Postmodernism can only result in the pragmatism of Richard Rorty. 
Rorty’s philosophy has its roots both in the analytic thinking of American philosophy 
and Continental philosophy. It has developed from the philosophy of Dewey and 
James as well as from that of Nietzsche. It is a type of thinking that is in the anti- 
Platonist mode:
If one thinks of philosophy as the love of wisdom, and of wisdom 
as consisting in the grasp of truth, and of truth as the accurate 
representation of natural order, then one has reason to doubt 
that philosophy is possible. For various twentieth century movements 
within philosophy have denied the existence of such a natural order, 
in the sense of an order which persists regardless of human languages 
and human history. The tradition in European philosophy which 
stems from Nietzsche -  a tradition now often called ‘post-modernism’ 
- insists that there is no such order. The pragmatic tradition in 
Anglophone philosophy does so as well.
In this lecture, I want to discuss what philosophy, in the sense of 
‘the love of truth’, might mean once one has abandoned the 
definition of truth as the accurate representation of a natural order.
I think that abandoning that definition has made it advisable to change 
the meaning of the term ‘wise’, and I should begin the lecture by 
suggesting how this might be done...
I shall use ‘pragmatism’ as a name for the views about truth, 
knowledge and rationality which were common to Nietzsche and 
William James. These views are corollaries of the denial that there is 
any order which exists independently of human languages and human 
history.15
15 Rorty, R. ‘Is it Desirable to Love Truth?’ in Rorty, R. Truth, Politics and ‘Post-modernism 
Spinoza lecture 1. Assen: VanGorcum, 1997. pp. 13-14.
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Pragmatism abandons the idea of a natural order that can be discovered. Language is 
no longer representational but a way of imposing an order; it is a tool with which to 
function in the world:
But if descriptions are viewed pragmatically rather than 
representationally, they will be evaluated as we evaluate tools, 
rather than in the way we evaluate photographs.16
If we apply the pragmatist’s approach to our understanding of nature we appear to 
have some problems. If there is no natural order to discover and we are imposing a 
framework on nature through our use of language, which framework should we use? . 
The pragmatist takes the relativist view of Protagoras of Ancient Greece where ‘man 
is the measure of all’, for if it is language that gives truth and value to everything then 
there is nothing objective to be found. Rorty insists that no language brings us any 
closer to the way things are than any other. Order comes from the way languages fit 
together:
Any descriptive vocabulary comprehensive enough to relate lots 
of things we talk about to lots of other such things will produce 
a description of an ordered universe.17
Nature, according to Rorty, may be described in any possible way that is preferred:
Once one starts thinking in terms of equally valid descriptions 
the idea that nature might prefer to be described in one vocabulary 
rather than anpther begins to seem merely quaint. It looks like a
16 Ibid. p.22.
17 Ibid. p. 17.
214
relic of the anthropomorphism which Spinoza and Hobbes both 
decried. Nature under a description will always exhibit an order.
But nature undescribed in any human language is simply Kant’s 
unknowable thing-in-itself, an utterly useless notion, the plaything 
of philosophical sceptics, a toy rather than a tool.18
Rorty cannot really mean what he appears to be saying. It does not seem possible that 
we should understand the order of nature simply to be a product of our own 
languages. It would make any scientific inquiry senseless. Even if the pragmatist 
does not like an underlying reality, the notion of such seems to be a basic concept 
without which no knowledge of any kind would be of any worth to anyone. The 
pragmatist approach to the world about us is highly suspect particularly for anyone 
working within environmental problems. The following seems to be the least helpful 
statement a philosopher could make:
To sum-up: the more one thinks about language, the less need there 
is to think about nature.19
If language is indeed a tool with which we understand the world about us, it 
appears that many philosophers throughout the world have become entranced with the 
tool in itself. The pragmatist links the scientific reductionist framework to the ideas 
of Continental philosophy in which constructs of language within a cultural 
background play an important part. Rorty shows his philosophy to be strongly 
dependent on Darwinian theory. Value decisions are based on pragmatic actions 
within a biological setting. Rorty wants to escape the Cartesian picture of mind and
18 Ibid. p. 17.
19 Ibid. p. 17.
215
with it the concept of rationality and an objective reality. Rorty dismisses the 
dichotomies of philosophy: mind/body, appearance/reality. These dichotomies are, 
according to Rorty, illusory thinking. Distinctions are simply a matter of more useful 
or less useful. It appears that Rorty is influenced by a particular form of Darwinian 
thinking. Thinking is the product of evolutionary creatures that are trying to survive:
Pragmatists hope to break with the picture which, in Wittgenstein’s 
words, ‘holds us captive’ -  the Cartesian -  Lockean notion 
of a mind seeking to get in touch with a reality outside it. So 
they start with a Darwinian account of human beings as animals 
doing their best to develop tools which will enable them to 
enjoy more pleasure and less pain. Words are among the tools 
which these clever animals have developed.20
In pragmatist terms, language is just a tool for survival: it is a way humans have learnt 
to handle the environment. But the pragmatists’ approach to language devalues value 
words for there can be nothing with true value if  language is the source of that value 
for the sake of human survival. Certainly nothing can ever have intrinsic value. The 
only value is survival of the human species, ‘these clever animals’.
Rorty has a way to defeat the sceptic over the problem how humans can know 
what is reality:
There is no way in which tools can take one out of touch with 
reality. No matter whether the tool is a hammer or gun or a 
belief or a statement, tool-using is part of the interaction of the 
organism with its environment. To see the employment of words 
as the use of tools to deal with the environment, rather than an 
attempt to represent the intrinsic nature of that environment, is 
to repudiate the question whether human minds are in touch with 
reality -  the question asked by the epistemological skeptic.21
20Niznak and Sanders eds., 1996. op. cit. pp. 37-38.
21 Ibid. p. 38.
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Although the pragmatist’s approach may triumphantly defeat all scepticism, it does 
not provide any value for nature other than a pragmatic one. The conclusion must be 
for a pragmatist that there are no intrinsic values to be found in nature because there is 
no reality outside our definition of it and our own needs of survival. In this type of 
explanation of humans, Rorty suggests that the only values we have are those of each 
organism surviving and, if survival is easily attained then also of ‘gratifying our 
desires’. Once again there is an echo of the philosophy of Lucretius and the 
Epicureans:
The right question to ask is, For what purposes might it be useful to 
hold that belief? This is like the question, For what purposes would it 
be useful to load this program into my computer? On the view I am 
suggesting, a person’s body is analogous to the computer’s hardware, 
and his or her beliefs and desires are analogous to the software. 
Nobody knows or cares whether a given piece of computer software 
represents reality accurately. All we care about is whether it is the 
software which, among programs currently available, will most 
efficiently accomplish a certain task. Analogously, pragmatists 
think that the question to ask about our beliefs is not whether they 
are about appearance, but simply whether they are the best available 
habit of action for gratifying our desires.22
But the question Rorty leaves open is: how do we decide which desires to gratify? 
When it comes to problems of the environment this attitude to belief systems seems to 
detract from the possibility of any meaningful action towards solving those problems. 
If it is all a matter of selecting belief systems that are the best available for action, 
then it is easy to argue that the western capitalist system is not destructive to the
22 Ibid. pp. 39-40.
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environment because many people benefit from it. This does, in fact, seem to be the 
conclusion of many people today. If relating belief systems or knowledge do not 
relate to appearance or an underlying reality, any reason for action becomes entirely 
arbitrary. Rorty’s pragmatic approach to action promotes the type of individualistic, 
multi-cultural society in which Rorty himself lives. The main guideline for living in 
such a society is tolerance at all costs. Therefore even truth must be defined in terms 
of tolerance, even though ‘tolerance’, as a value word, cannot be justified:
When we praise a scientist or scholar for the love of Truth what we 
often have in mind is simply open-mindedness: curiosity about 
opinions different from their own, tolerance for the existence 
of such opinions, and willingness to let their own views be 
corrected by argument. When we say that someone loves truth 
more than herself we may mean simply that she respects her 
colleagues enough to prefer the view which they can, freely and 
peaceably agree upon to the view she has developed on her own.23
With this type of attitude towards truth and belief systems it seems there can be little 
room for arriving at any conclusion about action, for if one person should argue that 
global warming is caused by humans and another argues that it is not, then according 
to Rorty, we should each tolerate one another’s opinion. The result would inevitably 
be no action for where would be the truth of either opinion on which to act?
Not only does Rorty undermine the concept of truth to simply a matter of 
tolerance, but he is also dismissive of the concept of reality, and reason as a means to 
discovering reality. He criticizes the rationalist:
For the rationalists, Reason has authority, because Reality, the way 
things are in themselves, has authority. Reality deserves respect, and
23 Rorty in Rorty, 1997. op. cit. p. 25.
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Reason is the faculty which puts us in touch with Reality. For us 
‘post-modernists’, on the other hand, reason is conceived dialogically. 
We treat is as just another name for willingness to talk things over, 
hear the other side, try to reach peaceful consensus. It is not the name 
of a faculty which penetrates through appearance to the intrinsic 
nature of either scientific or moral Reality. For us, to be rational is 
to be conversable, not to be obedient.24
When it is problems of the environment, how long must we converse before we create 
a need to take action? We could converse forever, which in fact is the result today 
under the influence of postmodernist thought. Here we have Rorty summing up the 
background of today’s thought in which nothing can possibly be achieved:
We think that anything you can do with notions like ‘Nature’, 
‘Reason’, and ‘Truth’, you can do better with such notions as ‘the 
most useful description for our purposes’ and ‘the attainment of free 
consensus about what to believe and to desire’.25
But who will decide which is the most ‘useful description’? For whom or what is it 
the most ‘useful description’? Could one ever attain a ‘free consensus about what to 
believe and to desire’ when there is no solid foundation on which to even begin to 
have a belief of any kind? Where do these beliefs come from? The pragmatist seems 
to have a severe epistemological problem.
Rorty’ s pragmatic solution has many faults. It results from the integration of 
the two major systems of thought of today, that of scientism and Continental 
philosophy. It brings us to an impasse. A consensus of opinion can never be 
adequate for any major decision, and least of all when dealing with environmental
24 Ibid. p.43.
25 Ibid p.43.
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problems. Neither scientism nor Continental philosophy provides us with the values 
we need to make decisions about the environment, as I have argued above. But the 
two systems of thinking combined make any progress impossible. In fact, they both 
decry progress and with that the possibility of changing situations for the better. The 
result is that the free market of capitalism, so often blamed for the destruction of the 
environment, is left entirely free without any restraint placed upon it.
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PART III
Value
Introduction
The first part of my thesis involved looking at the concept of nature through 
history. How have people in the past understood nature? In Part III  explored the 
concept of human nature in relation to nature as it has developed up to the present 
day. Since Kant’s philosophy there have been two distinctly different ways in which 
to perceive humans in relation to nature. Throughout history there has been a conflict 
between whether humans can be perceived as a part of nature or apart from nature and 
this distinction has continued into the complexities of thinking today. On the one 
hand is the explanation of human nature that has come through science and 
evolutionary theory resulting in the extreme form of Ultra-Darwinism which rests on 
the assumption that scientific knowledge is the only form of knowledge. This has 
been termed scientism. On the other hand is a postmodernist interpretation of humans 
developed from Continental philosophy. I have argued that the unquestioned 
acceptance of these two conflicting views has caused the inertia of today, particularly 
in regard to the solving of environmental problems. In the confusion of today the 
rejection of any encompassing metaphysics and the support of pluralism has seemed 
to be the only option, or otherwise to accept a type of pragmatism that is exemplified 
by Rorty’s philosophy.
The combination of scientism and postmodernism leads to some difficult 
problems as regards to ethics in general and environmental ethics in particular. Both 
scientism and postmodernism are metaphysically poor and do not provide firm 
foundations for a system of values. Ethical theories may accept either explanation of
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humans or a composite of the two. It is therefore not surprising that environmental 
philosophers are in the main part concerned with the problem of how humans should 
find value for the environment and ultimately for nature. It is a difficult task largely 
because, as I have indicated above, both explanations of humans, taken to their logical 
conclusion, support the view that the only value for each individual to hold is that of 
their own survival, or, in prosperous times, that of the satisfaction of their own desires 
or interests. Metaphysical systems that support only individual values are ideal for 
the flourishing of the capitalist system without any restraint. The capitalist system 
ultimately values economic wealth for the individual. But profit-making systems are 
time and again accused for their disregard of environmental factors. The capitalist 
system needs restraint, but where do the values come from that can restrict 
capitalism?
Environmental philosophy struggles in a situation of value-poor metaphysics. 
The search for values means that environmental ethics becomes the main area of 
interest in environmental philosophy.
Environmental philosophy is a relatively new field of 
philosophical ethics concerned with describing the 
values carried by the non-human natural world and 
prescribing an appropriate ethical response to ensure 
preservation or restoration of those values. This often 
urgent concern arises especially in view of threats to 
nature posed largely by humans. These threats are both 
to other humans and to non-humans, placing in 
jeopardy the commitment of life on earth.. .The principal 
question underlying such research was how values carried 
by nature could best be described, often asking whether nature 
is directly morally considerable in itself, rather than only indirectly 
morally considerable because it is appreciated or needed by humans1
1 Light, A. and Rolston, H. ‘Introduction: ethics and environmental ethics’ in Light, A. and Rolston, H. 
eds. Environmental Ethics: an anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003. pp. 1-2.
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The task of finding values for nature has proved difficult because environmental 
philosophers so often restrict themselves to basing values on scientific facts or a 
postmodernist interpretation of humans.
Patrick Curry also recognizes the two modes of thinking within environmental 
writing. He describes scientism as follows:
First there is the clear complicity of objectivism, realism and 
rationalism -  culminating, potentially and often actually, in 
scientism -  in the ecological crisis. Such approaches are united 
in maintaining and propagating the idea of the ‘environment’
(a word that already does a lot of work marginalizing nonhuman 
nature) as essentially a mere setting for the human drama, most of 
which comprises a set of passive resources for the advancement 
of human interests, with the latter being the most, or even only 
ethically considerable kind.2
Curry understands ‘scientism’ as anthropocentric in its approach and that scientific 
thinking promotes anthropocentrism. Curry describes the second approach:
The second understanding of nature involves a family of approaches 
commonly held (by both its proponents and opponents) to take 
the opposite view in relation to the first: social constructivism, 
cultural relativism, and/or postmodernism... The nonhuman natural 
world is a tabula rasa, whether mere inert matter or a dynamic but 
meaningless chaos, upon which human beings struggle to write, read 
and erase each other’s social, cultural and political concerns. So I 
shall call the members of this school constructionist subjectivists.3
Curry is describing the view that has largely developed from Continental thinking that 
humans can never escape their subjective perceptions of the world.
2 Curry, P. ‘Re-thinking Nature’ in Environmental Values. Vol. 12 (3) 2003. p.338.
3 Ibid. pp. 339-340.
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I would agree with Curry to a certain extent. I have argued that the total 
acceptance of science can lead to what may be termed as scientism as scientific 
materialists assume that scientific explanations are the only ones. Science is based on 
the search for objective knowledge and the assumption that there is a ‘real’ world that 
can be found through the scientific enterprise. Indeed science could not begin to 
function without these two fundamental assumptions. However, although science can 
lead to the objectification of nature as opposed to the subjective being of humans so 
that ‘the idea of the ‘environment’., [is] essentially a mere setting for the human 
drama... ’ as Curry describes it, it can also include humans within its objective study 
so that every part of the being that is human is to be understood as a part of the object 
‘nature’ where ‘nature’ implies ‘all that is’. This is the assumption of evolutionary 
psychologists as well as eliminative materialists. In this construction of reality 
humans can be understood objectively like any other part of nature. Although not all 
scientists take this extreme view there are indications in society at large that many 
accept this assumption.
On the other hand within a postmodern interpretation of nature, the nonhuman 
world is ‘.. .a tabula rasa, whether mere inert matter or a dynamic but meaningless 
chaos, upon which human beings struggle to write, read and erase each others’ social, 
cultural and political concerns’, as Curry describes it. What humans understand as 
nature is seen through the prism of social and political movements: nature is not the 
objective reality of the scientists but a human construction. But then nature is 
fragmented into as many cultural and political pieces as there are humans to construct 
their frameworks of understanding, and nature becomes a victim of human 
idiosyncrasy. In this way of upderstanding nature humans are apart from nature, as a 
concept of nature can only be formed through human social and political
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constructions. Environmental philosophers who accept postmodern interpretations of 
humans discuss the need to change our language and to construct new ‘narratives’ or 
‘worldviews’.
The paradoxical nature of these two systems of thought is that they each 
regard themselves as depicting humans as a part of nature: humans are the result of 
evolutionary processes like anything else; humans are ‘embedded’ in nature and all 
human experience is from that ‘embeddedness’. But they would accuse each other of 
depicting humans as apart from nature: humans objectify nature through scientific, 
mechanistic explanations; or again humans deny the reality of nature and only see it 
as a social or political construction of humans.
Environmental ethics encounters all the problems of ethical theory today, but 
with the additional problem of including the non-human within the ethical sphere. 
Ethical theories that were possibly coping with problems of morality become 
inadequate. When the non-human is included within the ethical circle the search for a 
metaphysical system on which to base the ethical theory becomes even more 
important. It is then that we reach this deep metaphysical problem of how humans 
relate to nature and is at this level that there is a fundamental contradiction in the way 
we understand ourselves. Are we beings like any other within nature and thereby 
another object of scientific investigation, or are we constructing our realities and 
thereby creating concepts of both nature and ourselves within our cultural contexts?
In the third part of my thesis I would like to look at how environmental 
philosophers have tried to find value for the environment and how they are influenced 
by the two concepts of nature and human nature as discussed above.
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Chapter 1
Science-informed Environmental Philosophy
A large part of environmental philosophy shows the extent of the influence of 
the biological sciences, sometimes accepting the explanation of human nature in terms 
of Ultra-Darwinism. Thus a recent article by Walter Dodds largely accepts an Ultra- 
Darwinism explanation of humans when dealing with game theory and conservation:
Animals behave selfishly because of their evolved propensity 
to survive and propagate. All non-human animal behaviours 
that seem altruistic (unselfish) can be explained as successful 
strategies of selfish individuals driven by their genetic program. 
Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene explained eloquently how evolution 
selects for strategies that benefit the survival of genes, leading to 
a ubiquitous strategy of ‘you scratch my back, I’ll ride on yours’.1
In his quoting of Dawkins he implies that he accepts the Ultra-Darwinist explanation 
of animal behaviour, including human behaviour. However, he does concede that 
humans are in some respects different from non-humans:
Humans are unique in that we, as a species, are able to 
realise that it is in our best interests to avoid destructive 
short-term behaviour of selfish individuals. We are also 
unique in having cultural evolution in addition to biological 
evolution.2
He also concedes that human behaviour can be more complex than simple 
evolutionary selfishness or altruism for he says:
1 Dodds, W. K. ‘Game Theory and Conservation’ in Environmental Values. Vol. 14 (4), 2005. p. 414.
2 Ibid. p. 414.
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It may be useful to distinguish between selfishness as a 
characteristic of evolutionary fitness and psychological 
egoism (the idea that human behavioural choices are 
always driven by selfish motives.)3
Nevertheless his article is written on the assumption that the behaviour of humans is 
the result of evolutionary selective processes and that selfishness is a characteristic of 
evolutionary fitness. This begs many questions. The problem stems from Dawkins’ 
use of the word ‘selfish’ to describe genes. As has been pointed out by other 
philosophers, the term ‘selfish’ functions within the social/moral framework of 
humans. It is inappropriate to apply the term to biological entities. Any behaviour 
that is selected by evolutionary processes is outside the realms of morality: there can 
be no good or bad behaviour in nature. It is only through humans that the concept of 
good or bad behaviour (altruistic or selfish etc.) has meaning. Whatever has been 
selected by evolutionary processes in humans is prior to any moral description. 
Therefore, Dawkins and his disciples are incorrect on two accounts: first, to apply a 
moral term to a biological entity; and second to extrapolate that any behaviour in 
humans that can be described in moral terms is the result of evolutionary processes. 
Any environmental philosophy founded on Dawkins’ ‘selfish gene’ is sadly misled.
Environmental philosophers whose philosophy is informed by the biological 
sciences may not accept the extreme reductionism of Ultra-Darwinism, but they 
certainly accept the statements of science as being approximately true. They at least 
accept:
1. That there is objective knowledge.
2. That statements in science are usually true, particularly within the realms 
of biology, ecology and evolutionary theory.
3 Ibid. p. 414.
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3. That biology, ecology and evolutionary theory are the best ways of 
understanding nature and human nature over and above other sciences and 
other forms of knowledge.
4. That eventually a form of ‘naturalism’ may be possible, whereby values 
can be obtained from the natural world.
Science-informed environmental philosophers, seeking to find values from the facts 
of science, are led into debates on anthropocentrism (weak and strong) versus non- 
anthropocentrism, and instrumental value versus intrinsic value. These arguments are 
the result of the difficulty of establishing values from the facts of science. To place 
values only with humans would lead to strong anthropocentrism that many 
environmental philosophers wish to avoid, claiming that it has been strong 
anthropocentrism (humans valuing nature only for their own interests), that has 
caused environmental problems. To avoid anthropocentrism some environmental 
philosophers hold that nature has intrinsic value or some value of its own beyond 
human concerns. However, a science-informed environmental philosophy takes the 
facts of science to find value when scientific knowledge, by definition, should be 
value-free. I shall look at the work of some science-informed environmental 
philosophers to show the types of problems that arise.
Early environmental philosophers understood the need for humans to alter 
the perception of themselves in relation to nature and many of them worked within the 
scientific paradigm. J. Baird Callicott describes the background thinking of much 
environmental philosophy:
Environmental philosophers, rather, are attempting tp prfipplate 
a new worldview and a new conception of what it ippans to be 
a human beipp, distilled from the theory of evolutipp, the New
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Physics, ecology and other natural sciences.4
Callicott is working within the scientific paradigm but he uses the term ‘worldview’ 
in a way that shows the influence on him of postmodernism. It is not that we should 
seek to understand ourselves as we really are in relationship to nature but that we 
should form for ourselves a new conception out of the worldview that science offers. 
This is the human animal constructing its own realities. Nevertheless Callicott 
describes environmental philosophers as working within the monistic materialism of 
the sciences wherein humans are a part of nature and are to be understood as one 
species among many, all of which have equal rights. This is a holistic approach to 
environmental philosophy whereby the whole ecological system has value beyond the 
individual.
Callicott takes Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac as his starting point. 
Aldo Leopold accepted the facts of the biological sciences to realign the relation of 
humans to nature. Callicott describes him:
He was an environmental philosopher before environmental 
philosophy came on the scene. He was an amateur twenty-first 
century philosopher, exploring the moral implications of the 
biological sciences, living in the twentieth century -  and only 
during the first half of it, at that.5
Leopold emphasized the need of a holistic, biotic, non-anthropocentric approach to 
our dealings with nature. His guiding principle was:
4 Callicott, J. Baird. Beyond the Land Ethic: more essays in environmental philosophy. Npw York: 
State University o f New York, 1999. p.30
5 Ibid. p. 7.
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A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability 
and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise.6
He was attempting to use the biological sciences to provide an ethical guideline.
But Callicott is aware of the difficulties in providing a moral theory from the sciences, 
because of fact/value dichotomy:
As it seems to me, the more obvious theoretical problem facing 
the land ethic is how, in view of the divorce between fact and 
value decreed in twentieth-century academic philosophy, science 
can inform ethics, more especially, how the theory of evolution 
and ecology can inform the land ethic.7
Callicott maintains that evolutionary theory can inform ethics, and I shall deal with 
his theory of value later.
For Leopold the emphasis for moral significance is the community, not the 
individual. Ecological principles of integrity and stability are of primary importance. 
But the land ethic of Leopold fails to offer a complete ethical theory for humans in the 
future. The implications of Leopold’s land ethic are unacceptable to any 
understanding as to how humans should interact with one another and is only 
concerned with the good of the land. Human needs would be overlooked for the good 
of ecological balance. Although Leopold understood the land ethic as not a single 
principle but another principle to be added to already functioning moral principles, it 
would be difficult to hold this consistently as the land ethic would clash with other 
moral principles.
6 Leopold, A. A Sand County Almanac: and sketches here and there. Illustrated by C. W. Schwarz. 
Introduction by R. Finch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. pp. 224-225.
7 Callicott, 1999. op. cit. p. 7.
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The land ethic has been accused of ecofascism and there is an element of truth 
in the accusation. It demands certain behaviour from humans to keep an ecological 
balance that would often go against human compassion. Furthermore the land ethic 
has problems today because it was based on an understanding of ecological balances 
in nature that are no longer accepted within scientific circles. Science has put forward 
another view of nature, as Callicott admits:
Sometime around 1975, the equilibrium, or balance-of-nature 
worldview in ecology gave way to one in which nature is constantly 
changing often chaotically and in which violent disturbance is a normal 
and healthy, not an abnormal and pathological, occurrence.8
This picture of the ecological norm does little to help build any system of moral 
behaviour.
Leopold intended his ethics to be non-anthropocentric:
In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from 
conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen 
of it. 9
However, in the final analysis, his main concern is with good management of the 
land, and this is a human-centred concern. He calls for a conservation programme 
informed by the ecological sciences. In this way he fails to be non-anthropocentric, 
for the health of the land that he wishes to promote is in terms of human needs.
8 Ibid. p.8.
9 Leopold, 1989. op. cit. p. 204.
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Callicott develops Leopold’s land ethic. He accepts the truths of modem 
science but is against the ‘worldview’ that he calls the Baconian-Cartesian-Newtonian 
model. This he interprets as a view of humans as apart from nature where nature is 
viewed mechanistically. He wants to move to what he calls the Darwinism- 
Einsteinian-Leopoldian model:
Put positively, I think that the political implementation of 
environmental ethics -  the only implementation that can make 
a significant practical difference -  will follow upon the transition 
of the prevailing worldview from the Baconian-Cartesian-Newtonian 
model to a Darwinian-Einsteinian-Leopoldian model. When we -  
we the people, not just we environmentalists -  come to see nature 
as a systemic whole and ourselves as thoroughly embedded in it, 
a part of nature, not set apart from it, then what is called the 
‘political will’ necessary for mutual coercion mutually agreed upon 
may materialize.10
He is concerned to change the ‘worldview’ so that humans will want to act favourably 
towards the environment. For ‘worldview’ he means that a certain type of 
metaphysical understanding of the world should be accepted. But the move from the 
Baconian-Cartesian-Newtonian model to a Darwinian-Einsteinian-Leopoldian model 
as he advises is not such a change in direction as he believes, for both ‘worldviews’ 
are underpinned by scientific knowledge and the belief that humans are simply one 
part of nature. Although Bacon would have understood his own thinking to be 
placing humans apart from nature, and environmental philosophers often accuse him 
of ‘objectifying’ nature in opposition to humans, yet within Bacon’s promotion of the 
scientific method were the seeds of understanding humans as a part of nature. As 
science progressed every aspect of humans was explained within a monistic
10 Callicott, 1999. op. cit. p.51.
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materialist interpretation. Monistic materialism can easily lead to a mechanistic 
description of humans based on the acceptance of a hierarchy of the sciences whereby 
all the sciences can be reduced to events explained by physics. Humans then can be 
understood as embedded in a mechanistic nature where all events are subject to 
physical causes including all parts of human consciousness.
Callicott is inspired by what he calls New Physics, the physics of relativity and 
quantum theory coupled with evolutionary theory. He is not against new technology, 
as many environmentalists have been, because he sees it as linked into a holistic view 
of the world where humans are a part of nature:
Ecology and the New Physics are cognitively resonant and 
complimentary. The emerging solid-state solar-electronic 
generation of technologies embodies the systemic and holistic 
foundations of the New Physics.11
Rather than this being in direct contrast to the Baconian-Cartesian-Newtonian model, 
his interpretation becomes an extension of this model with the teleological view of the 
cosmos, as well as humans being privileged in some way, having been removed.
The land ethic of Leopold that Callicott champions supports the monistic 
materialism of an extreme form of Darwinism and alters the ethical status of humans:
Leopold summarizes Darwin’s natural history of ethics with 
characteristic compression:4 All ethics so far evolved rest 
upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a 
community of interdependent parts’. Then he adds an ecological 
element, the community model of the biota espoused most 
notably by Charles Elton: Ecology 'simply enlarges the 
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants
11 Ibid p.56.
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and animals, or collectively the land to which we belong’, not as ‘a 
commodity belonging to us’, that some ‘simplest reason’ of 
which Darwin speaks, might kick in. And, when it does, what 
results will be a land ethic that ‘changes the role of Homo sapiens from 
conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it’.12
Although there is a need for humans to no longer picture themselves as ‘conqueror of 
the land community’, the description of humans as ‘plain member and citizen’ seems 
to deprive humans of taking any particular ethical role, for if all in the land 
community, both humans and non-humans alike, are plain members and citizens there 
seems to be no room for humans to be in any favoured position to make decisions for 
the well-being of all. Yet it is important that humans are in a position to make value 
judgements about the land, for only through humans comes the concept of a healthy 
environment. The land ethic cannot be a basic principle that can link humans 
satisfactorily in a moral way to the environment
Callicott holds that all values are subjective, human-created. However, he 
maintains that this does not mean that values should be human-centred or 
anthropocentric. Humans can value the nonhuman world intrinsically and not just 
instrumentally. He accepts the explanation of human nature given by evolutionary 
psychologists and that values have evolved through natural selection:
.. .Callicott accepted a kind of socio-biology, manifesting itself 
as a belief in the biological origin of ethics in the community.
Ethical behaviour in human beings is instinctive, having been 
evolutionarily selected for, since ethical responses by individuals 
in a biological community makes the species most likely to survive.13
12 Ibid. p. 66.
13 Palmer, C. ‘An Overview o f Environmental Ethics’ in Light, A. and Rolston, H. eds. Environmental 
Ethics: an anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2003. p. 24.
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His theory of evolutionarily evolved values goes someway to explaining the 
possibility of shared values among humans, although it is debatable whether such 
values as justice and mercy could be explained by his theory. His insistence that 
morality is about survival much like keen eyesight or sharp hearing demolishes the 
concept of morality as previously understood:
Darwin’s biosocial account of the origin of moral values explains 
how value in general, and moral values in particular, have become 
more or less fixed, standardized by natural selection. Having the 
right values is every bit as necessary to our survival and reproductive 
success as having keen eyesight, sharp hearing, good health, strength 
and so on. We must have a robust sense of what Hume and Smith 
called ‘self-love’, that is, we each value as an end-in-itself our own 
life and instrumentally value those things that really are means to 
our own well-being.. .and in order that our familial and social 
institutions might flourish, we must value, as ends-in-themselves 
our parents, siblings, spouses, friends, neighbors, colleagues, fellow 
citizens and those social institutions as such -  our families, 
communities, etc.14
His description of morality reveals that he has some confused thoughts on these 
matters. The extent of his confusion is shown by the way he equates morality with 
‘right values’, that is right values for survival.
Rather one may be said to have the right values in the same 
sense that one may be said to have the right number of fingers 
if one has five on each hand. Values, like physical features, have 
been normalized, standardized by natural selection. And just as 
many human physical characteristics...sometimes exhibit wide range 
of normalcy, so likewise do many human psychological 
characteristics, human values among them.1
14 Callicott, 1999. op. cit. p. 87.
15 Ibid. p. 87.
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His account of morality suggests that each human may have evolved in a slightly 
different way in having ‘right values’. If someone has not evolved to the ‘norm’ then 
they may not survive, or, at least, have difficulty in surviving. This account is a very 
odd basis for morality. An ethical theory cannot be based on a deterministic account 
of human nature, for morality must be appropriate to every human being and not some 
successfully evolved elite. Callicott wants values to be ‘correct’ or not ‘correct’ so 
that they are not relative, but he denies them any truth criteria:
Thus, while a given value is neither true not false, something 
pragmatically equivalent and functionally analogous to truth 
and falsity serves to make some values correct and other incorrect. 
Values are not, therefore, radically relative.16
Callicott’s aim to provide a holistic account within environmental ethics, based 
entirely on evolutionary selection, leads him to an ethical theory that would exclude 
some humans from the ‘norm’ as well as making morality only a survival tactic. This 
cannot be correct. Evolutionary theory may be able to inform some areas of ethics but 
it cannot be the only explanation and guideline for values. For sociobiologists, like 
Callicott, values in general and moral values in particular are described as the result of 
evolutionary processes and only the result of evolutionary processes. This offers a 
description of how morality exists and why certain things are valued today but it is 
hard pressed to give guidelines for what ought to be valued in the future. Do we wait 
to be selected by evolutionary processes to find if we had the ‘correct’ values? An 
historical account of values is inadequate to motivate us to have concern for nature.
16 Ibid. pp. 87-88.
236
Furthermore, Callicott’s sociobiological explanation for environmental ethics 
leads him to give the community ethical priority over the individual. He argues that 
for the health of a community, some individuals may have to be sacrificed for the 
whole. This leads him to a position which opens him to the accusation of being an 
ecofascist. To escape this accusation he claims that the land ethic is a supplement to 
community-based social ethics. But then he contradicts his belief in the need of a 
monistic environmental ethics. A sociobiological account, concerned as it is with 
survival, is inadequate to preserve the dignity of the individual human. It is contrary 
to many ethical systems that promote concern for the suffering individual. Later 
Callicott changed his position to allow humans to be the centre of concentric circles of 
concern, with ethical obligation diminishing towards the outside. With this 
concession he weakens his claim to be non-anthropocentric for in any moral situation 
humans would be preferred before non-humans. He denies that nothing matters 
except human interests, but if human interests are put first would this position be 
much different from a weak anthropocentric position which would take in non-human 
interests for the benefit o f humans?
A sociobiologist account of human nature is not adequate to give a basis for an 
environmental ethic. It is possible to accept evolutionary theory, but oppose the 
extreme reductionism of it in its application to humans that underlies the type of 
philosophy that Callicott prescribes. How far science can explain human nature, 
consciousness and mind as well as morality, is a debateable issue. Brian Baxter tries 
to support a sociobiological explanation of humans as a way towards an 
environmental ethics, but he himself agrees that evolutionary history gives a bleak 
explanation of humans:
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It has to be admitted, however, that this picture has its dark side 
too- it is a tale of life forms emerging by an immensely long 
process of death, suffering and destruction. Certainly,., .the 
evolutionary approach to our self-understanding has some 
extraordinary challenging claim for us to contend with -  that the 
process has no pre-ordained end-point or purpose; that nature 
does not contain harmony and balance; that death and suffering are 
integral to it, not optional extras; that human beings can rely only 
upon each other for care, concern and compassion, and that these 
may have a fragile basis in our natures. The most troubling point 
of all is that our deepest moral concerns emerge solely and 
contingently from our evolutionary-produced natures, not from some 
fundamental source within the very fabric of being. These are not 
just deeply disturbing thoughts, they are also very new ones, and 
will take a great deal of time to assimilate them and rethink our
17philosophical position in the light of them.
The above passage outlines all the reasons why there should be strong opposition to a 
sociobiological approach to human nature and why it will not be assimilated but 
eventually strongly rejected. Baxter remarks that evolutionary explanation has no 
‘pre-ordained end-point or purpose’. The concept of purpose within human nature I 
shall be discussing further later in this thesis, but I would like to say here that the 
concept of purpose is an important one for humans. It links with a concept of 
progress. A sense of progress is often the major factor in motivating humans to 
action. A theory that does not take into account the human need to project into the 
future is not adequate for the explanation of human nature. Baxter points out that 
nature, being the result of evolutionary processes, contains no balance or harmony. 
But humans often bring into discussions about the environment the need of balance 
and harmony in nature. If these concepts are not in nature then an evolutionary 
explanation of humans is not enough for the presence of such a concept in humans.
17 Baxter, B. ‘Naturalism and Environmentalism: a reply to Hinchman’ in Environmental Values. 15 
(2006) p. 65.
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Furthermore, we need the concepts of balance and harmony as well as progress when 
we wish to project forward to a vision of having a better relationship with nature.
Baxter also shows the bleakness of a description of morality in terms of 
evolutionary processes, ‘ that our deepest moral concerns emerge solely and 
contingently from our evolutionary-produced natures... ’ and he is right that it would 
be bleak if that were the case. But morality has as its major characteristic that it is 
unlike anything that is in nature. Human beings alone in the world are moral beings 
and morality is often about going in opposition to the ways of nature. It is also very 
often not about survival at all. These aspects of morality cannot be satisfactorily 
explained by sociobiologists and, if that is so, a sociobiologist account, of human 
nature, like that of Calicott, is not adequate as a basis for an environmental ethic.
Holmes Rolston also has a holistic approach to the environment but not a 
sociobiological one. He bases his arguments on the sciences of ecology and 
evolutionary theory, although he also includes a more individualistic approach in 
contrast to Callicott. Unlike Callicott, he argues for objective values in nature, 
although these are not moral values. He argues for the individual within the system. 
Individual value is the telos of each individual organism: every organism has a good 
of its own. His argument rests heavily on the genetic DNA claiming that the genetic 
set is a normative set, but not in a moral way:
Even stronger still, the genetic set is a normative set; it distinguishes 
between what is and what ought to be. This does not mean that the 
organism is a moral system, for there is no moral agent in nature 
apart from persons, but that the organism is an axiological system, 
an evaluative system. So it grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds, 
and resists death. We can say that the physical state the organism 
seeks, idealized in its programmatic form, is a valued state. Value
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1 ftis present in this achievement.
Sentience or ability for conscious reflection add value, so that the more sophisticated 
a living organism, the more valuable it is. But is this the way back to 
anthropocentrism, for presumably humans are the most sophisticated of all 
organisms?
Rolston also thinks that intrinsic value lies beyond the individual and is 
applicable to species and ecosystems. His emphasis on survival values indicates the 
influence evolutionary theory has had on his work:
The appropriate survival unit is the appropriate location of 
valuing.
All such valuing is deeply embedded in the historical evolutionary 
ecosystem. The species lineage is woven into the supporting, 
stimulating, biotic community. The system is a kind of field 
with characteristics as vital for life as any property contained 
within particular organisms. The ecosystem is the depth source 
of individual and species alike; it has systemic value. The molecular 
configurations of DNA are what they are because they record at the 
microscopic level the story of a particular form of life in the 
macroscopic historical ecosystem.19
He has three tiers of values that are found in nature: intrinsic value for the individual, 
instrumental value within species, and systemic value in the ecosystem. The 
ecosystem and the biosphere have value according to Rolston because they are life- 
creating processes. It is creativity in individuals, species and ecosystem that give 
them value:
18 Rolston, H. Environmental Ethics: duties to and values in the natural world. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1988. pp. 99-100.
19 Rolston, H. Genes, Genesis and God: values and their origins in natural and human history. The 
Gifford Lectures. University o f Edinburgh, 1997-1998. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999. p. 43.
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Humans are not so much lighting up value in a potentially 
valuable world, as they are psychologically joining ongoing 
planetary natural history in which there is value wherever 
there is positive creativity. While such creativity can be present 
in subjects with their interests and preferences, it can also be 
present objectively in living organisms with their lives defended, 
and in species that defend an identity over time, and in systems 
that are self-organizing and that project storied achievements.20
There are problems in his theory. If every individual of every species has a 
telos that gives it intrinsic value, and species too have a value of their own, it would 
be difficult to justify the view that any individuals that are not human, or indeed entire 
species (such as disease carrying insects) need to be eradicated because of the harm 
they cause humans. There are many living things that at least need some tight control 
by humans or life for us would be very unpleasant. When we introduce the concept of 
intrinsic value we are intending to give a reason for preventing the destruction of the 
things of nature, otherwise I am not sure what work the term ‘intrinsic value’ is doing 
in environmental ethics. ‘Intrinsic value’ may be too strong a term for what we need 
to protect the things of nature. I shall discuss the concept of intrinsic value later in 
this chapter.
A further problem in his theory is the difficulty there would be in reconciling 
the value of an individual with the value of the species and also with that of the whole 
system. Indeed he argues that sometimes the value of nature as a whole takes priority 
over the needs of individual people. In the end he argues that it is the ecosystem that 
is the appropriate unit of morality, which makes his environmental ethics a holistic 
one. A holistic environmental ethics can lead to some unpleasant conclusions if 
followed rigorously. Rolston’s concern for ecological systems and preservation of
20 Rolston, H. ‘Value in Nature and the Nature o f Value’ in Light and Rolston. 2003. op. cit. p. 152.
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species leads him to put humans second in situations where the environment is likely 
to be destroyed. He is seriously wrong in his conclusions:
Yes, but there is another kind of killing here, one not envisioned at 
Sinai, where humans are superkilling species. Extinction kills 
forms (species) -  and not just individuals; it kills collectively, not 
just distributively. Killing a natural kind is the death of birth, not 
just of an individual life. The historical lineage is stopped forever. 
Preceding the Ten Commandments is the Noah myth, when 
nature was primordially put at peril as great as the actual threat today 
There, God seems more concerned about species than about humans 
who had then gone so far astray.. .There is something ungodly 
about an ethic by which late-coming Homo Sapiens arrogantly regards 
the welfare of one’ own species as absolute, with the welfare of all the 
other five million species sacrificed to that. The commandment not to 
kill is as old as Cain and Abel, but the most archaic commandment of 
all is the divine, ‘Let the earth bring forth’. Stopping that genesis is the 
most destructive event possible, and we humans have no right to do 
that.21
Quoting the Bible within a philosophical argument is not always appropriate. 
However, I think Rolston has his interpretation wrong about the Noah myth. The 
story seems to be about saving the righteous man Noah and his family. And the 
archaic commandment ‘bring forth’ was surely made secondary to the main 
commandment of the New Testament. Biblical texts aside, it cannot be moral to 
protect nature to the disadvantage of humans and by ‘disadvantage’ I mean whereby 
the situation of a human life would become intolerable. Our moral circle should be 
widening, not including non-humans at the expense of humans. What we should be 
looking for is particular moral behaviour from humans that will protect all humans as 
well as nature. A holistic environmental philosophy may lose the importance of 
humans and the moral status that we have correctly given to ourselves. In Rolston’s
21 Rolston, H. ‘Feeding People versus Saving Nature?’ in Light and Rolston. 2003. op. cit. p. 461.
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later writing he is arguing for a favoured moral position for humans, but this may lead 
to a moderation of his holistic ethics.
Rolston’s environmental ethics is ecocentric and, like Callicott’s, is in favour 
of the species over the individual. Paul Taylor offers a biocentric environmental ethic 
and puts a moral obligation towards individuals:
I argue that finally it is the good (well-being, welfare) of 
individual organisms, considered as entities having inherent 
worth, that determine our moral relations with the Earth’s wild 
communities of life.
Taylor argues that humans are just one species among many and that non-humans, 
like humans, should receive as much respect as human individuals. Like Rolston he 
believes that all living things have a telos and a good of their own which gives them 
‘inherent worth’ (a similar term to ‘intrinsic value’). The difficulty of maintaining 
this argument is shown by Taylor’s complex arguments to resolve moral conflicts.
Taylor’s environmental ethics is based once again on an evolutionary 
interpretation of human nature:
We share with other species a common relationship to the earth, 
in accepting the biocentric outlook we take the fact of our being 
an animal species to be a fundamental feature of our existence. 
We consider it an essential aspect of ‘the human condition’. We 
do not deny the difference between ourselves and other species, 
but we keep in the forefront of our consciousness the fact that in 
relation to our planet’s natural ecosystems we are but one species 
population among many.. .In this light we consider ourselves as 
one of them, not set apart from them.23
22 Taylor, P. W. ‘The Ethics o f Respect for Nature’ in Ibid p. 74.
23 Ibid. p.76-77
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But his thinking leads him to the conclusion that the earth would be a better place 
without humans:
If, then, the total, final, absolute extermination of our species 
(by our own hands?) should take place and if we should not 
carry all the others with us into oblivion, not only would the 
Earth’s community of life continue to exist, but in all probability 
its well-being would be enhanced. Our presence, in short, is not 
needed. If we were to take the standpoint of the community 
and give voice to its true interest, the ending of our six-inch 
epoch would be most likely greeted with a heavy ‘Good riddance’.24
What we are ultimately looking for in an environmental ethic is one that will motivate 
people to care for nature. Environmental philosophies that depict humans as 
unimportant to the earth, or even that the earth would be better without them, do not 
give such an incentive. There is something seriously wrong with any ethical theories 
that want to eliminate humans for the sake of nature.
However, Taylor makes some concessions for human enterprises, such as the 
advances of medical sciences against harmful living things. This demolishes his 
argument for equality for all living things. He has a hierarchy of interests with 
humans placed at the top. Thus his attempt for non-anthropocentrism is somewhat 
weakened. In any situation human interests would be considered first and this would 
lead to a similar solution as within a weak anthropocentric position. A weak 
anthropocentric position could hold that human interests come first but that would not 
mean that humans should act destructively towards nature because the care of nature 
would be in the long term interest of humans.
24 Ibid. pp. 77-78.
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Deep ecologists also have a holistic approach to environmental philosophy, 
but they emphasize the need for social and political change as well as including a 
metaphysical, and indeed mystical, account of nature and human nature. The 
ecophilosophy of Arne Naess is also based on the science of ecology. Within his 
philosophy humans are regarded as a part of nature and just one of the many species 
that share the planet, as Rothenberg explains::
More precisely, it is the utilization of basic concepts from the science 
of ecology -  such as complexity, diversity, and symbiosis -  to clarify 
the place of our species within nature through the process of working 
out a total view.2
Naess praises the ecological field worker who has the insight to see the necessary 
connections in ecosystems. From this he draws the conclusion that it is not only 
humans that have the right to live. He advocates an equal right to life for all, although 
later he qualifies ‘all’, for ‘all’ cannot possibly mean every individual living creature. 
However, to insist on the continuation of the privileged position of humans in ethical 
decisions is to be anthropocentric and to be anthropocentric is detrimental to all life 
whether human or non-human:
The ecological field worker acquires a deep-seated respect, even 
veneration, for ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding 
from within, a kind of understanding that others reserve for fellow men 
and for a narrow section of ways and forms of life. To the ecological 
worker, the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and 
obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism 
with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves.26
25 Rothenberg, D. Introduction. Ecosophy T - from intuition to system. In Naess, A. Ecology, 
Community and Lifestyle: an outline o f  an ecosophy. Translated and revised by D.Rothenberg. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 3.
26 Naess, A. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: an outline o f  an ecosophy. Translated and revised by 
D. Rothenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 28.
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The eco-philosophy of Naess demands a non-anthropocentric approach to problems 
of the environment. Based on the science of ecology Naess believes that he can give 
a normative system -  an ecosophy -  that would govern the behaviour of humans so 
that they would act within the natural processes of the environment. This he calls 
‘deep ecology’ which he puts in opposition to ‘shallow ecology’. ‘Shallow ecology’, 
more recently named ‘light green ecology’, is based on the acceptance of 
anthropocentrism although encouraging concern for the environment. The 
environment should be cared for but only by taking into account the needs of humans. 
Naess is scornful of this attitude as are all environmentalists who accept deep ecology. 
Katz explains the deep ecologist’s position:
These shallow policies attempt to reform human activity regarding 
the environment without instigating a systematic change in human 
behaviour, attitudes or institutions. Deep ecology, on the other hand, 
offers a normative critique of human activity and institutions and 
seeks a fundamental change in the dominant worldview and social 
structure of modernity.
Naess rejects anthropocentrism and gives intrinsic value to non-humans:
The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life 
on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, 
inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness 
of the non-human world for human purposes.28
27 Katz, E. et al. ‘Introduction: deep ecology as philosophy’ in Katz, E. et al.eds. Beneath the Surface: 
critical essays in the philosophy o f  deep ecology. Cambridge: MIT, 2000. p.ix.
28 Naess, A. ‘The Deep Ecological Movement: some philosophical aspects’ in Light and Rolston, 2003. 
op. cit. p. 264.
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If I can digress, a word here needs to be said about the concepts of 
anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism as well as the related terms of ‘intrinsic 
value’ and ‘instrumental value’. Holistic type environmental philosophers lay the 
blame of environmental problems on an anthropocentric approach to nature: 
environmental problems have been caused by human-centred activity. Their 
argument is that we need to have a non-anthropocentric approach to nature, that we 
should move beyond caring only for humans and their needs and care also for all 
living things or even both living and non-living things on earth. This leads to the 
argument of instrumental value versus intrinsic value. If humans are the centres of 
concern then it is obvious that the things of nature only have instrumental value. But 
for holistic environmental philosophers this is not enough, because some reason must 
be given to value nature beyond just human needs. The term ‘intrinsic value’ is then 
introduced. ‘Intrinsic value’ means that any such thing, living or non-living, that has 
intrinsic value is valued for itself and not just instrumentally.
The lengthy discussions on intrinsic value reveal that it is not a simple term.
Its definition for anyone is linked to fundamental beliefs, so that often the term is used 
is many different ways in philosophical texts. Not only does this cause confusion, but 
often the same philosopher will use the term ‘intrinsic value’ with different senses 
within the same text. John O’Neill in his article ‘The Varieties of Intrinsic Value’ 
helps reveal the complexities of the term. The use of ‘intrinsic value’ he says is an 
example of the fallacy of equivocation:
The term ‘intrinsic value’ is used in at least three different basic
Senses:
1. Intrinsic value(l) Intrinsic value is used as a synonym for non­
instrumental value...
2. Intrinsic value (2) Intrinsic value is used to refer to the value an 
object has solely in virtue of its ‘intrinsic properties’...
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3. Intrinsic value (3) Intrinsic value is used as a synonym for
‘Objective value’ ie. value that an object possess independently of 
the valuation of valuers.29
I would suggest that ‘intrinsic value’ as defined by O’Neill in the second sense is the 
only legitimate sense. ‘Intrinsic value’ should not be equated with ‘objective value’ 
for there could be things that can have objective value in nature without them having 
intrinsic value. Further, to claim that the things of nature should not only have 
instrumental value does not lead to them having intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is a 
term with a stronger meaning than that of one merely equivalent to non-instrumental 
value.
The legitimate use of ‘intrinsic value’ would be to indicate that an object has 
something ‘solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties’, coupled with Callicott’s 
definition that it indicates the goodness of something independent of any 
consciousness that might value it. But this needs explaining. What things in the world 
have properties that would give them value in themselves? We can say this of 
humans. This was not always so, for slaves were humans that had instrumental vqlue 
and were not valued in themselves. But we now hold that all humans have intrinsic 
value that gives them particular rights. Humans should be valued for themselves even 
if this is not always put in practice. This gives them moral standing.
However, this move is easy for humans, because we are self-conscious beings 
who are value-makers, but it is more difficult to give intrinsic value to non-humans. 
For the question is whether intrinsic value is an objective value that can be
29 O’Neill, J. ‘The Varieties o f Intrinsic Value’ in Light and Rolston. 2003. op. cit. pp. 131-132.
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discovered, or whether it is one created by humans. There have been extensive 
debates about the origin of values:
This discussion of intrinsic value, however, inevitably raises a 
second question about the origin of value. Is it created by 
human beings, or is it something already in existence in the world, 
which human beings recognize rather than bring into being? Again 
this is a subject of great debate amongst environmental ethicists, 
sometimes called the dispute between value subjectivists and value 
objectivists . Value subjectivists argue that intrinsic value is 
something which humans create and attach to their own lives, the 
lives of other people, and/or to particular states of affairs (such as 
pleasure or, the avoidance of suffering) or perhaps to values such as 
harmony. Value objectivists, on the other hand, think that non­
instrumental value is not something which humans create, but 
something already in the world.30
The problem of value subjectivists is the return to human-centredness and thus 
becomes a form of anthropocentrism, which defeats the point of intrinsic values and 
the problem for value objectivists is how we should be able to recognise an intrinsic 
value, and what sort of thing or object it is? The facts of science do little to solve this 
problem. Callicott argues that although intrinsic values are anthropogenic (human 
created) they need not be anthropocentric: we can value things beyond ourselves. But 
in this case it does not appear that things can have intrinsic value. For if we decide 
the value then the things of nature do not have value within themselves.
Holmes Rolston is a value objectivist. He claims that values are in the things 
of nature that we discover. But then he claims a hierarchy of things that hold more 
value than other things and we are back to humans deciding what that hierarchy is. 
Too often when environmental philosophers give intrinsic value to non-humans they 
dilute the force of the term ‘intrinsic value’.
30 Palmer, op. cit. in Light and Rolston, 2003. op. cit.p. 17.
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But if ‘intrinsic value’ is defined in its strong sense, which I maintain is the 
only legitimate sense, in which intrinsic values are to do with intrinsic properties, 
there can be no hierarchy of those beings that possess intrinsic value. Something has 
intrinsic value or it has not. If it has intrinsic value then it has equal value to any 
other thing that has intrinsic value and therefore must be treated in an equal way. 
Humans have intrinsic value: it gives them moral status. All humans should be 
treated equally in regards to matters of morality. We cannot give this status to non­
humans. There will always be times when humans will need to control non-humans 
in some way, unless we can educate them to have a moral sense, and this seems 
unlikely. To avoid confusion it would be better to talk of non-instrumental value when 
applied to non-humans, although even this may be difficult. Thus we may value 
dolphins and cats for the sake of biodiversity or as if for themselves, but our attitude 
would change towards them if their numbers became excessive and harmful to our 
well-being, as for example feral cats in cities. The way we give value to nature may 
be instrumental at some level, even if this is aesthetic value, recreational value or 
spiritual value.
However, there is one way in which we can perceive the things of nature as 
having intrinsic value. The things of nature do have a good of their own kind, in the 
way that Rolston describes their creativity. As Rolston also points out, this cannot be 
a moral value because there is no morality in nature: the terms ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
cannot be applied to the behaviour of the things in nature. So the intrinsic value 
found in nature is not like that of humans where is does give a moral value because 
humans are moral agents as well as moral patients. Non-humans are moral patients 
but only within a system where their well-being is a part of human \yell-being. It is 
in the contemplafivp mode that we discover intrinsic value in nature, when we rise
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above the circumstances of our human lives and can empathize beyond ourselves. It 
is a god-like view of nature, for in the eyes of a creative God all the things of nature 
would have value. For our daily lives we may not be able to hold this viewpoint. 
Nevertheless the ability to see beyond our own concerns is an important element 
when we are forming an environmental ethic.
The terms ‘anthropocentric’ and ‘non-anthropocentric’ also have several 
different confusing meanings. Bryan Norton outlines the ambiguity of the term 
‘anthropocentric’:
Writers on both sides of the controversy apply this term to positions 
which treat humans as the only loci of intrinsic value. 
Anthropocentists are therefore taken to believe that every instance 
of value originates in a contribution to human values and that all 
elements of nature can, at most, have instrumental value to the 
satisfaction of human interests. Note that anthropocentrism is 
defined by reference to the position taken on loci of value. Some 
nonanthropocentrists say that human beings are the source of values, 
but they can designate nonhuman objects as loci of fundamental 
values.31
The ambiguity of the term ‘anthropocentrism’ arises, Norton says, because 
philosophers are approaching the problem from either a fe lt preference or a 
considered preference. Norton defines two forms of anthropocentrism:
It is now possible to define two forms of anthropocentrism.
A value theory is strongly anthropocentric if all value 
countenanced by it is explained by reference to satisfactions 
of felt preferences of human individuals. A value theory is 
weakly anthropocentric if all values countenanced by it is explained 
by reference to satisfaction of some felt preference of a human 
individual or by reference to its bearing upon the ideals which exist 
as elements in a world view essential to determination of considered 
preferences.32
31 Norton, B. ‘Enyirpfijpepto! Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism’ in Ibid. Light and Rolston. 2003. p.
164.
32 Ibid. p. 165.
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Norton goes on to explain how these two definitions affect actions on the part of 
humans towards nature:
Strong anthropocentrism, as here defined, takes unquestioned 
felt preferences of human individuals as determining value. 
Consequently, if humans have a strongly consumptive value 
system, then their ‘interests’ (which are taken as merely to be 
their felt preferences) dictate that nature will be used in an 
exploitative manner...
Weak anthropocentrism, on the other hand, recognize that felt 
preferences can be either rational or not (in the sense that they 
can be judged not consonant with a rational world view). Hence 
weak anthropocentrism provides a basis for criticism of value 
systems which are purely exploitative of nature.33
If Norton’s analysis is correct then philosophers who advocate non-anthropocentrism 
are defining ‘anthropocentrism’ in terms of ‘strong anthropocentrism’. But if we take 
‘anthropocentrism’ in the terms of ‘weak anthropocentrism’ then the move to non- 
anthropocentrism may not need to be taken, as within a weak anthropocentrism it is 
possible to have a value of nature that is other than purely instrumental as long as the 
values are subject to rational debate and within the boundaries of caring for nature. In 
fact it does appear that this is the move we need to take, as it does not seem possible 
to take a non-anthropocentric position, because wherever the attempt is made there is 
a need to safeguard the interests of humans or otherwise the conclusions are morally 
repugnant to humans. However, as with intrinsic value, the attempt to find a non- 
anthropocentric viewpoint of nature may be helpful in forming an environmental 
ethic.
33 Ibid. p. 165.
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It is not easy to escape anthropocentrism without down-grading the moral 
status of humans and a certain type of anthropocentrism so often appears within non- 
anthropocentric theories. I shall show now that even within the deep ecology of Arne 
Naess, the move to escape anthropocentrism does not succeed. Naess gives an 
explanation of human nature from an ecological perspective. His position is that the 
objective empirical observations of science should merge with personal values for a 
normative understanding that would direct actions:
The total view, then, is essentially a normative description of reality, 
an understanding of the world that merges objective empirical 
observations (scientific descriptions) and personal values. More 
specifically, a deep ecological total view would address the human 
relationship to the non-human natural world and connect this 
normative understanding directly to action; an individual’s 
total view should be the basis of all decisions regarding 
his or her life.34
The question is whether we can really apply a normative system across the whole of 
living things in the way Naess suggests, for we would find it difficult to apply this 
ecosophy to parasitic creatures. Naess himself realizes the faults in his own 
philosophy:
Equal rights to unfold potentials as a principle is not a practical 
norm about equal conduct towards all life forms. It suggests a 
guideline limiting killing, and more generally, limiting obstruction 
of the unfolding of potentialities in others.35
34Naess, 1989. op, pit. p xi
35 Ibid, p. 167.
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In other writings of Naess he gives a fuller outline on the limits of his ecosophy. 
However he can only do this by introducing a concept of hierarchy of value, which 
seems to subtract from his concept of equal rights.
Naess’ philosophy also includes the concepts of self-identification with nature 
and self-realization.. Many deep-ecologists follow Naess in their emphasis on this 
identification of humans with the whole of nature combined with the concept of self- 
realization. Their claim is that the changes that need to be made that influence human 
behaviour are not within an ethical level but at a metaphysical level. Freya Matthews 
puts forward her project as a metaphysical one as well as an ethical one:
My project, then, was to find a metaphysical and ethical 
expression for the intuition of ‘oneness’ and interconnectedness 
.. .environmental philosophy revealed the significance of the 
concept of ecology as both a metaphysical and ethical model, and 
in ecophilosophy, and particularly in the area of ecophilosophy 
known as ‘Deep Ecology’, all the ideas with which I had been 
working were pulled together, and their normative implications 
drawn out in some detail.36
In their emphasis on the metaphysical level I would probably agree with them, but 
their emphasis on ecology to guide their thinking seems to leave them in an ethical 
confusion. When they involve themselves at the metaphysical level they seem unable 
to escape a form of anthropocentrism and thus their claims of non-anthropocentrism is 
not justified. Naess’ concept of self-realization, on closer examination, is particularly 
a form of human self-interest. Richard Sylvan criticized this aspect of human self- 
interest in deep-ecology. He saw it as a result of the two concepts of humans in 
relation to nature, that of being a part of nature and also of being apart from nature.
36 Matthews, F. The Ecological Self. London: Routledge, 1991. p.3.
254
Although in support of a non-anthropocentric approach to nature, Katz argues that 
even deep ecologists fail to escape anthropocentrism when they advocate self- 
realization:
It seems clear, as the late Richard Sylvan pointed out in his criticism 
of deep ecology, that we should be wary of the entire notion of 
self-realization, for it has an anthropocentric history and pedigree. 
The goal of self-realization ‘emerges direct from the humanistic 
Enlightenment; it is linked to the modem celebration of the 
individual human, freed from service to higher demands, and also 
typically from ecological constraints’. Sylvan reminds us that the 
concept involves the maximation of egos, individual selves, or, at 
best, the privileged class of humanlike selves. Even the attempt 
to escape egoism, with the notion of a capital ‘S’ Self as a 
holistically extended super-self, succeeds only because we are 
identifying ourselves with the universe through an anthropocentric 
notion, a comparison to ourselves as individual human beings.37
We may conclude from these observations that even in an attempt to be non- 
anthropocentric, as in Naess’ deep ecology, humans may find it impossible to rid 
themselves of anthropocentricism. To seek freedom from an anthropocentric point of 
view may not be a satisfactory way to go.
Deep ecologists fall victim to the complexity of ideas today moulded equally 
by the ideas of science as well as of those of Continental thinking. From the point of 
view of science, the self is often taken to be a product of its genes and the 
environment, whereas within the Continental framework of thinking the self is fffe to 
form its own identification, to develop its own self-realization. Katz is right to point 
out that it is not possible for deep ecologists to escape anthropocentric thinking.
37 Katz, E. ‘Against the Inevitability o f  Anthropocentrism’ in Katz, E. et al. eds. 2000 op. cit. p. 35.
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Fox, a deep ecologist, lists the characteristics that were taken to underlie that 
claim that only humans have intrinsic value beginning with the Christian concept of 
soul:
.. .a special relationship with God, the possession of a soul rationality, 
self-awareness, free will, the capacity for symbolic 
communication, the capacity to enter into arrangements involving 
reciprocal duties or obligations, and the capacity to anticipate and 
symbolically represent the future ( and thereby to have knowledge of 
our own mortality38
The environmental philosophers who claim to be non-anthropocentric believe that 
intrinsic value should be given to non-humans. I have shown that a non- 
anthropocentric viewpoint is difficult to attain without some serious problems arising 
and perhaps a deep ecology is not a real possibility. And the giving of intrinsic value 
to non-humans may lead us into many problems of how to deal with the environment. 
However, it is certainly true that humans should and can become more caring about 
the environment instead of being exploitative. The danger of the claim for a non- 
anthropocentric position, as is claimed in deep ecology, is that those distinctions 
between humans and non-humans that Fox listed may be lost in the attempt to identify 
humans with the whole of nature. It may be those very distinctions that humans need 
for them to achieve an environmental ethics and to motivate people to have concern 
about the environment and care about nature. Although we need to acknowledge our 
dependence on nature, we also need to regard ourselves as quite different in order to 
prevent ourselves from being exploitative. Non-humans have an exploitative attitude 
to nature because they cannot reflect on their behaviour and decide ptherwise. We
38 Fox, W- Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: developing new foundations for environmentalism. 
Boston: Shambhala, 1990. pp. 151-152.
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need to be anthropocentric in Norton’s weak sense, so that we can use our reason to 
discover values in nature. To be able to discover these values we need to search for a 
way of understanding ourselves in a positive relationship to nature.
A theory that is totally science-informed is Lovelock’s Gaia theory. The Gaia 
theory is science-derivative with some insight but it is a theory that has major faults, 
particularly when followers of Lovelock have turned it into some form of mysticism. 
Lovelock claims that Gaia -  the earth and the biosphere combined -  is a living 
system:
The most important property of Gaia is the tendency to keep 
constant conditions for all terrestrial life.39
In this sentence Lovelock uses the term ‘property’ to keep the sense of a scientific 
theory. However, at some points of his work he animates Gaia and gives it purposeful 
action:
For the first of these characteristics, we have assumed that the Gaia 
world evolves through Darwinian natural selection, its goal b^ing 
the maintenance of conditions favourable for life in all 
circumstances, including variations in output from the sup fljyj 
from the planet’s own interior. We have in addition made die 
assumption that from its origins the human species has beep as 
much a part of Gaia as have all other species and that like them it 
has acted unconsciously in the process of planetary homoestasis.40
In this passage Gaia is given a ‘goal’, a word not usually used in scientific language. 
Humans are unconsciously a part of this ‘goal’. The use of the word ‘goal’ implies
39 Lovelock, J. Gaia: a new look at life on earth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.p. 119.
40 Ibid. p. 119.
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that Lovelock perceives Gaia as having conscious intentions although he probably did 
not mean that. Nevertheless it is the ‘goals’ of Gaia that are important and not any of 
those of humans. In this interpretation Lovelock firmly fixes humans as a part of 
nature and nothing but nature. He does wonder if humans have become ‘alienated’ 
from Gaia, but the implication is that any separation from being an unconscious part 
of the whole is not a positive event. Gaia has ‘needs’ and humans should not be 
acting against those ‘needs’. The earth is a superorganism, according to Lovelock, 
and as the personified Gaia she ‘seeks’ for the survival of all because everything is a 
part of her living being:
The history of the Earth’s climate is one of the most compelling 
arguments in favour of Gaia’s existence.. ..It may be that the 
natural negative feedback process of cloud formation or some other 
as yet unknown phenomenon would have preserved a regime at 
least tolerable for life, but if these fail-safe devices were not 
available, Gaia would have to learn by trial and error the art of 
controlling its environment, at first within broad bounds and 
later, as control was refined, by maintaining it near the optimum 
state of life.. .If we are prepared to consider Gaia as being able, 
like most living things, to adapt the environment to its needs, there 
are many ways in which these early critical climatic problems 
might have been solved.41
In this passage Lovelock uses words and phrases that are beyond normal science eg. 
Team by trial and error’ and ‘controlling’. This is when he takes the theory beyond 
scientific knowledge into the realms of the mystical, and he does it at the expense of 
humans who become only ‘bit players’ to the living being called Gaia. When 
described scientifically, Gaia could not be a conscious being, as Attfield remarks:
41 Ibid. p. 17 and p.23.
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For even, if, as the Gaia hypothesis requires, the biosphere should be 
regarded as a living organism, it is implausible that it is a conscious 
one.42
However, as the previous passages reveal, Lovelock does speak of Gaia as a 
conscious being. In fact, he then delegates humans to be the conscious part of Gaia. 
The consciousness, which is normally given only to humans, becomes, within the 
Gaia theory, the consciousness of Gaia that finds expression through humans.
If we are a part of Gaia it becomes interesting to ask:’To what 
extent is our collective intelligence also a part of Gaia? Do 
we as a species constitute a Gaia nervous system and a brain which 
can consciously anticipate environmental changes?’43
After claiming humans’ unconscious behaviour in Gaia’s interest, this is a clever way 
of putting humans’ consciousness back into the picture, albeit in the form of some sort 
of ‘brain cells’ for Gaia. This gives an extraordinary role for humans in a theory that 
becomes a mixture of science and mythology. It certainly cannot give any guidelines 
for human behaviour, for how are we to know when our thoughts are a part of the 
collective consciousness of Gaia or when they are misbehaving, as they ipqst be when 
they lead to the destruction of the environment? Or is our destruction of the 
environment as we know it part of Gaia’s plans for her future?
There is a tendency towards mysticism within holistic accounts of nature. 
Sometimes this mystical side is reached inadvertently as in Lovelock’s theory of Gaia. 
Arne Naess also tends towards the mystical. Information from science becomes
42 Attfield, R. Environmental Philosophy: principles and prospects. Aldershot: Avebury, 1994. p. 123.
43 Lovelock, 1995. op. cit. p. 139.
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turned into a new religion. Naess’ recommendation for humans to identify with all of 
nature has a religious, mystical tendency:
The ecosophical outlook is developed through an identification 
so deep that one’s own self is no longer adequately delimited 
by the personal ego or the organism. One experiences oneself to 
be a genuine part of life..
We are not outside of the rest of nature and therefore cannot do 
with it as we please without changing ourselves...
My concern here is the human capability of identification, the 
human joy in the identification with [for example] the salmon on 
its way to its spawning grounds; and the sorrow felt upon the 
thoughtless reduction of the access to such important places.. 
When solidarity and loyalty are solidly anchored in identification, 
they are not experiences as moral demands; they come of 
themselves.44
Naess dismisses morality as such because, to his mind, the identification that is 
experienced makes all intellectual moral thought redundant. This theory of 
identification would make practical living for humans extremely difficult. Other deep 
ecologists also follow Naess’ concept of identification, sometimes leading to 
excessive expressions. Fox, who as a deep ecologist is sympathetic to these 
expressions, quotes Robert Aitkin:
Deep ecology requires openness to the black bear, becoming 
truly intimate with the black bear, so that honey dribbles down 
your fur as you catch the bus to work.45
Although deep ecologists claim that identification frees humans frojp 
anthropocentrism, this excessive form of identification seems a form of
44 Napss, 1989. op. cit. p. 174
45 Fox, 1990. op. cit. p. 239.
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anthropomorphism: a human arrogance that assumes that the experience of another 
animal can be understood in a human way.
Callicott’s sociobiological environmental ethics also leads to a strong 
identification of humans with nature. This similarly leads to a questionable ethical 
position as I argued earlier. Fox, a deep ecologist, describes the sociobiological basis 
for identification of humans with non-humans:
Sociobiologists would claim that evolutionary advantage (in terms 
of the continuation of an organisms own genotype) that is conferred by 
this strategy provides a biological basis for the psychological 
experience of identification with other entities. Moreover, it is even 
possible for sociobiologists to claim that this evolutionary strategy is 
able to accommodate a positive concern for the wider environment, 
since a habitable environment is necessary for the continuation of an 
organism’s genetic lineage.46
But Fox is critical of this type of identification:
However, in strict sociobiological terms, such a concern must 
generally run last in terms of any particular organism’s 
immediate personal preferences and priorities for the obvious 
reason that the idea of inclusive fitness invests primary 
importance in the survival of the organism’s closest kin, the 
organism’s next closest kin and so on, in that order 47
In fact Callicott’s explanation of morality has deeper problems than Fox outlines here, 
as I have argued. Any science-informed theory, where a holistic account is attempted, 
begins to lose the important aspects of ethical theories. Frederick Ferre points out the
46 Ibid. p. 264.
47 Ibid. p. 265.
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dangers of this strong identification of humans to nature and argues for the need to 
accept the difference of humans from nature:
The very conviction, however, that our species is wicked, deplorable 
selfish, heedless of our larger moral responsibilities to the earth, makes 
it impossible to maintain in any simple way that the human species is 
in every respect just a ‘plain member and citizen’ of the biotic 
community. Our species is distinguished from all others by standing 
under moral obligations not to be wicked, selfish and heedless. There 
is no known species other than the human to which it makes sense 
to preach self restraint, sacrifice of species advantage or limitation 
of growth.48
I would agree with him. It is with the idea of moral obligations that humans must 
necessarily conceive of themselves as different in kind rather than degree from non­
humans. It is interesting that Naess and others of the deep ecological position believe 
that morals become irrelevant in a world of identification. For a sociobiologist like 
Callicott morals become debased to ‘correct values’ for survival. This makes 
nonsense of morality which is concerned with values beyond survival. The attraction 
of the non-human world is that it is amoral, that all that happens in the non-human 
world is outside of moral evaluation. But humans are importantly not qmoral.
Humans need to be moral agents, judging their own behaviour and events in nature as 
being right or wrong. I am thinking here of the lion hunting his prey, or the 
destruction caused by hurricanes and earthquakes which are acts within nature and 
can not in themselves be right or wrong but only in the eyes of humans. Humans are 
separate from nature because of their ability to make moral judgements and it is this 
very separation that is important for solving problems of the environment. The 
identification with nature as recommended by science-informed environmental
48 Ferr£, F. Being and Value: towards a constructive postmodern metaphysics. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996. pp. 299-300.
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philosophies would not be helpful. Science-informed theories often seem to 
undermine the power of human moral discourse.
Environmental philosophers who attempt a non-anthropocentric account of 
values in nature fail to achieve their goal as well as developing ethical theories that 
are problematical. Other science-informed environmental philosophers accept an 
anthropocentric view of nature. They then conclude that the non-human natural world 
can be seen as having value instrumentally to humans. These values can be aesthetic 
and spiritual as well as physical. The question then is whether aesthetic and spiritual 
values are instrumental or not. In a sense they are instrumental because humans are 
using nature as a means to have an aesthetic or spiritual experience. However, in the 
contemplative mode these experiences would only occur because nature was seen to 
have intrinsic value beyond any values humans hold. In the contemplative mode 
nature would be seen as God’s creation having value in God’s eyes. This 
contemplative mode may also arise from a wonder of there being life at all, much in 
the way Wilson describes his ‘spiritual’ experiences.
An anthropocentric science-informed view of environmental ethics would 
maintain that humans should manage resources carefully. The acceptance of an 
anthropocentric view of values in nature avoids all the downfall of the attempt to find 
non-anthropocentric values. However, when this type o f environmental philosophy is 
only informed by science it can overlook many aspects of nature that are not 
immediately seen as instrumentally valuable to humans. It is often concerned mainly 
with sustainability and thereby turns nature into a mere resource for future 
generations, a particular type o f attitude towards nature that initially environmental 
philosophers were trying to aypid- This is particularly true when a parwinian 
explanation of hvpp^ps is accepted within a metaphysical materialism. Individual
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survival becomes the only motivation and this has disastrous consequences for the 
environment. To avoid the resource type attitude that can appear in theories of 
sustainability, a different type of metaphysics may be required.
The many conflicting strands of thought in environmental philosophy have 
turned some environmental philosophers to pragmatism and moral pluralism. 
Although these philosophers may have been influenced first of all by science, the way 
they now approach environmental ethics comes under the sway of postmodernism. I 
shall be dealing with their work in the next chapter.
It would seem impossible to begin any type of environmental discourse 
without scientific information. Eric Katz outlines this necessity to take ecological 
sciences into account for any environmental philosophy:
Rolston..is a clear example as are Callicott and Brennan, among the 
ecocentric and holistic environmental philosophers who are not 
considered members of the deep ecology movement. Even Paul 
Taylor, who bases his theory of environmental ethics on the respect 
for individual living beings -  and thus is not an ecocentric holist -  
uses basic ecological facts -  what he calls ‘the great lessons of the 
science of ecology’ -  on a fundamental principle of his ‘biocentric 
worldview’... all serious environmental philosophy -  whether or not 
they advocate deep ecology -  must find a central place for the science 
of ecology in the development of their thought. To deny the truths of 
ecology -  particularly the facts of the interdependence of systematic 
relationships of organisms and environment -  would immediately 
discredit the philosophical position as naive and out of touch with 
reality. An environmental philosophy that did not recognize ecological 
science would be unacceptable, irrelevant to the environmental crisis 
that surrounds us.49
Katz states that any philosophical position that was not based on the science of 
ecology as regards the environment would be ‘out of touch with reality’. This is
49Katz. op. cit. in Katz. 2000 op. cit. p. 30.
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obviously true, but the point at issue in an environmental ethics is how far should 
science be relied on when it comes to decisions that involve matters of value. It is not 
true that science has all the answers. Science-informed environmental ethics have 
many difficulties in forming a system of morality that would motivate people to care 
for the environment.
The problem with the ethical theories is the metaphysics on which they build. 
Much that is written in environmental philosophy is based on a metaphysics that is 
reductionist materialism. Roy Bhaskar regards this a feature of what he calls 
modernism:
The final feature that I would like draw attention to is its materialism. 
This may sound slightly shocking to some because in many quarters 
materialism is regarded as a well-worked out philosophical concept.
I do not think it is a well worked-out philosophical concept but we can 
go on to that later. But typically the modernists assumed a 
reductionist materialism. They intended to undervalue the role of 
ideas, of consciousness, of intentionality in human life. Of course, 
when you do that you eliminate the difference between the human and 
the non-human. You take away everything that is truly characteristic 
of the human world which has to be understood as agentive, that is 
as involving human agency, presupposing intentionality, and thus 
consciousness and ideation.5
Science-informed environmental philosophy could be included in Bhaskar’s definition 
of modernism. Bhaskar contrasts this acceptance o f certain features of modernism 
with postmodernism. Those who wish to lessen the difference between human and 
non-human within environmental thinking accept some form of materialism even if 
not reductive materialism. Science, taken alone as a source o f knowledge, encourages 
this form of thinking. Humans are then included in nature and not jqst at an organic
50 Bhaskar, R. Reflections on Meta-reality: transcendence, emancipation and everyday life. New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002. p.31.
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level but even at a mechanical level, where the laws of classic physics become 
ultimately the dominant mode o f all thinking. I will now turn from the perspective of 
a science-informed environmentalism, to types of environmental philosophy 
influenced by postmodernism.
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Chapter 2
Postmodernism and its Influence on Environmental Philosophy
The development of postmodernism from Continental philosophy has been 
outlined earlier in this thesis. Within it are strands of different types of philosophical 
movements: structuralism, post-structuralism and deconstructionism and social 
constructionism. Also pragmatism and pluralism can be included in this broad 
category. It is difficult to link all these movements together, but there are some 
common themes and they result in the one prevalent movement today of 
postmodernism itself.
Whereas the science-informed environmental philosophers accept scientific 
realism, postmodern environmental philosophers accept the postmodern scepticism of 
the concept of ‘reality’. Science assumes a common reality that it is possible to know. 
Only in the realms of quantum mechanics are there questions about that reality. But 
the postmodernist trend within many areas o f philosophy casts doubts on the concept 
of a common reality, and the word ‘reality’ is often only used between quotation 
marks. This scepticism about reality has its roots in both Continental philosophy and 
the philosophy of Wittgenstein and those who have been influenced by him. Since 
Wittgenstein many philosophers have affirmed that humans understand their world, 
and their relation to the world, through language. A postmodernist would agree that it 
is only through language that we can understand the world. An environmental 
philosopher within the postmodernist trend says:
After Wittgenstein, reality is a word that increasingly finds 
itself between quotation marks...
J-fumans, regardless of place or time, can never stand outside 
language to offer descriptions to each other of the thing itself
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(although they often claim to do so.)
So stated the linguistic turn appears to entail a new paradigm, that is 
a reflexive comprehension of language that has consequences across 
all areas of human endeavor, including science, religion and 
philosophy. Language is more and more seen as ontogenetic, that is 
as constitutive of the meaningful world that humans inhabit, and less 
seen as representative o f an independent reality. Science itself is 
viewed as a form of discourse through which our society typically 
constructs its picture of the world, the things in the world, and the 
relations among the things in the world, including our own 
ecosocial processes of production and reproduction.1
In this school of thought, the information gained from science is influenced by social 
structures as well as by subjective interpretation.
Environmental philosophers who work within this framework understand that 
any decisions to be made about the environment are at first reliant on the kind of 
social structures that are existing and the language that is used, and this includes the 
language used in science and the various descriptions of nature through science. They 
believe that the concept of nature, as inherited from the past, must be deconstructed 
and then reconstructed in a new way. New language should be used to encourage a 
more positive attitude towards the environment. Environmental philosophers within 
postmodernism are influenced by what Oelschlaeger terms ‘the so-called linguistic 
turn’. Oeschlaeger claims that science as well has brought about the ‘linguistic turn’:
Paradoxically, it may seem, my approach to postmodern 
environmental ethics begins with the scientific revolution 
and its consequences for the theory of language. My 
rationale is simple: no adequate description of postmodern 
environmental ethics can be given apart from language. 
Modem science has had an enormous effect on the way in 
which language is conceptualised. Indeed, it can be claimed 
that modem spjpnce engendered the so-called linguistic turn.
1 Oelschlaeger, M. ‘Introduction’ in Oelschlaeger, M. ed. Postmodern Environmental Ethics.. 
Albany : State University o f New York, 1995. p.5
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Thus modem science has also had an enormous effect on 
postmodern environmental ethics, since it explicitly takes the 
linguistic turn.2
Oelschlaeger views quantum theory and the theory of indeterminacy as unravelling 
the modem view of science to a postmodern view where the natural world is 
understood as processes and that the most basic or atomic level of reality is 
indeterminate. Postmodernism is therefore influenced by the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum theory with its belief that scientific discoveries are 
influenced by human consciousness, both at the level of subjective perceptions as well 
as social movements. Kuhn’s interpretation of science whereby scientists work within 
a particular social practice is therefore accepted without question.
Oelschlaeger criticizes the modernist use of scientific language as placing 
humans apart from nature. However, I have argued that with the acceptance of 
evolutionary theory as providing a total explanation of humans, as in evolutionary 
psychology, humans are considered as a part of nature in every respect. 
Postmodernism, with its linguistic turn, leads to an understanding of humans as apart 
from nature, or, at least, nature is subject to human interpretation. Postmodernist 
environmental philosophers would disagree with me as they interpret humans as 
‘embedded’ in nature and therefore humans are a part of nature, as I explained earlier. 
Oelschlaeger as a constructive postmodernist believes that the solution to 
environmental problems would be to construct a new language different from the 
present scientific language that scientists use within the modernist framework. But 
the question that a postmodern environmental philosopher needs to ask is how can 
they accept any of the theories of science. Oelschlaeger accepts evolutionary theory:
2 Ibid. p. 2.
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With the rise of evolutionary thinking and nonlinear 
thermodynamics, some members of the scientific community 
came to believe that the cosmos was better described in 
Heraclitean terms than in Parmenidean terms. A number of 
philosophers, including C.S. Pierce, Henri Bergson and Alfred 
North Whitehead, can be read as being among the postmodern 
avant guard, that is as initiating a sustained critique of the 
modem worldview and affirming an alternative or postmodern 
worldview.3
These philosophers accept a theory o f science in order to reconstruct a new 
worldview. If postmodernists understand science as finding information within 
cultural constructions, it is difficult to accept how they can base their worldviews on 
any scientific theory. However, a postmodernist would claim that what science holds 
as ‘true’ has some existence but lies at the boundary of the subjective and the 
objective. The difficulty then arises o f how we can separate the subjective from the 
objective. It is this type o f thinking that leads postmodern environmental 
philosophers to use the term 4 worldview’ rather than seek to find an underlying 
‘reality’ for the solution to environmental problems. The term ‘worldview’ implies 
that humans are constructing their own realities, much like primitive people created 
myths.
With the emphasis on culture and context, the postmodernists understand the 
concept of nature in a different way from science-informed philosophers. They deny 
that the concept of nature is formed from the experience of an objective reality. 
Instead they believe that ‘nature’, as it is understood now, is the result of historical 
and cultural influences. What is understood as ‘nature’, or as ‘natural’, is interpreted
3 Ibid. p. 3.
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as being formed by dominant power groups within society and their influence on 
thinking:
Since ‘progressive culture’ has constantly re-thought the limits it 
has imposed on what is ‘natural’ or ‘proper’ to human beings and 
their society, the use of ‘nature’, as if it referred to an independent 
and permanent order of reality embodies a kind of error, as failure 
to register the history of the legitimating function it has played 
in human culture. From this ‘culturist’ perspective then, ‘nature’ 
is a kind of self-denying concept through which what is culturally 
ordained is presented as pre-discursive external determination upon 
that culture.4
This historic and cultural perspective influences many writers in environmental 
philosophy, sometimes when they are even trying to escape the dilemma caused by 
postmodernist thought. Postmodern thinking has affected the way people perceive 
information. It is often seen as socially and politically constructed so that it may be 
difficult even to reach a popular acceptance that there is an environmental crisis to 
begin with. Arran Gare, although trying to escape the postmodernist situation, speaks 
of a ‘definitive social construct’ of the environmental crisis:
As yet, there is no definitive social construct of the environmental 
crisis. The mass media presents one image of the global 
environmental crisis, scientific journals another, while economic 
journals scarcely recognize any but minor problems which can be 
solved by the proper functioning of the market. Scientists, economists 
and business leaders in the USA have dismissed environmentalists 
as cranks, while many political leaders in Third World countries 
see the claims of environmentalists as nothing more than as effort 
to prevent Third World countries sharing the benefits of 
industrialization. The majority of the world’s population have no 
conception of a global environmental crisis at all.5
4 Soper, K. What is Nature? Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. pp. 33-34.
5 Gare, A Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis. London: Routledge, 1995. p.73.
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Gare points out that within a postmodernist perspective one cannot present one 
solution to this situation. First of all, it is necessary to decide which position is most 
nearly reflecting a ‘true’ position, and whether there is an environmental crisis and not 
just one culturally created for the benefit of any groups within society. This type of 
thinking makes it almost impossible to even begin an environmental ethic.
A postmodern environmental philosopher tackles the problems of the 
environment by deconstructing the socio-economic power complexes of the modem 
world and reconstructing a new ‘narrative’ to describe humans and their relationship 
to nature. However, although they see the need of constructing new ‘worldviews’ or 
‘narratives’, at the same time they are opposed to all ‘totalizing narratives’. They 
reject the total view approach and so are wary of environmentalists who dictate a 
particular foundational solution to environmental problems. Postmodernists in 
general are in support of difference and not of universalization. Therefore, 
postmodern environmental philosophers do not accept the holistic theories of deep 
ecologists, and reject ‘Cartesian certitude’ as is found in the thinking of 
environmental philosophers influenced by sociobiology. They are opposed to 
globalization and therefore are against the solutions offered by science-informed 
philosophers in general, being in favour of diversity and ambiguity, as well as 
plurality. All globalizing claims are suspect:
...poststructuralists are suspicious of all such globalizing claims 
and are more concerned to deconstruct all claims to a privileged 
stand-point. To gain any perspective on the environmental crisis, 
and to evaluate these different responses, all that can be done is 
to examine and then contrast the various stances on the issue.6
6 Ibid. p.74.
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The opposition to ‘totalizing’ as well as the emphasis on language is exemplified in 
Jim Cheney’s work. Language, for him, is a way of manipulating the world around 
us. He is opposed to ‘totalizing language’ because he believes it undermines the 
individual and his/her experiences:
The effect of totalising language is to assimilate the world to it. 
Totalizing language provides an abstract understanding that cuts 
through individual differences when these are irrelevant to its 
purposes.7
Totalizing language is the result o f one culture having power over others and 
superimposing their ‘worldview’ on individuals outside the dominant culture:
The possibility o f totalising, colonizing discourse arises from 
the fact that concepts and theories can be abstracted ffom their 
paradigm settings and applied elsewhere. Although these 
abstractions are frilly intelligible only within the paradigm setting 
which gave birth to them, such abstractions achieve a life of their 
own; they can be articulated in accordance with canons of coherence 
and made into apparently self-contained wholes ready for export 
and application to a variety of situations. The situations to which 
a theory is deemed applicable, however, are specified within the 
theory, by the theory as articulated in abstraction from its
• # oparadigm setting.
The result is that the totalising language constructs the view of nature without taking 
into account those individuals who experience nature in different ways. Cheney 
follows the postmodernist’s emphasis on contextual language. Contextual language is 
language used in specific places by the people there. Cheney incorporates within his
7 Cheney, J. ‘Postmodern Environmental Ethics: ethics as a bioregional narrative’ in Oelschlaeger, 
1995. op. cit. p. 26.
8 Ibid. pp. 25-26.
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thinking some of Heidegger’s existentialism. The world is formed through human 
beings who are within the world. In rejecting totalising language, Cheney believes 
that contextual language should be used in dealing with environmental problems 
rather than totalising language:
Within the geography of human landscape the contextual 
voice can emerge in clarity and health through a ‘constant 
recontextualizing’ which prevents the oppressive and 
distorting overlays of cultural institutions (representing a 
return of the repressed) from gathering false, distorting, and 
unhealthy identities out of the positive desire for unity, for 
Oneness’.9
Any total view of the world, using totalising language, assimilates the world to it, and 
so contextual language, that is, language used about specific places and peoples, 
needs to be used in environmental matters. This approach also influences postmodern 
ethical theories in general. They criticize modem ethical theory as linguistically 
naive, maintaining that ethics in general and as applied to environmental thinking is 
situated in language, and that due notice should be taken of linguistic context and the 
socially dominant form of narrative. Change can be brought about by discourse:
We in the postmodernist West are only beginning to see such 
possibilities in language. Postmodernism makes possible for 
us the conception of language conveying an understanding of 
self, world, and community which is consciously tuned to, and 
shaped by, considerations of the health and well-being of individual, 
community, and land and our ethical responsibilities to each. This 
postmodernist possibility is an actuality in the world of tribal 
myth and ritual.10
9 Ibid. p.33.
10 Ibid. p.28.
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But the problem with this restriction to the local means that there can be no overall 
view of what needs to be done for the environment as a whole. Many have 
recognized the fact that the problems o f the environment are of a globed nature and 
this is why Arran Gare advises that a ‘grand narrative’ for the environment should be 
constructed. This would be unacceptable to most postmodernists.
Postmodern environmental philosophers lay the blame on the values of the 
Renaissance, Humanism and the Enlightenment for the problems of the environment. 
Authority figures and intellectuals o f these times have ‘silenced’ nature. They use 
Foucault’s analysis of social power as the basis for their arguments:
To regard nature as alive and articulate has consequences in the 
realm of social practices. It conditions what passes for knowledge 
about nature and how institutions put that knowledge to use. 
Michel Foucault has amply demonstrated that social power 
operates through a regime of privileged speakers, having 
historical embodiments as priests and kings, authors, intellectuals, 
and celebrities. The words of these speakers are taken seriously 
(as opposed to the discourse of ‘meaningless’ and often silenced 
speakers such as women, minorities, children, prisoners, and the 
insane). For human societies of all kinds, moral consideration 
seems only to fall within a circle of speakers in communication 
with one another. We can, thus, safely agree with Hans Peter 
Duerr when he says that ‘people do not exploit a nature that speaks 
to them’. Regrettably, our culture has gone a long way to 
demonstrate that the converse of this statement is also true.11
They attack the humanist for marginalizing nature and causing it to be ‘silent’, in 
Manes’ expression. For a postmodern environmental philosopher the solutions of 
science-informed environmental philosophers have not gone beyond the concerns of 
the rational human subject and therefore are not successful:
11 Manes, C. ‘Nature and Silence’ in Ibid. pp. 43-44.
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By neglecting the origin of this silence in the breakdown of 
animism, the humanist critics of deep ecology reiterate a 
a discourse that by its very logocentrism marginalizes nature, 
mutes it, pushes it into a hazy backdrop against which the 
rational human subject struts upon the epistemological stage.
It has become almost a platitude in modem philosophy since 
Kant that reason (as an institutional motif, not a cognitive 
faculty) is intimately related to the excesses of political power 
and self-interest. As Foucault puts it, ‘we should not need to wait for 
bureaucracy or concentration camps to recognize the existence 
of such relations’. The easy alliance of power and reason that 
sustains those institutions involved in environmental destruction
•  19also sustains their discourses.
The conclusion of Manes is to take away from humans the concept that they take 
centre stage within the natural world. The concept of ‘Man’ in the Humanist sense 
should be removed and humans should understand themselves as ‘homo sapiens’, one 
species among many. However, by doing so they are removing those very 
characteristics of humans that have led them, first of all to be aware of the damage to 
the environment, and secondly to contemplate the role of humans towards nature. We 
need both rationality and power in order to control nature at a suitable level for the 
benefit of both ourselves and all other species.
Turning to the issues of how humans are to value nature, postmodern 
environmental philosophers are opposed to moral monism. They do not accept that 
the same moral principles can apply to all things in nature. Thus they advocate moral 
pluralism:
The alternative conception toward which I have been inviting 
discussion, what I call moral pluralism, takes exception to 
monism point by point. It refuses to presume that all ethical 
activities (evaluating acts, actors, social institution, rules, 
states of affairs, etc.) are in all contexts (in normal interpersonal 
relations, across large spaces and many generations, between species)
12 Ibid. p. 44.
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determined by the same features (intelligence, sentience, capacity 
for emotions, life) or even that they are subject, in each case, to the 
same overarching principles (utilitarianism, Kantianism, 
nonmaleficence, etc.). Pluralism invites us to conceive the 
intellectual activities of which morals consist as being partitioned 
into several distinct frameworks, each governed by its own 
appropriate principles.13
In arguing for moral pluralism, the postmodernist environmental philosopher is 
criticizing much of the philosophy of those who work within the scientific framework. 
Many of those philosophers have been attempting to find one principle to guide our 
actions towards nature, such as the land ethic of Leopold or the identification of deep 
ecology. Moral pluralism appears in general ethics and is a reaction to the confusion 
of many conflicting schools of thought within ethics. However, moral pluralism has 
the problem of when to use which set of principles. As in much postmodernist 
thought it leads towards more fracturing of the social framework. Environmental 
ethics, as in any other area of ethics, demands an all-embracing principle to guide all 
humans across all cultures.
Moral pluralism also appears in the philosophy of pragmatists. Rorty, a neo­
pragmatist, takes on a form of scepticism as regards philosophy in general. He 
accepts pluralism:
In this spirit of chastened pluralism, we may conclude this section 
with a reflection on Richard Rorty’s dictum that our current age 
of troubled transition has finally come to the ‘end of philosophy’. 
The effort to reconstruct philosophy is futile, he argues, since the 
correspondence of thought with reality is untestable and coherence 
unattainable. The wise neopragmatist attitude would be to accept the 
incommensurability of problems, affirm pluralism live without 
the ‘rage to Qffjpr’ the universe in all-embracing perspectives.14
13 Stone, C. D. ‘Moral Pluralism’ in Ibid. p. 250.
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The pragmatist environmental philosopher accepts ‘the incommensurability of 
problems’ and denies the possibility of one moral principle in environmental ethics, 
and embraces pluralism. Their concern is to move from theoretical debates and be 
able to engage in the practical resolution of environmental problems. They feel that 
the endless theoretical debates within environmental philosophy slow down the 
process of change in the practical world. They advocate the need to place practical 
issues of policy consensus at the forefront of environmental philosophy.
Andrew Light and Eric Katz describe two types of pluralism for 
environmental pragmatists: theoretical pluralism and metatheoretical pluralism:
Theoretical pluralism is the acknowledgement of distinct 
incommensurable bases for direct moral consideration.
One example of this theoretical distinction would be a position 
which holds a concern for the moral consideration of different 
individual animals, based on both Peter Singer’s criteria of 
sentience and Paul Taylor’s criterion of respect for all teleological 
centres of life.
Metatheoretical pluralism involves an openness to the plausibility 
of divergent ethical theories working together in a moral enterprjse- 
as both ecofeminist and ecological holists can work towards the 
preservation of the same natural habitats, based on different 
foundational claims.15 ...........
While it is laudable to encourage all who have a concern for the environment to be 
able to work together, it is still important to discover some basic foundation on which 
all environmental decisions could be founded. Although a number of different 
positions can be held towards the environment, at the practical level there will
14 Ferre, F. Being and Value: toward a constructive postmodern metaphysics. Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1996. p. 283.
15 Light, A. and Katz, E. Environmental Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 1996. p.4.
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inevitably occur at some point a clash of values. The theoretical work needs to 
continue.
Anthony Weston argues that environmental ethics is at an ‘originary’ stage, a 
time when there is an evolution in the area of values for the environment alongside of 
new social practice. At this point in time there should be an open-ended inquiry and a 
time for experimentation in the expression and language of environmental thought:
A pluralistic project is far more tolerant and inclusive. Indeed 
it is surely an advantage of the sort of umbrella conception of 
environmental ethics I am supporting here that nearly all the 
current approaches may find a place in it.16
This is also laudable, as long as the ‘umbrella conception of environmental ethics’ is 
not accepted indefinitely, but only until such a time as a complete view is better 
understood. There is a feeling of world weariness in these accounts as though there 
could not be a way of humans able to relate to nature in one way, and indeed 
pragmatists would not accept that there was one particular vision of nature that was 
correct.
Environmental pragmatists are influenced by American pragmatism. Kelly 
Parker outlines the major characteristics of pragmatists’ theories about the world:
There is an irreducible pluralism  in the world we encounter.
There is the idea (supported by contemporary physics) that 
indeterminacy and chance are real features of the world. Change 
development and novelty are everywhere the rule...
Pragmatism, then, sees the reality as process and development, 
and sees beings as relationally defined centers of meaning rather 
than as singular entities that simply stand alongside qqq another 
in the world- It emphasizes not substantial beings, but interrelations,
16 Ibid. p. 156.
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connectedness, transactions and entanglements as constitutive of 
reality.17
There are some strongly postmodernist elements in Kelly’s thinking, particularly the 
acceptance of indeterminacy and chance from the Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum physics, and connectedness and entanglements. Values are a part of ever- 
changing processes and all values emerge in experience. What is good is understood 
as the interaction of the experiencing organism with its environment. Therefore there 
can be no laws, because every situation is different and a pragmatist accepts that 
reactions are different in each situation. Only past experiences give us direction and 
this is uncertain:
After many trips through the swamp, we arrive at the means 
that serve best.18
It is a rather ad hoc way of finding value, and without too much reflection.
For an environmental pragmatist, the environment is a part of us and we are a 
part of the environment. A pragmatist asks what aspects of an environment give us 
valuable experience. Also there is the question of what relationship should we have 
to the environment, because all things are related. Pragmatists support moral 
pluralism in environmental ethics because they emphasize the differences in moral 
situations. There are many kinds of entities and possible relations among them, so 
that there are many varieties of values and hence many different conflicts to be 
resolved. There is irreducible pluralism in the world so that pragmatists accept
17 Parker, K. ‘Pragmatism and Environmental Thought’ in Ibid. p. 24.
18 Ibid. p. 26.
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anthropocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism within environmental ethics. They 
accept that each theory held on its own is problematical, so they advise that all should 
be accepted and apply which ever relevant one to a situation when necessary: 
sometimes the individual is important; sometimes the whole biosystem.
The general effect of the theories of pragmatism in environmental ethics is that 
not much has been worked out at all. There is an impression that the thinkers are 
overwhelmed by the particulars of the world and are not able to perceive universal 
patterns. There is not an underlying metaphysics that can link all the aspects they 
accept.
Roy Bhaskar is critical of postmodernism and his criticism could apply to 
environmental philosophy influenced by postmodernism. He describes the main 
points of postmodernism:
First of all postmodernism highlights what I will call epistemic 
relativity. That is, there is an emphasis on difference, relativity 
and pluralism.. .for postmodernists an understanding of the truth 
of epistemic relativity has always seemed to rule out ontological 
realism, commitment to a real world and judgemental rationality, 
commitment to the rationality of choice.1
Bhaskar outlines the characteristics of postmodernism in the following terms: 
relativism, linguisticism, ontological irrealism, judgemental irrationalism, no grounds 
for belief, life is an assemblage, there is no total view, failure to universalise, 
incapacity to maintain a concept of human emancipation, heightened sense of 
reflexivity (that is the understanding of the self in relation to its contexts) and 
therefore emphasis on contextuality, politics of identity and difference and then
19 BhasK&f, R. Reflections on Meta-reality: transcendence, emancipation and everyday life. London: 
Sage Publications Ltd., 2002. p. 34.
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support of minority groups, and acceptance of emotional experience over 
intellectualising. If Bhaskar is correct in his analysis of postmodernism, and I believe 
he is, then it is not a philosophy that can offer any positive solution to the 
environmental crisis that exists. In dealing with environmental problems we need to 
have beliefs that are judged to be true; we need a total view of the problems as well as 
of our relationship to nature; we need to be able to universalize and to see past our 
own perspectives; and we need to release ourselves from our own contextual 
situation. We also need to see beyond our differences and to be able to intellectualise 
and not be lost in the confusion of emotions and subjective perspectives.
Postmodern environmental philosophers deny too many of the characteristics 
of humans that are needed in order to make a solution to the environmental crisis a 
possibility. There are also contradictions in their position. If there is no ‘nature’ apart 
from the constructions of social power groups, then there is little basis for any 
environmentalist to give reasons to anyone as to what behaviour or viewpoint to take 
as regards nature. If they do suggest any criteria for a particular attitude to nature 
then by virtue of their own theories they are ‘fixing’ or ‘essentializing’ through their 
very choice of language according to their philosophical position. While decrying 
‘theory’ they put forward their own theory; while criticizing ‘narratives’ they create 
their own narratives. They claim that science is knowledge that is the result of social 
manipulation, but environmental philosophers influenced by postmodernism still 
accept knowledge from the biological and ecological sciences for decisions about 
solving environmental problems. Postmodernist-informed environmental 
philosophers cannot find a value in nature for itself, nor can they conceive of nature 
that exists civet- arid above human ‘embeddedness’ within it. They cnn only construct 
different ‘myths’ or ‘narratives’ or ‘ideologies’ from the ones they perceive as
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detrimental to the environment now, and they do not have an argument for anyone to 
accept any one of these myths as being the ‘right’ one.
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Chapter 3 
Ethics
When faced with environmental problems philosophers have sought to find a 
solution by positing value, other than instrumental value, in nature and the things of 
nature. The problem, they say, has arisen because humans have looked at nature 
from a human point of view, using it for their own advantage. Some philosophers 
claim that the value must be a moral value or, at least, a value that the things of 
nature have in themselves beyond merely human concern. Science-informed 
philosophers seek the value for nature through the sciences, ecology and 
evolutionary theory. Postmodern environmental philosophers seek to change the 
language we use in regard to nature claiming that the problems have arisen from 
certain power groups. Both positions in philosophy claim value for nature but it is 
uncertain what sort of value this should be. As I showed in the last chapter, both 
positions have serious problems with their claims for value in nature.
If we have a duty to care for nature it seems that the value we should give 
nature is a moral one. Holmes Rolston thinks that this is not the case, but that 
nature has objective values of some kind. The problem is, that if we should be duty- 
bound to act well towards nature beyond our own concerns we seem to be within 
the realms of morality; otherwise there would be no obligation. Nature can have 
instrumental value for us and this is no problem to understand. But instrumental 
value alone has led to the misuse of nature and the present environmental problems. 
Science-informed philosophers have put forward the concept of intrinsic value: 
nature has value in itself ppd for itself. They have attempted to reach a non- 
anthropocentric position towards nature. I showed in Chapter 1 of this part that a
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non-anthropocentric position is very difficult to achieve, if at all, although the 
concept of it may help towards being more sympathetic to the things of nature. The 
concept of intrinsic value I also showed to have many problems, as the value that 
the non-human world had cannot be as strong as the value we give to humans.
But, again, the concept of intrinsic value within nature may encourage humans to 
care more for nature.
However, there are further problems with the non-anthropocentric approach 
to nature. When philosophers talk of the intrinsic value of nature they think of the 
wilderness of America or the equatorial forests of South America or the gentle 
wooded hills of England. In contexts of this kind it may be easy to think of the 
things of nature as having intrinsic value: they flourish and have a good of their 
kind. However, it is possible that the world could be a gigantic manure heap on 
which grubs and maggots o f various kinds, worms, ants and cockroaches live and 
flourish successfully. It forms an environment of ecological balance and all the 
creatures have a good of their kind. According to holistic environmental 
philosophers all these creatures have intrinsic value and therefore we should make 
no judgement about such a world. But we would. Why would we? Because it is 
not a world in which humans would be happy. So when we speak of a nature that 
has value we inevitably speak of a world which is favourable to humans: it has 
value to us, whether it is trees that soak up carbon dioxide, or wooded hills where 
we can walk, or fertile plains where we can live. Deserts are full of flourishing life, 
reptiles and small mammals, but we lament the erosion of areas that have been 
overused and are turning to desert. Why? The reason is that they are not areas of 
flourishing in our eyes, except, perhaps, for specialists in the natural sciences.
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To give intrinsic value to the things of nature does not answer the problem 
of our relationship to nature because ultimately we value only those things of nature 
that are directly or indirectly of benefit to us, at least those things that do not harm 
us: this seems like instrumental value again. However, to conclude that nature can 
only have instrumental value to us leads us back to where we have come from and 
the results of humans through the centuries of only valuing nature in an instrumental 
way and thereby believing it not to be wrong to destroy it. This is a particular worry 
when we consider the higher mammals because of their levels of conscious 
awareness and their sentience and our ability to identify with them to a certain 
extent. They cannot be included in the moral circle in the same way as humans 
because they are not moral agents, but we do have moral obligations to them. To 
regard nature as having only instrumental value cannot be the right conclusion. So 
how are we to value nature? Richard Routley’s example of the ‘last man’ brings 
out this moral obligation:
The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world 
system lays about him, eliminating, so far as he can, every 
living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at 
the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according 
to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds is wrong. 
Moreover one does not have to be committed to esoteric values 
to regard the last Mr. Last Man as behaving badly and destroying 
things of value (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking 
and values have shifted in an environmental direction in 
advance of corresponding shifts in the foundation of 
fundamental evaluative principles.1
‘The last man’ example illustrates that many of us would consider the man wrong, 
and morally wrong, to destroy the environment for no reason at all. Therefore we
1 Routley, R. and Routley, V. ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics’, in Mannison, et al. 
eds. Environmental Philosophy. Department o f  Philosophy, Research School o f Social Sciences, 
Australian National University, 1980. pp. 129-131.
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have a moral obligation towards nature not to destroy it. But where does this moral 
obligation come from? Environmental philosophy leads to environmental ethics. 
Environmental philosophers turn to the ethical theories of today.
Ethics has always been the most difficult area of philosophy. There have 
always been questions about what morality is and what ethical theories we should 
accept:
In radically different ways, philosophers from Socrates 
to Wittgenstein have found in ethics a source of deep 
philosophical perplexity. Virtues, principles and consequences 
for human well-being have all been proposed as the most 
important focus of ethical understanding. Intertwined with 
these are concerns about rationality, impartiality and moral 
freedom.2
Environmental ethics is involved in these perplexities. Ethics in general is 
concerned with reasons for actions and so environmental ethics must take part in 
these bigger debates:
Ethics in its widest sense stands to questions about what 
there is reason to do, as logic in its wider sense stanc|s to 
questions about what there is reason to believe. It is the 
normative theory of conduct, as logic is the normative theory 
of belief. Through its concern with action ethics also becomes 
concerned with character, as it bears on action ancj reason for 
action.. .And through that concern with character, it becomes 
concerned with questions about what there is reason to feel, 
and how reasons to feel connect with reasons to act.3
Many ethical theories of the past were concerned only with relations 
between humans. Alasdair MacIntyre describes Aristotle’s ethics:
2 Skorupski, J. Ethics in Bunnin, N. and Tsui-James, E. P. eds. The Blackwell Companion to 
Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996. p. 198.
3 Ibid. pp. 199-200.
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‘Every craft and every inquiry, and similarly every action and 
project, seems to aim at some good; hence the good has been 
well defined as that which everything aims’. The book which 
Aristotle opens with this trenchant sentence is traditionally 
known as the Nicomachean Ethics.. .but its subject matter is 
declared to be ‘politics’. And the work which is called the 
Politics is presented as the sequel to the Ethics. Both are 
concerned with the practical science of human happiness in 
which we study what happiness is, what activities it consists 
in, and how to become happy.4
Kant’s moral philosophy is concerned only indirectly with non-humans: how 
humans act towards nonhumans has importance only within the sphere of human 
morality. Within religious spheres one could argue that there has appeared a 
greater value for nature than there has been within philosophical traditions but this 
viewpoint is controversial. An example from the psalms of the Old Testament can 
show this respect for nature beyond a human-centred point of view:
The trees of the Lord are full o f sap;
The cedars of Lebanon, which he hath planted; 
Where the birds make their nests:
As for the stork, the fir trees are her house.
The high hills are a refuge for the wild goats; 
And the rocks for the conies.5
Within many religions there is an appreciation of nature that is definitely not 
anthropocentric. However, within a secular world, ethical theories have difficulty in 
reaching a non-anthropocentric appreciation of nature and many have found the
4 MacIntyre, A. A Short History o f  Ethics: a history o f  moral philosophy from the Homeric Age to the 
twentieth century. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967. p.57.
5 Psalm 104. vs. 16-18. in The Bible: authorized version. Editor, J. Stirling. London: the British & 
Foreign Bible Society. 1954.
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Christian religion at fault. As usual religious writings are often open to many 
interpretations.
The collapse o f church authority over matters of morality has meant that there 
has been a yawning gap where once there was a coherent system of moral rules. 
Philosophers and the Law have tried to fill that gap but in many ways there is a 
moral crisis that becomes more perplexing within the framework of postmodernism 
that encourages difference and moral pluralism. Which of the many ethical theories 
should be used when discussing the value o f nature? Alaister MacIntyre in his book 
After Virtue writes about his own perception o f a moral crisis when looking at moral 
philosophy from an historical and anthropological view:
But at the same time as 1 was affirming the variety and 
heterogeneity o f moral beliefs, practices and concepts, it 
became clear that 1 was committing myself to evaluations 
of different particular beliefs, practices and concepts. I gave, 
or tried to give, for example, accounts o f the rise and decline 
of different moralities; and it was clear to others as it ought 
to have been to me that my historical and sociological accounts 
were, and could not but be, informed by a distinctive evaluative 
standpoint More particularly I seemed to be asserting that 
the nature of moral community and moral judgment in 
distinctively modem societies was such that it was no longer 
possible to appeal to moral criteria in a way that had been possible 
in other times and p\aces-and that this was a moral calamity! But 
to what could I be appealing, if  my own analysis was correct?6
MacIntyre in this passage eloquently reveals the postmodern dilemma of moral 
debate today. All our actions and thoughts are governed by some value system, but 
they seem to be the remains o f many different and conflicting ethical theories. For 
some philosophers the answer is to accept some kind of moral pluralism. The
6 MacIntyre, A. After Virtue: a study in moral theory. 2nd edition. London: Duckworth, 1985. p.ix.
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weakness of moral pluralism is its implied relativism. Ethical theories are 
understood to have validity contextually, as different situations require different 
ethical theories. This implies that there is no ethical theory that can deal with the 
total situation. However, local solutions would not be enough when environmental 
problems are global problems.
MacIntyre is right to point out that today we have a confusion of ethical 
theories that give us a multitude o f reasons for ways of valuing and many o f them 
contradict one another. MacIntyre’s book After Virtue gives a good historical 
account of how the present moral confusion has arisen, although I do not agree with 
his conclusion. The philosophy o f Nietzsche openly questioned the objectivity of 
morality. Continental philosophers accepted Nietzsche’s analysis o f morality. The 
individual subject, as Kierkegaard had revealed, was the important centre for 
experiencing and obtaining knowledge. Sartre also emphasized the need for the 
individual to acknowledge his/her own freedom and to escape bad faith  by being 
able to decide on moral values rather than accept the current moral code without 
question. But the emphasis on the individual and the subjective experience 
combined with the Nietzschean rejection o f the possibility of objective knowledge 
resulted in a morality that was not based on any firm foundation. Individuals should 
be free to create their own moral systems from their own subjective experiences and 
these moral systems need not be universalising. Continental philosophy therefore 
promoted subjectivism and relativism within ethical theories. It also undermined 
the role of reason within ethical theories and supported an emotional response to 
morality.
At the same time, the logical positivists, under the influence o f scientific 
methodology, had separated fret from value. The logical-positivists viewed
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language as only being meaningful when it could be verifiable by experience. A 
statement is true or false depending on whether the facts could be checked. If  there 
is no possible evidence for a statement being true or false, then it is meaningless. 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus influenced the logical positivists in what they regarded as 
meaningful statements. A. J. Ayer later claimed in Language, Truth and Logic that 
there were only two kinds o f propositions: truth known by definition and truth 
known by reference to sense experience. This claim resulted in the conclusion that 
moral statements must be meaningless. This opened the door to an emotivist theory 
of morality. Therefore both within Continental philosophy and within British 
philosophy emotivism was a serious element in ethical theories. MacIntyre certainly 
argues for the case that today the existentialism o f the Continent has been extremely 
influential and that the rational-based ethical theories have been discredited because 
of the postmodernist attack on the concept o f reason as being nothing more than the 
result o f a particular power structure o f  eighteenth century imperialism. He argues 
that to have some amount o f  credence analytical moral philosophy has resorted to 
ethical theories based on philosophy o f use rather than a philosophy o f meaning.
For some thinkers, ethics was seen as a covert way o f expressing one’s own 
preferences or giving commands. MacIntyre shows the link between Continental 
existentialist thought and an emotivist-based approach to ethical theory in analytical 
philosophy and the move to a theory o f use:
I therefore take it that we have no good reason to believe that 
analytical philosophy can provide any convincing escape from 
an emotivism the substance of which it so often in fact concedes, 
once that emotivism is understood as a theory of use rather than 
meaning. But it is not only analytical moral philosophy of which 
this is true. It also holds o f certain at first sight very different 
moral philosophies in Germany and France. Nietzsche and Sartre 
deploy philosophical vocabularies which are in large part alien
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to the English-speaking philosophical world and in style and 
rhetoric as well as in vocabulary each different from the other 
as much as from analytical philosophy. Nonetheless when 
Nietzsche sought to indict the making of would-be objective 
judgments as the mask worn by the will-to-power of those too 
weak and slavish to assert themselves with archaic and 
aristocratic grandeur, and when Sartre tried to exhibit the 
bourgeois rationalist morality of the Third Republic as an 
exercise in bad faith by those who cannot tolerate the recognition 
of their own choices as the sole source of moral judgment, both 
conceded the substance o f that for which emotivism contended.7
MacIntyre was writing in the 1980’s. In recent years ethicists has returned to 
cognitive-based ethical theories, such as consequentialism, Kant’s deontolgical 
ethics and virtue ethics. To some extent applied ethics, concerned as it is with 
matters of vital importance in today’s world, has given impetus to this change. In 
fact the writings of environmental philosophers may have had some influence on 
Philippa Foot’s more recent ethical theory when she attempts to close the fact/value 
distinction by naturalizing ethics. She wants to link the evaluation of plants and 
animals to the moral evaluation o f humans:
My belief is that for all the differences that there are, as we 
shall see, between the evaluation of plants and animals and 
their parts and characteristics on the one hand, and the moral 
evaluation of humans on the other, we shall find that these 
evaluations share a basic logical structure and status. I want to 
suggest that moral defect is a form of natural defect not as 
different as is generally supposed from defect in sub-rational 
living things.8
7 Ibid. pp.21-22.
8 Foot, P. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. p.27.
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She appeals to ‘natural goodness’ in nature that she finds in the intrinsic value 
within nature and extends the concept to human morality. I do not wish to examine 
her theory at this stage but simply to point out one element in her argument. She 
speaks o f ‘function’ and ‘purpose’ when evaluating living things:
The question is, therefore, whether characteristics of humans can be 
evaluated in relation to the part they play in human life, according to 
the schema of natural normativity that we found in the case of plants 
and animals. In favour of this there is the fact that a certain network 
of interrelated concepts such as function and purpose is found where 
there is evaluation of all kinds o f living things, including human 
beings.9
She speaks of a special form of explanation to which the ideas of function and 
purpose are related, either for animals and plants or humans, and these are 
teleological explanations.
However, in spite of the return to cognitive ethical theories, the postmodern 
influence is still strong, particularly amongst the populace as emotivism, 
subjectivism and relativism as well as moral pluralism sit well within a liberal 
society that accepts unbridled capitalism. Pragmatism also is suited to a liberal 
society.
Cognitive ethical theories have some difficulty within the postmodern 
situation because of the suspicion cast on the role of reason and any type of 
totalizing system of thought. Also there are conflicts within the numerous cognitive 
ethical theories and thus there are many questions about moral decisions and which 
ethical theory is most applicable for today.
9 Ibid. p. 40.
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At the same time ethics has been under attack from sociobiologists who claim 
that morality needs to be naturalized. They argue that morality is a result of natural 
selection and therefore comes under the domain of biologists and not philosophers:
What made the hypothalamus and the limbic system? They evolved 
by natural selection. That simple biological statement must be 
pursued to explain ethics and ethical philosophers, if not 
epistemology and epistemologists, at all depths.10
Wilson claims that ethics can be ‘biologized’:
The time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from 
the hands of philosophers and biologized.11
The affect of this ‘biologizing’ has been the reducing of morality to the extent that it 
is at the point of elimination. It is explained as simply a way by which human 
genetic material is kept intact:
Human behaviour.. .is the circuitous technique by which human 
genetic material has been and will be kept intact. Morality has 
no other demonstrable ultimate function.12
Michael Ruse also gives a reductionist account of morality: it is a means by 
which humans are able to survive and humans, by their belief in morality, are 
subject to an illusion:
10 Wilson, E. O. Sociobiology: the new synthesis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975. 
p.3.
11 Ibid. p. 562.
12 Wilson, E. O. On Human Nature. Cambridge: Harvard Universcity Press, 1978. p. 167.
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Morality, or more strictly, our belief in morality, is merely an 
adaptation put into place to further our reproductive ends. Hence 
the basis of ethics does not lie in God’s will... or any other point 
of the framework o f the Universe. In an important sense, ethics... 
is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes to get us to cooperate.13
This emphasis on the evolution of morality by natural selection leads to Dawkins’ 
conclusion, misled by his application of the moral term ‘selfish’ to a biological 
entity, that all human behaviour, including what we term ‘altruistic’, is ultimately 
always selfish:
The logic..is this: Humans and baboons have evolved by natural 
selection.. .Anything that has evolved by natural selection should be 
selfish. Therefore we must expect that when we go and look at 
behaviour of baboons, humans, and all other living creatures, we 
will find it to be selfish.14
Sociobiologists and their ilk go on from these types of statements to discuss 
altruism and co-operation among humans as a mixture of opportunism and 
exploitation. All behaviour of humans is ultimately selfish and when claims are 
made that some behaviour is altruistic humans are being self-deceived by their 
clever genes. This account makes a mockery of morality.
Sociobiologists and Ultra-Darwinists claim that science is the source of all 
knowledge and that therefore as biologists they have the expertise to ‘know’ about 
human behaviour. But this claim should be questioned. Evolutionary theory as the 
only explanation of human behaviour is very simplistic. It gives a reductionist
13 Ruse, M. and Wilson, E.O. ‘The Evolution o f  Ethics’ in New Scientist. 108. no. 1478. pp. 50-52.
14 Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene. New edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. p. 4.
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account of morality and takes strength from a monistic materialism: everything, 
including human behaviour, can be explained by reduction to simple physical parts.
A further claim o f evolutionary accounts of morality is that human behaviour 
can be explained by reference to the behaviour o f non-humans. This claim also 
needs to be questioned. The evolutionary account o f behaviour is adequate for non­
humans, but morality is a phenomenon that only appears in humans: it is nowhere 
else in nature. It is questionable whether morality can be explained only in terms of 
biology. Many philosophers have argued against the reductionist explanation of 
morality, including Holmes Rolston, although he bases much of his environmental 
ethics on evolutionary theory. Rolston argues that there is no morality in nature and 
on this point I would agree with him. But within humans at a certain level of 
consciousness and a certain level o f cultural complexity, the concept of right and 
wrong appears. It is therefore, at the very least, a cultural phenomenon and not a 
biological one (although it could not appear without the basic evolution of human 
beings):
To interpret events in terms o f biology, when these are events in 
culture is to fail to see that there is an emergent chapter in the story. 
It is an archaic interpretation. To interpret events in biology in terms 
drawn from cultural phenomena, which emerge novel to biology, is 
anachronism, a misplaced interpretation historically. It is a mistake 
both to see ourselves in fur and feathers and to see ourselves as 
nothing but fur and feathers. Try as we may to redefine the term 
borrowed from one domain for use in the other, we fail this way 
when we label behaviour of bacteria, bees and baboons as selfish and 
then find that human altruistic behaviour is the same.15
15 Rolston, H. Genes, Genesis and God: values and their origins in natural and human history. The 
Gifford Lectures, University o f  Edinburgh, 1997. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. pp. 
279-280.
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But the difference between the explanation o f ethics from a sociobiologist 
viewpoint and that of Rolston is ultimately the difference between their underlying 
beliefs. The sociobiologists interpret humans as a part o f nature in every respect 
and their explanations are within a reductionist materialism. But die explanation of 
morality as being essentially a human property is a move towards understanding 
humans as apart from nature in some important sense. Culture cannot be reduced to 
biological terms. Rolston explains morality as an emergent property that is different 
in kind from the building blocks in which it has its foundation. In this way the 
formulation of ethics is based on belief systems.
Any ethical theory is based on beliefs and values and these beliefs and values 
exist prior to any ethical theory. Indeed if  there were no beliefs and values, the 
whole idea of morality would become meaningless, because there would be no basis 
for calling any action good or bad. It works both ways: ethics is informed by 
fundamental beliefs and values, but fundamental beliefs and values may not be 
recognized until a moral dilemma occurs. This is certainly true o f problems in the 
environment Only when the problems arose was it necessary to question our 
beliefs and values about nature. That is why so often environmental philosophers 
become concerned with what are metaphysical issues.
Metaphysics is a notoriously difficult area to approach. Yet values cannot 
be understood without a metaphysical system and a metaphysical system cannot be 
begun without values. Ferre points out the circularity of dealing with any 
metaphysical problem:
If, as argued in chapter 1, metaphysical thinking is aimed at 
constructing a comprehensive, adequate and coherent theory 
of reality, should we not say instead this is a book about the 
(proper) understanding of value in a (good) theory of reality?
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Note the value terms. Is this bad? Is it a sign of circular 
reasoning? If our first formulation seems to beg the 
question against the intrinsic value ladenness of reality, does the 
second beg the question in the opposite way, toward the 
inescapable inclusion o f values in any satisfactory theory o f 
value?16
A metaphysical system is required for any ethical theory, but values already are 
needed for forming a metaphysical system. The difficulty o f metaphysics lies in its 
subject matter. As Ferr£ says:
.. .metaphysics is nothing more (nor less) than the theory o f 
reality in general.17
And so:
.. .it aims at complete comprehensiveness. This makes for 
trouble.18
The area of knowledge which metaphysics is meant to cover is immense and often 
the subject has been dismissed as nonsensical or, at least, an area of knowledge that 
is best left alone. There is an implied arrogance in the task o f metaphysics:
There are times when we philosophers are morally no less 
than epistemologically obliged to acknowledge the arrogance 
- the sheer presumption - o f  trying to pour the ocean o f reality 
into the thimbles o f our minds. This is one of those times. If 
there is a justifiable ground for rejecting the whole enterprise 
of metaphysical theorizing, here it is. Many have done just that.
I for one cannot bring myself to blame them. In the past I have 
been in their company. I still recoil from the whiff of dogmatism.
16 Ferr€, F. Being and Value: toward a constructive postmodern metaphysics. Albany: State 
University o f New York, 1996. p. 19.
17 Ibid. p .l.
18 Ibid.p.4.
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If ever a ‘know-it-all’ attitude is radically inappropriate, it is when 
one is indeed trying to know the All.19
Metaphysics is concerned with ‘all that is’, and by this factor become an area that is 
almost impossible to approach. Yet it may be suggested that without some form o f a 
metaphysical structure to the world around us, humans would not be able to make 
any sense of it. In the absence o f any constructed metaphysics, a concept o f reality 
will nonetheless be formed. When we are faced with environmental problems the 
need of a metaphysical system to underpin our moral obligation to nature becomes 
unavoidable; otherwise we can make no claim for that moral obligation.
Although there are no intentionally formed metaphysical systems today it 
appears that monistic materialism, as Roy Bhaskar describes it, underlies both 
postmodernism and Ultra-Darwinism, even though each is strongly opposed to the 
other. They are metaphysically poor in the informing o f any ethical theory, but 
particularly when it comes to environmental ethics. The one encourages diversity 
and embraces moral pluralism, which lacks foundation for any ethical decision: the 
other gives a deterministic account o f humans and undermines all morality by its 
reductionist explanation. These two areas o f thinking do not remain separate from 
one another but merge into a confused system o f metaphysics in which ethics and 
any system of valuing also become confused. There is a similar confusion in the 
understanding of nature and the relationship o f humans to nature. Whatever is said 
at the intellectual level, there is an underlying suggestion that:
Humans are biological creatures, determined by evolutionary processes. Moral 
behaviour is the result o f natural selection.
19 Ibid. p.5.
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And that:
There is no objective reality or objective values. Humans are creatures that create 
their own worldviews (even within science) and their own value systems that are 
best for the survival of the individual.
These two views are contradictory but they reveal the paradox of the human 
situation: we are and we are not a part o f nature. This is the subject/object 
distinction that haunts philosophy and is highlighted in areas of discussion to do 
with nature and the environment. What neither o f these two views, taken separately 
or together, is able to give us is why we should have a moral obligation to nature. 
When we take the two together we have the conclusion:
Moral obligation to nature is only for those humans who, because they have evolved 
that way, choose to have a moral obligation to nature within their worldview.
This conclusion highlights the problem: when we are concerned with the things of 
nature, there is something wrong with our concept o f reality or "reality’.
What is needed when we talk o f ourselves and our relationship to nature is 
what Nagel calls ‘a view from nowhere’:
The attempt is made to view the world not from a place within it, or 
from the vantage point o f a special type of life and awareness, but 
from nowhere in particular and no form of life in particular at all*
The object is to discount for the features of our pre-reflective 
outlook that make things appear to us as they do, and thereby to 
reach an understanding o f things as they really are.20
In metaphysics and ethics we require a non-relativistic point for viewing the world. 
Mechanistic materialism does not see the problem as even existing: postmodernism 
would see Nagel’s solution as accepting mechanistic materialism-
20 Nagel, T. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. p.208.
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The underlying problem is the objective/subjective distinction. Science so 
often works towards understanding all o f nature, and humans as a part of nature, in 
objective terms: postmodernism incorporates nature into the subjective. But a 
metaphysical system of ‘the whole’ needs to unite the objective and the subjective. 
Mary Midgley describes the objective and the subjective as two ‘aspects of life’:
These two aspects o f life are not two kinds of stuff or force.
They are two points o f view -  inside and outside, subjective and 
objective, the patient’s point of view of his toothache and that of 
the dentist. The two angles often need to be distinguished for 
thought. But both o f them are essential and inseparable aspects 
of our normal experience, just as shape and size are inseparable 
aspects of objects.21
Not only do we need to accept the two ‘aspects of life’, but we also need to know 
the limitations of both -  what things are a part of objective knowledge, and what 
things are the area of subjective experience. A metaphysical system needs to situate 
both ‘aspects of life’ within it before we can move to finding value for nature. This 
project is inevitably extremely difficult but, nevertheless, worth pursuing.
21 Midgley, M. Science and Poetry. London: Routledge, 2001. p. 134.
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Chapter 4 
Metaphysics
I have argued in the previous chapter that when we concern ourselves with the 
problems of the environment we become concerned with the reason for why we 
should value the things of nature and which things we should value above others. This 
brings us into discussions about values in general and moral values in particular, and 
thereby to ethical theories. However, the strength of ethical theories relies on 
underlying belief systems, and this is the realm of metaphysics. Any metaphysical 
account needs to accommodate both the objective and subjective aspects of our lives.
Our beliefs should be ones that are true beliefs if  they are to give full authority 
to our ethical theories. I am not talking about a ‘worldview’ or a ‘grand narrative’ as 
postmodernism would have us believe, but a search for something that is not based on 
our own constructions. For values to have meaning there needs to be a belief in an 
objective reality of which we can have knowledge. This is a massive problem and not 
one I can solve in this thesis. Nevertheless I hope to have done some work to the 
formulating of the problem and that I will give some new ways of dealing with it.
The first task is to secure our capability o f achieving objective knowledge.
1. Objective Knowledge.
The research for this thesis has led to the unravelling of two major opposed 
trends of thought in the thinking of today -  that of science, as originally formulated, 
and that confusion of thought that has been termed ‘postmodernism’. The results of 
the scientific enterprise and the need of humans to find a place for subjective 
experience outside the confines of ‘objective’ science, have led to major metaphysical
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confusions. We need to be sure o f the role o f the subjective and the objective in our 
approach to our understanding of nature. Ferre outlines what our agenda is for the 
future:
...o f reuniting physics with mentality, objectivity with 
subjectivity, efficient causality with purpose, stability with 
change.1
Amongst this list we can see the same problems that intrigued the ancient Greek 
philosophers: reason and experience, reality and appearance, teleological explanations 
and events explained mechanically, permanence and change.
In the past it was assumed that objective knowledge was obtained through the 
use of reason. Postmodernists have questioned this concept of reason and they have 
put the emphasis on the interpretations o f the world that humans contrive within 
social and cultural environments. Foucault, in particular, attacks reason and the 
connected term ‘rationality’ by turning all such concepts into ideology that are non- 
rational by nature:
His real point, [Foucault] himself would say, is not that the ideological 
perspectives o f the past were foolish or irrational at all, but rather 
that all ideology in the very wide sense in which he uses the term, 
including our present ideology, is culture relative. He is trying 
to show us how every culture lives, thinks, sees, makes love, by a 
set of unconscious guiding assumptions with non-rational 
determinants. If previous ideologies now seem ‘irrational’ it is 
because we judge them by our culture-bound notion of rationality.2
1 Ferre, F. Being and Value: toward a constructive postmodern metaphysics. Albany: State University 
o f New York, 1996. p. 262.
2 Putnam, H. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. p. 160.
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Hilary Putnam points out that this type o f thinking is extremely worrying because of 
its deliberate attack on rationality itself:
What is troubling about Foucault’s account is that the determinants 
he and other French thinkers point to are irrational by our present 
lights. If our present ideology is the product of forces that are 
irrational by its own lights, then it is internally incoherent. The 
French thinkers are not ju st cultural relativists; they are attacking 
our present notion o f rationality from within, and this is what 
the reader feels and is troubled by.3
The relativists’ arguments against reason and rationality are tremendously 
compelling, but they lead to nihilism by discarding any way in which humans can 
achieve true knowledge. From their point o f view, there cannot be objective 
knowledge for we have no way o f knowing if  we have access to it even if there were 
such a thing. This is an unsettling conclusion. It is true that we still have the ancient 
problem of how far we can trust our senses to provide us with information of an 
objective reality versus the suggestion that humans are trapped within their own 
perceptual and conceptual frameworks, but what has been lost is the sense of a divine 
gift, ‘reason’ in the traditional sense, which leads humans beyond appearances to 
reality in a way that Plato believed.
The attack on objective knowledge and reason has consequences for our belief 
in objective values. In fact the concept o f objective values has been abandoned by 
many thinkers since the beginning o f the 20th century. Science presents an objective 
reality but denies that it can discover objective values: postmodernism accepts values 
but concludes that they are a result o f so many factors that they cannot be termed 
‘objective’ and so supports pluralism, relativism or even subjectivism. With the
3 Ibid. pp. 160-161.
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postmodernist attack on reason and objective knowledge, we first need to establish 
both these concepts as well as the possibility o f objective value. There could be 
objective knowledge without objective value, as some scientists assume, but there 
cannot be objective value without objective knowledge.
Objective knowledge, if  not interpreted as intersubjectivity, implies that there 
is a reality to be discovered. However, even within science, objective reality has been 
brought under scrutiny firom some interpretations of quantum theory. Objectivity 
seems a hard concept to be able to hold and yet, to be able to have and use knowledge, 
the concept of objectivity is essential. We certainly need to have the concept of 
objectivity in opposition to subjectivity. In many of our discussions about the world 
we are brought to the conclusion that we are necessarily drawn into the duality of 
objectivity and subjectivity. Perhaps the extreme form of dualism, as expressed by 
Cartesian substance dualism, is mistaken, but that does not imply that all expressions 
of duality are wrong. We need to distinguish between the subjective and the objective 
and we are, in fact, as Robin Attfield shows in his article in Environmental Values, 
committed to this distinction:
My next point is that all readers o f this essay (including its 
author) are committed to accepting this distinction, even if  any 
are consciously inclined to reject it. For none of us can help 
believing that we... are reflecting .. .on value and objectivity 
and on various beliefs.. .about these things. And if  we believe 
this, then whatever we may say about the Copenhagen 
interpretation o f quantum mechanics, or the self as a social 
construct, or the relational theories o f perception and of 
identity, we also recognize and accept the distinction between thinkers 
and objects of thought. For we presuppose this distinction before we 
can as much as consider the nature of selves or of objects.4
4 Attfield, R. ‘Postmodernism, Value and Objectivity ’ m Environmental Values. 10 (2), 2001. pp. 
146-147.
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The objective/subjective distinction is important for a foundation of 
knowledge but that acceptance is not to be equated with acceptance o f the fact/value 
dichotomy. Putnam traces the origins o f the latter division to Hume’s dictum that an 
‘ought’ can never be derived from an ‘is’, along with his distinction between ‘matters 
of fact’ and ‘relations of ideas’ that became the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. The 
logical positivists accepted Hume’s analysis so that ‘facts’ were to do with what could 
be observed, or objects. Later they found that they needed to include theoretical 
terms as ‘facts’, but by accepting theoretical terms the logical positivists had to 
redefine cognitive significance as being a system that helps in prediction. This move 
led them into a quandary over the axioms o f mathematics and logic:
But to predict anything means (to logical positivists) to deduce 
observation sentences from  a theory. And to deduce anything 
from a set of empirical postulates, we need not only those 
postulates but also the axioms o f mathematics and logic.
According to the logical positivists, these axioms.. .do not 
state ‘facts’ at all.5
The axioms were defined as analytical by logical positivists. The subversion of the 
analytic/synthetic dichotomy by Quine revealed the confusion of the thinking of the 
logical positivists. And the clear notion o f ‘fact’ as the logical positivists had defined 
it also collapsed. Quine’s analysis broke down the concept of the a priori which led 
him to question any putative rules o f right reason that judged how experience should 
be interpreted. In that move he went too far, as it led him to a position that 
undermines the ability for us to be able to attain objective knowledge of reality
5 Putnam, H. The Collapse o f  the Fact/Value Dichotomy: and other essays. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 2002. p. 29.
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beyond our own reality. Although he is not a relativist as regards truth, the truth for 
him is reduced to ‘what is held to be true’.
However, Quine’s analysis did open the doors to questioning of the logical 
positivist’s definition of ‘fact’. Putnam points out that values, which the logical 
positivists had excluded from being facts by their definition and therefore were not 
within the cognitive realm, were mostly thought o f as ethical values. But there are 
other values, such as epistemic values that scientists use:
The classical pragmatists, Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, 
all held that value and normativity permeate all of experience.
In the philosophy o f science, what this point o f view implied 
is that normative judgments are essential to the practice of 
science itself. These pragmatist philosophers did not refer 
only to the kind of normative judgments that we call ‘moral’ 
or ‘ethical’; judgments o f ‘coherence’, ‘plausibility’, reasonableness’, 
‘simplicity’, and what Dirac famously called the beauty of hypothesis, 
are all normative judgments in Charles Peirce’s sense, judgments of 
‘what ought to be’ in the case o f reasoning.6
I do not want to take a pragmatist’s position, but there is something worthwhile in 
Putnam’s analysis of values. Ethical values are one type of value amongst many, 
including aesthetic values and epistemic values. To equate values with the subjective 
is not satisfactory for, as Putnam points out, even science uses certain values which 
are understood to be objective, as, for example, ‘a coherent theory’ where ‘coherent’ 
is a value judgement which is intended not to be limited to any subjective point of 
view. The fact/value dichotomy makes the mistake of equating objectivity with 
description, assuming that where there is a fact there must also be an object But 
value terms as well as mathematical and logical truths, although there are no objects
6 Ibid. pp. 30-31.
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to which they refer, can also be objective. ‘Objectivity’ is better equated with 
‘governed by reason’, or even ‘discovered by reason’. This equation puts the 
emphasis on reason or rationality and so we conclude that ‘reason’ is an essential 
concept as regards to obtaining objective knowledge. We can define reason as a 
mode of discovering patterns or order in the world about us beyond our own 
subjective experiences, and the order once discovered can be shared with others as a 
legitimate way of perceiving the world. In this way the use of reason leads us to 
objective knowledge and also to objective values once we free ourselves from the 
fact/value dichotomy as Putnam suggests. David Brink points out that even if we 
accept the fact/value dichotomy the is/ought gap is no greater than any is/is gap in 
other areas of knowledge:
Philosophers o f science concerned with intertheoretic reduction 
have long claimed that propositions in one scientific discipline 
cannot be deduced from propositions belonging to other scientific 
disciplines without the addition o f bridge premises that 
nomologically connect possession of properties picked out by 
the discipline being reduced and properties picked out by the 
reducing discipline. A classic illustration of this claim is the 
inability to deduce the laws of thermodynamics from the laws 
of statistical mechanics without the aid of bridge premises, such 
as Boyle-Charles law, which state lawlike relations between 
kinetic molecular energy and temperature.7
The acceptance of the is/is gaps between two levels o f explanation demonstrates that 
the is/ought gap does not provide a reason to deny that moral claims are fact-stating 
and that we can therefore have objective moral values.
7 Brink, D. Moral Realism and the Foundations o f  Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989. p. 167.
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Agreeing on the possibility o f objective knowledge brings us to the concept of 
truth. The problem that we have is to do with related terms: objective knowledge, 
reason and rationality, truth and reality. To have objective knowledge that is not 
simply intersubjectivity or consensus o f opinion we need a concept of reality. We 
also need a concept of truth, for in order that we can argue about die status of 
knowledge as objective or subjective we require a way of relating to reality in terms 
of true or false. I accept the realist concept o f truth as defined by William Alston:
A statement (proposition, belief...) is true if  and only if  what the 
statement says to be the case actually is the case.8
Alston continues to describe the conditions for truth by referring to the proposition 
‘gold is malleable’. He says that the content o f any statement gives everything that is 
needed to make the statement true:
In particular.. .there are no epistemic requirements for the truth 
of my statement. It is not required that any person or any social 
group, however defined, know that gold is malleable or be 
justified or rational in believing it. It is not required that science 
be destined, in that far-off divine event towards which enquiry 
moves, to arrive at the conclusion that gold is malleable. It is not 
required that it be accepted by a clear majority of the American 
Philosophical Association. It is not required that it has been rendered 
probable by some body o f empirical evidence. So long as gold is 
malleable, then what I said is true, whatever the epistemic status of 
that proposition for any individual or community.
8 Alston, W. A Realist Conception o f  Truth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. p. 5.
9 Ibid. p. 6.
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For a concept o f truth to be meaningful it needs to be as Alston describes it. Truth is 
related to what there is, to a reality, and not to just what we know. Reality is the 
foundation for claiming that there is objective knowledge so that objective knowledge 
is not considered as the result o f  numerous subjective interpretations. We also need a 
faith in reason, for reason is then understood to be the means by which humans are 
able to have access to reality and objective knowledge. Reason also is required to 
separate the objective from the subjective. This does not mean that we would never 
be mistaken. We may not always think clearly, or we may not have all the necessary 
information, or we may be swayed by personal experiences. Nevertheless, reason is a 
prerequisite to the obtaining o f objective knowledge that is knowledge of reality.
But the foregoing argument has been a problem for many philosophers over 
the centuries. The concept o f truth appears when we need to communicate 
information about the world around us. It seems to become a problem when there is a 
system of signs to convey information from person to person. For would a non­
human have a problem with truth? One could imagine the higher primates having the 
ability to communicate a truth or a non-truth, but it is unlikely that other creatures 
should be involved in this type o f communication. So truth and objective knowledge 
are linked to communication and the assumption o f a shared world:
All prepositional thoughts whether positive or sceptical, whether 
of the inner or the outer require possession of the concept of 
objective truth, and this concept is accessible only to those creatures 
that are in communication with others. Knowledge of other minds 
is thus basic to all thought. But such knowledge requires and assumes 
knowledge o f a shared world of objects in common time and space. 
Thus the acquisition o f knowledge is not based on a progression 
from the subjective to the ob|ective; it emerges holistically, and is 
interpersonal from the start.
10 Davidson, D. Problems o f  Rationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. p. 18.
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It is not the case that we move from the subjective to the objective. We already reside 
in the objective world by our assumption of a shared world. Davidson concludes that 
we must assume that most people must be right most of the time. However, 
Davidson’s conclusion needs some correction in that we should allow for the 
difference between what is generally held to be true and what is true. Nevertheless, 
we can at least agree with Davidson that there is an objective world of which we can 
have objective knowledge because we live in a shared world.
The argument I outlined in the last paragraph but one, is an argument for the 
correspondence theory of truth. It is from the perspective of metaphysical realism:
On this perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality 
of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and 
complete description of the ‘way the world is’. Truth involves 
some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought- 
signs and external filings and sets of things.11
Putnam calls this the externalist perspective because it takes the perspective 
of a God’s Eye point of view. Now I hold that the externalist perspective is the only 
view to have if we are to make sense o f objective knowledge and truth. There is one 
reality and an external perspective on that reality however difficult it is for humans to 
reach it. I therefore hold with a correspondence theory of truth.
Now this argument is notoriously difficult to uphold for there is always the 
problem of how we can bridge the gap between what we know about the world 
through our perceptions and what there really is. This problem has been expressed as 
the problem of appearance and reality. It is also the problem of how it could ever be
11 Putnam, 2002. op. cit. p.49.
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possible for us to escape our own conceptual frameworks and belief systems so that 
the concept of reality makes no sense. We can never be outside our own situation to 
compare it to reality. Putnam does not hold the correspondence theory of truth for he 
argues for an internalist perspective:
The perspective I shall defend has no unambiguous name. It is 
a late arrival in the history of philosophy, and even today it keeps 
being confused with other points of view of a quite different sort.
I shall refer to it as the internalist perspective, because it is 
characteristic o f this view to hold that what objects does the world 
consist of? is a question that it only makes sense to ask within a 
theory or description. Many ‘internalist’ philosophers, though not 
all, hold further that there are more than one ‘true’ theory or 
description of the world. ‘Truth’, in an internalist view, is some 
sort of (idealized) rational acceptability -  some sort of ideal 
coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences 
as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief
system -  and not correspondence with mind-independent or
10discourse independent ‘states o f affairs.’
Putnam, accepting the internalist perspective, thereby defines ‘truth’ as ‘rational 
acceptability’ and is accepting a coherence theory of truth. This definition of truth is 
not strong enough to do the work we need it to do to underpin any scientific 
knowledge let alone any other type o f knowledge we may wish to pursue. Although 
the correspondence theory of truth is the more difficult one to argue for, the coherence 
theory of truth can so easily collapse to a relativist position, although Putnam would 
not accept this. Although Putnam later argues that to draw on anthropological 
explanations is a form of scientism that leads to relativism (because the cultural 
perspective becomes most important), he does say the following to support his 
internal perspective:
12 Ibid. pp. 49-50.
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Our conceptions o f coherence and acceptability are, on the view 
I shall develop, deeply interwoven with our psychology. They 
depend upon our biology and culture; there are by no means ‘value 
free’. But they are our conceptions, and they are conceptions of 
something real. They define a kind of objectivity, objectivity 
for us, even if  it is not the metaphysical objectivity of the God’s 
Eye view.13
But in this passage he is relying on ‘our biology and our culture’ to explain our 
conceptions of ‘coherence and acceptability’ that can lead to the type of cultural 
relativism he is against. ‘Objectivity fo r  us ’ is a phrase that certainly has relativist 
implications.
Putnam’s definition o f objectivity is diluted by the inclusion of ‘for us’ and his 
concept of ‘truth’ is diluted by his definition o f it as ‘rational acceptability’. Both 
these dilutions can lead to a postmodernist position on truth and objective knowledge. 
As already discussed, postmodernism casts doubt on the possibility of one truth about 
the world:
Actually there is no such absolute as the truth,-, that, like 
the one God o f Abrahamic religions, is a persistent and 
dangerous monistic illusion.14
If there is not one truth, then there must be a plurality o f truths, as postmodernists 
argue. But a plurality of truths makes it more difficult to maintain die concept of 
objective knowledge. Michael Lynch takes his starting point from Putnam when 
arguing for a plurality o f truths about the world:
13 Ibid. p. 55.
14 Sylvan, R. Transcendental Metaphysics: from  radical to deep pluralism. Cambridge: White Horse 
Press, 1997. p. xiii.
313
The notion o f pluralism  shines brightly within academia and 
throughout the culture at large. In its more general form, 
pluralism is the idea that there can be more than one story o f the 
world; there can be incompatible, but equally acceptable, accounts 
of some subject matter. There are no absolute facts but a diversity 
of truths, all o f which equally clamor for our attention.15
But he realizes that to claim that there is a diversity of truths casts doubts on the 
possibility of objective knowledge. He is aware that this is a dangerous situation to be 
in when we need the concept o f objective knowledge to make sense o f any enterprise. 
He has a clever argument in which he argues for a realist concept of truth within a 
metaphysical pluralism. There is only one concept o f truth but it is limited to 
conceptual schemes:
According to the type o f pluralism I’ve been defending in this book, 
the conditions under which a proposition is true are determined by the 
conceptual scheme in which the proposition is expressed. But what 
makes a proposition true is not its relation to the scheme but whether 
or not the conditions obtain. For a claim to be true (or false), the 
conditions must be relative to a scheme.16
Although Lynch realizes the necessity o f objective knowledge, his arguments do not 
really solve the problem if  a pluralist position is taken. He argues that there are many 
worldviews and conceptual schemes, but an acceptance of this argument one could 
retort would lead to the impossibility o f knowing which o f the worldviews or 
conceptual schemes was correct. In fact whether they were correct or not does not 
come into the equation, only whether they are viable, and that is a problem too:
15 Lynch, M. Truth in Context: an essay on pluralism and objectivity. Cambridge: MIT, 1998. p .l.
16 Ibid. p. 139.
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The pluralist, then, needn’t admit that every possible worldview or 
conceptual scheme is as good as every other. There are viable and 
nonviable worldviews. A viable worldview hangs together, is free from 
massive inconsistency, fits the empirical data, is mostly trueful, 
and so on. A nonviable worldview is fragmented and inconsistent, 
ignores the data and is more often mistaken than not. Of course, there 
is no calculus to tell us when we have a viable or nonviable scheme.17
But if there is nothing that can tell us if  we have a viable or a nonviable scheme then 
the conclusion must be that we have no objective knowledge. Truth is limited within 
particularly conceptual schemes and that gives us no footing to decide which of the 
conceptual schemes should be accepted. Lynch claims that his thought was inspired 
by Putnam’s work; so Putnam’s coherence theory o f truth clearly does open the doors 
to the difficulty of claiming that there is objective knowledge. It seems wiser to 
accept a correspondence theory o f truth so that objective knowledge can be a 
possibility.
We need to have a belief in the possibility o f objective knowledge to underpin 
all our enterprises. To do this we need a correspondence theory of truth as well as a 
concept of reality. I take the realist position as being the only way to retain the 
concept of objective knowledge. Realists are often equated with being materialist, but 
this need not be so. A realist can accept the reality o f both mind and matter. Roger 
Trigg defines a realist as one that holds that there is a world that is independent of our 
judgement of it:
Although realists may be materialists, they do not have to be. The 
nature of the ultimate constituents of the world is a totally different 
problem from the relation o f reality to our true judgements about
17 Ibid. p. 150.
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i t  Indeed realists leave open what is to be meant by ‘the world’.
We have used the term rather broadly to mean ‘what there is’.
The realist can accept that mind, matter and even other kinds of 
entities might exist. His argument with the idealist is not concerned 
with the reality o f mind. He is merely concerned to hold that the 
mental does not exhaust reality.18
The realist holds that truth is related to what there is, even if  what is is beyond our 
abilities to experience, and this chimes well with the correspondence theory of truth.
A major opposition to the realist in academic fields today comes from those 
who define ‘truth’ as being related to what agrees only with our experience:
We must distinguish between those who want to define truth 
by some notion o f correspondence or agreement with reality, and 
those who turn instead to the idea o f truth being related to what 
agrees with our experience.19
The correspondence theory o f truth does not guarantee realism, but it is at least a way 
of avoiding the pitfalls that occur if  the possibility o f correspondence is denied. Truth 
that is defined as agreeing with our experience takes us eventually a long way from 
what may be first thought o f as realism. An argument for reality as agreeing with 
experience may go as Trigg outlines it:
It may be suggested that reality must be experienced if  the 
notion of correspondence is to be meaningful.
Correspondence with an ineffable and mysterious reality would 
be useless as a criterion for truth, and it may be thought that 
we cannot mean by ‘true’ a correspondence which we can 
never discover. Truth appears to be forever removed from our 
grasp unless reality can be experienced and expressed in
Trigg, R. Reality at Risk: a  defence o f  realism in philosophy and the sciences. 2nd edition. London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989. p. 28.
19 Ibid. p.39.
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language. The natural consequence is to insist that we mean 
by ‘reality’ empirical reality. In other words, reality is what 
we experience and hence we can talk about20
But when this line of argument is taken it brings us to the verification principle:
The corollary o f this is that truth becomes linked to the 
possibility o f verification. The insistence that the truth 
or falsity o f meaningful sentences must make a publicly 
observable or verifiable difference is the basis of the so called 
‘verification principle’. It is held meaningless to talk of what 
is beyond such verification.21.
However, verificationism, although a theory about meaning, raises questions about 
the relationship of truth to reality. The theory as first formed led to the conclusion 
that the only reality that was intelligible was one that humans could describe through 
observations. A verificationist refused to accept that there was a separation between 
what was true and what could be recognized as true. So the discussions are confined 
to the notions of truth and language, and what makes a meaningful sentence. This 
way of thinking of truth led to the anti-realist position. An anti-realist will hold that 
some sentences are neither true nor false, and even that we cannot talk of truth and 
falsehood for some sentences, as truth is limited by the human capacity for evidence. 
The anti-realist limits truth and reality by defining them within the limits of what 
humans have evidence for at any one time.
Trigg outlines Dummett’s version of anti-realism. Dummett accepts:
20 Ibid. pp.39-40.
21 Ibid. p. 40.
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. - .that a statement is true ‘only if  there is something in the
world in virtue o f which it is true’. He would part company
with a realist in thinking that all statements are true or false, and would
say that if we cannot decide the truth of a sentence for lack of
evidence, there is nothing in the world in virtue of which it is
true. ‘The world’ or ‘reality’ is the world as we see it or reality
fo r  us. 22
The problem with this conclusion is that it takes away the force of our ability to 
discover reality itself. The emphasis on meaning has led to an ontological claim 
which limits humans to a reality that is only within their ability to find evidence for i t  
There is no reality beyond the evidence humans find. The anti-realist does not just 
limit what we can say about reality, but limits reality itself to what we can say about 
it. This leads to the conclusion that Trigg sums up:
Under this view [anti-realism] ‘reality’ can never be 
inaccessible, since it is normally no more than the 
circumstances under which we learnt the meaning of what 
we wish to say.23
The anti-realist, like the verificationist, becomes entwined in language because of 
their emphasis on truth being linked to meaning. In this way their concept o f reality 
becomes concerned about communication between humans and the form of language 
that we possess. Truth becomes only a semantic category.
This approach cuts across other problems in philosophy. It is a problem not 
only about the relation o f concepts to reality but also a problem about the distinction 
between mind and language. Concepts can be thought o f as wholly mental or formed
22 Ibid. pp. 44-45.
23 Ibid. p. 45.
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by a shared language. The emphasis on the latter is one interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy whereby meaning is defined in terms of use and the mind 
becomes just a linguistic ability. But the adequacy of language in describing reality 
and the status of reality apart from, and sometimes even beyond, language cannot be a 
linguistic question. A realist, like myself, would hold that truth must also lie beyond 
the confines of human language even though we may become concerned with it 
through communication. It may be the case that we cannot talk of what is not 
expressible, but if knowledge is to advance, particularly scientific knowledge, we 
need to assume a reality and a truth beyond our present verifications and language:
The realist belief in strong objectivity with its consequent 
insistence that many things are beyond the powers of our 
language or understanding to grasp raises serious problems. 
We cannot talk of what is inexpressible, so we are not even 
in a position to say that we cannot put ‘it’ into words. What 
is ‘it’? Our response is to point to what happens in science as 
scientific knowledge grows and its vocabulary continually 
increases. New words have to be produced to refer to new 
entities as they are discovered. The realist view of science 
is that the categories used by scientists are intended to reflect 
real distinctions in nature.24
When looking at a scientist’s confrontation with problems about ‘what there is’, we 
can see how our present language and concepts can be a restriction to the attempt to 
understand ‘what there is’. David Bohm puts forward the case in his book Wholeness 
and the Implicate Order that our language is largely to do with fragmentation. This 
leads scientists to approach reality in fragmented terms and may lead to the 
confusions at our understanding of reality at the quantum level. We need to ask the 
right questions but our questions may be based on the wrong presuppositions. It is the
24 Ibid. p. 45.
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presuppositions. It is the scientist who can step beyond the present confines of 
language and language structures that often solves important problems in science:
In scientific inquiries a crucial step is to ask the right question. 
Indeed, each question contains presuppositions, largely implicit. 
If these presuppositions are wrong or confused, then the 
question itself is wrong, in the sense that to try to answer it 
has no meaning. One has thus to inquire into the 
appropriateness o f  the question. In fact, truly original 
discoveries in science and in other fields have generally 
involved such inquiry into old questions, leading to a 
perception of their inappropriateness, and in this way allowing 
for the putting forth o f new questions. To do this is often 
very difficult, as these presuppositions tend to be hidden very 
deep in the structure o f our thought.25
Science to make progress needs to go beyond language and even beyond particular 
accepted concepts of thought. Theories are put forward so as to give a new pattern 
and order to what there is. Then they are tested experimentally to see if the pattern 
and order expressed in the theory is close to reality. If the theory is close to reality 
then the experiments confirm the theory. If the theory is not close to reality then the 
experiments do not confirm the theory. Scientists largely assume that they are dealing 
with objective reality. It is in the area o f science that we can most easily argue for 
objective knowledge because o f its success in solving problems.
Science has been the main area o f knowledge that has held the belief in 
objective knowledge: objective knowledge was a prerequisite of science. Still 
unquestionably accepted among some parts o f the scientific community is that science 
has as its goal the pursuit o f objective knowledge and even truth:
25 Bohm, D. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. p. 36.
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.. .in pursuit of some worthy aim (variously characterized as truth, 
knowledge, explanation etc.) the members of the [scientific] 
community dispassionately and disinterestedly apply their tools, 
the scientific method, each application of which takes us a 
further step on the royal road to the much esteemed goal.26
The postmodernist viewpoint challenges this ‘goal’. Kuhn and Feyerabend were 
amongst the first thinkers that questioned the scientific enterprise as entirely 
objective. The war between scientific realism and postmodernism is fought at a 
metaphysical level. Scientific realists accept the objectivity of science, but 
postmodernists challenge this objectivity claiming that science is governed by 
ideological assumptions and that there is no objective truth:
The differences between the proponents of these sketches 
go as deep as intellectual divergences ever go, involving 
in this case differences concerning the objectivity of truth, 
the possibility of rational discourse, the nature of values, 
language and meaning and explanation, among others 27
Thinkers who follow Kuhn and Feyerabend put forward a thesis that denies 
commensurability of two scientific theories and then from this conclude that there can 
be no facts that are outside constructed theories: truth is relative:
Both Kuhn and Feyerabend pass from the thesis of 
incommensurability to a thesis of the relativism of truth. 
Kuhn says that the most fundamental feature of 
incommensurability is: ‘In a sense I am unable to explicate 
further (that) the proponents o f competing paradigms (ie. 
incommensurable theories) practise their trades in different 
worlds.’ Feyerabend holds that the proponents of
26 Newton-Smith, W. H. The Rationality o f  Science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. p. 1.
27 Ibid. p.2
321
incommensurable theories differently constitute the facts. For 
him there are no facts which are independent of our theories 
concerning them.28
When trying to make sense o f why scientific theories change our conception of reality 
so radically at times, the non-rationalists say that when a scientific paradigm changes, 
the meanings of all terms change according to the new paradigm.
Roger Trigg argues against the postmodernist trend because it opens the 
doors to relativism and nihilism:
The chill winds of relativism and even nihilism are blowing 
ever more strongly. The status of the parts of human 
knowledge which have seemed most firmly established, is 
put in question. If we cannot say what the world is like with 
any hope of success, we must realize that our beliefs 
however firmly held are merely the result of influences on us 
and our society. These in turn may have nothing to so with 
the way the world is. The work of such writers as T.S. Kuhn 
and Paul Feyerabend in the philosophy of science has made it 
seem impossible that anyone should adopt one theory rather 
than another on rational grounds. Their accounts appear to 
invite the sociologist or die psychologist to give explanations 
why a theory is chosen.29
Trigg shows that if we believe that all our knowledge was a result of social and 
psychological influences on us we would have no grounds to accept one theory rather 
than another. The result would be that we would have no reason to embark on any 
project of enquiry. If there is no objective knowledge possible in science then the 
concept of objective knowledge in any area is threatened.
28 Ibid p. 10.
29 Trigg, 1989. op. cit. p. ix.
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The scientist who is a rationalist and accepts the possibility o f objective 
knowledge based on the belief that we have access to reality would also accept that 
the goal of science is to discover truth about that reality. To argue for objective 
knowledge we need to assess the belief that science has as its goal the discovery of 
truth. Is this a valid belief? Or to put it another way, would science be intelligible if 
this were not the goal? Newton-Smith outlines the problem to be tackled:
1 .What reasons are there for taking the goal to be 
truth or approximation to the truth? Can one 
render the scientific enterprise intelligible by 
assuming some other goal?
2.1f no account other than one making the goal 
approximation to the truth is acceptable, can we 
provide a satisfactory explication o f this notion?30
It surely is the case that no scientist would begin any scientific research at all unless 
they assumed that they sought the truth or, at least, an approximation to the truth 
however difficult that might be. The scientific enterprise simply would be nonsense 
without that goal. So the problem lies with Newton-Smith’s second point.
Many recent thinkers have accused scientific research o f being socially and 
politically controlled or being confined within certain conceptual frameworks. But 
scientific research to be rational must go beyond these restraints. Whether the 
scientific enterprise is seen as rational or non-rational affects the overall view of 
metaphysical reality:
Where the rationalist sees progress (or the possibility of 
progress) judged in relation to his standards, the non-rationalist 
sees mere change which is to be explained sociologically
30 Newton-Smith, 1981. op. cit. p. 15.
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and/or psychologically. Theories simply supplant one another.
The explanation o f these mere changes lies in the external factors and 
not in the internal factors specified by a rational model.31
If science has as its goal ‘approximation to truth’ then it must see itself as progressing, 
not simply changing theories. O f course there may be any amount of social and 
economic factors that mould an enterprise o f any kind, but this does not mean that all 
enterprises have been socially, psychologically and economically determined, nor that 
there can be no progression within enterprises.
In science, the notion that science progresses or achieves some approximation 
to reality is proved by the powers of problem solving. It is quite evident in the 
contemporary world that science has increased its powers o f problem solving, as in 
the growth of technology and the successes o f medical science; so this supports 
approximation to the truth. Further, from this conclusion it is an inescapable fact that 
scientific method is applied successfully. Newton-Smith answers Feyerabend, who 
denies scientific method, that scientific progress could not be possible without 
scientific method:
If you want to make scientific progress you cannot do just 
anything.32
This sounds like common sense! Science is rational in that it follows the best method 
to achieve the goal of approximation to the truth and that is attested by its successful 
predictions. In answer to the instrumentalist, science does not just give approximate
31 Ibid. p. 17.
32 Ibid. 269.
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ideas that work, for the results o f  the scientific enterprise not only predict successfully 
but also give explanations. Sometimes those explanations are faulty but continued 
explorations refine those faults. Knowledge is acquired and as knowledge is acquired 
so there is scientific progress. That there are sometimes sociological or political 
motivations to the scientific enterprise does not entail that these are the only ones. 
Humans do not always follow rational motivations, but this does not entail that they 
never follow rational motivations, for how would we judge the one against the other if  
there were no rational motivations? Science must be accepted as rational where it has 
been successful at explaining the world around us. If this is possible then the goal of 
approximation to the truth must be accepted as viable. In that case it follows that 
there is a reality that can be discovered and that objective knowledge is a possibility.
Quantum theory has undermined this concept o f the objective. It produces 
many paradoxes that seem unsolvable and it does not appear to be in line with 
classical physics. At the quantum level it is impossible to make measurements o f a 
sub-atomic system without disturbing it in some way. The problem of the elimination 
of the subjective/objective distinction, as mentioned earlier, becomes apparent at the 
quantum level. Reflecting on matters at the quantum level the scientist or philosopher 
may conclude that the measurements have not been genuinely made until someone 
has become conscious o f the results. The observer then becomes a part of the system, 
not separated from the reality he/she observes. The problem that we have at the 
quantum level is that we cannot know the system itself but only how it behaves. This 
raises the question about the concept o f  objective reality. Further, there appears to be 
an essential indeterminism at the quantum level. Knowledge obtained can only be 
within the terms of probability. This leads to the emphasis being placed on the 
measurements and observations made rather than on ‘what is’. Because o f the
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impossibility of knowing ‘what is’, scientists and philosophers have been led to 
accept an instrumentalist explanation of science. However, other scientists have 
followed Einstein’s questioning of the situation.
Einstein was unhappy with the paradoxes that quantum mechanics seemed to 
imply. He believed in a well-ordered universe. In his biography on Einstein, Ronald 
Clark reports on a letter from Einstein to Philip Frank:
What Einstein was saying was this: if all the details of a coin’s 
velocity, mass, moment of inertia, and other relevant factors 
were known as soon as it was in the air, and if it was still 
impossible to tell only by statistics which way it would fall, 
this was due not to a failure of causality. There was simply 
another causative factor which had not been considered. So 
with the laws of nature. Current ability to understand events 
in the atomic world only in statistical terms sprang from the 
limitations imposed by ignorance. In due course scientists 
might learn all the necessary facts, and the mysteries would 
then be removed. In 1907 it was difficult to dispute that this 
would eventually be so. The arguments were not developed 
until more than a decade later when the progress of physics 
slowly revealed that at the atomic level the laws of cause 
and effect give way to the laws of chance. Einstein remained 
unmoved, acknowledging that the work of his earlier years 
had led to the new situation, confident that ‘God did not play
- I T
dice with the world’.
In other words, Einstein realized that he could not have achieved what he had done in 
science if he had not assumed that ‘God does not play dice with the world’. Thus, 
Einstein would not accept indeterminacy. He recognized the fact that, if there is to be 
knowledge at all, then there needs to be a real world that has order that humans, in 
principle, can understand. He fought against a conclusion that many intellectuals 
accepted.
33 Clark, R. W. Einstein: the life and times. Introduction by Sir Bernard Lovell. London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1973. p. 120.
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But the philosophical issues raised by quantum mechanics 
are by no means esoteric. Does quantum mechanics imply 
the overthrow o f causality, and if  so, how (if at all) is science 
still possible? If the observer creates the result of his or her 
observation, can one consistently suppose that there is a 
single objective world accessible to our observations? 34
If indeterminacy is accepted then this will support an uncertain, disordered world — a 
world of particulars that show no overall pattern. In this world there can be no 
objective knowledge but merely pragmatic knowledge — knowledge that works in 
practical ways - and we would not be able to say why. This has become the accepted 
opinion of many people today, including eminent intellectuals. The concept of a 
world in which there can be no objective knowledge because there is no underlying 
reality to reach has had far reaching consequences in other areas o f thought beyond 
science:
For this [conceptual problems in the foundations o f quantum 
theory] has been among the most fertile sources for people 
in the (erstwhile) humanistic disciplines who wish to give 
‘scientific’ credence to their claim that realism is a thoroughly 
outmoded doctrine which no self-respecting physicist would 
nowadays endorse.35
The result o f this thinking outside physics departments was:
The emergent trend towards anti-realism and cultural 
relativism in various quarters of ‘advanced’ theoretical
34 Healey, R. ‘ Quantum Mechanics’ in Newton-Smith, W.H. ed. A Companion to the Philosophy o f  
Science. (Blackwell Companion to Philosophy). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001. p. 376.
35 Norris, C. Quantum theory and the Flight from  Realism: philosophical responses to quantum 
mechanics. London: Routledge, 2000. p.2.
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debate.. .the advent o f a  new postmodernist fashion which 
seemed to count reality a world well lost for the sake of 
pursuing its own favoured kinds o f hyperreal fantasy 
projection.36
Thus the indeterminacy theory fuelled the postmodernist trend. But also the 
postmodernist trend fuelled the acceptance o f the indeterminacy theory. Anti-realism 
and cultural relativism that have flourished in many academic departments has filtered 
into everyday life. In any debate there is little acceptance o f truth or reality, or that 
truth should be the goal. The result is acceptance o f pragmatism in the style of Rorty, 
or pluralism, both within academia and the populace.
Although quantum theory has fuelled the postmodernist undermining of an 
objective reality, there are scientists today who question the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum physics because o f its unacceptable implications. New 
theories are constantly being put forward to ‘close the gap’. David Bohm has offered 
a theory in opposition to the indeterminacy theory. He suggests that the problems that 
appear at the quantum level can be solved in a similar way in which the problem of 
the Brownian motions was solved in physics. What may appear random at one level 
of understanding can be found to be determined by deeper individual laws:
Similarly, in the field o f physics, when it was discovered that 
spores and smoke particles suffer a random movement obeying 
certain statistical laws (the Brownian motion) it was supposed 
that this was due to impacts from myriads of molecules, obeying 
deeper individual laws. The statistical laws were then seen to be 
consistent with the possibility o f deeper individual laws, for as in the 
case of insurance statistics the overall behaviour of an individual 
Brownian particle would be determined by a very large number of 
essential factors. Or, to put the case more generally: lawlessness 
o f individual behaviour in the context o f a given statistical law is,
36 Ibid. p. 1.
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in general, consistent with the motion o f more detailed individual 
laws applying in a broader context.37
More recently other physicists have sought an underlying substance beyond the 
quantum level to solve the paradoxes. What is important about these endeavours is 
that it reveals the fact that humans, whether scientists or not, seek to understand the 
world around them. To accept that the world is the result of pure chance happenings 
is to cease the search for an explanation o f it. The only way to understand the world 
is to seek for some order or pattern within it. Humans never cease from searching for 
these patterns. Mathematics is a supreme example of this need to find patterns. Even 
within chaos theory there is a search for patterns that do not at first appear to be there. 
Like the ancient philosophers we seek order from chaos, because this is the only way 
we can learn about the world in which we live. The search for order is also the search 
of objective reality and a truth beyond appearance. To give up this goal would be for 
humans to return to being simply experiencing centres in the same way as non­
humans, or to be locked within our own concepts learning nothing new and without 
any insight to the deeper truths that surround us.
Writers in the New Scientist recently express their concern at the attack on 
reason. They point out that science began with the belief in an ordered world:
In medieval and early modem Europe, when science made its 
greatest strides, scholars believed that the secrets of the universe 
could be unravelled because they had been implanted by a reliable 
and all-powerful creator God who had written nature’s rules in a 
dependable way. In other words, the full emergence of science 
required belief in one all-powerful god, whose perfect creation 
awaited rational, scientific explanation.38
37 Bohm, 1980. op. cit. p. 87.
38 Koch, R. and Smith, C. ‘The Fall o f  Reason’ in New Scientist 24 June 2006. p. 25.
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They go on to ague that science has achieved so much that it would be foolish to 
abandon the original belief in reason:
There is little justification to abandon our trust in rationality 
and in science, for the best forms of civilization depend utterly 
on them. But in losing the idea that science helps us all make 
sense of the world, the west has forfeited one of its main sources 
of optimism, success and commitment to a humane society.39
To accept the successes of science is to accept that science has the means to obtain 
objective knowledge. For objective knowledge we need to accept the assumption that 
there is an ordered reality of which we can to some extent obtain knowledge by the 
use of our reason.
2. Objective Values.
We can accept that science is successful in obtaining objective knowledge 
because of the way it both explains our world and advances our ability to control the 
world. If we hold that objective knowledge is possible because reason leads us to 
some part of reality and thereby to some truths about the world, then we can take a 
realist position. However, we need to go beyond scientific realism to metaphysical 
realism. Those that accept scientific realism believe that it is through the scientific 
enterprise that knowledge of what there is can be discovered. However one can be a 
realist while holding that science is not the only way in which to obtain knowledge.
39 Ibid. p. 25.
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Trigg differentiates between an epistemological view of reality (knowledge of reality) 
and a metaphysical one (reality itself):
Once we are clear that reality is to be firmly distinguished 
from whatever method may prove successful for an 
understanding o f it, we are free to wonder whether the 
methodology of the physical sciences provides the only path 
to knowledge.40
This distinction allows us to criticize some aspects of the results of the scientific 
enterprise while retaining a realist approach. Science may be an excellent way of 
understanding some areas of what there is, but is by no means the only way. There 
has been a tendency to restrict reason and rationalist explanations and accounts of 
truth to the scientific realm and treat the scientific method as the only way of 
obtaining objective knowledge. To return to Putnam and his comments on reason and 
rationality:
Starting in the fifteenth century, and reaching a kind of peak in the 
seventeenth century scientists and philosophers began to put forward a 
new set o f methodological maxims. These maxims are not rigorous 
formal rules; they do require informal rationality, ie. intelligence and 
common sense, to apply. In short, there is a scientific method; 
but it presupposes prior notions of rationality.41
In other words, science is not the way in which reason and rationality come into 
being. Reason and rationality are necessary before the scientific enterprise can even 
begin to take place. Science therefore need not be the only area of knowledge that
40 Trigg, 1989. op.cit. p.xxiii
41 Putnam, 2002. op. cit. p. 195.
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deals with objective knowledge and truth. This is particular important when dealing 
with social interactions and morality. If we hold that reason and rationality are the 
ways in which we can achieve objective knowledge then we can also hold that in 
areas of knowledge other than science we can reach objective knowledge because 
reason and rationality are precursors of science. Putnam holds that truth and 
rationality are interdependent:
The argument in a nutshell was that fa ct (or truth) and rationality 
are interdependent notions. A fact is something that is rational 
to believe, or more precisely, the notion of a fact ( or a true 
statement) is an idealization of the notion of a statement that is 
rational to believe. ‘Rationally acceptable’ and ‘true’ are notions 
that take in each other’s wash.42
I would agree with him up to a point although perhaps not to the extent that leads 
him to believe that ‘truth’ can be defined as ‘rationally acceptable’. A truth may be 
rationally acceptable but because it is a truth and not because this is what rationally 
acceptable means. However, Putnam has more recently found his own definition 
inadequate:
Although I myself tried for a number o f years to defend the 
idea that truth can be identified with ‘idealized rational 
acceptability’, I am today convinced that this was an error.43
Putnam is against anti-realism for he holds that there are many truths, as a matter of 
contingent empirical fact, that are beyond the power of humans to ever know. I would
42 Ibid. p. 201.
43 Putnam, 2002. p. 124.
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agree that there are truths that we can never know, but this should not limit us in our 
attempts to pursue truth even if  it might seem at present beyond our limitations.
Although a metaphysical realist position is a difficult one to defend it is the 
only one possible if we are not to slide into relativism, or pluralism or a pragmatic 
approach to knowledge. If the argument holds that there is objective knowledge that 
justifies scientific enterprises because there is a reality of which we can have some 
truth, then we can begin to argue for objective values. Following Putnam, I have 
argued that as the scientific enterprise depends on our powers o f reason and 
rationality we can apply our reason and rationality to other areas of knowledge, 
particularly that of morality and values in general. There can be no question that we 
are valuing creatures, that we are concerned with right and wrong and values of many 
kinds. The question so often asked is where our values come from. Both scientific 
realists, such as Ultra-Darwinists, and postmodernists explain morality in historical 
terms, whether evolutionary theory for the former or cultural history for the latter. 
Both explanations are forms o f reductionism. They are both trapped within a form of 
thinking which finds the possibility o f discovering values not acceptable because we 
do not have sense organs for determining values. Putnam calls this empiricist 
phenomenology:
Connected with the idea that to know that there are values we 
would need to have a special sense organ is the empiricist 
phenomenology according to which perceptual experience 
(as opposed to ‘emotion’) is value neutral and values are added 
to experience by ‘association’.44
44 Ibid. p. 102.
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But the reality o f the situation is that humans are constantly using value terms 
even within the realms o f science. Humans are more valuational creatures than they 
are scientific creatures. Perhaps this is because humans are social creatures and as 
soon as we are interacting with one another we need to be dealing with matters of 
value. If we have a faculty to understand the world around us, we certainly also have 
a faculty to value the world as well. Now, just as in understanding the world 
successfully through science we need to use reason and rationality, so we need to use 
reason and rationality in discovering the right values to hold. Just as in science the 
concept of truth, or the approximation o f truth, is a necessary one in the motivation to 
pursue knowledge (or why would there be science), so the concept of truth or the 
approximation of truth is also necessary for motivation in the discovery o f right 
values. The pragmatist’s equation o f truth to ‘consensus of opinion’ is not good 
enough. Although debates are required concerning values, rather as recommended by 
Habermas’ discourse ethics, it cannot be undertaken as if  all we are doing is coming 
to a consensus of opinion. It needs to be undertaken in the sense that we are 
discovering true values. Ultra-Darwinists and postmodernists could never accept this 
position. But for morality to have meaning, values need to be considered as having 
objective reality.
To argue for objective values is not to deny that we cannot make mistakes in 
our values. Errors can be made as errors are often made in the sciences. It was an 
error of the ancients that the earth was understood to be the centre o f the Universe. It 
could not be recognized as an error until the discoveries o f the 15th and 16th centuries. 
Similarly errors can be made in finding right values. However, just as we make some 
discoveries in science that appear to be as close to the truth as possible, because 
explanations are given for certain phenomena that previously seemed mysterious, so
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certain moral values, once discovered, seem obviously to be true, such like ‘no human 
should be slave to another’. As Putnam puts it:
In the case o f ethics, the corresponding thought is that we can 
concede to the skeptic that we have no irreducibly ethical 
knowledge. But what is, what could be, more irreducible 
than my knowledge, face to face with a needy human being, 
that I am obliged to help that human being?4
Just as we need to argue for scientific realism to give meaning to the 
scientific enterprise, so we need to argue for moral realism to give meaning to 
morality.
Moral realism is a diesis about the metaphysical states o f moral 
claims. Realism about the external world asks us to take the 
claim of the natural sciences and commonsense physical theory 
literally, as claims that purport to describe more or less accurately 
a world whose existence and nature are independent o f our 
theorizing about it...
In a similar way, moral realism asks us to take moral claims literally 
as claims that purport to describe the moral properties o f people, 
actions and institutions -  properties that obtain independently of our 
moral theorizing. Moral realism is roughly the view that there are 
moral facts and true moral claims whose existence and nature are 
independent of our beliefs about what is right and wrong... The moral 
realist thinks that our moral claims not only purport to but often do 
state facts and refer to real properties, and that we can and do have 
at least some true moral belief and moral knowledge.46
Brink’s case for moral realism is to be applauded and I accept his arguments.
Many ethical theories today attempt to find objective values for morality, but 
they often try to do this by ‘naturalizing’ ethics. There is a danger in this if  it is
45 Ibid. p. 132.
46 Brink, 1989.op.ciL p. 7.
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achieved in a reductive way. David Brink accepts ethical naturalism but argues that it 
needs to be understood in a  non-reductive way:
A non-reductive form o f ethical naturalism claims that moral facts 
and properties are constituted by, and so supervene upon (or vary 
in a lawlike way with), natural and social scientific facts and 
properties even if  moral terms are not definable by natural terms.47
I do not accept Brink’s utilitarian approach to ethics but 1 do want to argue for moral 
realism and accept that moral facts supervene on natural and social scientific facts and 
properties without being defined by natural terms. Moral facts are acquired by 
processes of reasoning in a similar way to the process of reasoning in the acquiring of 
scientific facts. The process o f formulating ethical theories is no different from the 
process of formulating scientific theories. Both require a certain amount of input 
from experience before an insightful creative leap to the formulating of a particular 
pattern and order that is then tested by experiment and observation. Such insightful 
creative leaps are found in the sayings o f religious leaders, ‘Love thy neighbour as 
thyself, or ethical theorists as in Kant’s categorical imperative or the realization of 
the importance of future states o f affairs for moral facts, which is one positive aspect 
of consequentialism. However, although we are valuing creatures the acquiring of 
moral facts is infinitely more complicated than the acquiring of scientific facts. The 
ability to discover the patterns and orders within the interactions of humans, or 
between human and non-human, is a complex matter. There is room for many 
mistakes both at the normative level and at the theoretical level. But to admit that it is 
a complex matter to acquire moral facts is not to say that we can only resort to moral
47 Ibid. p.9.
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pluralism or leave the realm o f ethics to an emotivist or subjectivist position. Rather 
it involves a great deal o f thinking. It requires the use of reason in the same way as is 
used within the sciences, but at a more complex level.
Brink argues against the non-cognitivists’ approach to ethical theory.
Morality does not come from an internalist, subjective stance. Moral realism can be 
accepted because it explains the point and nature o f moral enquiry:
Although various sorts o f considerations support moral realism 
its intuitive appeal derives, I think, from the way it explains the 
point and nature o f moral inquiry. In moral argument and 
deliberation, it seems, we are trying to discover what sorts of 
of things are valuable, praiseworthy, or obligatory. We recognize 
moral requirements, they constrain our will and our conduct. We 
think people can be morally mistaken and some people are morally 
more perceptive than others.48
The italics are Brink's but they underline the claim he is making that morality is about 
discovering moral facts by the use o f reason. We could not take part in discussions 
about morality or come to realize that we were mistaken in some moral beliefs if  
ultimately there were no moral facts to be discovered. It is a similar enterprise to the 
scientific one where theories are accepted because they are a way of perceiving 
pattern and order in the world around us. Ethical theories can be accepted because 
they also are an attempt to see the pattern and order in the way people interact with 
one another and the world around them. Both scientific theories and ethical theories 
may be wrong or incomplete and there is the possibility that we may never be able to 
reach the whole truth either about the world around us or how we should behave. But 
both types of theories rest on the assumption that there is a reality that can be known.
48 Ibid. p. 8.
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This assumption is an important one and we can see the success of this assumption 
both in the discoveries of science and the progression in the ever-expanding moral 
circle.
3. Value for Nature.
Once we accept objective knowledge and objective values, we can also accept 
the realist position, both in science and in morality. In this way we can begin to move 
towards discovering the moral obligation we have to nature. Both in science and in 
morality humans reveal their differences from non-humans. We are creatures that can 
learn about the world around us beyond our immediate needs of survival. Many 
scientific discoveries were not motivated by a need for survival but from a deep 
curiosity about what the world is really like. Morality, the deep reflection on how we 
should behave towards one another, does not appear in the non-human world. As I 
have mentioned before, that non-humans are outside of morality lends to their 
attractiveness: their actions are outside of judgement. Only humans judge and value 
at all levels. The ability to evaluate and judge is the source of morality and this 
ability, alongside of a curiosity about the world, appears at a particular level of 
consciousness.
I have been arguing that both Ultra-Darwinism and postmodernism are 
metaphysically poor as regards to values. This metaphysical poverty, I have argued, 
leads to some unsatisfactory ideas in environmental philosophy because they do not 
answer the problem of why humans should care for nature. Postmodern thinking leads 
to a confusion of various different moral codes with no one principle to follow in 
making decisions about the environment. Science-informed environmental 
philosophy is lost in defining terms like ‘intrinsic value’ and ‘non-anthropocentrism’
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in order to find value for nature. But intrinsic value gives little solution to the 
problem of how we should behave towards the environment because at some level we 
must use nature and so it is the instrumental value of nature that we are concerned 
about. In many ways we cannot escape from an anthropocentric point of view 
because our concern for nature comes from the concern we have for our own well­
being, although we can moderate our demands on nature. The question is about how 
we should use nature, or what is the moral way to use nature. To take a 
sociobiologist’s explanation of humans, as Callicott does, results in a morality which 
is far from the original concept of morality. ‘Morality’ in Callicott’s terminology is 
the result of natural selection. If we are behaving ‘morally’ towards nature we will 
survive: if we don’t behave ‘morally’ then we won’t survive. But how do we know in 
advance what is a surviving ‘morality’ and what is not?
I have argued that we should be confident in the discoveries of science, that 
they are the ‘truth’ or an approximation to the truth, because they are so often 
successful in explaining and predicting the world around us. Evolutionary theory has 
proved to be successful: it explains and predicts many aspects of life on earth. 
Therefore evolutionary theory must be an approximation to the truth. However, we 
must be careful about the extent of the theory. As Dennett says Darwinism is so 
successful it is like ‘a universal acid’: it can explain everything. But perhaps it can 
explain too much. There are certain areas of the human condition that if explained by 
an extreme form of Darwinism become problematical. These areas are those of 
morality, freewill, responsibility and spiritual experiences, and also, I would argue, 
the sense of purpose. In Darwinian explanations they lose their original meaning and 
may even be assumed to be illusions developed in the mind to aid survival.
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Although I have opposed Ultra-Darwinism against postmodernism, in some 
areas they complement one another. Postmodernists would favour a coherence theory 
of truth and so would Darwinians:
The Darwinian simply denies that truth can mean correspondence 
between one’s ideas and reality, arguing rather that truth means... 
a coherence between all the parts that we hold important and 
significant. Unless challenged, one accepts the touchstone and 
tries to make a comprehensive, consistent and meaningful 
overall picture.49
Therefore both Darwinians and postmodernists would disagree that the 
correspondence theory of truth was a possibility. ‘Reason’ also becomes suspect, for 
a wholehearted Darwinian would have to argue that reason was the result of 
evolutionary processes so that it has been formed in the way it is because that led to 
the survival of humans at the present. Postmodernists would say that ‘reason’ was the 
result of certain cultural movements.
Somehow we need to save the concept of ‘reason’ in a stronger way than just a 
result of evolutionary processes for human survival. If it is an adaptation we must 
hold that it is a specific adaptation because it does actually allow us to attain ‘truth’ of 
the world about us, or at least an approximation of the truth: our minds are so formed 
that it is possible for us to perceive a true picture of reality even if we may be prone to 
errors. We need a strong sense of ‘reason’ not only to underpin our discoveries in 
science, but also to underpin our ability to find truths about morality.
The other criticism I have made of both Ultra-Darwinism and postmodernism 
is that their explanations of humans are in terms of the past: either evolutionary
49 Ruse, M. Can a Darwinian be a Christian: the relationship between science and religion.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. p. 109.
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history for the former or cultural history for the latter. But humans are as much 
defined by their futures as by their past At a certain level of consciousness and self- 
awareness humans are able to deliberate and in this way free themselves from any 
kind of determinacy, whether biological or environmental. It is this psychological 
fact about humans that the existentialists explore in their description of anxiety. The 
freedom in our choices for the future can be overwhelming for us. We stand in the 
present free to form our futures. We are goal-orientated, purposive creatures. We are 
concerned with our futures whether in terms of education or career or a family. We fix 
our goals and we then have a purpose to fulfil our goals. Morality, I argue, is 
connected to this purposiveness. Morality is not only formed by past experiences but 
is also to do with our projections into the future and our concept of progress.
In morality the objective and the subjective are united. From the subjective 
stance we are aware of goals to be achieved, purposes to be fulfilled. Moral codes, I 
have argued in the last chapter, come from our ability to perceive patterns in our 
behaviour which lead to moral truths: morality supervenes on objective facts about the 
world. This is true for interactions between humans, but also for interactions between 
humans and non-humans. There are facts about nature and there are facts about the 
well-being of humans. Science informs us of what aspects of nature are necessary to 
our well-being. As well as the facts from science, we have the means to envisage 
ourselves as better people, to be able to live more harmoniously with other people and 
to be able to create a better environment. We possess concepts that are concerned 
about improving ourselves, our social relationships and the ways in which we live. By 
reason and insight we can find moral truths that can bring about the reality of our 
projections into the future.
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Although circumstances may confine us, we are free to make what we can of 
those circumstances, whether to be overcome by them or to make the best of them. 
The concept of the human as free within the moral sphere is an important one. We 
need to hold to the belief that we are free to take the moral path whatever our 
situation: neither genes nor social environment determine our moral behaviour. Our 
futures are open to us: we can create goals and progress towards those goals. The 
desire to achieve these goals gives us purposes. Ultra-Darwinism and postmodernism 
limit the concept of morality. Neither account for the fact that morality is concerned 
with the future and with progress that can take us beyond the limits of our present 
situations.
When dealing with environmental problems we need to free ourselves from 
determinism in morality: morality is not the result of natural selection. At the level of 
human civilization where morality arises we have gone beyond biological selective 
processes. It is to do with our capabilities o f reasoning and projecting to the future. 
Morality transcends cultural perspectives: for morality to be morality is for it to be 
universalising. Morality is concerned with every human in every situation or culture. 
True morality brings into play obligation that requires a deeper commitment to action 
than pure practicality requires: it is not to do with consensus of opinion.
Purpose and progress are linked. If we cannot progress in any area of 
knowledge then there would be no purpose in undertaking any attempts to gain 
knowledge. Knowledge would become merely description of our present situation, 
one that could have an explanation in historical terms -  how we arrived at this 
particular stage of knowledge — but not one that could help us to move forward. In 
matters of the environment it is important to accept the possibility of progress; 
otherwise there will be little motivation for action. I am not condoning the sort of
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concept of progress put forward by Comte and the French intellectuals of the 19th 
century, nor that of Spencer’s evolutionary progress, nor unbridled economic and 
technological progress. But I am referring to a belief in progress in the sense that, 
however prone to errors, humankind can have a more enlightened set of values. We 
can move forward to a better world than we have now:
Yet there is no reason to reject belief in the desirability or the 
possibility of many o f the strands in the notion of progress. We 
can in some measure mould our own future, and to do so we 
need whatever understanding of nature and society we can come 
by, combined with a moral vision of states of society and of the 
world which would count as better than the present ones, and such 
grounds as there are for hope that we can move towards them.50
We need a goal of a better way of humans living with nature and the belief that we 
can progress towards that goal. Morality is concerned with those goals. However, 
morality is not simply to do with consequences, for then die consequences become 
more important than the acts themselves. Each act should be decided upon as one that 
will help bring about a better state o f affairs. If we want a society in which we can 
trust one another, then we should never deceive one another. The final goal will be a 
better world for all and each act is a move towards that goal.
Humans are purposeful beings at many levels. We set ourselves goals whether 
these are at the level o f basic survival, for example to seek for employment for the 
purpose of earning money, or at a higher level as in education for the purpose of a 
worthwhile career, or in political movements for the purpose of changing society. 
However, in the realm of morality purposes are beyond the individual or even the
50 Attfield, R. The Ethics o f  Environmental Concern. 2nd edition. Athens: The University o f Georgia 
Press, 1991. p.83.
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social group. The purposes o f morality are concerned with the well-being of humanity 
at large and even the well-being o f non-humans and all o f nature. This ability for 
humans to have purposes transcending themselves is unlike anything else in nature. 
This gives humans a unique and important position in nature.
Not only in our own lives do we find purposes to fulfil, but we also perceive 
purposes within nature. There may not be purposes in nature itself. Following 
Bacon’s scientific method final causes have been eliminated from the scientific study 
of nature, but nevertheless humans are still compelled to view nature as having 
purposes. We can link the concepts o f function and purpose when we observe nature. 
I refer back Philippa Foot’s link o f function and purpose to evaluation:
In favour o f this there is the fact that a certain network of 
interrelated concepts such as function and purpose is found 
where there is evaluation o f all kinds of living things, 
including human beings. It is possible of course that the 
meaning o f words such as ‘function’ or ‘purpose’ should 
diverge when used in speaking on the one hand of 
characteristics and operations o f plants and animals and on 
the other of those of human beings. But it seems significant 
that there is a special form of explanation- teleological 
explanation -  to which the idea of function and purpose 
is related in each case.51
The purpose that we see in nature where we link purpose to function is the awareness 
of purpose that comes from our own level o f consciousness. The things o f nature just 
are, living according to the needs o f survival: they have no goal or purpose. However, 
humans can perceive that parts o f nature are the way they are because they achieve 
some purpose, whether it is for the ecological balance of nature itself or for the well-
51 Foot, P. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. p. 40.
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being of humans. Trees have the purpose o f maintaining the balance of carbon 
dioxide and oxygen in the atmosphere which benefits all living things.
We can link nature, humans and value together if we claim that value comes 
into being where humans perceive that something has a purpose for achieving a 
particular goal. Therefore trees have value for humans and nature as a whole because 
they have the purpose of maintaining the right type of atmosphere for life. The 
function of the particular gives the purpose for it within the whole. The reflective 
human may further search for the purpose o f the whole. We are beings who interpret 
the world around us in terms o f purposes. Humans alone perceive this purposefulness 
in their own lives and in nature.
Science has been opposed to final causes and so has lessened the role of 
purpose in nature. In my brief history o f the concept o f nature I showed how the 
move has been away from teleological explanations. But this has caused a problem 
about values. It is teleological explanations that give value both to humans and to 
nature. Teleological explanations give a role to humans within nature, because 
humans have the purpose to care for nature. This is certainly true of many religious 
explanations of humans, for example the stewardship tradition in Christianity. In a 
Christian teleological framework humans have been given the Earth to care for it and 
bring it to fruition. The Earth is not perfect; nature is not in harmony. But the human 
has the ability to conceive o f the perfect and to desire harmony. It is the role of 
humans to work towards the goal o f perfection and harmony. That would mean that 
we need the facts of science to understand the world about us in order that we are able 
to strive towards that perfection and harmony. We are not here to be victims of 
evolutionary forces: we are here to make possible a greater good. That is our purpose.
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The facts of science may need to be fitted into a broader metaphysical picture, 
one which supports a teleological view o f everything. This may seem unsettling to 
pure Darwinians, but not to those o f a religious inclination. Perhaps religion has some 
role to play in our lives. It is a difficult one to tackle for a Darwinian, as can be seen 
from Dawkins’ satisfied acceptance o f atheism:
Although atheism might have been logically tenable before 
Darwin, Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually 
fulfilled atheist.52
However, Michael Ruse has argued for die possibility o f being both a Darwinian and 
a Christian in his book Can a Darwinian be a Christian? He does not see them as 
mutually exclusive:
Can a Darwinian be a Christian? Absolutely! Is it always easy 
for a Darwinian to be a Christian? No, but whoever said that 
the worthwhile things in life are easy? Is the Darwinian 
obligated to be a Christian? No, but try to be understanding 
of those that are. Is the Christian obligated to be a Darwinian? 
No, but realize how much you are going to foreswear if  you do 
not make the effort, and ask yourself seriously (if you reject 
all forms of evolutionism) whether you are using your God-given 
talents to the full.53
Ruse speaks for Christianity when he shows that there is no conflict between religion 
and science: Darwinism does not entail atheism. However, his defence of Christianity 
against scientific atheism could be one that could be used for all religions and for any 
teleological philosophy.
52 Dawkins, R. The Blind Watchmaker. New  York: Norton, 1986. p. 6.
53 Ruse, 2001. op. c it p. 217.
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Science is wary of teleological explanations because these types of 
explanations take us into the realm of speculative metaphysics which is a highly 
uncertain area of knowledge. However, science itself is not adverse to highly 
speculative theories, for example string theory or theories that rely on multiple 
universes.
In environmental philosophy we are concerned about giving value to nature.
A non-teleological explanation, as science offers today, cannot give value to nature, 
but a teleological explanation can. The problems of the environment have forced us to 
re-examine our place within nature. We can no longer be complacent about ourselves 
and our intellectual abilities. Environmental philosophy leads us eventually to 
question our very beings. Science cannot give the answers, for it was never the task 
of science to do so. That science works within a non-teleological framework does not 
imply that our understanding of ourselves and the world about us should be within 
that same non-teleological framework. When we are seeking for values we are led to 
a teleological explanation of humans and nature.
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Conclusion
Environmental philosophy prompts questions about value, the nature of our 
being and what we understand to be nature. The deeper level of questioning leads to 
metaphysical problems. In the absence of any formed system of metaphysics, 
environmental philosophy flounders as much as any other area of philosophy today. 
Searching for solutions to problems at a metaphysical level cannot be merely creating 
‘worldviews’: we are concerned with questions about reality. Metaphysics today 
needs to unite the objective and the subjective -  the world that we call ‘nature’ and 
our own experiences within the world. We need to accept a reality that includes the 
objective knowledge from science, as well as other areas of knowledge, and 
subjective experiences that include the religious and spiritual:
The materials with which metaphysical construction can be done 
are not to be lifted directly from science or religion, though both 
are intimately related to the project. These quests for reality are 
of great importance. They each rest on and thematize immense 
foundations of experience of different sorts. Each demands respect: 
science for its explicitness and precision, religion for its qualitative 
depth and pervasive power.1
Although to venture forth into a metaphysical project may be daunting, it cannot be 
overlooked. We require firm foundations in metaphysics if we are to be able to find 
an ethical theory that will give guidance not only to interpersonal actions but also to 
the actions between human and non-human. Knowledge from science is not sufficient 
for this task. There are many areas of human experience that need to be seriously
1 Ferr€, F. Being and Value: towards a constructive postmodern metaphysics. Albany: State 
University o f New York, 1996. p. 378.
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considered and included within a metaphysical system, such as morality, free will, 
purpose and inspiration:
In addition, metaphysical construction needs to be open to other 
forms of experience of all kinds. Moral experience with its great 
intuitions of obligation, responsibility, good, and right, needs to be 
included with respect. Other personal experiences such as freedom 
purpose, love, limits, aspiration, possibility, and creativity are 
resources as well.2
It is not the province of science to explore metaphysical issues, nor can philosophers 
wash their hands of this immense task, or feel a weariness of trying to find a total 
view of reality. Environmental problems require that we seek solutions.
Part of the task of environmental philosophy is to find a theory of value. This 
is only viable if we accept the possibility of objective values which rest on the 
possibility of objective knowledge. I have argued for both in Part III. The success of 
science reaffirms our confidence both in our use of reason and the possibility of 
objective knowledge. Having affirmed our confidence in science we can also be 
certain of other areas of knowledge and our use of reason, as reason is a prerequisite 
for the scientific enterprise. We can then proceed to use our reason in the search for 
objective values. In Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 I showed that a total scientific 
approach to finding value in nature is inadequate and that a postmodern approach 
results in confusion. The metaphysics upon which they rest (although not always 
completely formed) is not sufficient for forming a theory of value, at least not one that 
links humans to nature.
2 Ibid. p. 378.
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Environmental philosophy is also required to give a theory of human nature. 
Postmodernism is against any totalising concept of human nature and so abandons the 
task. A scientific account of human nature omits too much of the important areas of 
human experience. A reductionist explanation of humans reduces many central 
human experiences to mere illusions. Subjective experiences, such as free will, 
responsibility, inspiration and purpose, are not given enough weight within the 
reductionist scientific account. Science can provide valuable information about the 
world and ourselves within it, but it is not the only way of understanding the world. 
Mary Midgley argues against Dawkins’ remark that ‘science is the only way we know 
to understand the real world’ in her book Science and Poetry:
Dawkins makes it plain here that the kind of science he means here 
is essentially just particle physics. But the world which we need to 
understand -  the world we actually live in -  is in the first place a 
perceptual and social world, a turmoil of lights, colours and noises, 
love and hate, danger and hope, friends and enemies, plans and 
despairs. It has to be this kind of world because we are not pure 
observers, but social animals of a particular species.3
A theory of human nature has to take into account the human condition and the social 
situations in which we find ourselves. It also needs to account for our fears and 
hopes, our dreams and aspirations. Much of the human condition is to do with the 
future. We stand in the present, not just formed by the past events, but with an 
awareness of the future and what we expect and wish from it. We have goals given to 
us (‘do well in your school exams’) or we form them for ourselves (‘I want a good, 
fulfilling career’). These goals give us purposes to be fulfilled and influence our 
every waking hours. If is not from where we have come that so engages us but where
3 Midgley, M. Science and Poetry. London: Routledge, 2001. p. 141.
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we are going. The individual who does not have goals and purposes (even if they are 
ones imposed upon a person), falls into depression or, at least, is motivated by little. 
Both the Ultra-Darwinian account of human nature and the postmodern approach to 
human nature lack the acknowledgement of the importance of the future to humans. 
They are historical accounts, whether in terms of evolutionary theory or in terms of 
cultural and political movements. I showed in Part II how the combination of these 
two types of historical account of human nature leads to human inertia. A theory of 
human nature, particularly when we are concerned about the future of the planet, 
needs to include human goals and purposes.
Andrew Brennan first stipulated that environmental philosophy requires a 
theory of nature, and that a theory of nature, a theory of human nature and a theory of 
value should all be linked. In ancient philosophy there were two major explanations 
of nature: teleological and non-teleological, as I briefly outlined in Part I.
Teleological explanations are found in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, as well 
as in the philosophy of the Stoics. The teleological explanation gained strength under 
Christianity throughout the medieval period. There were also non-teleological 
explanations of nature in the ancient world which were eventually most fully formed 
in the philosophy of the Epicureans. Non-teleological explanations regained 
credibility after the rise of science as they fitted well with the exclusion of final 
causes from science. Teleological explanations were eventually only accepted by 
those who had religious beliefs.
However, non-teleological explanations of nature have problems in finding 
value for nature as well as not adequately linking humans to nature. The non- 
teleological explanations in science regard humans as entirely a part of nature and that 
humans can be explained in objective terms much like any other part of nature. This
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means that some fundamental areas of human experience are not accounted for and 
values are reduced to subjective experiences. Science-informed environmental 
philosophy seeks to find value by means of ‘intrinsic value’, a value that nature has in 
itself. However, the term ‘intrinsic value’ is a confusing one. It can only be credible 
from the subjective perspective of the valuing individual, where the individual can 
claim ‘I have value for myself. Thus the term can be applied to humans (subjective 
experiencing individuals) but it becomes difficult to apply it to non-humans when we 
see no evidence of the same level of self-awareness as there is in humans except in 
some of the more sentient non-humans. Intrinsic value admits of no degrees and it 
would be difficult for humans to live at all if everything of nature possessed intrinsic 
value. The only way to redeem ‘intrinsic value’ within nature would be to hold that 
there was a God that valued each and every part of His creation for itself.
Non-teleological explanations often give a description of nature as harsh and 
cruel. As Dawkins says in answer to the theories of Ashley Montagu and Lorenz:
Unlike both of them, I think ‘nature red in tooth and claw’ sums
up our modem understanding of natural selection admirably.4
Humans, being a part of nature, are then required to pursue their own individual 
survival and well-being as the most rational thing to do. The Epicureans of the ancient 
world encouraged individuals to take care of themselves rather than be concerned 
about the political and social problems of the day. The following passage from 
Lucretius, a disciple of Epicurus, sums up the Epicurean attitude:
4 Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene. London: Granada, 1978. p. 2.
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What joy it is, when out at sea the stormwinds are lashing the 
waters, to gaze from the shore at the heavy stress some other 
man is enduring! Not that anyone’s afflictions are in themselves 
a source of delight; but to realize from what troubles you yourself 
are free is joy indeed. What joy, again, to watch opposing hosts 
marshalled on the field of battle when you have yourself no part 
in their peril! But this is the greatest joy of all; to possess a quiet 
sanctuary, stoutly fortified by the teaching of the wise, and to gaze 
down from that elevation on others wandering aimlessly in search of 
a way of life, pitting their wits one against the other, disputing for 
precedence, struggling night and day with unstinted effort to scale 
the pinnacles of wealth and power. O joyless hearts of men! O minds 
without vision! How Dark and dangerous the life in which this tiny 
span is lived away! Do you not see that nature is barking for two 
things only, a body free from pain, a mind released from worry and 
fear for the enjoyment of pleasurable sensations.5
In the face of all the cruelties of life, the Epicureans extolled the virtues of the 
individual pursuing his own life free of pain. For the Epicureans a natural life was one 
without pain and therefore the individual’s only concern was to seek a life of 
tranquillity, free from the concerns of the world. There are certain parallels between 
the lifestyle encouraged by the Epicureans and the lifestyles fashionable today under 
the influence of an extreme form of Darwinism (echoing the Social Darwinism of 
Spencer) and postmodernism. Both sociobiology and postmodernism promote 
individualism. The emphasis is on the individual who pursues his/her own lifestyle 
Liberty and the rights of the individual are the main political and social concerns. 
Since the 1970’s (and before) the western world has been an individualistic one. The 
central role of the individual and the individual’s lifestyle has fed the consumer 
society, a fractured society that is given full support by the media and politicians in 
order that big businesses can flourish. The corollary of an individualistic society is the 
undermining of communities and socialist political movements. It is not a society
5 Lucretius. On the Nature o f  the Universe. Translated by R. E. Latham. Revised with an introduction 
and noted by John Godwin. London: Penguin Books, 1994. p. 38.
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which can bring about motivation for solving environmental problems. Buying 
‘green’ becomes another fashionable trend to put money into the enterpriser’s pocket. 
What is required for an environmental movement is that humans recognize their 
dependence on one another and their dependence on nature. This would require a 
global community, one in which the poverty of the nations outside the west would be 
of more concern than the convenience of using a personal vehicle for getting to work.
Teleological explanations underlie the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and 
the Stoics. The assumption in these philosophies, although they differ from one 
another in several ways, is that the universe is an orderly structure. The notion of 
order is combined with the notion of goal and purpose. Humans are rational creatures 
who by use of reason can discover the underlying order. Logos, reason or law, is 
important in Stoic philosophy. The Stoics posited a cosmic principle that was not 
only intelligible but also intelligent. Of much importance today for environmental 
philosophy is the Stoic’s idea that all things are interdependent. In Stoicism to be a 
good and happy man is to be related in a certain way to Nature or God. Although the 
individual is not forgotten in these systems of thought, the emphasis is more on the 
place of the individual within the whole society and also nature. Each individual has 
a purpose within the whole system and is a necessary component in the successful 
functioning of every area of human activity. This gives the individual certain 
responsibilities. Christianity and other major religions present a similar call on the 
individual to take a responsible role within society. In Stoic philosophy co-operation 
is emphasized as the key to human relationships:
The Stoic philosophy of Nature provides a cosmic orientation 
for personal identity which far from neglecting human relationships 
makes them implicit in life according to reason. ‘We have come
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into being for co-operation’. (Marcus).6
Certainly if we are to solve the problems of the environment humans will need to be 
motivated to co-operate.
A teleological explanation of nature, particularly one within the Christian 
faith, emphasizes the beauty and goodness of nature. Alister McGrath refers to the 
sense of wonder that a Christian experiences when observing nature;
One of the central themes of Christian theology is that the 
creation bears witness to its creator: ‘the heavens declare 
the glory of the Lord!’ (Psalm 19:1). For Christians to 
experience the beauty of creation is a sign or pointer to the 
glory of God, and is to be particularly cherished for this reason.7
As the first part of my thesis revealed, Christians have had a tradition of perceiving 
nature as a bountiful gift from God.
Although I neither wish to endorse wholly the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle 
and the Stoics (I would, for example, question the determinism within Stoicism), nor 
any religion, I have come to the conclusion that teleological explanations of nature 
have certain advantages over non-teleological explanations of nature within 
environmental philosophy. Teleological explanations can successfully link a theory 
of nature, a theory of human nature and a theory of value. The emphasis on the future 
in teleological explanations can give humans a moral direction to care for nature for 
the future good of both humans and nature. Teleological explanations also provide
6 Long, A. A. Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. 2nd edition. London: Duckworth, 
1986. p. 163.
7 McGrath, A. Dawkins ’ God: genes, memes, and the meaning o f  life. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2005. p. 149.
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strong motivation for people to act because they emphasize the individual’s purpose 
within the striving for the good of all.
Environmental philosophers have argued that humans once lived in harmony 
with nature in some ‘Golden Age’, but that this harmonious relationship has been lost. 
I argued at the beginning of my thesis that harmony never existed between humans 
and nature, neither is it in nature itself. But humans have a concept of order and 
harmony and these concepts are strong in teleological explanations. The attainment 
of harmony between humans and nature is the future towards which humans should 
strive, for what we require at the moment is that we reach a balance between 
ourselves and nature. The knowledge we gain through science combined with the 
insights that religion and philosophy bring can help us towards understanding what 
we should do in our relationship to nature to attain that harmony. This may require 
control of nature to a certain extent, but we should also seek the wisdom to know 
when it is best to allow nature to be left outside our control. The concept of future 
harmony can give the guideline for how we should value nature. Each part of nature 
will be seen to have a function and purpose towards that goal of harmony. Thus trees 
have value because their function and purpose is to keep the balance between carbon 
dioxide and oxygen in the atmosphere; bees and other insects have value for the 
function and purpose of pollinating plants; flies and other creatures have value for 
their function and purpose of decomposing of waste matter; and many other creatures 
and plants will be found to have important purposes to keep the balance of an 
ecosystem.
A part of the future harmony will be that humans should live together in co­
operation and not in competition with one another, as well as not over-exploiting 
nature. Humans have the purpose of understanding nature, to perceive what is good
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and what is bad in nature, and for acting as stewards towards nature. The tradition of 
stewardship fits well into a teleological explanation, as indeed it was within a 
teleological explanation that the concept of stewardship was first formed. Science 
can provide the information of what we require from nature for our own well-being, 
and philosophy and religion can provide the deeper metaphysical structures in which 
humans can find the motivation to co-operate with one another.
Philippa Foot in her book Natural Goodness argues for natural goodness from 
‘Aristotelian necessities’:
These ‘Aristotelian necessities’ depend on what the particular species 
of plants and animals need, on their natural habitat, and the ways of 
making out that are in their repertoire. These things together 
determine what it is for members of a particular species to be as 
they should be, and to do that which they should do. And for all 
the enormous differences between the lives of humans and of plants 
or animals, we can see that human defects and excellence are
o
similarly related to what human beings are and what they do.
Human beings are valuing creatures who live in social situations and who need a 
healthy environment and a fruitful nature. We are beings that are as much, or even 
more, concerned about our futures as of our pasts: we are motivated by goals and 
seek purposes in life. When we seek a metaphysical basis for environmental 
philosophy we need to consider the importance of meaning and purpose in people’s 
lives. The major religions have always been concerned with this larger metaphysical 
picture. A metaphysical basis for an environmental philosophy requires that 
knowledge both from science and religion should be included in the account. 
Concerns about nature promote the deeper reflections on what humans are and what
8 Foot, P. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. p. 15.
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role they have towards nature. Without people having a sense that they are part of a 
larger whole they will not be motivated to care for nature.
In conclusion, we need to hold to the clarity of our reason and the possibility 
that through our reason we can obtain objective knowledge and objective values. Only 
in that way can we underpin our scientific knowledge (including evolutionary theory 
and the solving of the problems in quantum physics) as well as guarantee that it is 
possible for us to discover objective moral values that are true for all people for all 
time. These moral truths will not only be about the way we should behave towards 
one another, but also about the way we should behave towards nature. The concepts 
of order and harmony can guide us.
The future may look bleak to some with the present political upheavals and the 
increasing environmental disasters. But the Epicurean way of seeking our own 
tranquillity within a disturbing situation would be disastrous. Rather we should 
accept our role as that part of nature that can rise above our own individual comforts 
and our own wish for individual survival. We should understand ourselves as a part 
of a global community in which each of us has a part to play, sharing similar values, 
to bring about peace and harmony with one another and with nature.
In the past two hundred years or so, we have steadily moved towards non- 
teleological explanations of nature and ourselves. With the deeper reflection that has 
been brought about from trying to find value for nature and how to motivate people to 
care for nature, it may be time to reverse that process of thought. A re-examination of 
teleological explanations may be the way to go in order to link together a theory of 
nature, a theory of human nature and a theory of value.
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